Cmde C Uday Bhaskar (retd.), speaks with Col Anil Bhat (retd.) on '25 years since the Kargil confrontation: Have we learnt any lessons?' | SAM Conversation
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00:00Welcome to SAM Conversation, a program of South Asia Monitor. It is our pleasure to
00:15welcome Commodore Uday Bhaskar, looking at 25 years of the Kargil conflict, loosely referred
00:23to as the Kargil War. It was in the Kargil War. I say that this is the fourth India-Pakistan
00:28war continuing since the late 1970s, 70s, 80s, late 1970s, and continuing where Kargil
00:37was an intensification from May till July 1999. We were, I think, only about at least
00:46eight months late in reacting to the war when we did in May 1999. Preparation for this Pakistan
00:53Army's misadventure, whatever, at Kargil was easily maybe a year older because they
00:59raised 12 battalions of the Northern Light Infantry specifically for Kargil. When India
01:07was celebrating 50 years of independence and the armed forces were looking at 50 years
01:12of their existences, you know, the Army, Navy, Air Force of independent India. In August
01:181997, Pakistan Army bombarded the, they made the attempt to try and cut off Kargil. And
01:27there was some traffic which, moving on it, which was, you know, targeted, which got targeted
01:35and it got reported by the Kashmir, media in Kashmir. Then there was diary of a Lieutenant
01:43Majullah Khan Sumbal, which was, which came into the hands of Indian Army personnel and
01:49which the Army headquarters made copies of. And a lot of us got, got hold of that. This
01:54here's an officer of the Pakistan Army who was deputed to one of the battalions of the
01:59Northern Light Infantry and reported there in December 1998. And the Northern Light Infantry
02:07was raised. I don't think there's any doubt that it was raised as cannon fodder. It was
02:11a largely non-Sunni force of eight major groups, Baltis, Shins, Yashkuns, Mughals, Kashmiris,
02:19Pathans, Ladakhis and Turks. 49% Shias, 23% Ismailis, 10% Noorbakhshis, only 18% were
02:29Sunni. 55% of these are from the Gilgit region. 35% of them were from the Baltistan region. And
02:37they were launched to try to capture Kargil, Drass and Batalik. And when the Indian Army
02:46reacted in May, this force was well deployed in Sangars or fortifications, bunkers. The heights
02:56were very, very steep. And the Indian Army paid a very dear price by way of fatal casualties.
03:05The bravest of actions by Indian Army soldiers and junior leaders. Bravest of actions. I mean,
03:16that's nothing new. And then this, what do you call it? It's an intelligence failure. And it's
03:24also maybe a little bit of shutting of the eyes by the brass to certain developments on the ground.
03:32But then we do learn about 21 years later, 2020 at Galwan, there's a reputation by the,
03:44you know, this time by the Chinese. And then 25 years later now, we have for the past month
03:50in Jammu and Kashmir, we are seeing an unprecedented, unprecedented renewal of
03:59terrorism where almost back to back we've had about 20 incidents in that many days.
04:06Governor Uday Bhaskar has commented a lot. I've heard him. I look forward to share his thoughts.
04:15Please. Thank you, Anil. First of all, for inviting me to have this conversation with you.
04:21And you have given a very detailed background to the genesis of Kargil and
04:29where we are 25 years later. And if we were to reflect on the lessons learned and the issues
04:38that we should be focusing on, I think what stands out, and you have made reference to that particular
04:45aspect, is the sheer valor and gallantry of the Indian Forge, particularly those who were in the
04:55ground zero, which was at heights in the Himalayan peaks that were completely unprecedented.
05:01We are talking of peaks that are between 13,000, 14,000 and going all the way up to perhaps even
05:0716,000 feet. And to conduct those operations with the kind of information, material resources,
05:17and preparation that they had was a very daunting task. When it began, it seemed near impossible.
