BREAKING NEWS: Boeing Airline Whistleblower Testifies Before Senate Homeland Security Committee

8 months ago

On Wednesday, Boeing quality whistleblower and executives testified before the Senate Homeland Security Committee.

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Transcript

00:00:00 and Government Affairs Committee will come to order.

00:00:03 We welcome everyone here.

00:00:04 We have a tight timeframe because of other proceedings

00:00:10 in the Senate.

00:00:11 I want to thank the witnesses for being here

00:00:15 and their cooperation.

00:00:19 And thank the Ranking Member for his cooperation

00:00:23 and other members of the Committee who are here today.

00:00:28 Our purpose today is to hear from whistleblowers

00:00:32 who have personal eyewitness factual stories to tell

00:00:41 about Boeing putting profits ahead of safety,

00:00:47 putting stock price ahead of quality,

00:00:51 production speed ahead of responsibility.

00:00:54 This story is serious, even shocking.

00:01:01 The kinds of evidence that we will hear today

00:01:07 is fact-based, science-based testimony

00:01:12 that the public deserves to hear.

00:01:16 And it is part of a continuing series of hearings

00:01:21 that we will have based on what these whistleblowers will tell

00:01:27 us and evidence that we obtain from documents

00:01:32 from a variety of sources.

00:01:35 There are mounting serious allegations

00:01:40 that Boeing has a broken safety culture

00:01:44 and a set of practices that are unacceptable.

00:01:50 These whistleblowers have come forward at great personal risk.

00:01:55 In fact, a number of them and others

00:01:58 have suffered harassment, isolation, transfers,

00:02:03 and even threats of physical violence.

00:02:07 Just as an example, this tire was in a car

00:02:14 that belonged to Mr. Salpour.

00:02:17 He will testify about the circumstances that

00:02:20 led to, in effect, a bolt being driven into a tire in his car,

00:02:27 which posed not only a symbolic message to him,

00:02:33 but also a personal risk to his safety.

00:02:37 It is simply one example of retaliation and reprisals

00:02:43 and threats that he endured.

00:02:47 Boeing is at a moment of reckoning.

00:02:49 It's a moment many years in the making.

00:02:52 It is a moment that results not from one incident or one flight

00:02:56 or one plane or one plan.

00:02:58 It reached the public consciousness

00:03:03 after the death of 346 people, 346 innocent travelers

00:03:11 in 2018 and 2019, that led Boeing to promise that it would

00:03:20 overhaul its safety practices and culture.

00:03:24 That promise proved empty.

00:03:28 We know it was empty because of incidents

00:03:31 that have occurred since then, most recently the Alaska

00:03:35 Airlines panel blowout.

00:03:38 We know it was empty because the FAA itself audited Boeing's

00:03:43 production and manufacturing and in March concluded,

00:03:46 quote, "noncompliance issues in Boeing's manufacturing process

00:03:52 control, parts handling and storage, and product control,"

00:03:56 end quote, were prevalent.

00:04:00 I want to welcome particularly Sam Salpour, who

00:04:04 came to us because of the gravity of his concerns

00:04:09 and because of what happened to him when he tried to raise

00:04:13 these concerns to Boeing's management,

00:04:16 not once, twice, but consistently and constantly

00:04:22 over a period of years.

00:04:25 And as a result, he was isolated, transferred,

00:04:29 even threatened for refusing to stay silent.

00:04:32 What Boeing did was, in effect, try to silence him,

00:04:37 conceal and cover up the facts that he

00:04:40 was trying to bring to their attention about basic defects

00:04:45 in manufacturing, the failure to properly fuse fuselage parts,

00:04:52 the kind of concerns that led to the blowout of that panel

00:04:58 on the Alaska Airlines flight.

00:05:01 In the wake of the 737 MAX crashes,

00:05:05 many current and former Boeing and FAA officials,

00:05:08 like Ed Pearson and Joe Jacobson, both of whom

00:05:12 are with us today, came forward to raise

00:05:15 those kinds of concern about safety culture at Boeing.

00:05:20 And tragically, last month, John Barnett,

00:05:24 a former Boeing quality control manager in South Carolina

00:05:28 who became a whistleblower, committed suicide

00:05:32 after alleging that managers had been pressuring workers not

00:05:35 to document defects and properly address safety risks.

00:05:40 Since this hearing was announced,

00:05:45 our subcommittee has received outreach

00:05:47 from other individuals affiliated

00:05:49 with Boeing who have contacted us to voice their concerns.

00:05:56 For example, a former Boeing South Carolina manager

00:06:00 wrote to us with examples of what he described as, quote,

00:06:05 "culture of shortcuts, pressure, and hostility"

00:06:10 that he experienced while working at Boeing

00:06:13 between 2009 and 2020.

00:06:16 Another Boeing mechanic who asked to remain anonymous

00:06:21 wrote to us and said, quote, "The Boeing South Carolina

00:06:26 plant was run by a good old boy network that

00:06:29 played by their own rules.

00:06:31 When we raised concerns that the work was not

00:06:33 in accordance with the process and procedures,

00:06:35 we were ordered to just do it and told

00:06:39 there were hundreds of others waiting in line outside the gate

00:06:45 wanting our jobs."

00:06:48 I'm going to ask without objection that these two

00:06:50 letters be entered into the record.

00:06:55 The outreach that we've received,

00:06:58 important and serious contacts with substantive information,

00:07:04 in just the last few days, suggests

00:07:06 that there may be others out there who live in fear,

00:07:10 like Mr. Salipur, like John Barnett.

00:07:16 And they have witnessed the shortcuts or defects that

00:07:20 could lead to the next tragedy.

00:07:25 And their coming forward may help prevent it.

00:07:30 To Mr. Salipur, to Mr. Pearson, to Mr. Jacobson,

00:07:34 and others who have come forward and will come forward

00:07:39 in the future, I just want to say thank you.

00:07:43 Thank you for your courage.

00:07:46 Thank you for speaking truth to power

00:07:51 in the best sense of that word.

00:07:53 Thank you for facing down one of the most powerful companies

00:07:59 in the world.

00:08:00 We intend to uncover what has enabled the culture of safety

00:08:10 disregard to exist so that we can change it for good.

00:08:17 To create a genuine and comprehensive culture

00:08:20 of safety, Boeing must create workplace conditions

00:08:23 where everyone feels comfortable reporting quality and safety

00:08:27 concerns, even in situations where concerns turn out

00:08:31 to be unfounded, even where the complaints are mistaken.

00:08:37 Boeing's culture must be one where employees

00:08:42 are encouraged to speak up.

00:08:48 Boeing is fortunate to have one of the most skilled, competent,

00:08:56 honest, dedicated workforces in the world.

00:09:01 The United States is fortunate to have them working at Boeing.

00:09:07 They deserve to be rewarded, not punished,

00:09:11 for doing their job properly and speaking up

00:09:15 when it's appropriate.

00:09:19 Fortunately for Boeing and for passengers around the world,

00:09:23 this moment of reckoning and the changes that must follow

00:09:25 can still happen before any more lives are lost.

00:09:30 Our committee has initiated a bipartisan inquiry.

00:09:35 We expect both Boeing and the FAA

00:09:38 to fully cooperate and appear before our committee.

00:09:44 Today's hearing, as I mentioned earlier,

00:09:45 is the first of several we intend

00:09:47 to hold to get to the bottom of Boeing's broken safety culture.

00:09:53 We expect Boeing's CEO to appear before us

00:09:57 to tell the American people why the promises made five years ago

00:10:01 by this company have not been fulfilled.

00:10:06 I don't want anyone to mistake our objectives here.

00:10:10 Our goal is not to drive Boeing to fail.

00:10:14 In fact, just the opposite.

00:10:17 We want and need Boeing to succeed.

00:10:21 It is a company that once was preeminent in engineering

00:10:26 and safety.

00:10:27 We want to restore the luster of that reputation

00:10:33 and its business, which have been so sadly battered.

00:10:38 Boeing's workers remain as skilled and talented as ever.

00:10:42 And I'd be remiss if I didn't recognize

00:10:44 that many of these workers are represented by unions,

00:10:47 like the International Association of Machinists

00:10:49 and Aerospace Workers

00:10:51 and the Society of Professional Engineering Employees

00:10:54 in Aerospace.

00:10:54 And they have helped to protect a number of their employees

00:11:00 against retaliation and reprisal.

00:11:05 We want Boeing to learn from its mistakes and be accountable.

00:11:11 We want the Department of Justice

00:11:13 to take this evidence and other facts

00:11:16 that it has obtained to examine the deferred prosecution

00:11:21 agreement, whether conditions of that agreement

00:11:24 have been violated, whether criminal prosecution

00:11:27 is appropriate.

00:11:30 I'm not jumping to conclusions.

00:11:32 I'm a former prosecutor.

00:11:33 I know that investigations have to proceed carefully

00:11:38 and methodically.

00:11:40 But these investigations are important to accountability.

00:11:44 Again, thank you to the witnesses for being here today.

00:11:50 And I turn now to the ranking members.

00:11:53 -Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

00:11:54 I also want to start by thanking our witnesses,

00:11:57 your courage in coming forward as whistleblowers.

00:12:00 I want to underscore what you did say,

00:12:04 that we all want Boeing to succeed.

00:12:08 I would ask that my written opening statement

00:12:10 be entered in the record.

00:12:13 Prior to this hearing, I talked to stakeholders.

00:12:15 I talked to airlines, Boeing's customers.

00:12:18 I talked to Boeing representatives.

00:12:22 It was an overall theme that everybody

00:12:24 wants Boeing to succeed.

00:12:26 We need them to succeed because, as a traveling public,

00:12:30 we want to feel safe in the air.

00:12:32 And I think I enter this investigation

00:12:36 acknowledging the fact that airline travel

00:12:38 is still probably the safest way to travel.

00:12:41 It's what I keep telling myself when I hop on an airplane,

00:12:44 and even when I hop on a 737 Max, it's been taken care of.

00:12:50 We need more whistleblowers, not only in Boeing,

00:12:54 but we need them in the airline,

00:12:56 in their maintenance departments.

00:12:57 We need whistleblowers from the FAA.

00:13:00 This is a very complex business.

00:13:05 They're complex products.

00:13:07 It's a complex problem.

00:13:09 And so I appreciate this hearing.

00:13:12 I'm a little concerned.

00:13:13 What I don't want this committee to do

00:13:15 is scare the you-know-what out of the American public.

00:13:20 In the end, I want the public to be confident

00:13:23 in getting on an airplane and experiencing air travel.

00:13:29 But I have to admit, this testimony

00:13:32 is more than troubling.

00:13:35 And as I was reading the testimony last night,

00:13:38 as I've read more things this morning, as a matter of fact,

00:13:40 I'm going to enter an article that I was given to this morning

00:13:43 written on April 3rd in City Journal.

00:13:47 The title is "An Insider Explains

00:13:48 What Has Gone Disastrously Wrong With Boeing."

00:13:51 And we have to be concerned about what's happening.

00:13:59 And we've got to get to the bottom of this.

00:14:01 This is going to take a lot of work.

00:14:03 This is going to take a lot of investigation.

00:14:05 And again, we need to hold these hearings,

00:14:07 but we need to do the detailed work,

00:14:09 and we need more information.

00:14:11 We need people coming forward on all sides.

00:14:13 Okay?

00:14:15 But I do want to just quote from this article.

00:14:17 It's an interview with an insider,

00:14:22 a whistleblower that's not coming public.

00:14:24 But he tells the story of elite dysfunction,

00:14:28 financial abstraction, and DEI bureaucracy

00:14:30 that has poisoned the culture,

00:14:32 creating a sense of profound alienation

00:14:34 between the people who occupy the executive suite

00:14:36 and those who build airplanes.

00:14:39 It goes on, "Right now, we have an executive counsel

00:14:41 running the company, Boeing, that is all outsiders.

00:14:44 The current CEO is a General Electric guy.

00:14:47 As is the CFO who we brought in.

00:14:50 We have a completely new HR leader

00:14:52 with no background at Boeing.

00:14:54 The head of our commercial airplanes unit in Seattle,

00:14:56 who was fired last week,

00:14:57 was one of the last engineers in the executive counsel.

00:15:01 The headquarters in Arlington is empty.

00:15:03 Nobody lives there.

00:15:04 This is an empty executive suite.

00:15:06 The CEO lives in New Hampshire.

00:15:07 The CFO lives in Connecticut.

00:15:10 The head of HR lives in Orlando.

00:15:13 We just instituted a policy that everyone has to come to work

00:15:15 five days a week except the executive counsel,

00:15:18 which can use private jets to travel to meetings.

00:15:21 And that is the story.

00:15:22 It's a company that is under caretakers.

00:15:24 It's not under owners,

00:15:26 and it's not under people who love airlines.

