FBI Director Christopher Wray testifies before the House Appropriations Committee.
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00:00:00 to this committee and formally congratulate Chairman Cole upon becoming the new chairman
00:00:09 of the committee. We look forward to continuing to work with both of them.
00:00:14 I'll begin by recognizing myself for an opening statement. We want to welcome our witness,
00:00:22 the Honorable Christopher Wray, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, back to this subcommittee.
00:00:30 Director Wray, who has nearly 30 years of DOJ and FBI experience, dating back to the late 1990s,
00:00:40 has served in his current role since August of 2017. In his capacity as director,
00:00:49 he oversees an agency of over 35,000 people, including special agents, intelligence analysts,
00:00:58 language specialists, scientists, and information technology specialists. The 25 budget requests
00:01:07 for FBI salaries and expenses is $11.3 billion, with $6.7 billion of that amount, about 60%,
00:01:18 designated as defense spending. The request amounts to a 6% increase above the fiscal 24
00:01:27 enacted level for salaries and expenses. Overall, the FBI budget request includes $119 million
00:01:37 in program increases and approximately $700 million in other adjustments, representing
00:01:45 the substantial increased cost of continuing the FBI's current activities. In particular,
00:01:54 the largest program increase request is for what the FBI has labeled restoration of 2023
00:02:02 national security and law enforcement personnel. This request is for 85.4 billion
00:02:13 border positions, of which only 60 would be actual agents. The Bureau claims these
00:02:21 sections and function areas. Let's be crystal clear. Cartels continue to flood our streets
00:02:34 with fentanyl and poison. Americans are being hurt in record numbers. They're exploiting our
00:02:44 southern border and devastating families and communities, violent crime levels, murder,
00:02:52 rape, robbery, aggravated assault, all too high. There's no question the FBI's mission
00:03:01 is more critical than ever. The requested increases in the fiscal 25 budget are significant,
00:03:09 and it's my hope that they are fully discussed at today's hearing in relation to many of the
00:03:16 issues this country is facing. However, it is no secret that the nation's federal debt
00:03:24 stands at approximately $34 trillion. Let me repeat that number.
00:03:30 $34 trillion. And hardworking Americans continue to face elevated costs for everyday items.
00:03:40 Congress and this committee in particular cannot ignore the unsustainable path that we are on.
00:03:50 It's essential that we ensure every dollar appropriated to agencies is spent effectively,
00:03:57 efficiently, and appropriately. Anything less would be ignoring our constitutional duty.
00:04:04 To that end, our fiscal year 2024 appropriations bill made some difficult, yet necessary,
00:04:14 funding reductions for many agencies, including the FBI. As with all appropriations bills,
00:04:22 the fiscal 24 CJS bill was the product of careful consideration and collaboration within Congress.
00:04:31 We review budget submissions, call hearings, analyze program increase requests,
00:04:40 engage with the agencies, have countless debates, and make final judgment calls.
00:04:46 Not everyone will be satisfied with the final appropriated levels.
00:04:51 Whatever increasing debt levels require tough decisions. Director Ray, we look forward to the
00:05:00 opportunity to discuss with you today the President's fiscal year 2025 budget submission
00:05:08 for the FBI. We're looking forward to a full conversation on the major cost drivers
00:05:14 within this budget request. Beyond the funding implications of the budget request,
00:05:20 I'm also interested in the ongoing issues at the FBI that include but not limited to
00:05:27 the erosion of public trust in the Bureau. This includes the FBI's overly aggressive tactics,
00:05:35 questionable investigative standards, and the overall politicization of the Bureau.
00:05:42 Importantly, I also want to ensure we fully explore the grave crisis at our southern border
00:05:52 and the FBI's responsibility when it comes to combating the wide range of illegal activities
00:06:00 happening at the border that not only impacts the nation's southern states, but the entire country
00:06:08 as a whole. I believe the fiscal year 2024 appropriations bill achieved the right balance
00:06:16 and represented a step in the right direction with targeted cuts aimed at pushing the Bureau
00:06:24 to refocus on its core mission. Mission creep at federal agencies beyond their required duties
00:06:33 is a real problem and it must be corrected. I believe in the FBI's mission to protect the
00:06:41 American people and uphold the Constitution of our great country. I recognize the challenging
00:06:48 yet critical work the agency performs daily defending the U.S. against terrorists and
00:06:55 espionage, combating deadly fentanyl, protecting the nation's children from becoming victims,
00:07:02 and more. FBI agents are our nation's defenders and it's not lost on members of Congress
00:07:11 the sacrifices they make to protect our country. To be clear, the FBI's mission is critical to the
00:07:21 health of our entire nation. Mr. Wray, once again, we appreciate you being here to answer
00:07:28 our questions. We appreciate your hard work on behalf of the American people.
00:07:34 Let me now recognize my Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. Carl Wright, for any remarks
00:07:41 you may wish to make. Thank you and good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. And I join Chairman Rogers in
00:07:49 thanking our overall Appropriations Chair Kay Granger for her years of dedication and service
00:07:56 to this Appropriations Committee and congratulate Chairman Cole as he takes over that very
00:08:03 important role. And I also join Chairman Rogers in welcoming Director Christopher Wray to testify
00:08:13 today. As we all know, the FBI does an enormous amount of work to help protect the American people.
00:08:19 As a primary law enforcement agency for the U.S. government, the FBI employs roughly 36,000 people
00:08:26 in 56 field offices, 350 resident agencies, and several specialized facilities and analytical
00:08:34 centers across the country, as well as in over 60 legal attache offices in 80 countries around the
00:08:42 world. The FBI works to investigate and disrupt crime, including everything from violent gang
00:08:49 networks, cyber criminals, white collar crime, human trafficking, and domestic and international
00:08:56 terrorism. And I could not agree more with Chairman Rogers as he talks about FBI's mission,
00:09:03 including combating opioid and the opioid epidemic, including fentanyl poisonings
00:09:10 that are killing well north of 100,000 people, American citizens every year.
