Col Rajinder Singh Kushwaha (retd.), formerly of Bihar Regiment that lost 20 soldiers at Galwan in 2020, speaks with Col Anil Bhat (retd.) on why China cannot be trusted | SAM Conversation
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00:00Welcome to Siam Conversation, a program of South Asia Monitor. It's time, 62 years after
00:16the Chinese regression of 1962 October, that we look back in the light of a number of comments
00:27and issues that have come up. We like to welcome Colonel Rajendra Singh Pushwaha, who has written
00:38and commented a lot on whatever is going on, particularly since the Galwan incident, that
00:46is the second aggression in 2020 June. He commanded the 3rd battalion, the Bihar Regiment
00:57and he was one of the first to come up with the facts about what happened in Galwan on the
01:09fateful night of 15-16 June 2020. First thing I think we need to recall is the events of pre-1962,
01:24the run-up to the 1962 India-China war. Colonel Pushwaha, what would you mention as the sparking
01:36point? Anil, thank you very much. You have invited me to give my opinion on as to what
01:45happened before the 1962 war took place. Before I start off, there are certain things we must
01:51understand. There are two things. First, from 1950 to 1955-56, India's pro-China policy,
02:00thereafter from 1955-62 till the 1962 war happened, there was an anti-China policy. So,
02:10the duplicity we have to understand to understand as to why the war took place in 1962 and what
02:16were the reasons. Briefly, if you could please. Yeah. So, I'll come to you. Firstly, we must
02:22the two Asian giants, India and China, they are not complementary countries because one side,
02:33they said totalitarian government since 1949 when China became independent and Indian side,
02:40it was a democracy since 1947. And Chinese geography is about, the area is 9.7 million
02:50kilometers whereas India is one third of it, somewhere about 3.27 million kilometers. So,
02:58there was a mismatch between India and China in 1947-49 onwards. However, in 49 when China
03:07became independent or the communists came to power in China, that time the Indian economy
03:13was better, Indian military was better than the Chinese. Over a period of time, since 1950
03:22onwards, China got involved in certain wars like Korean War or taking over certain territories.
03:35At that particular time, Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru who was the Prime Minister of India,
03:41he had a special liking for China. And you'll see that he was of the opinion that if India
03:55has to progress and develop, then it has to be a friendly relation with China. And that is why
04:02some of these actions, as I spoke to you, when China occupied Tibet in 1950, Jawaharlal Nehru
04:11went ahead and supported China. Though, at that time Deputy Prime Minister before his death,
04:18Sardar Patel on 17 December 1950, he had opposed this. He had advised Nehru not to do it. He said
04:27that China will ultimately be our enemy. But Nehru overruled because he was a very tall figure and
04:36Sardar Patel who could question him, he had died by 1950, 1951 beginning. So, therefore,
04:44there was nobody to check Nehru as to whatever he wanted to do. He was such a towering figure
04:50at that particular time. Now, certain things that China occupied Tibet because of the reason
04:58that it thought that it was a Chinese territory ruled by the Qing dynasty since 17th century,
05:071644 to 1912. Surprisingly, just a bit of information for you, for all others who will
05:17be listening to me that Xinjiang province, first by known as East Turkmenistan was once
05:26an Indian tributary state during Mahabharata period. It was called as Uttarakuru. But China
05:35occupied in 1951 and this was accepted by Nehru. When India got independence, Britishers left.
05:43That time the Indian boundary with Tibet was undefined. Britishers had from time to time
05:51earmarked certain lines which they occupied because of Russian invasion from the expansion
05:59from that side in that order. So, there were boundaries between India and Tibet were not
06:06defined. From time to time, they kept on drawing lines as per their interest. But on the eastern
06:18side, they had an agreement with Tibet government where they had defined the McMahon line along the
06:28watershed which ultimately became in 1962 the major cause of the fight between India and China.
06:36Here I would like to point out that Arunachal Pradesh which is currently the bone of contention
06:44between India and China, it is called in the Chinese parlance as South Tibet. But however,
06:54in 1950, China had no attention towards it and India in 1951 February occupied Tawang which is
07:04also called South Tibet. Point of interest here is that Nehru was so enamoured with China. When
07:13China entered Tibet in 1950, China requested Nehru to give food and rations. Nehru sent
07:2410,000 months or 400 tons of rice for the PLA troops there. So, these are the things when he
07:35was basically trying to be thinking. Actually, Nehru and Gandhi, they were stuck in the
07:47heuristic bug they had. They said peace is the only way they can carry out progress. They were
07:54not very clear on the pragmatic way the world goes around today or even at that particular time. So,
08:03it was Jairam Dalatram, the governor of Assam that time in 1951. He sent Brigadier Major Bob
08:13Cutting. Bob Cutting made 200 men. 200 men he sent to capture. They went and occupied Tawang.