00:15:28 In this business, the workforce knows

00:15:30 if you love the thing you are building,

00:15:32 or if it's just another set of assets to you.

00:15:34 At some point, you cannot recover that process,

00:15:37 or recover with that, with process,

00:15:40 you cannot recover with process

00:15:43 what you have lost with love.

00:15:45 And I think it's probably the most important story of all.

00:15:47 There's no visible center of the company,

00:15:49 and the people are wondering what they're connected to.

00:15:52 Now again, I read this this morning

00:15:54 after having read the troubling testimony.

00:15:57 There's some real problems at Boeing that need to be fixed,

00:16:01 and I'm not exactly sure how they're gonna get fixed,

00:16:03 but again, this investigation has to include

00:16:06 not only Boeing, it's gotta include

00:16:10 how airlines maintain Boeing products,

00:16:13 but it's also gotta look at the FAA,

00:16:16 and government, and where government

00:16:19 has potentially dropped the ball as well.

00:16:22 So again, this is gonna be,

00:16:24 this has to be a detailed investigation,

00:16:26 and the end result has to be toward

00:16:29 helping Boeing succeed by exposing the truth.

00:16:32 So again, I appreciate the hearing,

00:16:34 and I'm looking forward to the witnesses,

00:16:36 and again, thank them for their participation.

00:16:38 - Thank you very much, Senator Johnson.

00:16:42 I think you've heard bipartisan accord

00:16:46 on the direction we're gonna take,

00:16:47 and I wanna introduce the witnesses for today's hearing.

00:16:51 Sam Salipour, current quality engineer at Boeing,

00:16:55 is a person with four decades of aerospace experience,

00:17:00 including work as an aerospace engineer

00:17:05 for a NASA contractor,

00:17:07 and 17 years as an engineer at Boeing.

00:17:11 In his role at Boeing, he monitors production,

00:17:14 analyzes defects, and develops strategies

00:17:17 to prevent the kinds of incidents

00:17:20 that we've seen from reoccurring.

00:17:23 Mr. Salipour has come forward to our subcommittee

00:17:27 after documenting years of safety concerns

00:17:30 while working on the 777 and the 787 aircraft.

00:17:35 Ed Pearson, executive director of the Foundation

00:17:38 for Aviation Safety, and a former Boeing manager.

00:17:43 Mr. Pearson is a former senior manager

00:17:46 and the current executive director

00:17:48 of the Foundation for Aviation Safety.

00:17:51 He spent 10 years at Boeing and oversaw teams

00:17:55 who manufactured Boeing's 737 MAX airplanes.

00:18:00 Prior to joining Boeing, Mr. Pearson spent over 30 years

00:18:05 in the United States Navy.

00:18:06 I believe you're a graduate of the Naval Academy.

00:18:09 Joe Jacobson.

00:18:12 Mr. Jacobson is a safety and aerospace engineer

00:18:15 who spent more than 25 years at the FAA.

00:18:20 He retired in 2021.

00:18:24 Prior to joining the FAA,

00:18:26 he was an engineer at Boeing for 11 years.

00:18:28 He now serves as a technical advisor

00:18:31 to the Foundation for Aviation Safety.

00:18:35 Dr. Sean Pruchnicki.

00:18:37 He has a PhD.

00:18:41 He's a professional practice assistant professor

00:18:45 for integrated systems engineering

00:18:47 at Ohio State University.

00:18:50 He is also an aviation safety consultant.

00:18:57 He has served as an aviation accident investigator,

00:19:00 and he's a former commercial airline pilot.

00:19:04 As is our custom, I will swear you in,

00:19:09 and then we'll hear your individual testimony

00:19:11 if you would please rise.

00:19:13 You swear that the testimony you're about to give

00:19:19 is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,

00:19:22 so help you God?

00:19:24 Thank you.

00:19:27 Mr. Salipur, you may begin.

00:19:30 Thank you.

00:19:32 Chairman Blumenthal, ranking member Johnson,

00:19:36 and the honorable members of this subcommittee,

00:19:39 thank you for convening this hearing.

00:19:41 My name is Sam Salipur,

00:19:43 and I'm a quality engineer at Boeing.

00:19:45 I have over 40 years of experience as an engineer.

00:19:50 I'm not here today because I want to be here.

00:19:55 I'm here today because I felt that I must come forward

00:19:58 because I do not want to see another 787,

00:20:02 I do not want to see 787 or 7777 crash.

00:20:07 I have serious concerns about the safety

00:20:09 of the 787 and 777 aircraft,

00:20:12 and I'm willing to take on professional risk

00:20:14 to talk about them.

00:20:16 First, a little bit about me.

00:20:18 I came to the United States in 1973

00:20:21 and got a mechanical engineering degree

00:20:23 from University of Missouri, where Senator Hawley is from.

00:20:27 After that, I worked for companies

00:20:29 that they were involved in space shuttle.

00:20:31 I had a friend, engineer, that worked on the space shuttle.

00:20:34 He was always complaining about the quality

00:20:37 of the O-rings that we had

00:20:39 in the space shuttle Sara Rauka boosters.

00:20:42 He was scared that they might fail.

00:20:45 He raised his concerns, and he was heard,

00:20:48 and he wasn't heard, and seven brave astronauts,

00:20:53 including the teacher in space,

00:20:56 died when the Challenger O-rings ultimately failed,

00:21:00 just as he predicted.

00:21:03 At the moment, I know that if I were ever

00:21:06 in a similar situation, I would have to come up

00:21:09 and speak up.

00:21:11 I have analyzed Boeing's own data

00:21:13 to conclude that the company's taken manufacturing shortcuts

00:21:17 on the 787 program that may significantly reduce

00:21:21 the airplane's safety and the life cycle.

00:21:25 Since 2013, there have been serious issues

00:21:29 on the 787 program, not properly closing thousands of gaps

00:21:33 in its assembly of the fuselage on major joints.

00:21:37 Boeing's standard says that these joints,

00:21:39 these gaps must be closed, usually by a small shim

00:21:43 or filler called a shim when they exceed

00:21:46 five thousandths of an inch.

00:21:48 This seems very small.

00:21:50 Boeing's PR team like to call it the width of a human hair.

00:21:55 When you are operating at 35,000 feet.

00:21:58 Details are that the size of a human hair

00:22:02 can be a matter of a life and death.

00:22:05 In a rush to address its bottlenecks in production,

00:22:08 Boeing hit problems pushing pieces together

00:22:11 with excessive force to make them appear

00:22:14 that the gaps don't exist, even though they exist.

00:22:17 The gap didn't actually go away,

00:22:19 and this may result in premature fatigue failure.

00:22:23 Effectively, they are putting out defective airplanes.

00:22:26 I respectively, I repeatedly produced reports

00:22:30 for my supervisors and Boeing management,

00:22:33 demonstrating that the gaps in the 787

00:22:36 not being properly measured or shimmed

00:22:38 in two major joints of the 787.

00:22:41 Evaluating from Boeing, from the 29 inspected airplane data,

00:22:46 I found gaps exceeding the specification

00:22:50 that were not properly addressed 98.7% of the time.

00:22:55 I want to repeat that.

00:22:56 98.7% of the time, the gaps that they were supposed

00:23:00 to be shimmed, they were not shimmed.

00:23:03 The other issue that I found when you have these gaps

00:23:08 and you drill through them,

00:23:09 you get some debris in the stack ups.

00:23:11 This is known to be a problem, you know,

00:23:14 not a good thing for the airplanes by Boeing.

00:23:17 But Boeing data also, you know,

00:23:19 from the inspection of the data shows

00:23:21 that the debris ended up in the gaps 80% of the time.

00:23:26 Again, you know, you have debris in the gaps 80% of the time.

00:23:31 I want to make clear that I have raised these issues

00:23:35 over three years.

00:23:36 I was ignored, I was told not to create delays.

00:23:40 I was told, frankly, to shut up.

00:23:42 At one point, Boeing management got sick of me

00:23:46 and raising these issues and moved me out

00:23:48 of the 787 program into this 777 program.

00:23:52 On the 777 program, I found problems.

00:23:55 Again, I found that Boeing started a new process

00:23:58 to build the airplane without taking into the consideration

00:24:02 of the design of the airplane

00:24:04 and how the airplane was designed.

00:24:06 As a result, I witnessed severe misalignment

00:24:09 when the planes were assembled.

00:24:12 Boeing manufacturing used unmeasured

00:24:14 and unlimited amount of force to correct the misalignment.

00:24:19 And this also weakens the airplane in the long run.

00:24:23 I literally saw people jumping on the pieces of the airplane

00:24:27 to get them to align.

00:24:29 I call it the Tarzan effect, among other improper methods.

00:24:33 Again, I raised concerns internally.

00:24:36 I was sidelined, I was told to shut up.

00:24:38 I received physical threats.

00:24:41 My boss said, "I would have killed someone

00:24:45 "who said what you said in a meeting."

00:24:47 And then, this is not a safety culture

00:24:50 where you get threatened

00:24:52 by bringing issues of safety concerns.

00:24:55 I hope that your work on this issue signals to Boeing

00:24:59 that they must make real changes

00:25:02 and get back to building their airplane safely.

00:25:05 I'll be more than happy to answer your questions.

00:25:08 - Thank you very much, Mr. Salipur.

00:25:10 Ms. Pearson.

00:25:12 (papers rustling)

00:25:15 - Chair Blumenthal, Ranking Member Johnson,

00:25:17 distinguished members of the committee, good morning.

00:25:20 Thank you for inviting me today.

00:25:21 My name is Ed Pearson.

00:25:22 My father was a Washington, D.C. homicide detective

00:25:26 and my mom was a nurse.

00:25:28 I learned the importance of telling the truth from them,

00:25:31 my teachers and coaches,

00:25:33 and this was reinforced at the Naval Academy.

00:25:36 The military, like all high hazard jobs,

00:25:38 demands that people tell the truth

00:25:40 and admit their mistakes

00:25:41 because if you don't, people will die.

00:25:44 Since the first Boeing Max airplane crash,

00:25:46 I've spent every day thinking about the victims,

00:25:50 their families, and the millions of people

00:25:51 that fly Boeing airplanes.

00:25:53 I've done everything I can to continue telling the world

00:25:56 the Max airplane is still unsafe

00:25:58 and to alert authorities

00:26:00 to Boeing's dangerous manufacturing.

00:26:02 I'm here today to share four key messages.

00:26:06 First, the manufacturing conditions

00:26:07 that led to the two 737 Max disasters

00:26:10 also led to the Alaskan accident, blowout accident,

00:26:14 and these conditions continue.

00:26:16 In 2019, I testified as a Boeing whistleblower.

00:26:20 I had previously warned the 737 general manager

00:26:23 before the Max crash to shut down the factory.

00:26:26 I also warned Boeing's general counsels,

00:26:29 the CEO and the board of directors

00:26:31 before the second crash to shut it down.

00:26:34 They ignored my warnings.

00:26:36 During my 2019 testimony,

00:26:37 I described the chaotic manufacturing,

00:26:39 the dysfunctional safety culture,

00:26:41 and the horrible job government authorities were doing

00:26:43 investigating the two crashes.

00:26:45 The world is shocked to learn

00:26:46 about Boeing's current production quality issues.

00:26:49 I'm not surprised

00:26:50 because nothing changed after the two crashes.

00:26:53 There was no accountability.

00:26:54 Not a single person from Boeing went to jail.

00:26:57 Hundreds of people died, and there's been no justice.

00:27:00 Unless action is taken and leaders are held accountable,

00:27:04 every person stepping aboard a Boeing airplane is at risk.

00:27:08 Government authorities ignored Boeing's

00:27:10 manufacturing problems until the Alaska accident.

00:27:12 Passengers shouldn't have to rely on whistleblowers

00:27:15 to provide the truth.

00:27:16 They should be able to get on airplanes

00:27:18 and not have to worry about what model it is,

00:27:20 whether it was designed and manufactured

00:27:22 to the highest of standards,

00:27:23 whether the airline is operating and maintaining it properly,

00:27:26 or whether government agencies are providing proper oversight.

00:27:31 FAA, DOT, and NTSB leaders frequently state

00:27:35 our aviation system is the gold standard.

00:27:38 There's a reason commercial aviation

00:27:40 has been historically safe,

00:27:41 and that's because people worked extremely hard

00:27:43 for decades to keep them safe.

00:27:45 They told the truth.

00:27:47 They admitted their mistakes,

00:27:48 and they didn't downplay safety incidents.

00:27:50 These agencies have become lazy, complacent, and reactive.

00:27:55 The deterioration has been occurring over several years.

00:27:59 My second point is the gold standard

00:28:00 is now fool's gold,

00:28:02 'cause the only thing that is more dangerous

00:28:05 than a dangerous environment

00:28:07 is the illusion of a safe environment.

