Navigating through troubled waters

The Manila Times

Navigating through troubled waters  Col. Raymond Powell, founder and director of SeaLight, a maritime transparency project that monitors and reports activities in the South China Sea talks to Manila Times reporters Kristina Maralit (Malacanang), Bernadette Tamayo (Department of Foreign Affairs) and Franco Barona (Defense) in the maiden episode of TMT Newsroom on Thursday, Feb. 15, 2024. Powell breaks down the impact of the South China Sea issue on Philippine defense and relations with its allies and China.  Subscribe to The Manila Times Channel - https://tmt.ph/YTSubscribe  Visit our website at https://www.manilatimes.net    Follow us:  Facebook - https://tmt.ph/facebook  Instagram - https://tmt.ph/instagram  Twitter - https://tmt.ph/twitter  DailyMotion - https://tmt.ph/dailymotion    Subscribe to our Digital Edition - https://tmt.ph/digital    Check out our Podcasts:  Spotify - https://tmt.ph/spotify  Apple Podcasts - https://tmt.ph/applepodcasts  Amazon Music - https://tmt.ph/amazonmusic  Deezer: https://tmt.ph/deezer  Stitcher: https://tmt.ph/stitcher Tune In: https://tmt.ph/tunein   #TheManilaTimes  #TMTNewsroom  #westphilippinesea

Transcript

00:00 For our maiden episode, we are fortunate to have with us today a retired officer from the United

00:05 States Air Force with 35 years of uniformed experience. He served as the Air Attaché for

00:11 Vietnam from 2013 to 2016 and was also the Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché to Australia

00:17 from 2007 to 2020. Now he is the founder and director of Sea Light, a maritime transparency

00:23 project of the Bordeaux Nautical Center for National Security Innovation at Stanford University

00:29 in California. Let's welcome Colonel Raymond Powell. Thanks, it's a pleasure to be with you.

00:34 After you left the USA Force, was it a natural transition for you to study the developments of

00:44 South China Sea? I will say I didn't have a good idea of what I was going to do when I left the

00:49 Air Force. I had, as you mentioned, I spent three and a half decades in the Air Force. That's a long

00:55 time to be sort of in that bubble and not having to decide what I want to be when I grow up.

01:00 But so I had to think very carefully and I decided I wanted to go back to where I was from,

01:07 which is Northern California. I have family in Northern California and I left them a long time

01:13 ago to join the Air Force, so I wanted to go back. So once I did that, I went to Stanford to do a

01:20 fellowship, a fellowship called the Distinguished Careers Institute, which had nothing to do at all

01:26 with maritime security or transparency or the South China Sea or the Philippines.

01:30 But as you know, I have been married to the Philippines for almost all of those three and a

01:38 half decades. I have a great love for the Philippines. And while I was at Stanford,

01:44 I began to dig into this question of how do we address the security problems in the South China

01:51 Sea? Because I studied that quite a bit while I was in the military and I felt like I didn't

01:57 understand what the US strategy was and I thought it was something that needed an innovative look.

02:03 The Gordian Knot Center, which is at the, for National Security Innovation, which is

02:09 at Stanford University, specializes in innovating for national security. So I just approached them

02:17 and I said, I'd love to take a look at this problem. There were a number of us, interestingly,

02:23 we were all volunteers. We were all people who had kind of the same interest and the same passion.

02:27 Some of them were students at Stanford, some of them were attached to Stanford.

02:32 And they, we all kind of came together and we began to dig into the questions of South China

02:38 Sea security. And then early in 2023, as we were examining the idea of what if we could

02:46 use commercial technology to shine a light into the places we call it the gray zone, where there

02:54 are no, there is no light, right? It happens out at sea, people don't know what's happening.

02:58 And that just happened to be a sort of a perfect time because as we began to do that,

03:06 the Marcos administration began to do something very similar. And I think we kind of fed off of

03:12 each other. And so things just kind of took off for the last year. So that's a long answer to

03:19 a short question. I understand Project Myosho started in Stanford. Can you tell us about it?

03:29 So the idea behind Project Myosho and the Gordian Knot Center is to take a look at national security

03:37 problems like an entrepreneur would. So we're near, Stanford is near Silicon Valley. Entrepreneurs do

03:43 not look at things bureaucratically or in a traditional military or government sense. Instead,

03:50 they try to look at it like a Silicon Valley entrepreneur looks at it. And so we kept sort of

03:56 using these entrepreneurial methods. We had a lot of conversations. We talked to a lot of people

04:01 in the United States, in the Philippines, in other countries, just sort of exploring

04:07 different avenues, trying to find out sort of where the market was, so-called, for an innovation

04:14 in the national security space. And eventually where we came down was in this transparency area,

04:25 where we thought this is where maybe the time is right for somebody to do something innovative.