08:20And the Chinese at that particular time didn't object to it. The objection came,
08:30when I come to it, I'll talk about it. Only after 1960. The Chinese did not object. But
08:36Nehru was very unhappy. He expressed his... Nehru was very unhappy. He was scared that
08:44Chinese will do it. But Chinese didn't object. Chinese objection came only after 1960 when
08:50Chao Enlai had come and gone back dejected as the Prime Minister of China had come,
08:561960. He had gone back dejected. Now, Indian border with Tibet was undefined. So,
09:05there was basically these lines were drawn by the Britishers only to keep keeping Russian
09:13expansion in mind. Otherwise, they were not ratified. Even the MacMahon line was not ratified.
09:19The major line which was John Johnson and Ardagh line which was 1865 when he had surveyed and
09:29marked it which included a side chain. This will come out later in our discussion. MacMahon line
09:36was in 1940 with the Shimla Agreement. They had decided with Tibet but it was not ratified either
09:43by Tibet or the Britishers. John Ardagh line was it was established in a earmark by surveyed by
09:52Johnson who was a surveyor of the British Army, British India. So, which included of course,
09:59a side chain. As I said, Nehru's pro-China approach in 1945 because of he had a moralistic
10:06and ethical concern about peace and harmony and not to occupy, not to go out of our borders.
10:14You would know that his famous rebuke to General Roy Butcher when he said,
10:21what we don't need army, we have no enemy. So, that is the kind of attitude he had about himself.
10:27And I already said 400 tons of rice he sent to PLA troops and when the uproar took place in
10:35the parliament in 1951-52, he appointed, a committee was appointed by Minister of State
10:43for Defence Himmat Singh to check as to what can be done to occupy these, I mean to check China.
10:54But that report came out in 1953 and no action was taken. Then again, Lieutenant Kulwant Singh
11:01who was really promoted as level core commander, he was asked to review the borderline between
11:09China and Tibet, Tibet and India. So, therefore, he recommended and in fact, he said that we must
11:21booster up our defences along with Tibet or against China. But nobody listened to him,
11:27that report also went to the deep freezer. But he had, Lieutenant Kulwant had made a statement
11:35that within 5-7 years, India will have a war with China. That was in which year?
11:43He did it in 55. 55, okay. 55, Lieutenant Kulwant Singh, he said India will have a war,
11:50in next 5-7 years, India will have a war with China. But nobody paid any attention and the
11:56Indian army was still left as it is. Now, if you could please come to the stage now where
12:07Nehru is now taking steps which are contrary to, they don't show him as being friendly to China.
12:19Okay, okay, I am coming to that. So, in 1954, he went to Vandu, the Vandu conference took place,
12:31that Panjshir agreement, 5 principles or 5 things were signed with China. When he came back after
12:39Vandu conference and having signed the Panjshir agreement, that is the time he was informed that
12:47China is building or constructing a road from Xinjiang province to Tibet, which is called as
12:53Tibet highway or G219. So, Nehru was unaware of all the geographical features and other things.
12:59So, he said, where is our border? Actually, this information had come to him through IB,
13:08whose chief was Bholanath Malik, who had been IB chief from 1950 up to 1964, as long as Nehru was
13:18the prime minister. 14 years he was the prime minister. 14 years he was the IB chief with Nehru.
13:29So, this information came to him and Nehru was shocked that I am trying to be friendly.
13:34Then he said, please explain to me where are our borders. Then these various lines of the British
13:41line which were drawn, they were explained to him by IB, Intelligence Bureau, IB Malik, BN Malik
13:55and also the army brief name. So, it was suggested to him that Johnson Ardagh line,
14:02which is the first line drawn by Mr. Johnson in 1865, that should be our boundary with Tibet
14:11because that included Aksai Chin. So, therefore, he said, okay, if that is the thing,
14:19this is our boundary, then publish our maps showing this is our boundary. So, 1954-55,
14:27he gave the orders for publication of new maps which showed our boundary with Tibet,
14:36a Johnson Ardagh line. So, then he gave two orders. On the advice of BN Malik, he gave two
14:42orders. First is a republication of the map where he showed the boundary along the Johnson Ardagh
14:49line. Second map, second order he gave of establishing post all along.