00:28:09 Two brand new airplanes crashed

00:28:11 after exhibiting production-related

00:28:12 electrical and electronic defects

00:28:14 within their first month of operation,

00:28:16 and the NTSB did not investigate the factory.

00:28:18 The evidence indicates the MAX crashes

00:28:20 were triggered by manufacturing defects,

00:28:23 not MCAS software.

00:28:24 The NTSB is investigating the factory now.

00:28:27 However, the reality is the NTSB is overly dependent

00:28:30 on Boeing and the FAA to provide technical assistance

00:28:32 in their action investigations.

00:28:34 They are not an independent investigative authority.

00:28:37 There is an inherent conflict of interest.

00:28:40 The Department of Transportation

00:28:42 has been completely useless

00:28:43 in helping the FAA do their jobs.

00:28:46 They have continued to take a hands-off approach

00:28:48 to this entire matter.

00:28:49 My third point is if the leaders

00:28:52 of those government authorities,

00:28:53 government agencies had done their jobs,

00:28:56 investigators would have uncovered

00:28:58 a mountain of important information.

00:28:59 The FAA would have known Boeing's production processes

00:29:01 were a mess and the safety culture was terrible.

00:29:04 The FAA could have prevented an ever-increasing list

00:29:07 of production-quality defects.

00:29:08 Instead, they're surprised each time it occurs,

00:29:11 showing how ineffective and reactive

00:29:12 their oversight has become.

00:29:14 Just last month, the FAA reported on uncommanded rolls

00:29:18 of MAX airplanes due to wiring that is being chafed.

00:29:22 Boeing and the FAA have known about these

00:29:23 manufacturing defects for more than two years

00:29:26 and did not inform the public

00:29:27 about this potentially catastrophic condition.

00:29:30 There are also Canadian reports of new MAX airplanes

00:29:32 with chafed wire bundles containing burn marks

00:29:35 and evidence of electrical arcing.

00:29:37 Routine, excuse me, Boeing routinely states

00:29:40 that their airplanes meet or exceed all safety standards.

00:29:43 This is untrue and misrepresents the safety of the airplanes.

00:29:47 The company illegally removed thousands

00:29:49 of quality control inspections on individual airplanes

00:29:52 without the FAA's knowledge

00:29:54 and without the knowledge of the airlines.

00:29:56 Although many of these inspections have been reinstated,

00:29:58 hundreds of airplanes have left Boeing factories

00:30:00 without those thousands of inspections.

00:30:02 My last point is the Department of Justice and FBI

00:30:05 relied on the slanted results

00:30:07 of the first MAX accident investigation

00:30:09 to develop an illegal and unjust

00:30:12 deferred prosecution agreement.

00:30:14 The NTSB chair reiterated to Congress last week

00:30:16 that Boeing has said there are no records

00:30:19 documenting the removal of the Alaska Airlines door.

00:30:22 I'm not gonna sugarcoat this.

00:30:23 This is a criminal coverup.

00:30:25 Records do in fact exist.

00:30:27 I know this because I've personally passed them to the FBI.

00:30:30 A five minute testimony is not nearly enough time

00:30:34 to explain how insidious this story is.

00:30:36 Boeing's corporate leaders continue to conceal the truth.

00:30:39 They continue to mislead and deceive the public

00:30:41 about the safety of the planes.

00:30:43 That is the safety culture at the top

00:30:44 of the Boeing company right now.

00:30:46 The good news is the employees of Boeing

00:30:48 and these agencies can overcome poor leadership.

00:30:51 We need them to be successful.

00:30:53 They're highly capable.

00:30:54 They need to be supported and encouraged

00:30:56 and these problems are fixable

00:30:58 but it starts with telling the truth.

00:31:00 - Thanks Mr. Pierson.

00:31:03 Mr. Jacobson.

00:31:04 - Thank you senators.

00:31:07 My name is Joe Jacobson.

00:31:08 I'm an aerospace engineer

00:31:10 with almost 40 years of experience.

00:31:12 I worked for Boeing from 1984 to 1995

00:31:15 on the 767 and 777 programs.

00:31:19 From 1995 to 2021 I worked in aircraft certification

00:31:23 at the FAA.

00:31:25 I retired from the FAA in 2021

00:31:27 and have been volunteering

00:31:28 as an independent aviation safety advocate since,

00:31:31 mostly in support of the ET302 families.

00:31:35 On November 6th, 2018, a week after the Lion Air 610 crash,

00:31:41 I received an email from a colleague

00:31:44 asking if we had done any issue papers on MCAS.

00:31:47 This was the first day that I heard about MCAS.

00:31:51 The next day, although not assigned

00:31:52 to the crash investigation,

00:31:54 I received an email from a colleague at the FAA

00:31:57 which contained flight data recorder information

00:31:59 from the Lion Air crash.

00:32:01 It was immediately obvious to me

00:32:04 that the 737 MAX had a serious design flaw.

00:32:08 I saw that the horizontal stabilizer

00:32:09 was repeatedly moving at a high rate

00:32:12 because of a faulty angle of attack input.

00:32:14 I guessed that a software error was responsible.

00:32:17 A few days later, I was shocked to discover

00:32:20 that the airplane was purposely designed

00:32:22 and certified to use just one AOA input

00:32:25 for this flight critical function.

00:32:27 When the house report was released in September of 2020,

00:32:32 I finally understood why I hadn't known about MCAS.

00:32:36 Boeing meeting minutes from June 2013

00:32:39 recorded the reason, saying,

00:32:41 if we emphasize MCAS as a new function,

00:32:45 there may be a greater certification and training impact.

00:32:50 Boeing intentionally hid the design

00:32:52 from FAA engineers and airline pilots.

00:32:55 Had we known, at least a half dozen experienced FAA engineers

00:32:59 in Seattle, in the Seattle office,

00:33:01 would have immediately rejected the original MCAS design.

00:33:06 Boeing concealment led to two crashes and 346 deaths.

00:33:11 After working on the recertification of the MAX

00:33:15 after the second crash,

00:33:16 I sent a letter to the parents of Sam Ustumo

00:33:19 shortly before my retirement in March of 2021.

00:33:23 I saw their anger and grief

00:33:25 and wanted them to know the true story

00:33:27 and not the false narrative presented by Boeing and FAA.

00:33:31 Over the last three years,

00:33:34 Sammy's parents have connected me

00:33:36 with many other crash families.

00:33:38 I frequently communicate with the devastated people

00:33:42 who have lost loved ones in the ET-302 crash.

00:33:46 I've heard many inspiring stories

00:33:48 about those who were lost.

00:33:51 Stories about Samia, Mick, Camille, Melvin,

00:33:54 Bennett, Danielle, Graziela, and others.

00:33:58 The recertification of the MAX has been characterized

00:34:01 as the most comprehensive in the history of aviation.

00:34:04 This is also a false narrative.

00:34:07 During the recertification of the MAX,

00:34:12 FAA leadership supported Boeing's effort to narrow the scope

00:34:16 to primarily focus on MCAS.

00:34:19 MCAS was a mess for sure,

00:34:21 but other critical items were off the re-examination table.

00:34:25 The MAX crew alerting system

00:34:27 doesn't meet current design requirements.

00:34:30 And by my count,

00:34:31 the old standard has contributed to eight fatal crashes

00:34:35 of Boeing aircraft and 885 deaths since 1996.

00:34:40 Despite this dismal safety record,

00:34:43 in July, 2022, Boeing Chief Safety Officer, Mike Delaney,

00:34:48 stated, "I personally have no belief

00:34:52 that there's any value in changing the 737."

00:34:56 CEO, Dave Calhoun, lobbied further and said,

00:35:00 "This is a risk I'm willing to take.

00:35:03 If I lose the fight, I lose the fight."

00:35:05 Boeing lobbying efforts ultimately succeeded.

00:35:08 The grandfathered design of this MAX

00:35:12 leaves many vulnerabilities.

00:35:14 When combined with the failure

00:35:16 to investigate the manufacturing chaos

00:35:18 identified nearly six years ago by Ed Pearson,

00:35:21 this has led to a predictable,

00:35:24 but still shocking list of unsafe conditions.

00:35:27 I've spent almost 40 years studying

00:35:30 and trying to eliminate aviation accidents.

00:35:33 Ignoring problems, taking shortcuts,

00:35:38 and deceiving the public just leads to more crashes.

00:35:42 I'm testifying today out of my great love and respect

00:35:45 for the crash family members that I know.

00:35:48 Michael, Nadia, Nisha, Catherine, Ike, Chris, Javier,

00:35:52 and others don't want this to happen to anyone else.

00:35:55 I also have children and grandchildren.

00:36:00 Let's work together to fix this now.

00:36:03 Thank you.

00:36:04 - Thanks, Mr. Pearson.

00:36:05 Mr. Brzezinski, Professor.

00:36:11 - Chairman Bartholomew, Ranking Member Johnson,

00:36:13 and members of the committee, good morning,

00:36:15 and thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

00:36:17 I'm an assistant professor

00:36:19 in both integrated systems engineering

00:36:20 and the Center for Aviation Studies

00:36:22 at The Ohio State University.

00:36:24 Prior to teaching at Ohio State, I was an airline pilot.

00:36:27 During my time teaching at the university,

00:36:29 I earned my PhD in cognitive systems engineering.

00:36:33 Although there have been slight variations

00:36:35 in the exact definition, one has been of safety culture,

00:36:39 one that has been used for years, decades even,

00:36:43 are shared beliefs, assumptions, and norms

00:36:46 which may govern organizational decision-making

00:36:49 as well as individual and group attitudes about safety.

00:36:53 An incorrect understanding of safety culture

00:36:55 is that it is commonly referred to as a single concept,

00:36:59 but rather it consists of four

00:37:01 individual-specific components,

00:37:03 whereas each one provides its own unique actions

00:37:07 to the overall concept of safety culture.

00:37:09 And without one of these,

00:37:11 the element and structure of culture will fall apart.

00:37:14 As such, each serves the greater goal

00:37:17 of providing a robust, effective,

00:37:20 and well-proven safety tool for all high-risk industries,

00:37:24 especially given its proven value in aerospace industries.

00:37:28 It should be made clear this culture concept

00:37:31 is not only for airline operations,

00:37:33 but rather any aerospace operation

00:37:36 where risk of injury or death is a possibility

00:37:39 to employees and/or customer after product delivery.

00:37:44 This is extremely important

00:37:46 in determining an organization's overall safety culture

00:37:49 as they all complement each other.

00:37:53 To be successful, organizations may not simply choose

00:37:57 simply one or two of these components

00:37:59 because they are less expensive or more manageable.

00:38:02 In addition, in aerospace,

00:38:04 not following all four components of the safety culture

00:38:08 or just the ones that have less impact,

00:38:11 thus to appear to regulators or shareholders

00:38:14 that they are being responsive, finally,

00:38:16 and expeditious is not acceptable.

00:38:19 This type of action will produce a non-viable, misleading,

00:38:24 and potentially dangerous safety culture

00:38:27 that will teeter on failure

00:38:29 and provide a false sense of security.

00:38:33 (papers rustling)

00:38:36 Let me be clear.

00:38:37 When you try to increase productivity

00:38:40 without the needed resources

00:38:43 and being guided by poor management

00:38:45 with only financial focus

00:38:49 and the lack of assembly line inspectors,

00:38:52 you are always borrowing from safety.

00:38:54 You cannot have both.

00:38:56 And case in point, this is where we see events

00:39:00 like the door blowout with Alaska Airlines.

00:39:04 NASA learned the hard way many decades ago,

00:39:07 and other organizations,

00:39:09 aerospace organizations have as well,

00:39:12 with their new plan to operate

00:39:14 when they decided they were gonna operate

00:39:16 faster, better, and cheaper, and it failed horribly.

00:39:19 They learned that you can only have two of the three,

00:39:22 never all three at the same time,

00:39:24 or accidents will happen.

00:39:28 When we examine these four components

00:39:30 of what constructs a safety culture,

00:39:33 it appears that Boeing has none of them under control,

00:39:37 and there is no evidence

00:39:38 that this trend is, in fact, reversing.

00:39:41 This was discussed at the Huntington Beach Conference

00:39:44 in February of 2023, which I attended,

00:39:47 but there does not appear to be any evidence

00:39:50 of such changes to any of the components on the horizon

00:39:55 as a string of alarming events continue to unfold.

00:40:00 In the safety engineering work,

00:40:01 we call these precursors to accidents,

00:40:04 and I have never in my decades of aerospace safety work

00:40:08 seen so many continuing to arrive one after another.

00:40:13 Where is the safety accountability

00:40:16 all the way to the CEO,

00:40:21 where they discuss safety

00:40:26 in addition to the money problems, all the way to the top?

00:40:29 Some of these companies profess to practice,

00:40:32 yet never seem to do that.