00:09:17 In addition, since Russia's brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine last year, the FBI has also
00:09:26 successfully worked to disrupt criminal, cyber, and hostile intelligence activities from Russia
00:09:32 that endanger Ukraine, our partners, and American citizens. The Biden administration is requesting
00:09:40 funding for several FBI initiatives in fiscal year 2025, including investments to restore and
00:09:46 enhance the FBI's efforts to combat violent crime and cyber crime and to enhance the FBI's
00:09:54 counterintelligence and counterterrorism capabilities, among other initiatives.
00:10:00 Director Wray, I look forward to hearing more from you about these and other priorities surrounding
00:10:06 the FBI's budget request. Again, I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back to you.
00:10:12 We want now to recognize our witness, Director Wray, for an opening statement.
00:10:22 Without objection, his written statement will be entered into the record, and I would ask him that
00:10:28 we would like to see him keep his remarks to five minutes or less so we can have additional
00:10:35 time for questions. Director Wray. Thank you, and good afternoon, Chairman Rogers,
00:10:42 Ranking Member Cartwright, members of the committee. I'm proud to be here today representing
00:10:47 the roughly 38,000 men and women who make up the FBI. Every day, our people are working relentlessly
00:10:56 to outpace our adversaries and to stay ahead of complex and evolving threats. So I'd like to
00:11:03 start out by thanking you and the rest of the committee for your support over the years for
00:11:08 our efforts to achieve our mission of protecting the American people and upholding the Constitution.
00:11:15 At the same time, I also realize the reality of the environment we're in today, where so many
00:11:22 agencies are dealing with tightening budgets. And this year, the FBI is one of those agencies.
00:11:30 With our fiscal year 2024 budget having now come in almost $500 million below what the FBI needs
00:11:39 just to sustain our 2023 efforts. And candidly, this could not have come at a worse time.
00:11:46 When I sat here last year, I walked through how we were already in a heightened threat environment.
00:11:54 Since then, we've seen the threat from foreign terrorists rise to a whole nother level after
00:12:01 October 7th. We continue to see the cartels push fentanyl and other dangerous drugs into
00:12:08 every corner of the country, claiming countless American lives. We've seen a spate of ransomware
00:12:16 and other cyber attacks impacting parts of our critical infrastructure and businesses, both
00:12:21 large and small. Violent crime, violent crime, which reached alarming levels coming out of the
00:12:28 pandemic, remains far too high and is impacting far too many communities. China continues its
00:12:39 relentless effort to steal our intellectual property and most valuable information.
00:12:44 And that is just scratching the surface. As I look back over my career in law enforcement,
00:12:52 I would be hard pressed to think of a time where so many threats to our public safety
00:12:58 and national security were so elevated all at once. But that is the case as I sit here today.
00:13:05 And while we have always found ways at the FBI to innovate and make the most with what we have,
00:13:12 this is by no means a time to let up or dial back. This is a time when we need your support the most.
00:13:19 We need all the tools, all the people, and all the resources required to tackle these threats
00:13:26 and to keep Americans safe. So to take each of those in turn, the tools, the people,
00:13:32 and the resources. First, an absolutely indispensable tool that Congress can give us
00:13:40 in our fight against foreign adversaries is the reauthorization of Section 702 of the Foreign
00:13:47 Intelligence Surveillance Act. It is critical in securing our nation, and we are in crunch time
00:13:53 with our 702 authority set to expire next week. So let me be clear, failure to reauthorize 702
00:14:03 or gutting it with some new kind of warrant requirement would be dangerous
00:14:08 and put Americans' lives at risk. Second, we need people, and I will stack the FBI's workforce up
00:14:18 against anyone, anywhere, anytime. They are innovative, they're efficient, they're relentless,
00:14:24 they're professionals, they're patriots. And we have been fortunate at the FBI in recent years
00:14:31 that our recruiting has gone through the roof. Americans are applying in droves to devote their
00:14:37 lives to a career with us protecting others. But we need more positions to be able to bring
00:14:44 all the good people we can to the fight, certainly not fewer. Now is not the time to cut back,
00:14:50 it's time to lean forward. And third, we need resources, which you will see in the 2025 budget
00:14:58 requests that we're here today to discuss. So we need funding to protect America from terrorism.
00:15:05 I touched on this earlier, but there was already a heightened risk of violence in the United States
00:15:12 before October 7th. Since then, we've seen a rogues gallery of foreign terrorist organizations
00:15:20 call for attacks against Americans and our allies. And given those calls for action,
00:15:27 our most immediate concern has been that individuals or small groups will draw some
00:15:33 kind of twisted inspiration from the events in the Middle East to carry out attacks here at home.
00:15:41 But now, increasingly concerning is the potential for a coordinated attack here in the homeland,
00:15:48 akin to the ISIS-K attack we saw at the Russia concert hall just a couple weeks ago.
00:15:54 We also need funding to counter the threat from the People's Republic of China, a government
00:16:02 sparing no expense in its quest to hack, lie, cheat, and steal its way to the top as a global
00:16:10 superpower and to undermine our democracy and our economic success. We need funding to counter
00:16:18 cyber threats, certainly those from China, but also from a crowded field of sophisticated,
00:16:24 hostile nation states and criminals, nation states like Russia, Iran, North Korea.
00:16:32 We need funding to mitigate the range of threats from the border, fentanyl,
00:16:38 gangs like MS-13, human trafficking. We need funding to address the violent crime that
00:16:46 remains at levels in this country that are still too high. And we need funding to keep
00:16:53 going after child predators and to rescue young victims from their tormentors.
00:16:58 Now, in all those areas I just mentioned, we're working closely with our partners at all levels
00:17:04 of government to achieve our shared goal of keeping our communities safe. Every day,
00:17:10 FBI agents, analysts, and professional staff are working shoulder to shoulder
00:17:15 with thousands of task force officers from hundreds of different police departments
00:17:20 and sheriff's offices all over the country on our FBI-led task forces.