14:58Are you referring to the forward posture?
15:01Forward posture all along the boundary.
15:04How many posts?
15:0660 posts were established by 1962.
15:0960 posts, okay. Did the Indian army have the strength to do so?
15:15No, Indian army had actually, while IB was suggesting a forward posture, forward policy,
15:25Indian army led by General Samaya was proposing defense in depth. They did not want to have
15:32posts on the borderline.
15:35Please also clarify, did we have the numerical strength to do so?
15:38No, we didn't have that numerical strength.
15:41We did not, yes.
15:43See, after 1952 report by General Kulwant Singh, then two ITBP was raised and two frontal posts
15:54were created by ITBP or under the Indian border police under BN Malik. And that time Nehru also
16:08ordered that these posts should carry out a forward patrolling. However, in 1959, a
16:17Kanka post incident took place where these ITBP people were massacred. So therefore,
16:24order was given that these posts, ITBP posts should be occupied by the army and army was
16:32to occupy the 60 posts which were created by right up to 1962. Before that in 1950,
16:38Lt. Gen. H.P. Thorat, who was a Western army, Eastern army commander, he suggested certain
16:44things to be done because army is not competent enough to hold all these posts and fight in the
16:52front. So, but BN Malik made a clarification that China will be reluctant to confront India,
17:04will not do anything even if he's in a position to do so. So, it was his messages which were
17:13his ears and Nehru was giving his ears to him, accepting his viewpoints. But army's viewpoint
17:19Nehru was not accepting. So, the defense in depth versus the forward policy. But after Kanka
17:26incident, the forward patrolling by ITBP was stopped and the army moved ahead and occupied
17:34these forward posts. In 1961, 2nd November 1961, I think, in a cabinet meeting once again BN Malik
17:43impressed upon the Prime Minister that we should carry out a forward posting and China will not do
17:49anything. So, it was that the restriction which was laid on forward posting that was lifted.
17:56Now, here comes in one of the post in Eastern sector which is called the Dhola post
18:05was established even before, even ahead of the McMahon line. By 1962, even ahead of the
18:14McMahon line that is even ahead of the accepted border with China, Tibet. On the Ladakh side,
18:23on the western side, another post was created in the Galwan valley. So, Chinese objected to it.
18:30First thing is the Chinese stated that this is the wrong place you have come in because this is
18:39our claim line. So, in July 1962, China had got out this Gurkha post in Galwan valley.
18:55And this post was then kept to the ground against a company post in the Galwan valley by
19:03Gurkha regiment. So, the Indian army sent a column of five-yard regiment to relieve this.
19:12But this was massacred by the Chinese and this column was sent on 6th of October 1962.
19:20Now, on the other side, on the Eastern sector where the Dhola post was there, Chinese
19:25had grouted on 8th of September. Dhola post, 8th of September they grouted and it was
19:33so the army headquarters was sitting in Delhi. And by that time,
19:40General BM Kaul had become the CGS and D. K. Palit, Brigadier D. K. Palit was the DMO.
19:49They gave the order to the people deployed on Dhola, people like General John Dalby's brigade,
19:57they were asked to clear a post 1000 yards northeast of Dhola post. The Chinese post
20:05captured it. So, by 20th October, the stage was set for China to take an event. In between
20:171960, the major causes in 1960, Chinese Prime Minister Chow En-lai had come
20:26and he wanted to settle the border issue. At that particular time, China was prepared to
20:33barter Nepal, South Tibet with India for Aksai Chin. Aksai Chin is an area of roughly about
20:4438,000 kilometers. And if you add 5,180 kilometers in 1961, which was ceded by Pakistan,
20:53it works out to be 43,180 square kilometers. Now, 62 years later, whatever happened then,
21:06is it still affecting us? Yes, because see the problem is…
21:11Briefly you can just bring that out. I will do that. But I thought we'll cover it in part two.
21:18That is what comes out in the Brooks HB report. The Anderson Brooks report.