05:26And that, I think, is the unparalleled valor and gallantry of the Indian soldier that they
05:32were able to retrieve the situation for India. Because if the Pakistani plan had succeeded,
05:39the one which had been secretly planned by General Musharraf, perhaps even from the time when he was
05:46the DGMO, from what you have recounted, I think this is the shining feature of the Kargil War
05:56that 25 years later, we should pay tribute and acknowledge
06:03the supreme sacrifice made by 527 bravehearts. And let us also not forget
06:10the more than thousands who were previously injured and even today bear the scars of that war.
06:18And of course, the families who lost their loved ones. If you can think of the young soldier,
06:23the young officer, who would have perhaps been raising their families, those children
06:33would have little memory perhaps of their fathers. And today they would be in their late 20s,
06:40if not early 30s. And I think it is to those that our hearts go out at this point in time,
06:46because this is one of those cruel aspects of any war, that on occasions like this,
06:52the families are remembered, those who are wounded are remembered, but very soon they are forgotten.
06:59So I think it's very important to underline this human aspect and salute the bravehearts and
07:07offer solace to the families. That having been said, I think we should also look at the
07:14systemic or institutional lessons that should be drawn. And here again, I'm picking up from two of
07:21the points that you made. The first, of course, is the intelligence lapse, as it is being referred to.
07:28Now, over the years, I think every year, you and I have both been students of that war,
07:33going back to our days in the IDSA and subsequently in other fora. And every year, my own reading is
07:42that we get to know a little more about the war because of some disclosure, some personal account,
07:49something that has appeared perhaps in the international media and so on, so on,
07:53journals and so on. So the distillation of all of this is that, yes, there was indeed an intelligence
08:00lapse. And how and where this lapse happened, I think is something that we need to look at
08:07objectively. You will recall that General Nirmal Vij, the former army chief, who was the director
08:14general military operations during the Kargil war, had authored a book, Alone in the Ring.
08:20The media had carried some excerpts of that book. And one of them, the excerpts that I saw, I think
08:26all of us have seen, spoke about the R&AW, Research and Analysis Wing, and that they were not able to
08:34provide whatever inputs the army could have acted on, is what General Vij has said. Now, that book
08:41is currently on hold. The government has apparently said it has to be vetted before release,
08:46which means that we do not even now, 25 years later, first of all, have an official version
08:51of that war. It's not even published. I gather it's still being vetted or it's the final stage.
08:59And the second is somebody like the DGMO, who would have had the overall 360-degree perspective
09:04sitting in Delhi of that war, his account is also not available to us. So I think this is unfortunate.
09:11But it does point to what I would call as not taking ownership of the lapsus. Meaning,
09:20if you remember, the reason why I'm making this observation is that
09:25when the Kargil war happened, soon after July 26, Kargil divested when the war formally ended,
09:36then Prime Minister Vajpayee, who incidentally was a caretaker Prime Minister,
09:42had what I would call as the courage and the integrity to set up a review committee to look
09:47into why Kargil had happened, because Kargil was a fiasco. It caught the Indian entire security
09:54apparatus, the armed forces, the intelligence agencies, and everyone who contributes to
09:59the management of national security, were caught napping. I mean, that is my rather stark
10:06reduction of what happened. And again, you were right when you pointed out
10:10that this happened in October 1962, when the Chinese, quote unquote, surprise India.
10:18It happened in Kargil in the summer of 1999. It happened in 2008, when Mumbai was attacked
10:29by a terror group. And alas, I think to our shame, in 2020 in Galwan, we were talking about
10:39the Indian units being surprised. So, there is a systemic issue here. And Prime Minister Vajpayee,
10:46when he set up the task force, had encouraged them to look at the issues that led to Kargil
10:53war or the lapses that led to the Kargil war. And in that particular Kargil review committee report,
10:59yes, intelligence lapses were identified. And I think there is some detail about
11:04how the army had perhaps not done its own due diligence based on all the inputs it has received.