00:17:26 On top of that, we provide technology and expertise, valuable investigative leads like
00:17:32 DNA matches, and cutting-edge training to law enforcement nationwide to help them protect
00:17:38 Americans from harm. So cuts to us are cuts to our partners, state and local law enforcement
00:17:47 agencies and officers who are on the ground putting themselves in the line of fire,
00:17:53 often quite literally. And that is just one way those cuts are going to have real impacts
00:17:59 on the American people. So yes, we took a hit in the 2024 budget, but the 2025 budget is a chance
00:18:09 to get back on track to provide the FBI's men and women the tools and the resources
00:18:14 the American people need us to have to keep them safe. So thank you again for having me here today,
00:18:20 and I look forward to our discussion. Thank you, Director Ray. We will now
00:18:29 proceed under the five-minute rule with questions for the witness. I'll begin by recognizing myself.
00:18:37 Director, has the Bureau observed any improvements in our efforts to dismantle
00:18:49 that fentanyl pipeline? And what role can the Bureau play here?
00:18:54 So I would say it's a mixed bag. Certainly, the scourge of fentanyl is still claiming way, way,
00:19:03 way too many lives. And I will tell you that from the FBI's perspective, one of the things that
00:19:10 we've been observing is that in our takedown of violent gangs, which is, of course, something
00:19:15 that we're doing all over the country all the time, we are noticing almost without exception
00:19:21 now that those takedowns of violent gang members also include seizures of fentanyl. So the fentanyl
00:19:28 that's coming from the cartels built on precursors from China ending up all over the United States
00:19:35 is often being distributed, of course, by these violent street gangs. So that is one of the things
00:19:40 that we're observing. We are trying to do our part. This goes way beyond any one agency and,
00:19:46 frankly, beyond law enforcement, as I know a lot of your efforts recognize. But some of the things
00:19:52 that we at the FBI are doing to try to do our part, I'll mention a few. Our Safe Streets Task
00:19:58 Forces are going after the gangs that are distributing so much of this poison. Our
00:20:05 organized crime, our TOC, Transnational Organized Crime Task Forces, are going after the cartels.
00:20:10 We have close to, I think, close to 400 investigations that go just after cartel
00:20:17 leadership. We also have things like JCODE, which is an initiative where we bring together 12
00:20:23 agencies that's focused on the dark web trafficking of fentanyl and other dangerous substances,
00:20:31 dismantling dark net marketplaces when we do that. We have a prescription drug initiative,
00:20:38 because, of course, especially in certain parts of the country, pill mills and irresponsible
00:20:44 prescribers of opioids are a driver of much of this epidemic. So we're using our healthcare fraud
00:20:52 expertise, for example, to try to go after some of those folks. We're working with our partners
00:20:58 on the other side of the border. And there I would say it's very uneven. We've had some instances
00:21:07 where we've had a key arrest, an extradition, a key operation. We're starting to work with vetted
00:21:12 teams down there, which is an important effort in the right direction. But we need much, much
00:21:18 more than we're getting from the Mexican government. So I guess I would summarize my answer to your
00:21:24 question by saying a lot of things to be encouraged by in terms of the effort and the work that
00:21:29 across multiple agencies people are making, but a lot of things to be very, very concerned about.
00:21:34 Last year, I guess the last two years in a row, I'll just leave it with this point. The FBI
00:21:40 seized enough fentanyl to kill 270 million American people.
00:21:47 And that gives you a sense of the scale of what we're up against.
00:21:52 When it comes to Mexico, what is the level of cooperation between our law enforcement
00:21:58 agencies, especially when it comes to drug trafficking? Are they working with you in Mexico?
00:22:06 Absolutely. I think one of the really bright spots that I see in my, especially when I compare it to
00:22:14 earlier in my career, is how close the partnerships are across all levels of law enforcement. All the
00:22:20 federal agencies, state and local law enforcement is so intertwined with today's FBI. Foreign law
00:22:28 enforcement in a lot of instances, the intelligence community working with law enforcement. So
00:22:33 partnerships are in many ways stronger than ever. And that's one of the things that's
00:22:38 keeping this from becoming an even worse problem. We work with, say, DEA on everything from OSODF
00:22:44 strike forces. We have DEA task force officers on a lot of our task forces and vice versa.
00:22:52 We work out at their SOD where there's intelligence sharing. So there's a whole range of ways in which
00:22:57 we all work together. Obviously, always room for improvement. We're always looking for ways to
00:23:02 innovate and take that to the next level. But if there's one bright spot that I can leave the
00:23:08 committee with is that the partnerships among law enforcement are, in my career, the best I've ever
00:23:15 seen. Well, is Mexico honoring our law enforcement efforts to bring the cartel leaders to justice?
00:23:26 As I think I said earlier, uneven, uneven. So we've had instances, individual instances of
00:23:34 successes, including events, significant cartel figures and extraditions. But then
00:23:39 the reality is that especially the two major cartels, Sinaloa and CJNG, are the drivers of
00:23:46 the vast majority of what we're dealing with here. And we need more from the Mexican government.
00:23:51 There are instances to be pleased about. We've had a top 10 fugitive, for example, of ours that
00:23:57 they helped us arrest and send back recently. So there are individual instances that are bright
00:24:03 spots. But this is such a big problem. We need consistent, sustained, scalable assistance from
00:24:11 them. Well, that border is so open and unchecked. And we're letting in the cartels who not only do
00:24:23 drugs, but they do human trafficking and everything else in the book. And my observation is
00:24:34 we're not getting enough cooperation out of the Mexican government on seeking out the cartels.
00:24:41 Can you agree or disagree with that? Well, the way I would put it is we certainly need more
00:24:47 from the Mexican government. I'm pleased with what we have gotten, but we need a lot more.