04:31 So you consulted the Philippine government before you started the project?

04:35 Not that much. I actually talked to a lot more people outside of government. And some of that's

04:42 by design because you're trying to understand things from all angles. So we did, we talked,

04:49 I had some conversations with people in Philippine government, but they were not central

04:56 to the evolution of Project Myoshu, which has since turned into Sea Light. It was really

05:03 such a wide spectrum of people, again, American, Philippine, other countries around the region,

05:12 people that are in think tanks and universities, people who are in business, and it was a very

05:17 wide variety. So the project started after the Duterte administration, right? Yes. So actually,

05:25 right as the Marcos administration was coming in, it was about the same time as it started. So I

05:32 came to the Philippines the first time in the summer of 2022, and that was when my first

05:37 conversations happened. So then Sea Light came into being after? Yeah. So after, so through the

05:45 end of 2022, it was still called Project Myoshu, and we were still exploring. And then in early

05:52 2023, we began to put out our little reports about ship movements at sea. And what particular

06:01 indication was that? You're using satellite? Yeah. So we're using what's called Automatic

06:08 Information System, or AIS, which is what most ships that are not warships, most ships broadcast

06:16 AIS, and so you can track them when they're going places. And some ships will turn it off on

06:21 purpose because they don't want to be tracked. They're not supposed to do that, but they do.

06:26 And usually if they do, that's an indication that maybe they're doing something that they

06:30 shouldn't be doing. So sometimes that actually gives its own indication. And so, interestingly,

06:36 when things really got going on transparency, it was a China Coast Guard ship turning off its AIS

06:46 that led me to believe that it was harassing a Philippine ship, in this case, the BRP Malapascua,

06:54 which was on a resupply mission to Iong and Shoal. And so it was that series of tweets at the time

07:02 that led to some news articles, and that turned out to be the incident when a laser was used

07:09 against the Malapascua. And so at that same time, after about a week, the Philippine government

07:17 decided to release the pictures. But we had already put out some reports, and I believe

07:24 that our reports sort of made it easier, maybe, for the Philippine government to make that decision

07:29 to go ahead and release the photos. Is the particular technology used before?

07:35 It's not a new technology. It costs some money, so you have to subscribe to it. And we also use

07:45 some overhead satellite photos that we have access to, some of them through the university.

07:51 Cornel, I understand you were the one who coined the term "circuitous reality," right?

08:00 I think that was me, yes.

08:02 So what was it all about?

08:05 So we felt like we needed something to explain what the Philippines was doing,

08:11 because what the Philippines has done over the past year, I think, is pretty revolutionary.

08:18 And so it wasn't just that. So we talked about the laser incident, the decision to release the

08:25 photos. In my mind, that was not assertive transparency. It was incidental or reactive

08:32 transparency. There was an incident that happened, and they had the photos, and then they decided to

08:38 release them. But what happened next was really unique, which is that then the Philippine Coast

08:46 Guard was sent out to take pictures of other things that were happening to Philippine outposts

08:52 and Philippine vessels in the West Philippine Sea. And to us, that marked something much more

08:59 assertive. So the Philippines obviously is overmatched by the strength of the Chinese

09:08 Coast Guard and maritime militia, backed up by their navy. But what the Philippines did have

09:14 was essentially a moral high ground. And if they could actually take pictures and say...

09:21 And so the very first thing that happened, excuse me, was they went out and they took pictures of

09:25 the vessel swarm that was off of Pagasa Island. And that vessel swarm had been there for a couple

09:34 weeks. And so they went out and they got pictures of it. And it's very interesting because almost

09:39 instantly you saw the vessels dispersed off into a cloud.

09:42 >> As if nothing happened.

09:43 >> Well, and I think it was clear that Beijing did not like those pictures and they didn't want

09:49 there to be more of them. And so the Philippines discovered we have something here. We have some

09:54 leverage in this struggle. >> So don't you think it's too early to say

09:59 the assertive transparency is effective? >> Oh, I think it's certainly early. Now,

10:06 I think that we can draw some conclusions. And if you read our paper, you'll notice we talk about

10:12 conditions for success that we think it's pretty clear that assertive transparency has worked

10:19 to achieve these conditions. So we talk about strengthening national resilience,

10:24 getting the Philippine people behind you so that you can take steps like building your maritime

10:30 security, looking at counter foreign interference type legislation. Those kinds of things are part

10:40 of building your national resilience so you're not as easily sort of exploited or pushed around.

10:46 The second is building international support. And I mean, I think it's without question that

10:53 a lot of international support has poured in since the assertive transparency campaign began.