11:12And again, most recent revelations are that of a major during the Kargil war, if I remember right,
11:19he was five para, has filed a case in the court in which he has charged General Ved Malik,
11:28the army chief at that time on the intelligence lapse issue. Now, we are analysts. And if we
11:35look back, I would say that one of the lessons that needs to be learned, and which has not been
11:40learned, is setting right the intelligence inadequacy. And I want to add here that Prime
11:48Minister Vajpayee did something unprecedented, which is that the Kargil review committee was
11:54commissioned in the end of July, within days of the war ending. And Mr. K Subramanian, you'll
12:01remember, former director of the IDSA, illustrious security director of India, he was the chairman of
12:07the committee, we had Lieutenant General Hazari, the former vice chief of the army, Mr. George
12:12Varghese, the celebrated journalist, and Mr. Satish Chandra, the diplomat, who was, if I
12:17remember right, was the deputy national security advisor at that time. They completed this report
12:24in record time. If you look at the published version on December 15, you have the four
12:30members signing that particular report and submitting it. And to his credit, Mr. Rajesh
12:35Mishra, the national security advisor to Prime Minister Vajpayee, allowed most of the report to
12:43be placed in the public domain in the form of a book. And furthermore, and this I think is a very
12:49interesting part that has perhaps not received adequate notice, within months, by the time we
12:56come to early 2000, Prime Minister Vajpayee sets up a group of ministers. If you remember, the
13:02cabinet committee on security at that time was Prime Minister Vajpayee, Defense Minister George
13:06Fernandez, Finance Minister Yashwant Singh, and External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha,
13:13eminent cabinet ministers who were part of Mr. Vajpayee's CCS. The group of ministers was
13:20constituted, if I remember right, in April. And they were, in turn, asked to make recommendations
13:27about how do we implement and ensure that the system is corrected for policy and systemic and
13:33structural changes. And again, to their credit, we must top our hat, the group of ministers
13:39deliberated and decided to set up four task forces. Again, I'm repeating what perhaps you
13:44know very well, and many of the others who have been following this more closely. Four task forces
13:50were set up. One, to look at the rewiring of higher defense management of the country.
13:56The second was intelligence. The third was border management, because there was
14:03an acknowledgement that India's borders need to be reviewed holistically. And finally,
14:08internal security, because Kargil was also part of the proxy war, the one that you referred to,
14:13and impacting India's internal security. These four task forces were set up, again,
14:19if I remember right, in April. And they were given three months to four months to complete
14:24their work. And look at the people who were appointed to head these task forces.
14:29Crossing the political divide, Mr. Vajpayee as prime minister, invites Mr. Arun Singh,
14:36who if you remember, was a former minister of defense. In the Rajiv Gandhi cabinet,
14:42he is invited to head the defense reforms, defense management task force. And the other three chairs,
14:50if I remember right, are Mr. Madhav Godbole, a very eminent civil servant, a home secretary.
14:56Mr. N. N. Vora, another civil servant, home secretary, defense secretary,
15:01man of enormous experience. And the last task force was Mr. Gary Saxena. G. C. Saxena was a
15:09former DGBSF, very illustrious IPS officer. And all these task forces submitted their reports,
15:16you have a GOM task force report, group of ministers report. It's again in the public
15:21domain in a redacted form. And we had a blueprint to proceed on all four tracks.
15:29And this to me is the biggest lesson, which was not learned after the end of the Kargil war,
15:36that none of the recommendations that were identified were reviewed, deliberated upon,
15:42and taken to their logical conclusion. As an analyst, I say with regret, India as a nation,
15:51the government of India, whoever be the Prime Minister, has not been able to take forward
15:59a very important task initiated by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. That I'm sorry,
16:04I took so long, but I thought I should leave it for the context.
16:07On the nail, on many, many issues, what is further lamentable is that it's not that we
16:20lack technology today, but it seems that now take, for instance, the
16:26IIB, the Research and Analysis Wing, and even the Army Intelligence, they still seem to be
16:40on their separate turfs. They don't seem to be converging at times when it's so vital to do so.
16:49And I feel that there have been instances where they've been sitting on gold mines of information.
16:59No, no, you're absolutely right. Let me add here that if you look back from Mr. Vajpayee's
17:06tenure as Prime Minister to where we are now with Prime Minister Modi in the chair,
17:10to his credit, the Modi government in the last five years, in the tenure from 2019 to 2020,
17:18before took a radical decision to perhaps take the first step, which is when they looked at
17:27the need to rewire the higher defense management. And the first CDS for India, General Bipin Rawat
17:34was appointed. And I think we all applauded at that time saying that perhaps this is the beginning
17:39of the major structural reforms. But when I look back, I would say it was an important step.