00:24:53 Mr. Idaho. I'm sorry. All right. Thank you, Chairman Rogers. I want to follow up Chairman
00:25:03 Rogers's line of questioning, Director Ray. We're getting some cooperation from the Mexican
00:25:12 authorities, but we need more. And it's what they are giving us is incomplete, is inconsistent.
00:25:19 The question is, what can we do? What are we doing to encourage their cooperation?
00:25:28 What more can we get out of them? And what's the best way to approach that?
00:25:32 So I think, you know, some much of this goes beyond sort of the FBI's lane, of course,
00:25:38 and other parts of the government. But your opinion matters. I want to be mindful of trying
00:25:42 to stay in my lane. But what I would say is we need their help cracking down on the cartels
00:25:48 harder. We need help rooting out labs where the poison is being produced. We need help stopping
00:25:54 the purchase and influx of precursor chemicals from the PRC. So those are a few things.
00:26:03 As far as what more can we do, specifically, I would say, again, at the lower law enforcement
00:26:10 kind of working level, there are any number of operations that show us what success could look
00:26:17 like at scale. We've now started doing, which is something I'm pleased with, with the Mexicans. We
00:26:26 now have sort of vetted law enforcement teams, much like we've been used to do and still do
00:26:31 in Colombia, you know, kind of going back to the efforts that we've had with Colombian government
00:26:37 over the years. I think that's a step in the right direction. But it's extraditions, it's
00:26:42 sharing of information. And it's, like I said, it's the key is having it at a scaled, consistent,
00:26:50 sustained level. It's not that there aren't bright spots, but we just need a lot more of it.
00:26:57 Now, you mentioned going after the cartels and 400 separate investigations at the FBI involving
00:27:04 them. What about what you just mentioned, interrupting the flow of precursor chemicals
00:27:09 from China to Mexico? How many of those investigations center on that effort?
00:27:15 And how much more help do you need from the Mexican government on that effort?
00:27:18 Well, we certainly need more help from the Mexican government on that part of it. We also,
00:27:23 of course, frankly, need the Chinese government to do a heck of a lot more than they're doing. I
00:27:28 mean, you have this dangerous intersection of increasingly sophisticated Mexican cartels with
00:27:36 malicious and unscrupulous actors in the PRC who are all too happy to be supplying the chemicals
00:27:42 that then fuel the cartels production. We are trying to tackle it on a whole bunch of different
00:27:49 levels. Our focus, going back over decades in terms of the FBI's approach to organized crime,
00:27:54 is to try to look for ways to dismantle the enterprise. And so that means trying to go
00:28:01 after the leadership, whether we're charging them, whether somebody else is charging them.
00:28:05 That means trying to go after their money. A big part of this is going after, after all,
00:28:11 this is a profit business for them. So the more we can go after their assets through asset
00:28:16 forfeiture and things like that and go after their money launderers, it doesn't work for them
00:28:21 if they don't have people to, and institutions to launder their money. So we're trying to kind
00:28:26 of tackle the infrastructure around them too, as opposed to just onesie twosies in terms of arrests.
00:28:32 So that's the approach we're trying to take, but it's a, it's very much has to be a team effort.
00:28:38 And do you need more money to do that or less money?
00:28:40 We need more money to do that.
00:28:42 More money. Now you mentioned takedowns of violent gangs, and you're noticing that
00:28:46 it's so often includes seizures of massive amounts of fentanyl. Am I correct in that?
00:28:52 That's absolutely right. I think something like 75% of the fentanyl we're seizing is coming in
00:28:59 gang takedowns, something in that magnitude.
00:29:02 Now tell me about these gangs. Are these American citizens?
00:29:06 Most of the gangs themselves are neighborhood gangs. I mean, there are, you know, gangs that
00:29:14 come from the Northern Triangle like MS-13 and so forth as well. But a lot of the takedowns
00:29:19 that I'm describing that we're dismantling are frankly neighborhood gangs who are then the ones
00:29:25 peddling the fentanyl on the streets, not just in the border states, but all over the country.
00:29:32 And how are they getting the fentanyl and the opioids from Mexico?
00:29:38 I think that much of that is probably a question better directed to DHS. I can tell you,
00:29:45 because most of our seizures are happening not at the ports of entry. They're happening after the
00:29:50 stuff's already here somewhere inside the United States. We had a big takedown in New England,
00:29:55 about as far away from the southern border as you could get. Something, the biggest takedown,
00:29:59 I think, in New England history involving all, you know, mountains of fentanyl. So
00:30:03 that's really where we're seeing it. But the actual traffic across the border and the ports
00:30:09 of entry is, you know, is DHS's lane. I know they've got a heck of a challenge on their hands,
00:30:15 to put it mildly. Thank you, Director. I yield back.
00:30:18 Mr. Kline.
00:30:20 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Director, for being here.
00:30:29 I wanted to ask about, continue to ask about the border
00:30:34 and your involvement at the border in assisting with identification of individuals. You'd agree
00:30:42 that it's a national security risk to allow individuals into the country who are not
00:30:51 properly identified, correct? That does raise national security concerns, yes.
00:30:57 Uh, the FBI has been engaged in DNA testing for several years of individuals crossing the border.
00:31:05 In fact, DHS recently, or within the past few years, mandated that that identification occur,
00:31:12 correct? Uh, yes, yes. And when DHS rolled out that program, authorities found that about 19%
00:31:25 of family units crossing were fraudulent. Does that sound about right?