10:59 So that's a second condition. And the third is imposing reputational costs on the gray zone

11:06 actor, in this case, China. And I think it's starting, you know, the evidence is starting

11:11 to pile up that these reputational costs are starting to bite. You know, we talked about it

11:17 when you took the pictures of the vessel swarms and the vessels dispersed, they didn't like that

11:21 clearly. I think it's clear just looking at say some of their statements and their propaganda

11:26 that they're very unhappy about the continued transparency. And this in our minds gives the

11:34 Philippines leverage in having negotiations because in the end, of course, the Philippines

11:39 is not interested in fighting with China. It would be much happier if it didn't have to do this.

11:44 But you know, when the other party is pushing you so hard, this is something that gives the

11:50 Philippines leverage. >> Do you think China has changed its strategy because of the assertive

11:56 transparency? >> Yeah. So I tend to think that its strategy remains largely the same. So what

12:06 China wants to do is consolidate its control over everything within its nine dash line, right,

12:12 including those parts of the West Philippine Sea. I do think it's starting to look at changing its

12:18 tactics, right? So I think that the assertive transparency is causing China to have to relook.

12:25 Is it still in China's national interest to be so overtly coercive in a way that is, you know,

12:35 is so easy to sort of demonstrate for the world? Maybe it needs to sort of adjust. And what it

12:42 adjusts to, I think, remains to be seen. >> Colonel, China largely ignored the

12:48 arbitral tribunal ruling. >> Yes. >> Also gained worldwide attention and the support of the

12:56 international community. So what can the assertive transparency do which the arbitral tribunal ruling

13:06 failed to establish? >> Sure. No, I mean, it's a great question. I look at them as part of the

13:13 same spectrum of activities. And in fact, as I talk about assertive transparency as being a great

13:19 Philippine innovation in counter gray zone, actually I look at the arbitral tribunal as maybe

13:25 being the last great innovation in gray zone tactics. And we would call that lawfare, right?

13:32 So now, as you say, China doesn't recognize it, but almost everybody else does. In fact, as we

13:40 talk about international support, recently even India came in and said that they support the

13:47 ruling of the arbitral tribunal. So I think that China is, you know, by degrees is finding itself

13:54 more isolated. And, you know, so all of these things, none of these things by themselves wins,

14:02 right? And it's not about sort of, you know, having the decisive battle that wins the campaign.

14:09 It's finding those things that give the Philippines a little bit more of an edge.

14:15 And again, ultimately, what we're really hoping for is this results in some kind of reasonable

14:20 negotiated settlement, right? >> Yeah. Because the past administration,

14:31 it was not as friendly to other allies of the Philippines, like America or other western

14:40 countries, because there was this perception that the Duterte administration was more pro-China.

14:46 >> Sure. >> But the administration now being more

14:49 vocal about the situation in the South China Sea or the west of the Philippines. So how do you see

14:56 that coming about moving forward? >> I mean, so, you know, one of the things

15:01 it does is it highlights that this is what happens in democracies, right? You have different

15:07 administrations, they have different emphases. We have the same thing happen. You know, people are

15:11 like, well, okay, do you, you know, is the U.S. going this way or that way? I think one of the

15:18 things that we learned through six years of Rodrigo Duterte is actually the underlying strength

15:26 of the U.S.-Philippine relationship has turned out to be really something, I mean, really strong.

15:31 Rodrigo Duterte made it very clear that he did not like the visiting forces agreement and wanted it

15:39 to end, and yet after six years, it's still there. And so there is a lot of institutional strength

15:47 in a lot of the things that have been built up over many decades. And so, you know, I think

15:55 President Duterte was not elected for being anti-American. He kind of brought that with him.

16:01 You know, that was part of the package. He had other electoral strengths that powered his election

16:09 in 2016. The anti-Americanism was kind of just part of the package. But as we've learned, you

16:17 know, national policy is more than just the president. And that's a good thing, right? And

16:24 we wouldn't want to sort of be whiplashed back and forth any time the U.S. or the Philippines

16:29 or anyone else had an election. Colonel, during the Duterte administration, South China Sea was

16:36 relatively quiet. But when the U.S. entered the picture, things escalated. So I'm going to disagree

16:46 with your characterization there. First of all, I think that it's actually not very clear

16:54 what was happening in the West Philippine Sea during the Duterte administration. Right. So

16:58 it's not we don't know all that was happening because there wasn't the transparency. Right.

