China’s military conducted a round of what it called punishment operations around Taiwan in May in response to President Lai Ching-te's inauguration speech. Does this set the tone for cross-strait relations over the next four years?
On this episode of Zoom In Zoom Out, Jaime Ocon sits down with Thomas Shattuck, senior program manager at Perry World House, a policy research center at the University of Pennsylvania. We first zoom in on China’s “Joint Sword-2024A” drills, then zoom out for a broader look at Beijing’s economic and political response to Lai’s inauguration.
On this episode of Zoom In Zoom Out, Jaime Ocon sits down with Thomas Shattuck, senior program manager at Perry World House, a policy research center at the University of Pennsylvania. We first zoom in on China’s “Joint Sword-2024A” drills, then zoom out for a broader look at Beijing’s economic and political response to Lai’s inauguration.
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00:00Welcome to Zoom In Zoom Out, your global look at news from Taiwan.
00:15I'm Hamilkar.
00:17China conducted a round of military operations around Taiwan, supposedly in response to President
00:22Lai Ching-Teh's inauguration speech.
00:25But guns and ships are only one part of China's intimidation tactics against Taiwan.
00:30To further discuss cross-strait relations under Lai Ching-Teh, we're joined again by
00:33Thomas Shattuck from the University of Pennsylvania's Perry World House.
00:37Thomas, thank you for joining us.
00:38Thanks for having me again.
00:39Well, Thomas, let's just dive right in.
00:42These exercises that we're seeing from China, Joint Sword 2024A, encircled the main island
00:48of Taiwan and also conducted joint patrols in the outlying islands of Jinmen.
00:52But was there anything new from China's capabilities that we saw at this time?
00:56Yeah, I think combining the outlying island drills in addition to surrounding Taiwan island
01:03itself is a new development.
01:05Normally, it's just been the focus on the island of Taiwan surrounding north, south,
01:10east, west, and then leaving the outlying islands kind of alone.
01:13So by adding that element, it is an all of ROC Taiwan simulation.
01:19So that is a new development that hadn't happened in previous years.
01:22It definitely expanded the scope of the zones that surrounded Taiwan compared to previous exercises.
01:29So it does seem like the little blocks are becoming lines, are becoming, I don't know,
01:34other things.
01:35Especially in the southern part of Taiwan, the zone that China announced was quite long,
01:41which is very different than the other spots, and particularly in previous drills of this kind.
01:45So yes, to blockade Taiwan, you need to surround Taiwan, particularly its major port.
01:51So by emphasizing like surrounding the south of Taiwan around Kaohsiung and in the north,
01:55those would be the two key areas where the major ports are to prevent any international
02:00shipping from going in and out.
02:01There was also another section that was to the east of Taiwan in Hualien.
02:06I think it was the closest section to the main island.
02:09Why do you think China did that exercise in that area?
02:11Yeah, so by pushing closer to Hualien, it showed that the PRC was able to move closer
02:17to Taiwan without being pushed back.
02:19It also moved it further outside of any conflict with Japan, which was different from the original
02:25August 2022 drill, which had the intentional overlap.
02:29And according to reporting, Xi Jinping himself approved of the missiles that were fired over
02:33Taiwan should land within the Japanese AEZ.
02:37The other issue that is of importance for the military side is the depth off the coast
02:42of Hualien goes down much quicker and deeper into the ocean.
02:46So that allows for the possibility of submarines being used in a way that is not necessarily
02:50possible or feasible in the Taiwan Strait, possibly harder to detect in Hualien.
02:55But yeah, by moving things closer to Hualien, it sends the message, particularly in an earthquake
03:01struck zone, that you are a target and we're not going to let you recover.
03:05So it's unfortunate that this is that happened very close to Hualien, but you can see the
03:10reasons why China did that sort of thing.
03:12And I think this is a good segue to talk about the previous two exercises in 2023 and 2022.
03:18Were these exercises more escalatory than the ones previously conducted?
03:22I don't think so for two main reasons.
03:26One is they were shorter in length in response to the Pelosi visit in August 2022.
03:31They were much longer.
03:33And getting to the second point, missiles were shot over the island of Taiwan.
03:37This time, no missiles were shot over the island.
03:40So this was much more symbolic, I would say.
03:43This is right after the inauguration.
03:45This was not a snap drill.
03:46This was long prepared, probably the day the president-elect Lai won the election in January.
03:52They knew they were going to do something.
03:53It was just which day of the week after the inauguration they were going to do it.
03:57Granted, the blocks were much larger, but I think that's just kind of picking around
04:02the edges.
04:03Overall, I would say this is less of a significant drill than the post-Pelosi drill and arguably
04:09the Kevin McCarthy-Tsai Ing-wen drill in 2023, which was joint sword.
04:13That one was much more smaller in scale.
04:16And that also had a Coast Guard element to it in the Taiwan Strait.