00:31:31 That part, I don't, I don't have any reason to dispute it, but I, as I sit here right now,
00:31:35 I can't remember that specific piece. Okay. Yeah. But failure to properly identify individuals
00:31:43 coming across the border, uh, engaged in human trafficking, sex trafficking, child and sex
00:31:50 trafficking are, are attempting to evade, uh, identification, correct? Right. I mean, the whole
00:31:57 identification piece of this is, I think you're rightly putting your finger on, is such an
00:32:01 important part of it. And that's why, for example, uh, we have, as a trying to be good partners with
00:32:07 DHS, we have been providing them with DNA kits that then, uh, our lab, uh, is the one who would
00:32:15 then test and it has proven to be critical in identifying murderers, rapists and all sorts of,
00:32:20 you know, dangerous individuals. But you have a shortfall, right? You have a backlog. We have
00:32:24 a backlog and that backlog because of the sheer volume at the border with the, with the volume
00:32:30 people coming across the volume of the need for samples has gone skyrocketing as well. So there's
00:32:35 a backlog and the backlog should be of concern to all of us. Do you think it would, uh, be
00:32:42 appropriate or would address this national security risk as you say, uh, if we were to ensure,
00:32:49 if we were to ensure that these individuals,
00:32:53 would not be released until their identification is complete?
00:33:00 Well, uh, certainly I think that's something we should be taking a look at. I mean, that's gets
00:33:07 into sort of DHS's authority. So I'm a little reluctant to, you know, given the sheer number
00:33:11 of things that are on our plate, uh, before I start weighing in on what should be on somebody
00:33:16 else's plate. But I, I will tell you that, um, we have any number of instances where somebody who
00:33:22 is of concern, where there wasn't adequate, uh, biometrics or other identification information at
00:33:29 the time they came across, then later information is found that highlights why they're of concern.
00:33:36 Uh, and then it's the FBI and our partners who have to then go try to find the person,
00:33:42 take whatever action we can to disrupt the threat that that person poses. So,
00:33:46 okay. Rather than ask if it should be mandated, let me ask it this way. Would it improve security
00:33:54 at our border to ensure that only those who have been properly identified are released into the
00:33:59 country? Uh, at least as I sit here right now, I don't see how that couldn't help. Okay. Thank you.
00:34:05 I want to also ask about, um, you, you touched on it in your testimony, FISA section 702. Um,
00:34:17 you've said that a warrant requirement would gut, I think was your term, uh,
00:34:24 compliance with the Fourth Amendment would gut a tool that you have. Is that essentially,
00:34:32 well, uh, I did use the word gut and I stand by it. I would say a couple of things. First,
00:34:36 when you say compliance with the Fourth Amendment, let's be clear. No court, as in none,
00:34:42 has ever held that a warrant is required under the Fourth Amendment for the FBI to run queries
00:34:48 of information that's already lawfully under, in our holdings under section 702. And the only
00:34:53 courts to have addressed the issue, but isn't that the other way. So that's one, but isn't that
00:34:58 information, uh, the intent of the law, uh, designed to provide the information of foreign
00:35:04 nationals, not American citizens, uh, who are, and wouldn't that really be a, an end run around
00:35:12 the statute as you say, to lawfully obtain this information? No, no, I appreciate the question.
00:35:19 Um, I think the purpose of section 702 is to identify foreign threats to us, to Americans,
00:35:27 uh, and so when you have, I'll give you an example to illustrate the point. It is critical
00:35:33 for our ability to identify foreign terrorist organizations communicating with, inspiring,
00:35:39 or working with people here in the U.S. and that's how we identify and stop attacks. We had an
00:35:45 example just last year where we had an individual foreign terrorist overseas who had some kind of
00:35:52 contact, not sure what it was at that point, with some person we believe to be in the United States.
00:35:58 So we did a query. We ran a U.S. person query on that U.S. individual's identifiers, but at the
00:36:04 time we ran that query, we didn't know what we had. Could it, was it the equivalent of a wrong
00:36:09 number? Was it just innocuous chit chat or was it something that was concerning? Well, because we
00:36:14 were able to run the query, again, information already lawfully in our holdings, that's when
00:36:20 we discovered, that's when we discovered, whoa, wait a minute, we got a live one here. This is
00:36:25 serious. This is urgent. Investigation kicked in very quickly and within less than a month,
00:36:31 within less than a month from that first query, we were able to arrest the person who had by that
00:36:37 time weapons, bomb making equipment, targets circled and everything else. And the point I
00:36:42 would try to make here is that if we had had to get a warrant in a day to run that initial query,
00:36:48 no, no, sir, it doesn't work that way. If somebody's had to get warrants, if we had had to
00:36:52 get a warrant for that initial query, there is no judge on the planet that would have given us a
00:36:57 warrant based on what we knew at the time. All we knew at the time was foreign terrorist overseas,
00:37:02 some kind of contact with some person in the U.S., no idea what it's about. I'm sorry,
00:37:06 Mr. Chairman, I've gone way over. I yield back. You mentioned earlier DNA testing.
00:37:14 As I understand it, in 2020, the Department of Homeland Security mandated an expansion of DNA
00:37:22 collections to essentially everyone coming across the border. Is that correct? That's my
00:37:29 understanding. And what's the purpose of taking DNA samples of all migrants?
00:37:39 Well, I think there are multiple purposes. I mean, I think one of them, which goes to,
00:37:43 I think the question that Congressman Klein was asking about is, you know, sometimes you have
00:37:47 people who we find a lot of times somebody then tries to reenter the country. They're deported,
00:37:55 as they should have been, but then they try to reenter. And because we have the DNA,
00:38:01 and they may come across, you know, in some other way, and they turn up somewhere else
00:38:04 because we have the DNA sample. Assumedly, doing DNA testing on all people entering the country at
00:38:12 the border is to be able to find criminals among the lot. And comparing the DNA test sample of that
00:38:23 person against the national criminal records, has that been effective? Have we caught criminals
00:38:31 that way? Absolutely. It's two prong. And the people who courts try to illegally reenter the
00:38:36 country are also committing a crime. But I think the point you're getting at is a very important
00:38:41 one, which is that this authority and the funding that this subcommittee has given us over the years
00:38:49 on this has enabled us to identify, you know, rapists, murderers, and any number of other
00:38:55 dangerous criminals and crimes around the country. And so the DNA collection and the testing and the
00:39:02 timely testing is critical to solving sometimes very heinous crimes here in the United States.