17:04 We didn't all know. So what was one big thing that's different is everybody knows. I will say,

17:09 I think that particularly the last six months of 2023, there has been a spike. Yeah. And I'm sort

17:16 of what's watching it happen is more Chinese ships came down. The second thing is I don't think you

17:24 can say it's necessarily all about the U.S. coming into the situation. Right. Sure, there were the

17:30 EDCA discussions. But I think it's maybe oversimplified to sort of apply that all to

17:37 the United States. I'm sure it certainly is a factor. But I mean, there are other factors.

17:42 Right. I mean, there were these there were these there was a laser, there was a vessel swarm.

17:46 There are these resupply missions to Iung and Shoal. All of these things are part of the same

17:54 picture. And, you know, the Philippines asserted transparency campaign. So I think that, you know,

17:58 certainly I wouldn't disagree that the competition between the U.S. and China is a factor. But I

18:06 think one thing that we see sometimes out of Chinese propaganda is the the effort to apply

18:13 everything to the U.S. and say, well, the Philippines is just being pushed into this

18:17 by its American ally. I think that is I think that robs the Philippines of its agency. Right.

18:23 Back in 2012, the U.S. said, indirectly stated that does not recognize any nation's sovereignty

18:34 over Scarborough Shoal. But everything changed. So 2012, first of all, you know, 2012, obviously,

18:42 the Chinese takeover of Scarborough Shoal. If you go back from when I started studying the South

18:50 China Sea back in the 80s, the American position was essentially this is a big mess. Right. You've

18:57 got you've got these these these islands, you know, these these reefs and that China is here

19:01 and Vietnam is here and Malaysia is here and it's a big mess. And we didn't want to get involved in

19:06 who owned what. We just wanted everything to stay the same. Right. Because it was such a mess. Right.

19:11 And so the other thing that was happening in U.S. policy throughout that entire period is there was

19:18 a lot of hope that China would become a more what we call a responsible stakeholder in the

19:24 international community. And it would sort of as it as it modernized, as it came up out of poverty,

19:31 it would sort of see the benefits that it was accruing and it would become more cooperative.

19:35 It would become more responsible in the way that we thought, you know, that the world order was

19:42 operating. And in retrospect, we were a bit naive. You know, we we did we just sort of we thought

19:49 that there was this this this arc that China would continue to follow and, you know, the

19:55 leadership in China had different ideas. So as we got to Scarborough Shoal in 2012, certainly not

20:04 our finest hour, I will say. And and again, I think part of it was that we were still in our

20:10 a bit of a delusion. Right. We were still hoping that, well, if we just talk to China enough and

20:17 they'll realize if you don't act this way, then then things will be better and we'll all get to

20:22 you know, and it you know, it took a little while to pull us up out of our delusion, I think.

20:26 You believe that all potential methods of opening communication could

20:33 result to tensions going down? Yes. That's very hard to say. And I spent a few years in the

20:44 diplomatic sphere. And one thing I will say that I've certainly noticed during that time,

20:50 and many of my colleagues noticed, is it's actually getting harder to talk to the Chinese

20:56 government. And that's because power has been more centralized. And so the number of people

21:02 who are sort of able to have a discussion is shrinking because, you know, so I would have

21:09 discussions with my Chinese counterparts. And I remember one in particular, as we were talking

21:15 about a particular issue a few years ago, and he kept he kept interrupting me as I was talking

21:20 about things. And he would say, I have to tell you something. Oh, no, I have to tell you something.

21:24 And I finally realized he had a list of things he had to tell me so that he could go back and

21:29 write his report and say that he told me all of these things. And, you know, at this point,

21:34 all I could do is hopefully, you know, insert a few things that he could also include in his report.

21:39 But I realized we were not going to really have a fruitful discussion. You know, in the end,

21:45 he was there to send me messages. And they were the approved messages that his government sent

21:51 him to tell me. And it's very hard to have dialogue that way. So I think, you know,

21:58 when you're talking to Xi Jinping, you know, as as the president or or one of his inner circle,

22:04 perhaps you can you can have fruitful discussions. But I think the number of people you're able to

22:10 talk to is much smaller than it was before. >> You mentioned Xi Jinping. In the past few

22:16 instances that President Marcus and President Xi have talked regarding the situation in South

22:22 China Sea, the Chinese government would always say, oh, yeah, we're going to cooperate with you.

22:27 We even established this hotline to sort out any problems. But it turns out that what they say

22:36 is different from what's happening underground. >> Right. Yeah. I mean, so we had our own

22:47 experience with this. Famously, in 2015, Xi Jinping met President Obama in the Rose Garden

22:54 and promised that he would not militarize the artificial islands that they were building.

22:58 And, of course, almost immediately, they militarized the artificial islands.

