'How Am I Supposed To Interpret That?': Ron Johnson Presses Witnesses About Boeing Reports

8 months ago

At a Senate Homeland Security Committee hearing prior to the Congressional recess, Sen. Ron Johnson (R-WI) spoke about the problems at Boeing.

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Transcript

00:00So let me point out, I think it's the 800-pound grill in the room, is the

00:05tremendous pressure, society-wide, to keep these planes flying. I mean, if we were to

00:13literally ground stop 737s, what would happen to our economy? That's, again,

00:18that's why we don't even like contemplating that reality. But I want to

00:23start focusing on the 737 because that's the one issue, got the 787, then you have

00:27the subcontractors, from my standpoint, the three, and then the overall culture of

00:31Boeing. But there's a discrepancy between our two witnesses here. Mr. Pearson,

00:37you were saying that it was a manufacturing defect, and Mr.

00:42Jacobson, you're focusing on the MCAS, which is what the public was all told.

00:46It was that control system, and with only a single indicator that if that

00:52went defective. So again, that was the story told. What is the truth?

00:57We'll start with you, Mr. Jacobson. Well, the truth is it's more than one

01:02thing, right? It's the entire system. You have to look at manufacturing, you

01:07have to look at also at the design. Since the MAX has gone back into service, this

01:15is the list of manufacturing. These are unsafe conditions that are identified by

01:20the FAA in the manufacturing area. Engine anti-ice, exhaust duct fasteners,

01:27compromised sealant adhesion within the center fuel tank, loose bolts in the

01:31rudder assembly, stuck rudder pedals, misinstalled electrical wire bundles

01:37in the wing spoilers, and then of course the door blowout was also a

01:41manufacturing defect. So we have a long list of unsafe conditions from

01:46manufacturing defects. We also have a long list, equally long list, of design

01:50defects. So what that tells me is it's a company-wide problem. So the MAX was

01:57taken out of service for how long? Quite some time, right? 20 months. 20 months, and

02:02again, the public, I was certainly hoping, assuming that that 20 months they

02:07were able to correct those defects, that they did install more of the indicators, right?

02:12So they've somewhat fixed that problem. I mean, are all these other problems

02:16completely unaddressed, not fixed? There were many problems that were

02:20unaddressed. The crew alerting system is the big one. That one was not addressed.

02:27That contributed to the crashes. The pilots had a lot of false indications

02:32going off, which delays their response, and they're trying to figure out what's

02:36going on. In the meantime, you know, the stabilizer is running and the nose is

02:44running down. So it's a combination of things that need to be addressed.

02:50What the pilots had to say about this? I mean, one of my things that comfort me is

02:54that, you know, pilots are concerned about safety. They do some safety

02:59checks before they get on the airplane, but they're the ones that have to fly these

03:02things. What do pilots have to say about the 737 MAX right now? Well, you know, I've

03:09heard some reports. You know, Dennis Tasier has been very vocal. He's an

03:14American Airlines MAX pilot, also works with us at the Foundation for Aviation

03:19Safety. He's been very vocal about the shortcomings of the MAX. Does he fly them?

03:25He does. And he still flies them? He still flies them, and he says, why is Boeing

03:31putting all these extra hazards into my cockpit? It's a big enough job to fly

03:38this airplane and take care of the passengers in the back. I don't need

03:41extra problems to be dealing with, like manufacturing defects, design defects, and

03:47they're one after another. There's a long list that I've put in my... Mr. Pearson, do you have

03:52anything to add to that on the 737? No, I totally agree with Mr. Jacobson. You know,

03:58when they investigated the accidents, they narrowly scoped it, and they kept it

04:02very tight. And as an example of that, when the plane was returned to service,

04:07the MAX airplanes were returned to service, they said that they fixed the MCAS

04:12software, and they provided the pilots the training that they needed, and then

04:15they said we fixed some wiring, but it was unrelated to the accidents. Well, a

04:21couple months ago, we found the service bulletin that was sent out to the

04:25airlines to fix some wiring. That document was 343 pages long. It

04:32identified at least 12 areas on the airplane that had improper electrical

04:37insulation, and I will tell you that when those planes are being built, we were

04:42having repeat problems getting our functional testing done correctly, and

04:47this is something that we continue to push and push and push the planes out

04:51the door, and we were having difficulty getting our aircraft systems testing.