00:39:09 Well, in the '24 budget, we included $53 million that you had requested
00:39:19 to address the increase in numbers of DNA samples. And the border has become more open since that
00:39:29 time with much more people, many, much more people coming across than before. And yet,
00:39:37 you made no request for money in fiscal '25. What's going on? Well, partly what we've done
00:39:45 is to try to prioritize that collection effort with the funds that the subcommittee has already
00:39:52 given us. The key to our 2025 request is to try to restore the roughly 1,000 position cut that
00:40:04 the net effect of the '24 budget would have. That's what, in our judgment, because we've had
00:40:09 to make hard choices, very consistent with the spirit of your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman,
00:40:16 and so that we didn't want to take away money from the DNA collection. And so we've, but in
00:40:21 our budget request, we're trying to restore the positions that go to everything from ransomware
00:40:27 to violent crime to fentanyl interdiction to counter espionage against the Chinese. I could
00:40:33 go on and on, but. Well, now there's a 15-month backlog on DNA testing. So by the time these
00:40:45 people are tested and counted, they're going to be long gone. Because you've got that backlog.
00:40:53 You will get no argument from me, sir, that the backlog is a negative development and that if
00:41:02 this subcommittee were to give us more resources for more DNA testing, we could bring down that
00:41:09 backlog even further. You mentioned hard choices. We got good funding from the subcommittee before
00:41:17 for this particular effort, and we haven't taken money away from it, but we've had to prioritize
00:41:22 the significant hit that we took in terms of the impact on our personnel in the '24 budget. And
00:41:31 that's what you see. But if you would see fit to give us more money for it, I can assure you it
00:41:36 will help. And the effort that the DNA collection is designed to accomplish is something that I
00:41:43 think you and I both agree is extremely important. Well, you make the request. We'll take it up.
00:41:48 Ms. Mang. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Director Wray. I, along with several of my
00:41:58 colleagues in the House and Senate, have previously communicated with the DOJ and the FBI about the
00:42:04 importance of the FBI's uniform crime reporting programs' reports on hate crime statistics.
00:42:10 I'm concerned about the trend of a decrease in the number of local law enforcement agencies
00:42:18 providing the FBI with incident data. This is the fifth year in a row that the number of local
00:42:23 agencies providing data to the FBI has declined. I wanted to ask how your agency may be working
00:42:31 with local law enforcement agencies to increase participation in this reporting system.
00:42:36 So I think you're right to ask about the issue, because one of the things we know about hate
00:42:43 crime reporting just in general as a starting point is that it's chronically underreported.
00:42:50 And so for quite some time now, we've been trying to engage in different forms of outreach to
00:42:55 our law enforcement partners to make it easier for them to understand what to report and how
00:43:02 to report it and so forth. And so that effort is continuing, and we're always trying to find
00:43:08 new and better ways to improve their responsiveness, if you will. The second thing that I think
00:43:15 contributes to the trend that you're describing is the conversion to NIBRS, the National Incident
00:43:25 Based Reporting System. And of course, that affects statistics not just on hate crimes,
00:43:31 but on all sorts of other crime reporting as well. And the NIBRS transition is something that
00:43:38 has been in the works for years and years and years. I mean, dating back to well before I
00:43:44 became FBI director, and we'd been repeatedly telling state and local law enforcement,
00:43:50 this is coming, this is coming. And once it gets to the point where we've shifted over to that,
00:43:56 that's the only way you're going to be able to report. But there are a lot of departments
00:44:01 that haven't yet made the conversion to NIBRS reporting. Every year it's been going up.
00:44:07 We're getting closer and closer to where we need to be on that. And I should add that the
00:44:11 NIBRS reporting system is something that all the major law enforcement associations wanted us to
00:44:16 switch to. It's not something we just came up with on our own. But so in the meantime, we're
00:44:22 trying to work with them to supplement that reporting to make sure that, you know, any gaps
00:44:28 in the completeness of the statistical picture are compensated for during this kind of
00:44:35 transitionary period. So that those are some of the things we're doing on that.
00:44:38 Appreciate that. And then, you know, in recent years, there was a rise in hate crimes committed
00:44:44 against people of Asian descent in fiscal year 2021. I was proud to partner with the DOJ to bolster
00:44:52 federal data collection in response to hate crimes. I'm concerned about language obstacles and what
00:45:01 the FBI can maybe be doing more to reach those who may have limited English proficiency.
00:45:08 And also to make sure that we are increasingly building trust with local underrepresented
00:45:15 communities. I don't want the DOJ and the FBI to lose the momentum of all the efforts that
00:45:22 have been happening to reach communities like the Asian American community.
00:45:25 So we agree with you that outreach to the community is an incredibly important
00:45:32 part of the effort here. We've been doing, I think, over the last few years, you know,
00:45:36 hundreds of training and liaison efforts with the AAPI community specifically, both locally
00:45:43 and some nationally. We have some of the materials that we've produced that help people understand
00:45:51 how to recognize hate crimes and, you know, what it is and what it isn't and, you know,
00:45:57 how to report it and so forth. We've actually had translated into multiple languages, including all
00:46:02 the major, the most common AAPI languages. And we've tried to have our people out in the community.
00:46:11 I think one additional piece to this that doesn't always get connected up with the so-called,
00:46:16 with sort of the hate crimes piece of it, is what we call transnational repression, which is
00:46:22 efforts by the Chinese government, specifically the Chinese Communist Party, to harass, stalk,
00:46:28 blackmail, or worse, you know, Chinese Americans and people of Chinese descent here. And so we've
00:46:36 been trying to reach out to the same communities on that as well so that they understand that we're
00:46:42 there for them and to try to help protect them against the common enemy, frankly, that we both
00:46:48 have, or the common adversary, I should say, namely the Chinese Communist Party.