23:02 And they had as their reasoning, well, we didn't realize you were going to sail your ships close

23:08 to these islands, so we have to militarize them. Well, of course, we'd have we've had a freedom

23:13 of navigation operations, you know, function for four decades. It's not new. So it's clear that

23:22 him telling Xi Jinping telling Barack Obama that was a way to put it off until they could

23:30 militarize the islands, and then they could come up with a reason that, you know, a predicate for

23:35 militarizing the islands. So I think, you know, it's I suppose this is true in all international

23:41 diplomacy, but particularly when dealing with Beijing, you really have to watch what they do

23:45 much more than what they say. >> Your thoughts on the recommendations

23:51 of the scarring detention, scientific cooperation, that help?

23:55 >> I mean, I think that there should be scientific cooperation. I mean, I would like to think that

24:02 we can have, you know, sort of we can compartmentalize. In terms of, you know, solving

24:09 the tensions, I don't know that it will solve the tensions. I mean, again, I think it's always good

24:15 to have more talking than less talking. But I think it's also important to be able to

24:21 when you are talking, to be able to distinguish between what is likely to, you know, produce real

24:29 results and maybe what's being done just to kind of satisfy you for now so that you don't ask hard

24:34 questions. >> What about the

24:37 meeting shared concern for both nations? Do you think somehow this will be the case?

24:46 >> I think the thing to remember about that is, and this goes back to the question of strategy

24:53 versus tactics. China's, remember that China's strategy remains the same. And the strategy is

24:58 to consolidate control within the nine-dash line. So when you are, well, you know, less tensions are

25:06 always better than more tensions. As long as reducing the tensions doesn't come at the expense

25:13 of, you know, surrendering important ground, you can't get back later, right? China frequently

25:23 will talk about its own desire for peace and stability and cooperation in the maritime domain.

25:30 And that's great. But what they mean by that is that we as the constabulary, as the police,

25:41 will make sure that everybody has peace and stability and cooperation, but we are in charge.

25:47 You know? And that's where the problem comes in, right? They have a very different vision of what

25:53 that peace and stability look like in the long term. >> Colonel Powell, some governments or

26:00 foreign governments or countries have defended the Philippines against China's bullying tactics in

26:08 the West Philippine Sea. However, some sectors believe that the Philippines need the support of

26:14 ASEAN. What prevents ASEAN from coming up with a stand against China's harassment or expansive?

26:27 >> There was a famous quote by a Singaporean diplomat where he said, "People expect ASEAN to

26:36 be a horse, but ASEAN is not a horse, it's a cow." So you can't ask a cow to be a horse.

26:42 ASEAN does some things well. Coming up with strong stances on collective security is not one of those

26:52 things. And that is partly a function of its requirement for consensus among all the members,

27:01 and the fact that many of the members have no stake whatsoever in the South China Sea.

27:06 Laos is a landlocked nation. It is not interested in the South China Sea very much. And if China

27:14 does not want a particular stance to be taken, it's not hard for China to influence those

27:19 discussions. So I think it's a lot to ask ASEAN to be able to come in and take a strong stand on

27:29 South China Sea issues. I think that there are those who are trying very hard. I commend them

27:35 for trying very hard. I'm a bit of a South China Sea pessimist when it comes to ASEAN, what I expect

27:41 from ASEAN. >> Do you think the economic influence of China over some ASEAN members is one of the

27:47 factors that prevent? >> Sure. Of course, yes. I mean, I do. And China is very well known for using

27:54 economic inducements on one hand, carrots, and then threats on the other hand, or sticks,

28:00 on the other hand, to sort of encourage nations or governments to go their way.

28:07 >> Sir, speaking of the ASEAN, there's this longstanding, dragging issue about the code

28:16 of conduct between ASEAN and China. And it seems that China's deliberately taking its sea time for

28:25 it not to be finalized, so much so that President Marcos have been saying as of late that if China

28:33 doesn't want to really finalize the code of conduct, then he as the Philippine president

28:39 would take it up with ASEAN to have its own code of conduct. Because it's not just the Philippines

28:45 who lays claim to this territory. There are other ASEAN member nations. So what's your take on this?

28:51 >> Well, I commend the president for being innovative, for thinking outside the box.

28:57 I think that the basic problem, and I've written about this, China and ASEAN agreed in 2002 to

29:06 something called the DOC, the Declaration of Conduct of the Parties to the South China Sea,

29:11 right? And that DOC set down some guidelines that China has since mostly ignored. And so the energy

29:20 behind this code of conduct, the COC, much of it is generated by the fact that there's frustration

29:27 that the DOC is not enforceable. Well, the question is, if you were able to come up with an

29:34 enforceable code of conduct, who would everybody agree would be the enforcer, right? Would China

29:42 agree to anyone but China enforcing a COC? And would anybody else agree to China enforcing a COC?