21:30Anderson Brooks report. Now, you must know what happened in 1960. Chow En-lai had come to sort
21:36out the border. But he wanted to barter Aksai Chin with Nehru, giving him Nepal or what you
21:47call it, Natal Pradesh or South Tibet. He said, you take and let's sort out the border. Nehru
21:52rejected this. And then Mao is said to have told people that let's teach a lesson to Nehru. When
22:03Chow En-lai went back, in fact, this is recorded by Kissinger in his book, in his autobiography,
22:12Mao told him that I want to teach a lesson to Nehru. Nehru was once his great friend
22:18till 1954. And China thought that Nehru is now backing out at the behest of USA. So,
22:27they wanted to teach a lesson to India. So, that is how the war took place. As things stand today,
22:36see the things have, though we are not what we were there in 1962, because our boys fought with
22:45100 rounds and they were all running around. Indian Air Force, I forgot the point, the Indian
22:52Air Force, why wasn't it used? It wasn't used because the IB said, IB again, BN Malik's
23:00assessment was that the terrain is not conducive for the use of Air Force and therefore, we should
23:09not use the Air Force there. And also the second point was that PLA Air Force was much stronger
23:18because they had MiG-19 and MiG-21 at that particular time, very offensive. But the point
23:23is that he did not, neither the Indian Air Force nor him understood that Chinese Air Force had
23:31to operate from mainland China, India, but they had no Air Force. I think we are a little strapped
23:38for time, but the fact remains that 62 years later, there are certain decisions taken then
23:49which are still affecting us very adversely and it now remains to be seen. Yes, one aspect is
23:59that whatever is coming out in the Henderson Brooks report, that should be made, that should
24:06be declassified fully and it now remains to be seen how the government will deal with whatever
24:18incursions that have occurred over the years since 1962 and what was added as a second Chinese
24:27aggression in 2020. See, I like to make a comment here before we get to the Henderson Brooks report.
24:39They say it is leaked out and something and Maxwell had made certain observation on this
24:47in his book India-China War. One thing is the Henderson Brooks report is in two parts. Part
24:56one has got four chapters. Part two is hardly anything. It is the lessons learned, tactical
25:01lessons. Basically, the thing which is going against the whole thing, publication of this
25:09Henderson Brooks report is part four, where damning remarks have been made by the report
25:16where it blames not Indian Army, not the government, but the intelligence agency which
25:24probably is manipulated by the foreign intelligence agencies. That is why this report
25:31is not being declassified with the Indian Army by the government of India. That is the main reason
25:37and I probably feel that part four is a must and we require a truth commission. India should ask
25:46for a truth commission as to what exactly had happened because we don't know. We are only
25:51blaming the Indian Army. We are only blaming the government of that time, but we don't understand
25:59the role played by the intelligence agency to provoke this war. Particularly, IB at that
26:05particular time, India had no other intelligence agency other than IB and this IB was only for
26:13internal information, internal intelligence, not for external intelligence. Now, as coming to your
26:19question, one minute I'll take. So, what exactly is the position? We should know in 1967 at the
26:25Nathula Pass, Chinese were plastered very badly and therefore, they had to run for their lives.
26:34Then again in 1987, they suffered the same humiliation. Again, come back to Galwan in
26:4415 June 2020, though they haven't disclosed their casualties, but they are much more. As
26:50for the Russian and the Americans, the casualty of Zainab was 160. They are much more than 43,
26:55they may go up to over 100 even. 100. So, therefore, Indian Army is not what it was in 1962
27:05when our boys fought in the winters of December. They fought in OG clothes and
27:13jungle boots in the area of the snow and 100 rounds each man had on him. Today, it's entirely
27:19a different thing. In defensive position, yes, we are going to give them a very bad time to Chinese
27:27if they try to do anything. In offensive role, probably we may not be that good at the moment.
27:36And that is why we need to, but China has built, you know, thereafter China has created a lot of
27:43facilities which we haven't done all along our border. We kept on the government which
27:50before the present government, they have been saying not to do anything on the border because
27:57Chinese will make use of it. And that is why our mobility and our deployment of forces was a
28:04problem which the work has started now. Thank you very much, K. Gutwaha, for all the inputs
28:12that you brought out. Look forward for another session on Henderson Brooks report, certainly
28:21at some stage if it can be, you know, we must hope for it to be declassified. Thank you very much.
28:34Okay. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Anant. Thank you.