00:40:35 All safety cultures, both those that have

00:40:39 and profess to have a good safety culture

00:40:41 and SMS programs were developed by the FAA

00:40:45 and provide guidance how to do that.

00:40:46 At Boeing, is there safety accountability

00:40:49 all the way to the top?

00:40:51 This was discussed after the previous accidents,

00:40:54 but where's the evidence for that?

00:40:56 In closing, you would think that there would have been

00:40:59 made clear after having been directly responsible

00:41:02 for the two air carrier fatal accidents

00:41:04 that at its core causation was 100% about money

00:41:09 and about sneaking through the certification process

00:41:12 and automation related component

00:41:15 that killed 346 people over money.

00:41:19 And yet we still have no proof that these programs

00:41:22 have even entered the lexicon of Boeing.

00:41:25 Aircraft despite the hollow comments to the contrary

00:41:28 at the Huntington Beach Safety Conference.

00:41:30 So it leaves me to wonder,

00:41:32 have we even gone backwards at Boeing?

00:41:34 The Alaska Airlines event strongly supports that.

00:41:37 My final comment is, I have always felt

00:41:41 as an accident investigator for over 20 years

00:41:44 and I've always said that with these accidents,

00:41:47 maybe the upper management should actually go

00:41:49 to these accident scenes and witness what they look like

00:41:53 as does the rest of us do.

00:41:55 Thank you for your time.

00:41:56 - Thank you, Professor Brzezinski.

00:41:58 (audience member speaking off mic)

00:42:02 I would be happy to talk to you after this hearing is done.

00:42:12 (audience member speaking off mic)

00:42:17 I wanna spare you being removed and just tell you

00:42:21 that we will be happy to take those documents

00:42:24 and meet with you privately.

00:42:26 And we welcome your being here.

00:42:28 We also welcome the presence of Chris and Clarisse Moore,

00:42:33 whose daughter Danielle died

00:42:39 in the Ethiopia Airlines crash.

00:42:43 They remind us that the seemingly abstract,

00:42:48 even antiseptic setting of this hearing

00:42:52 belies the fact that there are real people

00:42:56 who perished in those two crashes.

00:43:00 There are real people at risk getting on airlines right now.

00:43:05 No reason to panic, but a reason for deep concern.

00:43:10 And we thank everyone who may have documents

00:43:13 or information to bring to our attention.

00:43:15 We thank you.

00:43:16 Professor Brzezinski, what keeps ringing in my ears

00:43:23 is that phrase, 100% about money.

00:43:26 My understanding about what happened here

00:43:29 is that Boeing sought to produce more airplanes more quickly

00:43:34 without the necessary testing, inspections,

00:43:40 and then sought to conceal and cover up

00:43:44 what it knew was happening.

00:43:47 Is that aligned with your view of the facts here?

00:43:50 Absolutely, that in fact is part of it,

00:43:52 because those things are expensive.

00:43:55 And there's more to it.

00:43:57 There's other things that go into that process.

00:44:00 One of the biggest is the inspectors.

00:44:03 Cutting back and getting rid of your inspector staff

00:44:08 that looks at all the parts to make sure

00:44:10 that these things are assembled correctly.

00:44:12 We saw this with the Alaska accident.

00:44:15 One of the lessons here is that shortchanging safety

00:44:19 with shortcuts is short-sighted.

00:44:22 I wanna ask Mr. Salapor for many of us

00:44:27 who may not understand the technology

00:44:31 or the mechanics here.

00:44:34 My understanding of your testimony

00:44:36 is that Boeing in effect fastened parts of the fuselage

00:44:41 together using force rather than proper shimming

00:44:46 and thereby created a severe risk

00:44:50 that use over time and fatigue of the parts

00:44:55 and fasteners would create risk to safety.

00:45:00 Is that roughly correct?

00:45:01 Yes, sir.

00:45:03 Boeing, they are using significant excessive force

00:45:08 to squash the gaps before you measure it.

00:45:12 If you squash in the gap before you measure it,

00:45:15 you don't know what you're getting,

00:45:17 because the purpose of that is to measure the gap

00:45:20 in its free state.

00:45:21 When you squash that with excessive force,

00:45:24 basically you're getting false information.

00:45:26 If you get the gap measured falsely,

00:45:29 you are not gonna shim it properly,

00:45:31 and it's a danger to the airplane.

00:45:33 It's very, very important.

00:45:35 Boeing has put out reports that they say

00:45:38 that they can lose almost 80% of the airplane life cycle

00:45:43 if we don't follow these protocols,

00:45:48 which it is the proper shimming, measuring the gap.

00:45:52 One remedy or one precaution would be proper testing.

00:46:00 Has Boeing ever shown you conclusive testing results

00:46:05 that would dispel your concerns?

00:46:07 No, sir.

00:46:08 First of all, the testing that we're talking about,

00:46:10 I have never seen it, any of the information.

00:46:13 The second is the airplane is the king.

00:46:16 The numbers that you get from the actual airplanes,

00:46:20 regardless of what the testing done,

00:46:22 that should be considered.

00:46:23 And my data that I was using in my assessment

00:46:26 is from the 29 airplane that it was inspected.

00:46:31 Mr. Pearson and Mr. Jacobson,

00:46:34 you have very extensive experience with Boeing.

00:46:36 Will their safety do the allegations

00:46:40 that Mr. Salapur has brought to our attention

00:46:43 surprise you in light of your experience?

00:46:45 Well, I just wanna say that I can't,

00:46:47 obviously, technically say that what he's saying

00:46:50 is absolutely right, I just don't know that,

00:46:52 but I will say that the problem that he's describing

00:46:56 where he's trying to get information

00:46:59 and he's basically being told,

00:47:01 you know, basically shut up, don't worry about it.

00:47:03 He's obviously making an effort,

00:47:05 a long effort to try to get to the truth

00:47:07 and what should happen is somebody should say,

00:47:10 here's the data, here's the information.

00:47:11 He shouldn't have to wait until becoming a whistleblower

00:47:15 to get that information.

00:47:17 Mr. Jacobson, you worked at the FAA for quite a while.

00:47:23 Mr. Pearson and as well, Mr. Salapur,

00:47:28 have been critical, as many of us have been, of the FAA.

00:47:33 In fact, Mr. Pearson has brought to the attention

00:47:37 of federal authorities information

00:47:38 about the potential failings

00:47:42 of those investigative steps by federal agencies.

00:47:46 Do you think just assigning more inspectors

00:47:50 to Boeing from the FAA is a sufficient solution?

00:47:55 Well, certainly having more inspectors

00:47:59 is helpful in certain circumstances.

00:48:02 I think in the Renton factory, having more inspectors,

00:48:06 more of an on-site presence is very important,

00:48:10 but the attitude needs to change.

00:48:12 The attitude right now is Boeing dictates to the FAA,

00:48:17 tells the FAA what they will do, what they will accept,

00:48:20 and that needs to change.

00:48:22 The FAA needs to be a regulator.

00:48:25 They need to do their job,

00:48:26 and that's the missing piece right now.

00:48:29 Would it be fair to say that the FAA

00:48:31 has been too captive to Boeing?

00:48:33 They absolutely have been too captive to Boeing,

00:48:36 and that is one of the big problems that I've seen.

00:48:41 Even when we were trying to recertify the 737 MAX,

00:48:47 Boeing would try and focus the attention

00:48:50 on certain things like MCAS

00:48:52 to the exclusion of other parts of the airplane

00:48:56 or the design or the manufacturing

00:48:58 that needed to be investigated,

00:49:00 and Boeing and the FAA went along with that at high levels.

00:49:05 They went along with that,

00:49:07 you know, the redirect from the Boeing company.

00:49:12 - Mr. Salipur, I showed you earlier a photograph

00:49:17 of a tire wheel from your car.

00:49:20 That bolt was inserted by someone as a threat

00:49:26 or perhaps as a risk to you?

00:49:27 - Yes, I was losing just air on my tire,

00:49:30 and I bring it somewhere, and they say,

00:49:32 "Hey, you have a nailing tire."

00:49:33 That's about one month old tire,

00:49:36 so I brought it back to the shop that they fixed it,

00:49:40 and they fixed it, I went to pick it up,

00:49:43 and the gentleman told me that,

00:49:45 "You know, this nail was not picked up

00:49:47 "through normal driving."

00:49:49 You know, I didn't know anything about that.

00:49:52 He's the one who brought it to my attention.

00:49:54 And I came home, and I had to go all the way back there

00:49:56 to get the tire, to just save the tire.

00:49:59 It was like 25-mile drive, but anyway,

00:50:02 what the bottom line is that, yes,

00:50:04 the nail was inserted in there.

00:50:06 I believe it happened at work.

00:50:08 I have no proof of that.

00:50:10 - You mentioned also a threat to your physical safety,

00:50:13 someone saying they would have killed you if they heard.

00:50:16 - Yes, someone told me they would have killed someone like me

00:50:20 if you said something, what you said, so.

00:50:22 - The FAA issued an absolutely scathing report about Boeing,

00:50:28 and Boeing has said that it's developing an action plan.

00:50:34 I'd like to ask you, Mr. Pearson,

00:50:38 should we rely on Boeing to, in effect,

00:50:43 develop its own action plan,

00:50:44 evaluate itself, and go on about its business,

00:50:50 or do we need continuing investigation?

00:50:52 - We absolutely need continuing investigation,

00:50:54 and honestly, I'm so tired of hearing about plans.

00:50:56 We need action, and you know, you can plan all day long,

00:51:00 but if you don't actually carry through with it,

00:51:02 it doesn't matter.

00:51:03 - You'd like to see action?

00:51:05 - Yes, sir.

00:51:07 - I think that's one of the common themes here.

00:51:09 We need action, not just more talk.

00:51:12 I'm gonna yield at this point.

00:51:14 We're observing a seven-minute round,

00:51:17 and we're gonna try to stick to it.

00:51:20 Senator Johnson.

00:51:22 - So let me point out, I think it's the 800-pound grill

00:51:25 in the room, is the tremendous pressure, society-wide,

00:51:30 to keep these planes flying.

00:51:33 I mean, if we were to literally ground stop 737s,

00:51:37 what would happen to our economy?

00:51:40 Again, that's why we don't even like contemplating

00:51:43 that reality, but I wanna start focusing on the 737,

00:51:46 'cause that's the one issue, you got the 787,

00:51:48 then you have the subcontractors, from my standpoint,

00:51:51 the three, and then the overall culture of Boeing,

00:51:54 but there's a discrepancy between our two witnesses here.

00:51:58 Mr. Pearson, you were saying

00:52:00 that it was a manufacturing defect,

00:52:03 and Mr. Jacobson, you're focusing on the MCAS,

00:52:06 which is what the public was all told,

00:52:08 it was that control system,

00:52:10 and with only a single indicator

00:52:12 that if that went defective, so again,

00:52:15 that was the story told, what is the truth?

00:52:18 We'll start with you, Mr. Jacobson.

00:52:21 - Well, the truth is, it's more than one thing, right?

00:52:24 It's the entire system.

00:52:26 You have to look at manufacturing,

00:52:28 you have to look at, also, at the design.

00:52:33 Since the MAX has gone back into service,

00:52:36 this is the list of manufacturing,

00:52:38 these are unsafe conditions that are identified

00:52:41 by the FAA in the manufacturing area.

00:52:43 Engine anti-ice, exhaust duct fasteners,

00:52:48 compromised seal and adhesion within the center fuel tank,

00:52:52 loose bolts in the rudder assembly,

00:52:54 stuck rudder pedals,

00:52:55 misinstalled electrical wire bundles in the wing spoilers,

00:53:00 and then, of course, the door blowout

00:53:01 was also a manufacturing defect.

00:53:03 So we have a long list of unsafe conditions

00:53:07 from manufacturing defects.

00:53:09 We also have a long list,

00:53:10 equally long list of design defects.

00:53:12 So what that tells me is it's a company-wide problem.

00:53:17 It's not--

00:53:18 - So the MAX was taken out of service for how long?

00:53:20 Quite some time, right?

00:53:21 - 20 months.

00:53:22 - 20 months, and again, the public,

00:53:24 I was certainly hoping,

00:53:26 assuming that that 20 months,

00:53:28 they were able to correct those defects,

00:53:30 that they did install more of the indicators, right?

00:53:34 So they've somewhat fixed that problem?

00:53:36 I mean, are all these other problems

00:53:37 completely unaddressed, not fixed?

00:53:40 - There were many problems that were unaddressed.

00:53:43 The crew alerting system is the big one.

00:53:46 That one was not addressed.

00:53:49 That contributed to the crashes.

00:53:51 The pilots had a lot of false indications going off,

00:53:54 which delays their response,

00:53:56 and they're trying to figure out what's going on.