29:49 It's hard for me to see that outcome. I think that China is content to refer all problems to

29:57 the code of conduct negotiations and continue to consolidate its control. And so effectively,

30:04 people can keep talking and keep talking and keep talking about a code of conduct

30:09 and make marginal progress that never actually resolves itself while China continues to consolidate

30:16 control. And that's why I think that the danger is not in having the conversations. It's fine to

30:21 have the conversations. The danger is in putting all your hopes in the conversations that are

30:27 happening around the code of conduct, because while you're having those conversations, China

30:32 is pursuing its objective.

30:34 Cornel, you mentioned about legislation a while ago. We have a pending bill in the Senate. It's

30:41 called the Maritime Zones Act. Once passed, do you think it will fortify the Philippines'

30:48 territorial claim in the West Philippine Sea?

30:52 I think it is part of what we call that building of national resilience. I don't think it

31:00 substantially changes, of course, international law. The Philippines is already on very strong

31:07 ground under international law because of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the

31:11 Arbitral Tribunal case. So ultimately, that legislation is domestic legislation. And it

31:20 doesn't necessarily affect any other country's claims, but it does strengthen the national

31:27 resilience around the Philippine interest in the West Philippine Sea. So I think, you know,

31:33 that's kind of where I would categorize it. It's part of that national resilience story.

31:39 So it won't dissuade or prevent China from still continuing its harassment?

31:45 Right. No, it certainly won't.

31:49 Colonel, let's go back to the tribunal ruling. It's the same as the DOC.

31:56 The problem is how to enforce it.

32:00 Yeah. So it's part of what we, as we say, you know, the lawfare. What it does do is it gives

32:11 the Philippines extremely solid ground upon which to build its international support.

32:18 Because the Philippines case is so clearly right and has been ruled right in a really sweeping

32:26 ruling, the Philippines has the moral high ground to go to other countries in the region,

32:33 around the world and say, we have this lawful claim that has been ruled lawful in, you know,

32:41 in unambiguous terms and that in gaining that international support. So I think that's where

32:47 the arbitral tribunal, it's not that the ruling itself pushes China off of, you know, the Philippine

32:56 claims. It's that it gives the Philippines the international standing. And really, I will say,

33:02 you know, the Philippines is widely admired for having done what it did with the arbitral

33:08 tribunal. And so I think that does help when the Philippines goes to the international stage.

33:14 Second Thomas Shoal is news to me. So according to the arbitral tribunal ruling,

33:22 Second Thomas Shoal is simply a low tide elevation which can be claimed as sovereign.

33:29 Right. At the same time, it also rejected China's expansive claims.

33:34 So the contest here is who will control the shoal and not who owns it.

33:41 Right. And that's really the case with almost every feature. Right. I mean,

33:45 the Philippines has the stronger legal case to make for Iung and Shoal. Right. Because as you

33:54 said, it's a low tide elevation. You can't claim it as a sovereign territory. But who has possession,

34:02 right now, who has possession of Second Thomas Shoal? Well, certainly the BRPCR Madre gives

34:07 the Philippines a permanent presence there. At the same time, if it's surrounded by Chinese ships,

34:14 then who controls the shoal? Right. If one of the points I make repeatedly, and sometimes I'm a

34:21 broken record on this, is China has been enforcing a blockade of a Philippine outpost for many years.

34:33 I can't think of another place in the world where one country is blockading another country's

34:39 military outpost in peacetime. Right. Somehow, up until last year, we all forgot that that was an

34:47 outrage. We forgot that we should be outraged. You know, you're actually watching, you know,

34:54 the only boats that China lets through are small ones that it decides have no building materials

35:00 on them. Right. And, you know, they say, well, if you don't bring any building materials,

35:06 you're free to pass. Well, who are you to tell us we can't repair our ship? Right. It's our ship.

35:13 It's our outpost. And they will say, well, you're violating the DOC. I'm sorry, but 35 kilometers

35:22 away, you built a runway and a port and a military base at Miss Jafri after the DOC. Right. So the

35:32 whole idea is built on an outrageous set of assumptions that the whole world should have been

35:40 more exercised about a long time ago. We just forgot. Do you think it's too late now for that

35:48 to happen? I think it's never too late. Right. I mean, time doesn't, events don't unfold in a

35:55 predictable manner. You know, it's, things don't, I remember it wasn't very long ago that everybody

36:00 assumed that China would surpass the U.S. as the world's largest leading economy. Right. All of a

36:06 sudden, nobody thinks that anymore. Things don't go in a straight line. Events happen. Right. So,

36:13 you know, right now the Philippines is in a very difficult position.