17:47And the CDS was also given the status within the Ministry of Defense as the Secretary of the BMA,
17:53the Department of Military Affairs. And there was talk about setting up the theater commands.
17:59But from then to now, I repeat this point, it's been very uneven. And yes, it's a tragedy that
18:04General Rawat died in that helicopter crash. And subsequently, as I said, I only at this
18:11stage say that at least there has been some progress in trying to do the defense reforms
18:16within the military, which is CDS and theaterization, and perhaps the other steps will
18:21follow. But I think the biggest lapse has been intelligence, as you have pointed out, which is
18:25that despite the fact that intelligence lapses have bedevilled the Indian system from October
18:301962 to Galwan, perhaps, you know, one can say that even more recently, what has been happening
18:36in Jammu is a case of a different kind of intelligence inadequacy, that we've had so
18:43many challenges. And this is where I think the government of the day has been very hesitant,
18:49very reticent, to embark on the intelligence reforms that India needs so urgently. And I
18:55think even now, if you look at the verticals, which is the R&AW, the Research and Analysis Wing,
19:01the IB, the Intelligence Bureau, and all the others that have been created,
19:05for instance, within the armed forces, we have the three Army, Navy, Air Force Intelligence,
19:09the DIA, which is part of the IDS headquarters. So they're all different verticals.
19:15Their integration, and whatever had been recommended, is still on hold. And I think
19:21the biggest, again, I say this, I'm trying to say this as objectively as I can, that there seems to
19:27be a resistance to reform. And this, again, is perhaps, you know, inexplicable at one level,
19:33because in the last 20 years, we have had two very
19:40highly rated officers from the IPS in the chair of the National Security Advisor,
19:45Mr. M.K. Narayanan, if you remember, a former DIB, Director of the IB, the Intelligence Bureau,
19:51was the NSA, to Dr. Manmohan Singh. Now, we have Mr. Ajit Doval, who's very well regarded
19:58in his own domain. He has been NSA for 10 years. Yet, there has been no attempt, because my personal
20:05view, and I think many others share this, we need a more, you know, we need sunshine, we need to
20:12illuminate what is happening in the intelligence sector, like in any democracy, bring in a
20:17parliamentary kind of committee, if you want to, to review and get lateral talent. Lateral talent
20:23is not coming in. So I think the IPS, so I mean, I said that reform is very urgent, very critical.
20:29And that has not happened. Perhaps in the interest of time, we cannot go elsewhere. But if you were
20:34to ask me as concluding thoughts, the one single issue, which I think the Kargil war has in a way,
20:42highlighted is the need for intelligence reforms. And that has not happened. And both the
20:48parliamentary oversight, and the need for lateral induction and the use of technology, which you
20:53have also noted, are critical elements. Hopefully, Modi 3.0 would be able to look at this in a
21:02focused way. Uday Bhaskar, you've thrown light on so many issues. In fact, we're a little strapped
21:12for time. Otherwise, there's so much more that we can, I know, I've heard you speak on other
21:22networks and programs. And there's so much one has in one's own
21:33records and writings. All we can do is hope and pray that there's a tremendous amount of talent.
21:44And it should be, we've done these surgical strikes. These were a series of very, very,
21:57very well coordinated special operations over a distance of 250 kilometers, nine locations,
22:04which were dealt with in the middle of the night. Hats off. Balakot, again, an excellent example of
22:14an air force operation of pinpoint. But you can't just use these as technology demonstrators. If
22:22these are repeated, I think you will agree, sir, that I think the terrorism that is being
22:33supported, directed and produced from Pakistan may actually get, it may start hurting them,
22:40hurting Pakistan army. If we react each time to each attack, as we have the capability of doing.
22:54Thank you very much, Commander Uday Bhaskar.
22:59Look forward for some more in the future.
23:04Thank you. Bye.