00:53:59 In the meantime, the stabilizer is running,

00:54:04 and the nose is running down.

00:54:06 So it's a combination of things that need to be addressed.

00:54:11 - What have the pilots had to say about this?

00:54:13 I mean, one of my things that comfort me

00:54:15 is that pilots are concerned about safety.

00:54:18 They do some safety checks before they get on the airplane,

00:54:22 but they're the ones that have to fly these things.

00:54:24 What do pilots have to say about the 737 MAX right now?

00:54:28 - Well, I've heard some reports.

00:54:33 Dennis Tazer has been very vocal.

00:54:35 He's an American Airlines MAX pilot.

00:54:38 Also works with us at the Foundation for Aviation Safety.

00:54:41 He's been very vocal about the shortcomings of the MAX.

00:54:46 - Does he fly them?

00:54:47 - He does.

00:54:47 - And he still flies them?

00:54:49 - He still flies them, and he says,

00:54:52 "Why is Boeing putting all these extra hazards

00:54:54 "into my cockpit?

00:54:56 "It's a big enough job to fly this airplane

00:55:00 "and take care of the passengers in the back.

00:55:02 "I don't need extra problems to be dealing with,

00:55:05 "like manufacturing defects, design defects."

00:55:09 And they're one after another.

00:55:10 There's a long list that I've put in my--

00:55:12 - Mr. Pearson, do you have anything to add to that

00:55:14 on the 737?

00:55:15 - No, I totally agree with Mr. Jacobson.

00:55:19 You know, when they investigated the accidents,

00:55:21 they narrowly scoped it, and they kept it very tight.

00:55:25 And as an example of that,

00:55:27 when the plane was returned to service,

00:55:28 the MAX airplanes were returned to service,

00:55:31 they said that they fixed the MCAS software,

00:55:33 and they provided the pilots the training that they needed.

00:55:37 And then they said, "We fixed some wiring."

00:55:39 But it was unrelated to the accidents.

00:55:42 Well, a couple months ago, we found the service bulletin

00:55:45 that was sent out to the airlines to fix some wiring.

00:55:48 That document was 343 pages long.

00:55:53 It identified at least 12 areas on the airplane

00:55:56 that had improper electrical installation.

00:56:00 And I will tell you that when those planes were being built,

00:56:03 we were having repeat problems

00:56:05 getting our functional testing done correctly.

00:56:08 And this is something that we continued to push and push

00:56:11 and push the planes out the door,

00:56:13 and we were having difficulty

00:56:14 getting our aircraft systems testing.

00:56:15 What people don't know,

00:56:17 and I'll just give you a couple of examples very quickly,

00:56:19 is in the Lion airplane, that sensor,

00:56:22 that angle of attack sensor was removed the day before,

00:56:25 replaced with the refurbished sensor.

00:56:27 On the next flight, the plane almost crashed.

00:56:29 On the next flight, it did crash.

00:56:31 When that plane hit the ocean,

00:56:32 it went right into the seawall.

00:56:34 They never recovered that sensor that was just installed,

00:56:37 but they had the original Boeing installed sensor,

00:56:40 and they tested that sensor,

00:56:41 and it had an open circuit in it.

00:56:43 It had evidence of arcing and burn marks.

00:56:46 And so that is an example.

00:56:48 And then, I'm just pointing that out,

00:56:51 that this is-- - That's getting

00:56:52 a level of detail right now.

00:56:53 I don't have, I'm trying to find, appreciate that.

00:56:56 Again, I'll keep, this shows you, Mr. Chairman,

00:57:00 what we need to get the airlines in here,

00:57:03 whether they want to or not,

00:57:04 they have to come in here and talk about

00:57:06 what they're doing in response to these technical bulletins.

00:57:09 We need to get pilots in here.

00:57:11 We need to talk to pilots, 'cause from my standpoint,

00:57:13 they're almost the last line of defense

00:57:16 in terms of safety from the flying public,

00:57:19 'cause they're on that, I would never get on a plane

00:57:20 that's autonomous, never.

00:57:23 - Senator, I just, I echo what you're saying,

00:57:25 but I think we also need to broaden that aperture.

00:57:27 We need to talk to the mechanics--

00:57:28 - Oh, I agree. - And the technicians

00:57:29 and all those individuals.

00:57:30 - No, again, as you said in your testimony,

00:57:33 five minutes' testimony doesn't even begin

00:57:35 to scratch the surface.

00:57:36 Hour and a half hearing doesn't even begin

00:57:38 to scratch the surface.

00:57:39 That's what I said.

00:57:40 This needs to be an in-depth investigation.

00:57:42 There's a lot of elements to this thing.

00:57:44 In preparing for this, I did listen to one NBC News report,

00:57:49 and the, this is on the 787, on this gap,

00:57:54 and they were reporting that Boeing

00:57:56 had apparently stress-tested a plane,

00:57:58 165,000 takeoffs and landings,

00:58:01 which is three times normal life.

00:58:03 They inspected 689 of the 1,100 planes

00:58:06 that are in service, zero evidence of fatigue.

00:58:10 So how am I supposed to interpret that?

00:58:13 - Well, I think Boeing tries to put

00:58:15 a lot of misinformation out there.

00:58:18 The problem is that 165,000 was on the original airplane.

00:58:23 It did not see the excessive forces that we talking about.

00:58:26 If you haven't done the excessive force on those plane,

00:58:29 they just thrown that out there to muddy up the water

00:58:32 so that information is so clogged up that they are not.

00:58:37 You know, they saying they done 40,000 test or whatever.

00:58:40 You know, did they put the information out there?

00:58:43 Under what circumstances, what airplanes,

00:58:46 what was the situation?

00:58:48 None of that is shared.

00:58:50 I have asked Mrs. Fall, you know,

00:58:52 Lisa Fall, that it was on that thing,

00:58:55 two months ago or three months ago,

00:58:57 when I met her, I said, hey, you know,

00:58:59 I'm gonna complain, I'm complain to her about the 787.

00:59:02 She said, I'll have somebody get you the information.

00:59:05 You probably haven't seen the information.

00:59:07 I have not seen any information whatsoever.

00:59:09 As a matter of fact, you know,

00:59:11 like they're just throwing that stuff.

00:59:13 If you wanna change the information,

00:59:15 like the 165,000, then you need to rerun that test

00:59:19 with 165,000 with the new excessive force

00:59:24 and show that it's good.

00:59:25 - Now, you gotta show, or just one quick question

00:59:28 for Mr. Pearson.

00:59:28 You said you had delivered records to the FBI.

00:59:32 First of all, how did you obtain those records

00:59:36 and have you heard back from the FBI?

00:59:38 - The records were sent to me and--

00:59:42 - From an internal whistleblower?

00:59:44 - From an internal whistleblower

00:59:45 and I provided those records to the FBI.

00:59:48 And again, you know, for the last couple months,

00:59:50 there's been talk that there's no records

00:59:53 and that's obviously not the case.

00:59:54 - And this is on the Alaskan airline situation.

00:59:55 - This is on the Alaska airlines.

00:59:57 - That Boeing apparently overwrote the video

00:59:59 that would have shown, again, I've talked to Boeing

01:00:02 and said that's just normal, it's a 30-day cycle

01:00:04 and it's mainly, it's not really,

01:00:07 the video's not there to document the maintenance.

01:00:10 It's really to document other things potentially,

01:00:12 but it's overwritten regularly.

01:00:13 - Yeah, I'm talking about the actual documentation

01:00:15 that they've been saying has not been available.

01:00:18 It is available. - It is available

01:00:19 in the FBI's-- - And it has been available

01:00:21 for months.

01:00:21 - Okay, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

01:00:23 - Thanks, Senator Johnson.

01:00:26 We're gonna go to Senator Marshall,

01:00:29 then Senator Hassen and Senator Hawley.

01:00:31 - Great, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

01:00:34 Mr. Salapur, you've described several significant events

01:00:39 since you came forward with your claims.

01:00:41 One was the nail in the tire.

01:00:42 You described your life was being threatened.

01:00:46 Do you feel that this style of retaliation against you

01:00:48 has been part of Boeing's efforts to silence

01:00:50 and prevent you from sharing your story?

01:00:53 - I think the retaliation, somebody even was calling me

01:00:57 on my personal phone, time after time.

01:01:00 This is my personal phone.

01:01:02 - Well, what were they saying?

01:01:05 - Well, my boss was calling me there,

01:01:07 and for 40 minutes, he kind of berated me and chewed me out.

01:01:12 I have a work phone that he can use,

01:01:15 but he's calling you on your personal phone,

01:01:18 and it reminds me of people who they stalk people

01:01:22 or something like that.

01:01:23 They call you on your personal phone to let you know

01:01:25 that they know where you live, they know where you are,

01:01:28 and they can hurt you.

01:01:29 And after the threats and after this,

01:01:33 it's like it really scares me, believe me.

01:01:36 But I am at peace.

01:01:38 If something happens to me, I am at peace

01:01:41 because I feel like by coming forward,

01:01:43 I will be saving a lot of lives, and I'm at peace.

01:01:47 Whatever happens, it happens.

01:01:48 - Well, we certainly do appreciate you coming forward,

01:01:52 and certainly the brave and courage it takes

01:01:55 for all of you to do this.

01:01:56 Do you think that there was a culture of retaliation

01:02:00 against whistleblowers at Boeing?

01:02:03 - Absolutely, and also, there's a culture of

01:02:10 when you address the quality issues,

01:02:13 and that's all I have done.

01:02:14 I haven't made it personal.

01:02:16 All I've done is said, hey, you know,

01:02:18 we are not measuring the gaps properly.

01:02:20 We are not shimming the gaps properly.

01:02:23 Then, you know, you get threatened and this and that.

01:02:26 All I'm trying to say is that system needs to be changed.

01:02:30 - Do you still have your job?

01:02:32 - I have my job.

01:02:33 The only reason I have my job, because I had my attorneys,

01:02:36 we filed for the whistleblower system

01:02:39 before I spoke up this time.

01:02:41 - What's it like when you go back to work?

01:02:44 - Well, last time, if you can think of it,

01:02:49 I went to a meeting on the 777,

01:02:51 and I brought up my concern in that meeting

01:02:54 to say that the way we build in that airplane,

01:02:57 it does not correlate to what the design of the airplane is.

01:03:01 Because of that, we are resulting in a lot of misfares,

01:03:05 you know, misfares and a lot of problems.

01:03:10 You know, after 300 plus airplanes,

01:03:12 we should be able to make that airplane.

01:03:15 And my boss sent somebody to the meeting,

01:03:17 pulled me out of the meeting,

01:03:19 and called me on the phone and says,

01:03:23 I throw the person under the bus by asking the question,

01:03:27 what are we doing to make our design compatible

01:03:30 with our build system to overcome these,

01:03:33 you know, mislocated holes and this and that?

01:03:36 And then he says, what was my intention?

01:03:39 You know, and really berated me.

01:03:42 And a week later, he was gonna talk about that again.

01:03:45 I thought, you know, it's resolved,

01:03:48 but a week later, he was talking to me about that.

01:03:51 You know, why should you even be prosecuted

01:03:56 for something that, you know, all you're doing is saying,

01:03:59 hey, the design that we used to have,

01:04:01 we went to determine an assembly,

01:04:03 it's not working, what can we do?

01:04:05 Have you guys thought about anything to bring that

01:04:08 so that they are compatible?

01:04:10 - So your intention was to build a safe airplane?

01:04:13 - Absolutely, not with force.

01:04:16 - I wanna try to understand this,

01:04:18 the diagram that you all supplied us,

01:04:19 this is a Boeing 787. - 787, yes.

01:04:22 - And you're talking about where these joints come together.

01:04:25 - Yes, I'm talking about the one on the most forward,

01:04:28 between, yeah, right there, and one in the aft.

01:04:31 That's a 41-43, no, the one this way.

01:04:34 - This one? - Yeah, right.

01:04:35 - Between that one and the nose.

01:04:36 - That's a 41-43, it's a major joint,

01:04:39 and then one on the aft.

01:04:41 - So instead of shimming 'em,

01:04:43 they're basically just using force to bring 'em together,

01:04:46 and you're concerned that it hurts the composite.

01:04:48 - Well, it just violates every one of our common practices,

01:04:53 because you don't force the stuff together,

01:04:58 because when you force the stuff together,

01:05:00 you increase the stress concentration on that.

01:05:03 If you think of a paperclip,

01:05:06 if you bend it back and forth,

01:05:07 after a little while, it breaks.

01:05:09 - Yeah, you know, speaking of action,

01:05:11 that's what I wanna talk next about is action.

01:05:14 I'm not sure if any of you are familiar with NIAR

01:05:16 at Wichita State University,

01:05:18 the National Institute of Aviation Research.