00:46:53 On that note, I'll end with, I just want to make sure that the law enforcement agencies
00:46:57 are also utilizing culturally competent trainings and with their agents. Thank you.
00:47:04 Mr. Garcia.
00:47:08 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Director Wray. I'll be honest with you, and this pains
00:47:14 me to say this, but I don't trust you. I don't think that this is necessarily a funding problem
00:47:20 that we have for your agency as much as a leadership problem. And between the lack of
00:47:26 transparency in hearings like this and in intel hearings, your weaponization and politicization
00:47:33 of issues and instruments of national security against innocent Americans and against institutions
00:47:40 like churches, and the fact that you have held no one truly accountable for prior FISA abuses that
00:47:46 we have all seen and recognized, I think you yourself have acknowledged that there's been abuses.
00:47:50 And because of the fact that as the FBI director, that you've stood relatively silent and passive
00:47:56 about the biggest national security threat to our nation, that being our very open southern border,
00:48:03 as the chairman has been discussing. I give very little credence in either your ability to do this
00:48:09 job or frankly lead the brave agents below you. And I don't trust you to protect us. And that
00:48:15 is a very difficult thing for me to say. It pains me to say that because your job is critically
00:48:20 important to the safety of this nation and American lives. And I think because of your
00:48:26 inability to lead and also shape the policies and the DOJ and at the White House, we are now in a
00:48:32 more precarious position than we were, I would submit, than we were on September 10th of 2001.
00:48:39 You yourself say in your written testimony that over the past year, the threats facing our nation
00:48:44 have escalated. The breadth of these threats and challenges are as complex as any time in our
00:48:48 history. And the consequences of not responding and countering these threats have never been
00:48:53 greater. These are your words. And we don't only pay you to warn us of a threat, which you have
00:48:58 eloquently done here, although that's important and appreciated that you're warning us, but we
00:49:03 also pay you to prevent and protect us from the threats. And you're in an agency, and I'm on
00:49:11 committees where I'm your authorizer on the Intel Committee and I'm your appropriator here on the
00:49:16 CJS Subcommittee on Appropriations. And I find it difficult to trust you to protect us. And any data
00:49:22 or budget requests you bring to us as a result of that is, in my opinion, suspect. And in your
00:49:28 nearly 20 pages of written testimony, you've mentioned the southern border only approximately
00:49:34 four times. And even then, you kind of gloss over it. And we now have 7 million people in our
00:49:39 country, 350 people on the FBI terror watch list who have been apprehended, plus another 1.7 million
00:49:48 known gotaways here within our borders as a result of your leadership's border policies.
00:49:54 And I say your leadership and not your bosses because your bosses are the American people,
00:49:59 right? Your customers are the American people. You work for them. You work for the people to
00:50:04 protect them. So your leadership, the President of the United States, A.G. Garland, and Director
00:50:10 of Homeland Security Mayorkas are literally intentionally putting the people that you work
00:50:16 for, the average American citizen, into a clear and present danger situation that you yourself
00:50:21 have acknowledged in your written testimony. So you've testified before the Intel Committee
00:50:28 with the Worldwide Threats Briefs and other committees that there are giant red warning
00:50:32 lights and warning signs and, you know, lots of flashing signs from a threat and terrorism
00:50:38 assessment perspective. You know, and it's evident that you know and agree with this notion and that
00:50:44 we should all be concerned. Yet, despite this, you have been unable to change the policies driven by
00:50:50 your leadership, by the President, the A.G., DHS Mayorkas. And so it's difficult, but it's
00:51:00 in addition to being untrustworthy, you are also ineffective at a very important part of your job,
00:51:05 which is shaping the policies that do affect national security. And that should be, the open
00:51:13 border should be the biggest challenge that your administration is recognizing right now, and
00:51:18 unfortunately is not. And I think your biggest problem personally is that it's not just me that
00:51:25 doesn't trust you. It's the American people that don't trust you right now as a result of that.
00:51:29 Can I just get a simple yes or no response to this question? Does the open border policy make
00:51:34 your job easier or harder? Are we safer or less safe as a result of the open border policy?
00:51:41 I have been consistent over the years, frankly, in citing my concerns about the threats that
00:51:49 emanate from the border. Okay. And as to the long narrative that you went through at the beginning,
00:51:54 needless to say, I disagree very strongly with any number of aspects of it, but I recognize that we
00:52:00 are time limited. I understand. In the interest of time, I want you to acknowledge that the open
00:52:02 border policy makes us more insecure than strong. So I want to know, what have your discussions been
00:52:10 with the President? Have you been able to go into his office and say, "Boss, this open border policy
00:52:15 is a galactically stupid policy from a national security perspective"? Have you had that conversation?
00:52:21 If so, what did that look like? What has been the response? And how are we shaping this to make us
00:52:26 more secure in the future? Well, I'm not going to get into specific conversations with people.
00:52:31 I've been consistent in my message externally and internally about my concerns about the threats
00:52:37 that are from the FBI's perspective that emanate from the border. I'm out of time, Mr. Chairman.
00:52:45 I yield back. Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, always for your leadership and thanks to the
00:52:57 Ranking Member. Director, I want to say that I do trust you and I'm, one, very, very grateful for
00:53:05 your service on behalf of this entire country and the people who put their faith in you and the
00:53:11 Federal Bureau of Investigation. I frankly find it somewhat astonishing at this date and the age
00:53:18 in which we live that the American leadership here at times questions the role of the FBI.
00:53:25 I don't question it. I know you have a tough job and I appreciate all the incredible work that you
00:53:29 do. If I may, I just wanted to, despite discreasing, I think you mentioned in your testimony, decreasing
00:53:36 rates of homicide, non-fatal shootings in my community of Rochester, New York, upstate New York.