36:16 But, you know, the Philippines probably, you know, it's helpful for the Philippines to take a long

36:24 view and say, where do we hope things end up with, end up in 20 years? Right. It's natural when you've

36:33 got all of these pictures coming out for the Philippine people to say, why don't we get all

36:38 the Chinese out of Philippine waters? Well, that's, I mean, they built a military base there.

36:42 It's not so easy just to go and kick them all out. Right. So, you have to take the long view and you

36:48 have to say, how do we in the Philippines strengthen our position, strengthen it internationally,

36:54 strengthen it domestically, build out our maritime security, all of the things that we should do

37:00 in order so that we can improve our position in the future.

37:05 Colonel, China has repeatedly warned or threatened that it can, that it will remove the BRP Sierra

37:17 Madre in a union shawl. Do you think that's possible? How will they be able to do that?

37:22 So, they could do it if they tried. I don't think that they will try. So, how?

37:28 Why?

37:29 Well, because the BRP Sierra Madre is still a commissioned ship in the Philippine Navy,

37:36 and there is a treaty alliance with the United States, and an armed attack on a Philippine

37:41 public vessel would constitute something under Article 4 of the Mutual Defense Treaty.

37:47 It could be invoked.

37:48 That's right. It would certainly bring a response from the United States,

37:53 which is why I believe that China has elected this blockade as their strategy,

37:58 or as their tactic, is they've decided that we're going to blockade the ship and wait for it to fall

38:03 apart. And so, that's why they're always talking about building materials. They don't want the

38:07 Philippines to do anything that lengthens the time that the Sierra Madre stays intact on a union

38:14 shawl.

38:15 Because it could be possibly a flashpoint for something more bizarre, I guess, or chaotic.

38:23 I don't think that China is looking for a reason for the United States to get involved in a

38:31 conflict, a direct conflict, in the South China Sea. So, I think it will try to avoid that if it

38:38 can. So, for China, the best outcome from China's perspective is that tomorrow that ship starts to

38:46 fall apart, the troops on board call for help. China comes in, rescues the troops, drags the

38:53 ship off the shoal because it's a hazard, and then that's over. So, I think that that's China's

38:59 plan. It just wants to keep blockading the shoal until the ship finally falls apart.

39:05 What should the Philippine government do then? Do you think the Philippine government has

39:14 predicted this tactic?

39:16 I think the Philippine government very clearly now recognizes the tactic and is almost certainly

39:23 going through options. What is it that we can do? I would hate to sort of speculate on what I think

39:30 it would do. If I knew, I certainly shouldn't tell anybody because that would violate the—

39:37 I don't know. But if I knew, I think, though, that the government's going to have to probably

39:43 be innovative. The inevitable result if you don't repair or replace the ship is that the ship

39:51 eventually—

39:52 Just kind of falls apart.

39:53 Falls apart, has a big storm.

39:55 Well, you being an experienced Air Force official, would it be possible to do an airdrop?

40:02 So, of course, there was recently an airdrop, a small airdrop by a Philippine

40:08 plane. You can do small airdrops. I think that, for example, it would probably be wise,

40:16 given the Philippines' geography, just to invest in things like seaplanes and float planes.

40:22 You can land on the water if you have the right equipment. I think there are faster vessels that

40:30 you can invest in to make a resupply faster. There are types of vessels that can be easily

40:40 turned into almost platforms with helipads on them. I'm not the expert in what—the funny thing is,

40:48 I'm called a maritime security expert, but as you notice, I'm a retired Air Force officer.

40:53 So it's a very strange title for me to have inherited. But I think that there should be—the

41:01 Philippine government should be encouraged to look very broadly at its options and not just

41:09 sort of be focused on how do we get the next resupply through.

41:12 Yeah, the armed forces of the Philippines, a few months back, they floated this idea of

41:20 conducting joint patrols with allies in the contested waterway. What do you think of this?

41:27 Do you think this would provoke China even more? Well, so actually the joint patrols have started.

41:33 It's just that they haven't gone into some of the really sensitive areas, right?

41:38 Every deterrent a country takes will be cast as a provocation by the people who don't want

41:48 them to do it, right? So anything that is a deterrent will almost certainly also be seen

41:53 as a provocation. The Philippines' assertive transparency campaign is seen by China as

41:59 a provocation, right? So— EDCA is seen as a provocation. You can't really deter without

42:07 risking provocation. The thing that's actually really—one of the things that's really impressive

42:10 about what the Philippines has done in the past year is be willing to watch the situation escalate.

42:18 Most people would say that's irresponsible. You don't want to escalate. You want to de-escalate.