01:05:21 They specialize in aerospace R&D,

01:05:23 including composite advanced materials,

01:05:26 and they do wind tunnel testing,

01:05:28 where they would take an entire wing,

01:05:30 an entire fuselage from a plane like this,

01:05:33 and stress test it.

01:05:35 Mr. Jacobson, do you feel like that type of stress,

01:05:38 I wanna get the, we have different opinions,

01:05:40 but that's where I would have confidence,

01:05:42 and America would have confidence

01:05:43 if there was stress testing,

01:05:45 take some of these randomly,

01:05:46 and do that stress testing,

01:05:48 or maybe it's already been done, I don't know.

01:05:50 - Well, I'm not a structure specialist,

01:05:53 so I can't really comment on the details

01:05:56 of any of those sort of, you know, hypotheticals,

01:06:01 but I mean, in general, all of this,

01:06:04 there's design, then there's testing,

01:06:07 there's quite a process,

01:06:09 and you can't violate any part of that process.

01:06:12 If you violate--

01:06:14 - Okay, I'm sorry, but is anybody else familiar

01:06:16 with NIAR and that type of stress testing,

01:06:18 where you put 'em and do wind tunnel testing on these?

01:06:21 I just think that that's the action

01:06:22 that I would have confidence in,

01:06:23 as a scientist who have tested thousands of jets

01:06:26 and airplanes, and are experts in composite,

01:06:29 to see exactly if this is a challenge or not.

01:06:32 I think that would be a great answer to this question.

01:06:36 That's action.

01:06:37 Go ahead, Mr. Salihor.

01:06:39 - One thing that I wanna, you know,

01:06:40 the issue that we talking about

01:06:42 is pressurizing the fuselage from the inside.

01:06:46 - Okay.

01:06:47 - You know, when you pressurize and depressurize,

01:06:49 basically, you know, that's, we call a flight cycle.

01:06:52 Every time you go up and you come down,

01:06:54 that's one flight cycle.

01:06:55 - I'm sure that we can reproduce that at NIAR.

01:06:57 So I think it's a great point, though.

01:06:59 And lastly, my last question is,

01:07:01 it feels like the FAA and the DOT

01:07:04 has dropped the ball as well here, though.

01:07:06 Mr. Pearson, go ahead.

01:07:09 And this is the action.

01:07:11 - I'm sorry, it was the DOT and the--

01:07:14 - FAA.

01:07:15 - Yeah, 100%.

01:07:16 I mean, people don't understand.

01:07:17 The FAA is a subordinate agency

01:07:19 to the Department of Transportation,

01:07:21 and as the FAA has been struggling

01:07:23 with revolving leadership and everything else,

01:07:26 there's been numerous opportunities

01:07:27 for the Department of Transportation

01:07:29 to get involved and engaged.

01:07:30 And what we've seen from them is nothing.

01:07:32 They just kind of are on the sidelines.

01:07:35 - So to me, the action would be to ask the staff

01:07:37 to sit down with the FAA and the DOT and the people,

01:07:41 and send up a report.

01:07:43 We can't bring them in here for another six-hour hearing,

01:07:46 but I would love to see a little bit more report

01:07:48 on how they would defend themselves.

01:07:50 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

01:07:51 - And Senator, if I could just add,

01:07:52 I'm sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt,

01:07:53 but we met with the head of the FAA

01:07:57 and the deputy of Secretary of Transportation

01:08:00 in March 8th, and our foundation did,

01:08:02 and we met with them, and we went through 35 problems,

01:08:06 and we made recommendations to each one,

01:08:08 and we said we would offer to assist whatever we could,

01:08:10 'cause we want them to be successful.

01:08:12 But they need to get in the game, is all I can tell you.

01:08:16 - Thank you.

01:08:18 - Thank you, Senator Marshall.

01:08:20 I might just point out, we've been in touch with the FAA.

01:08:23 We hope that they will appear at a hearing as well.

01:08:27 And they've issued a scathing report

01:08:32 detailing the findings of an expert panel review

01:08:36 of Boeing's management practices.

01:08:39 The panel found, for example, quote,

01:08:42 "A lack of awareness of safety-related metrics

01:08:45 "at all levels of the organization," end quote.

01:08:50 So I'm hoping that the FAA will

01:08:54 be cooperative and aggressive

01:08:58 in our continuing investigation as well.

01:09:02 Senator Hassan.

01:09:05 - Well, thank you very much, Chair Blumenthal

01:09:08 and Ranking Member Johnson, for holding the hearing today.

01:09:12 Thank you to all of our witnesses for appearing today,

01:09:15 as well as your commitment to aviation safety

01:09:18 and protecting the public.

01:09:20 To Chris and Clarice Moore, thank you for being here.

01:09:24 I am so sorry for your loss.

01:09:26 The picture of your daughter is a reminder

01:09:31 of the reason we're here today

01:09:33 and why aviation safety is so important.

01:09:36 So thank you for being here.

01:09:39 And to Mr. Salopore, you mentioned in your testimony,

01:09:42 as I understand it, that the Challenger disaster

01:09:46 was a wake-up call and an example

01:09:48 of why safety is so important.

01:09:50 The teacher who was lost in that disaster

01:09:52 was Krista McAuliffe from Concord, New Hampshire,

01:09:55 and her loss is still felt today, as is her example.

01:09:59 So thank you for invoking her memory today.

01:10:04 And I wanted to start with a question to you, Mr. Salopore,

01:10:08 and apologies if some of this has been covered

01:10:11 because we are in and out, but as a whistleblower,

01:10:15 you raised two safety concerns regarding quality controls

01:10:20 during the manufacturing and assembly process.

01:10:23 Can you describe the internal Boeing culture

01:10:27 around reporting safety and quality concerns?

01:10:30 - Right now, basically, I have very,

01:10:37 I guess, negative attitude towards the quality concern.

01:10:42 You know, when I bring something to my boss

01:10:45 to say, you know, we have problems with this,

01:10:48 and he prevents me from even documenting

01:10:51 and prevents me from even sending the information

01:10:55 to the SMEs, you know, the subject matter experts,

01:10:58 to me, that's a problem.

01:11:00 You know, a quality manager telling you

01:11:03 not to write your concerns and not to send it

01:11:07 to the subject matter expert to just,

01:11:11 let's say, you know, I don't know for sure.

01:11:13 You know, they close a gap of like 3/4 of an inch

01:11:17 without shim.

01:11:18 You know, that's concerning.

01:11:20 Our rules are 010, so I said, you know,

01:11:24 I want to write that, but don't send it.

01:11:26 - So not only were you discouraged

01:11:29 and really told not to document it,

01:11:31 what's your impression of how comfortable

01:11:34 other Boeing personnel are with raising their concerns

01:11:36 to management, both before and after you came forward?

01:11:39 - Well, I think it's very negative.

01:11:42 It's really, they think that, you know,

01:11:44 like we had situation where they had debris in the gap,

01:11:49 and my friend put some inspections in there,

01:11:53 and the boss was telling them that, you know,

01:11:57 are you trying to stop the production?

01:12:00 You know, those are significant problems

01:12:02 that, you know, if you don't inspect,

01:12:05 you have to inspect to get a good quality airplanes out.

01:12:09 And what I'm trying to say is the attitude

01:12:13 at Boeing from the highest level

01:12:15 is just to push the defective parts

01:12:18 regardless of what it is, unfortunately.

01:12:20 - So what you're really saying is if,

01:12:22 so from the top down, people are discouraged

01:12:26 from coming forward, and so people are quite reluctant

01:12:30 to come forward in this culture.

01:12:32 - Absolutely, and you know, the fact that I asked

01:12:34 for the data from, I complained to Mrs. Fall, you know,

01:12:39 and she said she'll have somebody send me the information

01:12:43 on 787, to this date, I haven't received any.

01:12:46 - Okay, so another question for you, sir.

01:12:49 In 2020, Congress reformed safety

01:12:52 and certification requirements for aircraft manufacturers

01:12:56 following the 737 MAX disasters.

01:12:59 What was your experience with how those reforms

01:13:01 were implemented, and whether Boeing

01:13:03 appropriately followed them?

01:13:05 - My personal opinion from what I've seen

01:13:07 from bottom up, it's been nothing.

01:13:10 - Okay, and Mr. Jacobson, as a former FAA official,

01:13:14 do you have any thoughts about how effective

01:13:16 that agency was in implementing

01:13:18 and overseeing those reforms?

01:13:20 - The attitude from day one was not good

01:13:24 at upper levels of the FAA.

01:13:27 The message that I heard right after AXA was passed

01:13:31 was we're already doing all of this.

01:13:34 So that's the wrong attitude from day one,

01:13:37 and then what I saw, I tracked a lot

01:13:39 of the implementation of AXA,

01:13:41 working with Senator Cantwell's office,

01:13:45 and what I saw there was kind of a half-hearted look

01:13:51 at all of these recommendations and requirements.

01:13:56 They tended to lump them all together

01:13:59 and called them work streams and said,

01:14:01 we've got that covered, that's in this work stream

01:14:03 or that work stream, and instead of taking

01:14:06 each individual provision very seriously

01:14:10 and attacking them, that was not the attitude.

01:14:14 - Thank you.

01:14:15 This is a question to both Mr. Pearson

01:14:17 and then again to Mr. Jacobson.

01:14:19 You both raised concerns about the 737 MAX,

01:14:22 one of you directly with Boeing

01:14:24 and the other with the FAA.

01:14:26 Given the safety failures that have led us

01:14:28 to this hearing, how can Congress better empower

01:14:31 whistleblowers, protect them from retaliation,

01:14:33 and reestablish a willing adherence to safety standards?

01:14:37 So we'll start with you, Mr. Pearson.

01:14:39 - As I said, Senator, we really shouldn't have

01:14:43 to rely on whistleblowers, but with that said,

01:14:45 I think that all these programs need

01:14:48 to have much more oversight because what happens,

01:14:52 for example, right now, if a Boeing employee

01:14:54 wants to submit a whistleblower report to the FAA,

01:14:57 they submit a hotline report, and those hotline reports

01:15:00 go in and then it could take months,

01:15:03 potentially, for them to investigate it,

01:15:04 and sometimes we've been told that employees

01:15:07 don't really know what happened.

01:15:09 And so I think that there's a lot more,

01:15:10 it needs to be a lot more attention,

01:15:12 and again, I think what we need to talk about

01:15:14 is leadership at all levels, not just at the senior level,

01:15:18 but even at the very frontline level.

01:15:20 We need to treat people with respect,

01:15:22 and we need to value these employees,

01:15:23 and I think that will help a long way.

01:15:25 I think we're not providing enough training

01:15:27 to these employees.

01:15:28 I know that in the factory, and we're putting

01:15:30 individuals in responsible jobs,

01:15:32 and they need a lot more training,

01:15:34 and I think that will help a long way

01:15:35 of preventing having to use whistleblowers.

01:15:37 - Thank you, Mr. Jacobson.

01:15:39 - Yeah, I'm hopeful that Mr. Whitaker,

01:15:42 the new FAA administrator, will really take on

01:15:46 the challenge of changing the culture at the FAA

01:15:49 so that FAA is back to doing their job as a regulator.

01:15:53 If they just rubber stamp everything

01:15:56 that the manufacturers do,

01:15:59 then it's really, they're not doing anything useful.

01:16:04 And so we need to get back to them

01:16:05 doing a useful job as regulators.

01:16:09 - Thank you for that, and Dr. Prusznicki,

01:16:12 I have a question for you, but I am out of time,

01:16:14 so I will submit it for the record.

01:16:15 I'm just really looking for your recommendations

01:16:18 about how to eliminate these grave safety risks,

01:16:20 so we'll submit that for the record, thank you.

01:16:22 - Thanks, Senator Hassen.

01:16:23 Senator Hawley.

01:16:24 - Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

01:16:25 Thanks for convening this hearing.

01:16:26 Thanks to each of the witnesses for being here.

01:16:28 Mr. Salapur, let me just start with you.

01:16:30 I just wanna back up and make sure

01:16:32 I understand your testimony,

01:16:33 'cause it seems extraordinary to me,

01:16:35 and I'm reading the letters that you've submitted

01:16:38 from your attorney when you first contacted the FAA,

01:16:42 when you contacted the committee.

01:16:43 So my understanding is you worked on both the 787

01:16:47 and the 7777, correct?

01:16:49 - Yes, sir.

01:16:50 - And you identified major safety concerns

01:16:53 with both of these lines, should I say.

01:16:55 And you identified these to your superiors.

01:16:59 - Yes, sir.

01:17:00 I have written many memos, time after time,

01:17:04 that we can provide.

01:17:06 - Over a period of years, I take it.

01:17:07 - Yeah, this is like three years.

01:17:09 For the 787, it's been three years of effort.

01:17:13 - And so your concerns, who knew about your concerns?