04:20But besides from announcing that the drill perhaps would have stopped Taiwan flagged
04:26vessels in the central and northern part of the Taiwan Strait, to our knowledge, no
04:31Taiwan vessels were actually stopped by the Chinese Coast Guard.
04:34So that drill in and of itself created a precedent for what then later happened February of this
04:40year with the Jinmen incident, where they did stop a Taiwan flagged vessel.
04:43So I think in the grand scheme of things, this was much more symbolic.
04:48They couched it as a punishment towards Taiwan, punishment towards President Lai for not being
04:53a member of the KMT, punishment for not accepting the 1992 consensus, or frankly mentioning
04:58at all.
05:00So yes, I would say if you were to rank the severity of these, this would probably be
05:04two, maybe three, with the August 2022 drills being the top of the line there.
05:10Looking at the footage and the videos coming out from the exercise we just saw, there was
05:14a pretty big Coast Guard element from both Taiwan and China.
05:18Can you talk a little bit about the significance of blending in both the Coast Guard and military
05:23element from an operational perspective from China?
05:25Yeah, that's a great question.
05:27I think that it's very clear now that the Coast Guard will have the jurisdiction of
05:32the outlying islands theater.
05:34The Navy wasn't really a big part of that.
05:36It seems like the Coast Guard presence around Jinmen is not going away anytime soon.
05:41So it does seem there's a clear division.
05:44China's side of the Taiwan Strait, Coast Guard, again, the islands are probably not really
05:48going to be a major part of a conflict other than pacifying them quickly.
05:52And then the Taiwan side of the Taiwan Strait would be the naval element.
05:56So this is blending not just Navy, not just Army, Air Force.
06:00This is also now bringing in the law enforcement with the Coast Guard, because there is a clear
06:03difference between using the military and using law enforcement.
06:07So this was a unique drill in that regard, and especially how all of the outlying islands
06:12had that Coast Guard presence.
06:13So I think moving forward, we'll see a greater integration of the Coast Guard on the outlying
06:18islands into a lot of these drills.
06:20So I think that's a unique thing to this particular one in 2024.
06:23I think moving forward, if there's a joint sword B through Z, I think we'll see more
06:28Coast Guard involved.
06:32Well, let's zoom out now from the military and look at the broader cross-strait relations
06:36side of it.
06:37Because military operations are not the only thing that China conducts as harassment towards
06:42Taiwan.
06:43There's a lot of carrot and stick policies towards Taiwan from Beijing, and we've seen
06:47President Lai even try his best to extend an olive branch.
06:50Have we seen any carrots coming from Beijing recently?
06:54Not really.
06:55It has been very clear since Lai's inauguration that there's continued to be no interest from
07:02China to engage with Taiwan.
07:04Lai is new into office, he extended his olive branch after the drills, he called for dialogue.
07:09That wasn't reciprocated.
07:11And that's a very clear message that right now they're prioritizing the stick.
07:16The carrots may come, but I think the carrots will come at the subnational level through
07:20engaging with TPP and KMT, particularly KMT held counties and districts.
07:25Beyond that, I don't really see Beijing following with what Lai is hoping for, which is just
07:31some kind of conversation.
07:33The conversations are happening, just not with the TPP.
07:36They're happening with the KMT and with the TPP.
07:39Recently a group of Taiwan legislators actually from the KMT actually were just in China.
07:43What do you make of those exchanges?
07:45I think they're domestically focused to show that they're the party that can actually go
07:51to China and the DPP cannot and has not been able to go for eight years.
07:56But I think that if the KMT really wanted to, though I am doubtful, they could use this
08:03as an opportunity to try to get things a little calmer.
08:08But again, it does seem like between the recent visit to China, what's going on in the LY,
08:13plus the recent visit by the KMT to Taiping Island, they're using this as a way to show
08:18that the DPP cannot engage with China, the DPP is not willing to protect ROC sovereignty
08:24as far as in the South China Sea, and the KMT is not interested in compromising or cooperating
08:30with the DPP now that it is in the minority and doesn't have the ability to push forth laws.
08:36The KMT now has power back, it has a good partner in the TPP, so there's really not
08:41much that the KMT is willing to do to throw the DPP a bone, particularly when it comes
08:46with China, because that is the key difference is they always campaign on, we are the party
08:51that China can deal with or will deal with, and the DPP is the party of war.
08:56And that hasn't changed from the campaign season to post campaign.
08:59So at the time of this interview, Beijing just announced that they're reinstating tariffs
09:02on more than 100 items that China imports from Taiwan under the Economic Cooperation
09:07Framework Agreement.
09:09How badly is this going to affect cross-strait relations?
09:12Yeah, and that's typical of the response.
09:14It does seem like the military drills happen first, then the economic repercussions.
09:19This is a huge kind of change in the economic status quo with over 130 new items that are
09:25affected.
09:27But again, these are likely things that China can purchase elsewhere, or they can afford
09:31to pay a little extra on.