42:24 But if you have an adversary that is intentionally escalating to push you off your position,

42:31 sometimes all you can do is escalate with them. And the Philippines, in this case,

42:36 used assertive transparency as a means of escalation in order to sort of see if it could

42:42 gain some leverage. Because if your adversary is the only one escalating, then eventually what

42:47 they do is they just win by pushing you off your position. They demand your capitulation,

42:54 your submission. And so I think that President Duterte, in evaluating the situation in the

43:02 West Philippine Sea, said, "Well, we don't want to go to war with China." Well, nobody says you

43:09 have to go to war with China, right? So what he made was what we call a false dichotomy,

43:14 a false choice, right? Either submit and have peace or contest and have war. But that's not

43:23 the way it works. It's not like an on-off switch. There are many different ways you can approach it.

43:28 And if submission is your only option, then all you find out, your adversary takes advantage of you.

43:37 So is it safe to say that this administration is braver, is more courageous, in terms of its

43:45 stand regarding the contested territory, at least in policies and in its transparency?

43:54 You know, I hate to get involved in sort of directly comparing. I will leave that to

44:03 Filipinos to do. What I will say is, regardless of braver or what, the Marcos administration has

44:11 certainly showed a lot of courage. Because it is not easy for a country of 125 million people to

44:19 take on a country of 1.4 billion, a rising power with nuclear weapons. You know, that's not easy,

44:27 right? That takes what we call intestinal fortitude. It takes guts. And I've certainly

44:33 been impressed with the Marcos administration and its willingness to risk escalation for the sake

44:39 of asserting its sovereignty. I think it's been impressive.

44:42 Colonel, the Philippine government is focused on China. Totally forgot about Vietnam.

44:47 What's the development there?

44:50 Well, of course, you know, President Marcos just went to Vietnam. And I think that what

44:56 he has recognized, so I do think that he has recognized that Vietnam is going to be important.

45:03 Partner in the Philippines future development economically, as well as in the security

45:08 situation. And if he is able to come up with a series of bilateral or mini lateral agreements

45:15 on the West Philippine Sea or the South China Sea, then I think that's positive. And I think

45:21 that one of the ways that you know that it may be a very positive thing is Beijing has had a very

45:28 negative reaction to it. Right? So what they would Beijing will say is, well, no, you should

45:32 have all those discussions at the code of conduct negotiations. Well, I think that tells you

45:37 something about what Beijing is trying to do. It's trying to say, there's a place in the code

45:43 of conduct negotiations where we can sort of supervise these things. You shouldn't have

45:48 discussions amongst yourselves because that upsets the apple cart.

45:51 Yeah, but President Marcos is really adamant to have a bad agreement with Vietnam because during

45:56 his last visit, he said that by within the year, like they're going to come up with that bilateral

46:03 agreement regarding the territory and it's between coast guards of Vietnam and the Philippines.

46:12 So I think that realistically, Vietnam's claim and the Philippines claims overlap and those will not

46:21 be quickly resolved. Maybe not in any of our lifetimes. What can happen is that, as you say,

46:29 they can come up with some rules of the road for how to manage the inevitable issues that come up.

46:38 And so by putting in the mechanisms to manage those things, then that helps both countries

46:43 to concentrate on really the real threat to sovereignty, which is coming from the North.

46:47 Okay. And with that, time flies when we're having such a fruitful discussion.

46:52 Unfortunately, we still have a lot of questions to ask you, but unfortunately,

46:57 we're out of time. So before we wrap this up, maybe you have a few, your last words to our viewers.

47:04 Well, so first of all, I just want to reiterate, this is a labor of love for me. I love the

47:14 Philippines. Of course, again, I've been married to the Philippines for over three decades.

47:17 My heart is here. And I actually do really love this idea of transparency being the great

47:26 disinfectant, right? If the bad actor can't hide in the shadows because you've turned on the lights,

47:35 that really does help disinfect the whole thing. And it makes that bad actor responsible for their

47:43 actions in a way that they were hoping to avoid. And so I really believe that this is something,

47:49 I still haven't figured out how to turn this into something that makes me any money,

47:57 despite what some of my detractors believe. So if I didn't love it, I wouldn't do it.

48:05 And so I appreciate the opportunity to do it. I think that we've made a difference.

48:10 And I hope that over the long term, that what we see is the Philippines able to continue to

48:17 stand strong and defend its sovereignty. Okay, thank you once again, friends.

48:21 Colonel Raymond Powell of Sea Light. Join us again next time for another insightful discussion here

48:27 with the Manila Times. Once again, I'm Christina Morales with my colleagues Franco Baroña and

48:32 Bernadette Tamayo. We'll see you again next time.

48:35 Bye.

48:36 Bye.

48:37 Bye.

48:38 Bye.

48:38 (bell chimes)

48:40 [BLANK_AUDIO]

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