01:17:17 How far up the chain do you know that they went?

01:17:19 - I have gone as high as Mark Stockton and Lisa Fall,

01:17:23 who's the vice president.

01:17:25 - The vice president of the company?

01:17:27 - Yes.

01:17:28 - So they were and are aware of these major safety concerns.

01:17:32 And this is what you do for a living.

01:17:34 I mean, you're an engineer, right?

01:17:35 - I'm an engineer.

01:17:37 I went to quality about three, four years ago.

01:17:40 And when you put your quality hat,

01:17:42 we are the eyes and ears of the public

01:17:45 for the safety of the airplane.

01:17:47 That's how I feel about our job.

01:17:50 And so I have, you know, when I see concerning information

01:17:54 or concerning, let's say, production issues,

01:17:59 then it is our responsibility to make sure that, you know,

01:18:06 if we are causing the airplane

01:18:08 to have increased risk factors,

01:18:10 our job is to eliminate those risk factors.

01:18:14 - Are these planes safe?

01:18:15 - Right now, I would not, you know, it's like an earthquake.

01:18:20 You know, the big earthquake is coming,

01:18:22 but when that hits the building that, you know,

01:18:26 let's say if you're talking of a building,

01:18:28 have to be prepared to accommodate that type of,

01:18:32 let's say, shakeup.

01:18:33 You know, it has to be built properly.

01:18:35 Right now, from what I've seen,

01:18:37 the airplanes are not being built

01:18:39 per spec and per requirement.

01:18:42 - So your testimony is the 787 line and the 7777,

01:18:47 the 7777 line, are, you think, are not safe?

01:18:49 - Well, they are doing stuff

01:18:52 that increases the risk factors, okay?

01:18:55 When you increase the risk factors,

01:18:57 you know, it's not just one.

01:18:59 You are doing stress concentrations,

01:19:01 that those stress concentrations,

01:19:03 like, you know, breaking a paperclip,

01:19:06 you know, you do it once or twice,

01:19:07 it doesn't break, but it breaks at some time.

01:19:09 As the plane gets older, you know,

01:19:12 all of these things that, you know, you took,

01:19:15 you know, you said it's not a safety issue,

01:19:17 it becomes a safety issue.

01:19:18 - And the company's response to you was to threaten you?

01:19:21 - Threaten you, sideline you, you know, transfer you.

01:19:28 - You raised concerns about the 787,

01:19:30 and so they transferred you to the 7777, right?

01:19:33 - Well, yes.

01:19:34 Initially, they just cut me off of all the meetings.

01:19:37 They took my name out, and then so I was just doing nothing,

01:19:40 I wasn't informed of what, then they transferred me,

01:19:43 and they do it pretty stealthy.

01:19:45 Oh, we have a job over here, we want you to go over there.

01:19:48 So they move you down there, and you know,

01:19:50 I come from, like, 40 years of engineering background,

01:19:53 so when I see, and I've taken a lot of stress classes,

01:19:58 even though I'm not a specialist on that,

01:20:00 but when there's a problematic area that you see,

01:20:03 you can recognize.

01:20:05 - So they, I just want to make sure I get the sequence right.

01:20:07 So you raise these concerns, you get on the 787,

01:20:10 you get transferred over to the 7777,

01:20:12 you raise the concerns there, they ignore it in both,

01:20:16 they haven't addressed any of these concerns,

01:20:17 is that your testimony?

01:20:19 - Yes, sir.

01:20:20 - And at some point, they start to threaten you.

01:20:21 You're talking about your boss calling you

01:20:24 on your personal phone and berating you,

01:20:26 and when did that start?

01:20:27 - Well, that started right after when I said,

01:20:30 you know, we have made over 300 plus airplanes,

01:20:33 we still don't know how to put the load and sell.

01:20:36 What I mean by that, you know, if you're building

01:20:39 an airplane, I mean building a house,

01:20:41 it's like, you know, putting the foundation, you know?

01:20:44 We have made over 300 airplanes, we still changing

01:20:48 our process, like build the foundation

01:20:52 to put the airplanes.

01:20:53 We are struggling with that because they have changed

01:20:56 the process, you know, from stable to unstable situation.

01:21:00 They're not building the same datums that we were building,

01:21:03 so you're causing your own problem,

01:21:05 but you don't want to admit it.

01:21:06 Just force fit the problem, you know,

01:21:09 force fit the misaligned holes and everything else,

01:21:12 and move on, and that's what they have been doing,

01:21:14 and that's what I have brought up to their attention.

01:21:17 I told my boss that I said in the report,

01:21:19 I said, we have made 300 plus airplanes.

01:21:22 That should have been more than adequate

01:21:24 for us to resolve these things.

01:21:26 All the problems that we've had, we put band-aid

01:21:29 over band-aid to resolve the problems,

01:21:31 and band-aid over band-aid doesn't cover it.

01:21:34 Maybe we need to consider some engineering fundamentals

01:21:37 with a little bit of GD&T to figure out what the problem is,

01:21:40 and right after that, he came back to my desk,

01:21:43 and he, like I said, you know, he made the threat,

01:21:47 and then after that, he says, are you in or are you out?

01:21:50 What are how-- - Meaning what?

01:21:51 Are you in and are you out with Boeing?

01:21:52 I mean, are you gonna be a good citizen

01:21:54 and keep your mouth shut?

01:21:55 Was that the implication? - Well, that's how I can,

01:21:57 I can interpret that.

01:21:58 He would walk by me, and he said, you better,

01:22:00 then he said, I want you to write it in writing.

01:22:03 Tell me, are you in or are you out?

01:22:05 - Put it in writing whether or not you were gonna--

01:22:07 - I'm in or out, and what that means,

01:22:10 are you gonna just shut up?

01:22:13 - Right. - That's all--

01:22:14 - That would be in.

01:22:15 If you wanted to be in, you needed to be quiet,

01:22:16 you needed to stop this, you know, don't say anything more,

01:22:19 certainly don't tell the public.

01:22:21 - That's how I interpret it,

01:22:22 but he told me to write it in writing,

01:22:25 and I'm trying to write it, and there was 10 emails

01:22:30 just because I haven't received your email on this,

01:22:34 send it to me, and this and that.

01:22:35 - So then he's pressuring you.

01:22:37 - Then he's pressuring you, and then his manipulation

01:22:40 even got further than that, you know,

01:22:42 like I'm trying to take a class on my own time

01:22:45 that I have to flex the time, he wouldn't let me do that.

01:22:48 You know, I'm trying, I have a doctor's appointment,

01:22:51 he cancels my doctor appointment at the same day.

01:22:54 I mean, you know, different, minimalizing--

01:22:55 - Retaliatory behavior. - Different things

01:22:57 to retaliate, to make your life miserable,

01:23:00 and then, you know, I started talking to go somewhere else,

01:23:03 you know, I mean, you just try to escape from that

01:23:08 because this is hell, you know, that I was subjected to,

01:23:13 and then he threatens you with that,

01:23:15 and really, with my background, you know, I've had some,

01:23:19 you know, it really has made me,

01:23:23 where three o'clock in the morning,

01:23:24 I'm waking up with somebody stabbing me, you know,

01:23:28 I'm still receiving psychological help

01:23:30 to just get back on normal.

01:23:32 - Well, it is unbelievable to me

01:23:36 that in the midst of this safety crisis at this corporation

01:23:40 that what they're doing is threatening their own engineers

01:23:44 whose job it is to help identify potential safety concerns,

01:23:47 and rather than saying, you know what, you've got a point,

01:23:50 we need to maybe do something about this,

01:23:52 they're telling you to hide it, they're reassigning you,

01:23:54 they're threatening you, they're trying to shut you up.

01:23:57 In the meantime, I noticed this guy, Dave Calhoun,

01:23:59 I think he's the CEO, I guess he's leaving

01:24:01 at the end of the year, I wonder how much he's getting paid.

01:24:04 I bet it's a lot. - Yes.

01:24:06 - I bet it's-- - It's a lot more

01:24:06 than my paycheck. - I bet it's a lot more

01:24:08 than your paycheck. - Yeah.

01:24:09 - I bet it's a heck of a lot. - Yeah.

01:24:10 - Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing,

01:24:13 I think we're just scratching the surface here,

01:24:14 but this is just, this is extraordinary,

01:24:16 it's just extraordinary, thank you.

01:24:18 - I really appreciate that.

01:24:20 - Thank you-- - Giving us the opportunity.

01:24:20 - Thank you very much, Senator Hawley,

01:24:22 and again, I just wanna say,

01:24:24 I could not agree more with the points that have been made

01:24:28 about the need for continuing investigation

01:24:31 by our subcommittee, as well as by the FAA

01:24:35 and the Department of Justice.

01:24:37 And I'm anticipating we'll have strong bipartisan consensus

01:24:43 about the next steps that we will take,

01:24:46 but we're gonna have another round of questioning,

01:24:51 it's gonna be short, shorter than I would like,

01:24:54 because we have a deadline for being in our chairs

01:24:58 in the United States Senate on the floor

01:25:01 for a completely unrelated purpose.

01:25:03 But I wanna kind of begin where Senator Hawley ended.

01:25:10 Mr. Salipur, in your testimony, you told us that

01:25:16 since 2021, multiple colleagues have told you

01:25:20 about sharing your concerns.

01:25:23 Most of them have not come forward, why?

01:25:29 - It's the fear, I mean, if you think of how much problem

01:25:34 I have created, you know, by coming up with my,

01:25:38 you know, being persistent about talking about the defects

01:25:42 and everything else, ever since the space shuttle O-Rings,

01:25:45 that has really put a mark on me.

01:25:47 That thing should not have happened,

01:25:49 but it happened because of the faulty engineering,

01:25:52 and that's exactly what we have here,

01:25:55 is we have faulty engineering that, you know,

01:25:57 they're trying to shove on our throats to just say,

01:26:00 hey, you know, whatever we do, it's okay.

01:26:03 From one side, they put reports that it says it's not okay,

01:26:07 from other side, when they violate it,

01:26:09 they try to whitewash the influence.

01:26:13 - Whitewashing the seal man.

01:26:15 - Whitewashing the spec to say,

01:26:18 it's not important for this thing, you know,

01:26:20 this thing, if we don't meet it,

01:26:22 it's not that big of a deal,

01:26:23 let's just push the airplanes out.

01:26:25 And then the attitude of the people for,

01:26:30 like I said, you know, not being receptive,

01:26:34 you know, because of the threats or anything else,

01:26:37 that's because of that people haven't come forward.

01:26:41 - You know, you've been very careful

01:26:44 in the way that you have phrased the potential danger here.

01:26:49 You talk about the increased risk.

01:26:52 - Yes.

01:26:53 - One could compare it to something a little bit

01:26:57 like Russian roulette.

01:26:59 We never know exactly--

01:27:01 - When it's gonna happen.

01:27:02 - When or where or how it's going to happen,

01:27:06 but fatigue building and the potential vulnerability

01:27:11 of that fuselage to tearing apart

01:27:15 is a risk that has been increased.

01:27:20 And it's a risk that should never have been increased.

01:27:24 - Absolutely.

01:27:25 - And yet these processes are continuing, are they not?

01:27:28 - Yes, sir.

01:27:29 From what I know, it's continuing.

01:27:30 And right now, Boeing is coming back

01:27:33 and really, remember, whatever they put out there,

01:27:37 they say that everything is okay

01:27:39 because they never learn from their mistakes.

01:27:41 That's what the really significant thing

01:27:44 that I wanna take from this is that they never learn.

01:27:47 You know, it's like a lie.

01:27:49 When you say one lie, you have to lie 10 more times

01:27:51 to cover that lie.

01:27:53 You know, hey, we made a mistake,

01:27:55 let's correct it and move on.

01:27:56 But that's not what's happening.

01:27:58 - You've referred to numerous memos that you've written.

01:28:03 I have one of them, which is a 2021 memo.

01:28:08 The recipient of it has been deleted,

01:28:13 but the memo speaks volumes in my view.

01:28:17 And one part of it, one sentence, I think,

01:28:22 is kind of a coda for the lesson

01:28:25 that Boeing should have learned.

01:28:28 And I'm quoting, "Kicking me out of the program

01:28:32 "because I am raising safety concerns

01:28:35 "over the unintended consequences

01:28:38 "of the increased fit-up forces

01:28:41 "and potential escapements as a result

01:28:44 "does not help anybody."

01:28:47 It does not help anybody.

01:28:51 It doesn't help Boeing at all.

01:28:56 And again, this focus on stock price,

01:29:01 on quarterly profit,

01:29:06 on money over safety

01:29:11 is a bad investment.

01:29:14 It is malpractice

01:29:16 beyond simply a broken self-safety culture.

01:29:23 The expert panel of the FAA

01:29:26 said something that I thought was pretty telling.