09:33These are things that will probably hurt very specific sectors and geographies in Taiwan.
09:39And that is part of the course whenever there is a big drill like this.
09:43I do want to be careful, though, in coupling this specifically with Joint Sword.
09:47This also could be in response to the U.S. congressional delegations as well.
09:51So it's really unclear what is what when it comes to this, because so much is happening
09:56in the last few weeks with Taiwan.
09:58But yeah, while these economic issues are going on, we're having greater U.S. support
10:03coming in.
10:04Granted, it's much more symbolic.
10:05There aren't really many economic agreements coming from the U.S. because it's election
10:10year.
10:11We're not going to do any FTAs.
10:13But while these things are, China's doing these things in Taiwan to hurt it negatively,
10:17the broader international community is also stepping up.
10:20We'll see, though, if the symbolic nature of these things actually translates into deliverables.
10:25But it's very early in Lai's administration, so it's really unfair to him to expect a victory
10:30not even one month into office.
10:33And in talking with dealing with China, a part of that is the disinformation campaign
10:36from Beijing.
10:37The videos of the rocket launches over Taiwan, and there were even media reports of that
10:42China might try something in June.
10:44But looking at the disinformation, how is that affecting the public here in Taiwan?
10:48Yeah, I mean, it splits the public, but I don't really think that the disinformation
10:54will necessarily change someone's mind.
10:57I think there is a very limited number of people who are independent voters, so to speak,
11:03as we have in the United States, that you will believe what you want to believe.
11:07And there's only so much of an added value for the Chinese propaganda.
11:11I think the propaganda is helpful for China in showing the videos with the drills and
11:16things.
11:17Sometimes maybe a video during a campaign is effective, but Taiwan has been very successful
11:23at combating this.
11:24And there are a lot of countries that are having their own elections, like the United
11:27States coming up, that are victims of this type of thing.
11:31So having lessons learned from Taiwan on how they deal with Chinese misinformation is something
11:37that is on the civil society level that other countries that cannot engage at the official
11:42level with Taiwan can actually have those conversations about how China targets specific
11:47people, specific groups, or just broader media misinformation that comes out of Beijing towards
11:52these two countries.
11:53The last question I want to ask you is, with this U.S. delegation coming over, one of the
11:57things that Lai Ching just said in his little speech there with the congressional delegation
12:01was, he wants to continue working with U.S. partners and allies like the United Nations.
12:06And there's no doubt a need for President Lai to continue bolstering Taiwan's national
12:10security.
12:11But what areas do you think he's going to have to prioritize going forward?
12:15Yeah, he will likely have to continue the reform of defense, the change in conscription
12:22from four months to one year is a good start, but making sure that that is a useful year.
12:28But I think there'll be tough conversations that he's going to need to have with the United
12:31States about his vision for defense, because there was great tension during some of the
12:36time when Tsai Ing-wen was president, that they were making asks for things that the
12:40United States, just like, why are you asking for these things?
12:43In Taiwan's strategy, it may make sense, but the United States, a couple of times actually
12:48said, no, we're not going to sell you that, we don't think it's worth it.
12:51But now that President Lai is in office with new authorities from the United States, particularly
12:57the PDA, Presidential Drawdown Authority, and foreign military financing, those things
13:01existed towards the end of Tsai Ing-wen's presidency.
13:04He needs to take full advantage of that.
13:06And by connecting the drill to broader conflicts around the world in Ukraine and Gaza, he may
13:11have success, but he needs to be smart about what he asks for and show, like, these are
13:16the ways that Ukraine or this is the way that Israel has used this particular thing in this
13:19type of conflict, this is the type of conflict that we would imagine we would have, such
13:24as maybe striking into the mainland or at least striking into the Taiwan Strait during
13:29an amphibious invasion, we would need similar things that Ukraine uses against the Black
13:33Sea Fleet or into Crimea, or now that President Biden has kind of lifted this embargo on Ukraine
13:39striking into Russia, seeing what Ukraine actually does with that.
13:43The other thing with this is Taiwan's actually going to start getting some of this stuff.
13:48A lot of the things that were purchased under Tsai Ing-wen are now going to come under William
13:52Wye.
13:53And I think that's also important, that he may not need to ask for as much because he's
13:57going to be getting a lot of stuff.
13:59And now that he has these things, he needs to start thinking about what is the next step
14:03for this, because 2027 to 2035, that window is going to start in his presidency and potentially
14:10encompass his entire presidency if he were to be reelected.
14:14So he needs to start thinking about what do I need when I'm running for re-election
14:18and what do I need in my second term.
14:20So a lot of things to do, but Thomas, thank you so much for joining today's show and sharing
14:23your insights.
14:24Thanks for having me again.
14:26Well, this has been Zoom In Zoom Out.
14:28You can find more stories from Taiwan Plus News on our social media.
14:31Thank you for joining us and we'll see you next time.
14:44Bye-bye.