04:54What people don't know, and I'll just give you a couple examples very quickly,

04:58is in the Lion airplane, that sensor, that angle of attack sensor, was removed the

05:02day before, replaced with the refurbished sensor. On the next flight, the plane

05:07almost crashed. On the next flight, it did crash. When that plane hit the ocean, it

05:11went right into the seawall. They never recovered that sensor that was just

05:15installed, but they had the original Boeing installed sensor, and they tested

05:19that sensor, and it had an open circuit in it. It had evidence of arcing and

05:23burn marks, and so that that is an example, and then I'm just pointing that

05:30out. That's getting a level of detail right now. I don't know if I appreciate that.

05:35Again, I'll keep, this shows you, Mr. Chairman, what we need to get the

05:40airlines in here, whether they want to or not, they have to come in here and talk

05:44about what they're doing in response to these technical bulletins. We need to get

05:48pilots in here. We need to talk to pilots, because from my standpoint, they're almost

05:52the last line of defense in terms of safety from the flying public, because

05:57they're on that, I would never get on a plane that's autonomous, never.

06:01Senator, I just, I echo what you're saying, but I think we also need to broaden that

06:05aperture. We need to talk to the mechanics, technicians, and all those

06:08individuals. No, again, as you said in your testimony, five minutes

06:12testimony doesn't even begin to scratch the surface. Hour and a half hearing

06:16doesn't even begin to scratch the surface. That's what I said. This needs to be an

06:19in-depth investigation. There's a lot of elements to this thing. In preparing for

06:24this, I did listen to one NBC News report, and the, this is on the 787, on this gap,

06:32and they were reporting that Boeing had apparently stress-tested a plane,

06:36165,000 takeoffs and landings, which is three times the normal life. They

06:42inspected 689 of the 1,100 planes that are in service, zero evidence of fatigue.

06:47So, how am I supposed to interpret that? Well, I think Boeing tries to put a lot

06:54of misinformation out there. The problem is that 165,000 was on the

06:59original airplane. It did not see the excessive forces that we talking about.

07:04If you haven't done the excessive force on those planes, they just thrown that

07:08out there to muddy up the water so that information is so clogged up that they

07:14are not. You know, they're saying they've done 40,000 tests or whatever. You know,

07:19did they put the information out there? Under what circumstances? What airplanes?

07:24What was the situation? None of that is shared. I have asked Mrs. Fall, you know,

07:31Lisa Fall, that it was on that thing. Two months ago, three months ago, when I met

07:36her, I said, hey, you know, I'm gonna complain, I'm complaining to her about the

07:40787. She said, I'll have somebody get you the information. You probably haven't

07:44seen the information. I have not seen any information whatsoever. As a matter of

07:48fact, you know, like they're just throwing that stuff. If you want to change the

07:53information, like the 165,000, then you need to rerun that test with 165,000

07:59with the new excessive force and show that it's good. You got to show you or

08:05just one one quick question for Mr. Pearson. You said you had delivered

08:09records to the FBI. First of all, how did you how did you obtain those records and

08:14have you heard back from the FBI? The records were sent to me. From an

08:21internal whistleblower? From an internal whistleblower, and I provided those

08:25records to the FBI. And again, you know, for the last couple months there's been,

08:29you know, talk that there's there's no records. And this is on the

08:33Alaskan Airlines? This is on the Alaska Airlines. That Boeing apparently overwrote the video

08:37that would have shown. Again, I've talked to Boeing. They said that's just normal.

08:42It's a 30-day cycle and it's mainly, it's not really, the video is not there to

08:46document the maintenance. It's really to document other things potentially, but

08:50it's overwritten regularly. Yeah, I'm talking about the actual documentation

08:54that they've been saying has not been available. It is available. It is available in the FBI.

08:58And it has been available for months. Okay, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

09:03Thanks, Senator Johnson. We're going to go to Senator Marshall, then Senator

09:08Hassan, and Senator Hawley.

'How Am I Supposed To Interpret That?': Ron Johnson Presses Witnesses About Boeing Reports

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