01:29:29 Quote, "A safety culture is not something

01:29:32 "that springs up ready-made from near-death experience.

01:29:37 "Rather, it emerges gradually from the persistent

01:29:42 "and successful application of practical

01:29:46 "and down-to-earth measures,

01:29:49 "like giving you a bonus

01:29:53 "for your courage and your insights,

01:29:56 "rather than, in effect, threatening and penalizing you."

01:30:01 Dr. Puchnicki, am I correct in that kind of observation

01:30:06 about safety culture,

01:30:09 that it has to be the result of persistent,

01:30:12 step-by-step, down-to-earth actions by management

01:30:17 that is really committed to safety,

01:30:19 not just in word, but in deed?

01:30:22 And it has to put its money where its mouth is.

01:30:25 - No, you're exactly right.

01:30:27 And this is part of the four parts of a safety culture,

01:30:30 that you do have these reward systems in place,

01:30:34 and you are proud when people come forward like this,

01:30:38 and you embrace that, and you celebrate that.

01:30:40 There's many different ways you can do that.

01:30:42 Various companies can do this.

01:30:44 But if I may take this time

01:30:46 to just add one thing very quickly,

01:30:48 is one part of a healthy safety culture

01:30:51 is that the accountability goes all the way to the top

01:30:55 of the company, all the way to the CEO.

01:30:59 And when I go to help companies

01:31:02 with their safety culture problems, I talk to CEOs.

01:31:07 And one of the questions I ask them is,

01:31:09 "How much time do you spend weekly

01:31:11 "with your safety department?"

01:31:12 Because different companies might spend time

01:31:14 with their marketing people, their finance people,

01:31:17 and all their money people.

01:31:19 And what I find across the board is,

01:31:21 they don't spend time with their safety people.

01:31:24 Yet they say they're accountable,

01:31:25 and they sign documents they're accountable.

01:31:28 And most of the time, they'll tell me,

01:31:29 "Well, this person meets with them," or whomever.

01:31:33 That is not accountability to the top.

01:31:36 And I tell them that, "Well, if you have time to meet

01:31:38 "with marketing and your finance people,

01:31:41 "then you should have time to meet

01:31:42 "with your safety people weekly."

01:31:44 And if I had time to talk to Boeing,

01:31:47 I'd be fascinated to know how many times per week

01:31:50 their CEO people actually talk to their safety people.

01:31:53 That shows accountability.

01:31:55 It would be an interesting answer to that question.

01:31:58 - So, deans of business schools across the country,

01:32:02 and CEOs of corporations, big and small, are you listening?

01:32:07 Will you take a lesson from Boeing's experience?

01:32:09 - Yeah, 'cause if they're not doing this, they're wrong.

01:32:12 Flat out.

01:32:13 And we've seen this time and time again with accidents.

01:32:15 And I go all over the world,

01:32:16 I help companies straighten this out.

01:32:18 It's flat out.

01:32:20 - I'm gonna yield to Senator Johnson.

01:32:23 - So, let me just underscore,

01:32:25 from my own manufacturing background,

01:32:27 I think the key to a safety system,

01:32:29 quality system, is accountability.

01:32:31 In my little plastics manufacturing plant,

01:32:33 every roll of plastic that went out

01:32:35 had the operator's name on the name tag, on the roll tag.

01:32:38 If that was rejected, we knew exactly

01:32:40 who produced that, who approved it.

01:32:43 And so, accountability is crucial,

01:32:45 which takes me back to the 737 MAX,

01:32:49 and the Deferred Prosecution Agreement.

01:32:52 First of all, I want some clarity.

01:32:54 Was it or was it not the MCAS system that caused that crash?

01:32:59 - The MCAS system, Senator,

01:33:04 obviously played a significant role,

01:33:06 so did the lack of pilot training.

01:33:08 But as Mr. Jacobson has said, there was other factors,

01:33:10 and our analysis, my analysis,

01:33:12 shows that those airplanes also had manufacturing defects

01:33:15 that triggered the MCAS software.

01:33:17 - Mr. Jacobson?

01:33:19 - Yeah, I would-- - So, what were those

01:33:22 other defects?

01:33:22 I mean, was it the sensor?

01:33:24 I mean, only having one sensor

01:33:26 was part of that system, though, but.

01:33:28 - Well, the sensor, as Mr. Pearson has talked about,

01:33:33 the sensor showed problems.

01:33:36 The original sensor on the Lion Air airplane

01:33:38 showed a lot of manufacturing defects

01:33:41 when it was examined.

01:33:42 What I found curious was after the Ethiopian crash,

01:33:46 they said the sensor was taken off by a bird.

01:33:50 They had no evidence for that, none whatsoever,

01:33:53 but they concluded that it was the bird that did it.

01:33:57 And so, I think it's much more plausible and likely

01:34:01 that it was a electrical fault of some sort,

01:34:05 either arcing or something like that.

01:34:07 - So, of all the troubling testimony

01:34:10 that I've read here leading up to this hearing

01:34:12 and what I've heard here today,

01:34:14 probably the most troubling is the fact

01:34:17 that Boeing did not notify regulators

01:34:22 of this significant change in the MCAS system.

01:34:25 I mean, would you agree with that?

01:34:28 - I would.

01:34:29 I think both crashes would not have happened

01:34:33 if they had been fully transparent

01:34:35 and forthcoming with the design of the airplane.

01:34:38 - So, we come back to accountability.

01:34:41 - Yes.

01:34:42 - Has anybody been held accountable

01:34:45 for concealing that from the FAA?

01:34:47 I mean, 300-some lives were lost.

01:34:51 Again, my condolences to those family members of those.

01:34:54 Lives were lost.

01:34:56 This was beyond negligence.

01:34:58 This is an overt act.

01:35:01 And nobody has been held accountable

01:35:07 in any way, shape, or form,

01:35:08 financially, losing their job, criminally held liable.

01:35:12 - Look, we've been dancing around an issue here

01:35:18 that, quite frankly, being a systems engineer,

01:35:22 I design a lot of automation

01:35:24 and the interaction between human and automation.

01:35:27 And what they did is quite obvious.

01:35:30 They snuck the MCAS system

01:35:33 through the certification process, period.

01:35:36 It's that simple.

01:35:36 - And they-- - But they did that

01:35:38 over money, sir.

01:35:39 - Is that or was that criminal?

01:35:41 Again, I'm not a lawyer, I'm not a prosecutor.

01:35:43 Is that criminal?

01:35:45 Do we have laws in the books?

01:35:46 - I can't answer-- - That type of,

01:35:48 that type of, what's the right word?

01:35:52 - I don't know. - That kind of evasion.

01:35:53 I mean, was that criminal behavior?

01:35:55 Should somebody have been held liable criminally?

01:35:57 - I can't answer if that's criminal,

01:35:59 but as a cognitive engineer,

01:36:01 I can tell you, and I know how

01:36:02 the certification process works,

01:36:04 and I know how this accident works,

01:36:06 they snuck it through the process,

01:36:08 and it was all about money.

01:36:09 It was all about getting those airplanes to Southwest,

01:36:12 and it was all about money,

01:36:13 and that's why those people died.

01:36:14 - Has the deferred prosecution agreement

01:36:19 been made public, or is that sealed?

01:36:21 - I'm not aware if it's been made or not.

01:36:22 - It has been made public, Senator,

01:36:24 and it's an absolute,

01:36:25 probably the most embarrassing thing in my career

01:36:29 that I've seen is how those families were treated,

01:36:31 and that deferred prosecution agreement

01:36:33 should never have happened.

01:36:35 It was absolutely criminal that they did that.

01:36:37 It was just heart-wrenching.

01:36:39 - So who's in charge of that deferred prosecution?

01:36:43 Who agreed to that?

01:36:44 - That's the Department of Justice.

01:36:46 - Let me just intervene,

01:36:47 since I am a former United States attorney

01:36:50 and a federal prosecutor.

01:36:52 The Department of Justice

01:36:54 deferred prosecution agreement is public.

01:36:58 In fact, I was very critical of it

01:37:00 at the time it was reached,

01:37:02 and I've heard since then

01:37:03 that the Department of Justice

01:37:06 investigate whether, in fact, it has been violated,

01:37:08 and I think the ranking member raises

01:37:10 a very pertinent and important question.

01:37:13 Mr. Pearson has raised it as well.

01:37:16 He's presented evidence

01:37:17 that the Department of Justice should consider

01:37:21 through the FBI.

01:37:23 We have brought to the Department of Justice's attention

01:37:26 evidence that should be considered.

01:37:28 They're gonna have to make a judgment.

01:37:31 We can't because we're not prosecutors,

01:37:34 but accountability is critical.

01:37:37 - And that is the reason I'm going down

01:37:38 this line of questioning is

01:37:40 accountability all along the process,

01:37:44 within the company,

01:37:45 within their quality system,

01:37:46 their top management,

01:37:48 but then the FAA,

01:37:48 and then Department of Justice,

01:37:51 when they see the evidence,

01:37:52 not doing anything about it.

01:37:55 And again, I'll go back to

01:37:59 the reality of the fact

01:38:01 that we all want Boeing to succeed,

01:38:03 that we don't want to think

01:38:06 that there are conditions in these planes

01:38:07 that should really force regulators

01:38:09 to ground these planes,

01:38:11 what that would do to our economy,

01:38:13 what that would do to people's lives.

01:38:14 I mean, that's just a reality.

01:38:16 It's an awful reality,

01:38:18 but that's what we're all facing.

01:38:19 I think that's what's driving

01:38:20 the lack of accountability.

01:38:22 People want to be held accountable

01:38:23 because people don't want to take the actions

01:38:26 that might be required here.

01:38:29 I think that's just an awful reality.

01:38:32 - I just want to emphasize again

01:38:33 that the airlines play a huge role in this, right?

01:38:36 They obviously want airplanes,

01:38:37 they need airplanes to do what they want to do,

01:38:39 but they have very much a responsibility

01:38:43 to make sure those planes are safe.

01:38:44 I'll just give you an example.

01:38:45 We did an analysis,

01:38:47 and Alaska Airplanes,

01:38:48 we did it,

01:38:49 we published this thing in September 2023.

01:38:52 They had 53 brand new MAX airplanes.

01:38:55 We found over 1,200 aircraft system

01:38:57 malfunction reports that they had submitted

01:38:59 to the FAA,

01:39:00 1,200 on 53 brand new planes within two years old.

01:39:03 And I'm not talking tray tables or headrests.

01:39:06 I'm talking the systems

01:39:07 that Mr. Jacobson's been talking about.

01:39:09 So we need to make sure

01:39:10 that those things are investigated and resolved,

01:39:13 and they're supposed to be.

01:39:14 - Which is why I've reached out to the airlines,

01:39:16 I've talked to a couple CEOs.

01:39:17 We need to talk to their pilots,

01:39:21 we need to get their mechanics,

01:39:22 we need all these people talking together.

01:39:25 Just individual hearings aren't gonna do it.

01:39:26 I mean, this requires a full-blown investigation

01:39:31 with all these people being interviewed,

01:39:33 people feeling free,

01:39:35 they can come before us with whistleblower protection,

01:39:38 either stay anonymous or provide whatever protection we can.

01:39:42 Again, we need a lot of information,

01:39:44 we need a lot of witnesses,

01:39:45 we have an awful lot of information

01:39:47 to uncover and discover here,

01:39:48 a lot of truth to be exposed.

01:39:50 But thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.

01:39:52 - Let me just conclude,

01:39:54 and I would like to continue this hearing,

01:39:57 but Senator Johnson and I will be held accountable

01:40:01 if we're not in our seats

01:40:02 on the floor of the United States Senate before 1 p.m.

01:40:07 I wanna thank all of you for being here,

01:40:10 for all the reasons that you know too well,

01:40:13 you have taken risks throughout your career,

01:40:16 every one of you.

01:40:17 I wanna thank my colleague

01:40:21 for his very understandably passionate

01:40:26 and insightful comments,

01:40:29 which I share about the need for accountability

01:40:32 as a prosecutor.

01:40:34 Accountability is about deterrence,

01:40:36 it is about teaching lessons

01:40:39 with real consequences

01:40:41 for intentional mistakes and wrongdoing.

01:40:46 And I'm hopeful that we will be in touch

01:40:50 with the Department of Justice

01:40:52 to indicate our interest in cooperating with them.

01:40:55 And in the meantime,

01:40:57 this record will remain open for 15 days

01:41:01 for other questions that may be submitted in writing,

01:41:04 and also documents that may be submitted by others.

01:41:08 And we hope that there will be others

01:41:14 who will come forward.

01:41:15 So thank you all for being here today.

01:41:18 This hearing is adjourned.

BREAKING NEWS: Boeing Airline Whistleblower Testifies Before Senate Homeland Security Committee

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