00:53:41 We remain in a gun violence state of emergency. As you know, the passage of the 2022 Bipartisan
00:53:49 Safer Communities Act implemented changes in the National Instant Criminal Background Check System,
00:53:54 NICS, including a comprehensive background check on gun buyers under the age of 21 years old.
00:54:01 In this fiscal year, you're requesting $43 million to sustain implementation of that act,
00:54:08 as well as $8.4 million to support enhanced background checks, which includes funding to
00:54:13 address provisions such as the under 21 background checks. I just would ask, considering the critical
00:54:20 role NICS plays in preventing firearms from reaching the wrong hands, can you just share
00:54:25 with me how the budget request will allow the FBI to address these, what I expect and assume are
00:54:31 pretty labor intensive, enhancements to the operation of NICS as transactions continue to grow?
00:54:36 So, I appreciate the question. The Bipartisan Safer Communities Act added a number of additional
00:54:46 checks that NICS was responsible for conducting, specifically focused on, as we would call it,
00:54:53 the U21 group population. And this committee, and we're very grateful for that, helped get us,
00:55:03 at the time of the passage of the act, funding to bring on board positions and make certain
00:55:10 systems changes. But the problem is it was one-time funding. And so, if we're going to
00:55:16 sustain the work, then we need funding to continue it. And that's what you see reflected in the
00:55:22 request here. It's both to continue those positions, because it's, as you say, very
00:55:26 labor intensive, but also for systems enhancements to have the human workforce, have them be even
00:55:34 more efficient in their work. I've been out there myself and sat with the operators who were doing
00:55:40 the checks on a couple of occasions to see, and so I can see kind of how labor intensive it is.
00:55:47 I'm very pleased with the fact that they're already getting much, much faster at them.
00:55:51 And I think that's only going to improve, but we still do need the funding. Again,
00:55:57 the way to remember it is just it was funding was there, but it was one-time funding,
00:56:01 and we just need the funding to sustain it. Otherwise, it sort of loses its effectiveness.
00:56:07 And that's going to be, obviously, an annual request then to be able to continue to maintain
00:56:10 this. And I suspect they even require additional dollars in future years to be able to deal with
00:56:15 the growing number of challenges that we have there. If I can, coordination and partnership
00:56:23 between the FBI and state, local, and tribal entities is integral to the security of communities
00:56:30 across the nation. In my community, the FBI leads the Rochester Area Major Crimes Task Force,
00:56:36 the Child Exploitation Task Force, and the Joint Terrorism Task Force, and participates in the
00:56:41 Rochester Safe Streets Task Force. Considering your successful nationwide efforts alongside
00:56:48 state and local law enforcement partners to combat violent crime, could you describe how
00:56:53 the proposed budget will further enhance and strengthen information sharing and coordination
00:56:58 among not only the FBI, but all your local partners? So, the biggest part of our budget
00:57:05 request in '25 is to restore, essentially, the cuts that we endured in the '24 budget,
00:57:13 which there's no way to sustain without having an impact on our efforts on violent crime,
00:57:21 on child exploitation, on a whole range of threats that we're responsible for protecting
00:57:27 the American people from. And so, the request will allow us to continue the good work that's
00:57:35 being done in upstate New York and elsewhere on gang violence, on child exploitation,
00:57:42 on cyber attacks, on the cartels and organized crime, which, as I said before, that's not just
00:57:50 a border problem. It affects all 50 states, and we're seizing huge amounts of fentanyl all over
00:57:55 the country. So, all these things are incredibly important. Our folks are doing great work on the
00:58:01 violent crime side, for example. Just last year, we were arresting through our task forces
00:58:08 50 violent criminals and child predators per day, every day, all year long. So, a cut
00:58:17 means more bad guys on the street, more gangs terrorizing neighborhoods, more kids at risk,
00:58:24 et cetera. I see my time has expired. Mr. Chair, you're always very gracious. I appreciate
00:58:31 it. Director, thank you for your continued service, sir. I yield back. Mr. Clyde.
00:58:35 Thank you, Chairman Rogers. Director Wray, as I'm sure you know, this week, the House has been
00:58:48 considering the reauthorization of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
00:58:53 commonly known as FISA. I've been deeply troubled with the abuse of Section 702 of FISA in recent
00:58:59 years, and so your testimony today is very well timed. Thank you. So, Director Wray,
00:59:06 does the FBI currently comply in every way with the current Section 702 of FISA?
00:59:11 My understanding is that we're in compliance with the law. Okay, so you think you do. All right.
00:59:20 How do you respond to an unsealed document released by the U.S. Foreign Intelligence
00:59:24 Surveillance Court on May 19, 2023, which states your agency, the FBI, illegally misused this tool
00:59:31 more than 278,000 times between 2020 and early 2021, and is this number of 278,000 abuses accurate?
00:59:40 So, I appreciate the question. I'm glad to have the opportunity to clarify that. So,
00:59:46 first off, I would say that that opinion covers activity, querying activity, that occurs all
00:59:54 before all these reforms that we've put in place. So, that's number one. Second,
01:00:00 When did you start putting those reforms in place?
01:00:02 Mid-2022, somewhere in that range.
01:00:06 2022 or 2023?
01:00:10 They started in 2022, and they kind of rolled into '23. They obviously don't just flick a switch,
01:00:15 but the second thing I would say, too, is when you look at the FISA Court, the same judges
01:00:20 evaluating our compliance with 702 after all those reforms have been put in place,
01:00:28 you see consistently compliance rates well into the high 90 percent range, and the court actually
01:00:36 commending the FBI for the improvements that they've seen because of the reforms. So, that's
01:00:41 the second point. The third point I would make to you, third point, this is important because you
01:00:46 asked, the third point that is important is that the querying that you're talking about in that
01:00:52 opinion that, again, covers older activity, something like 99.7 percent of it would all
01:01:00 have been prevented by the reforms that we've put in place. On top of that, the vast majority
01:01:06 of those queries, the 278,000, are not actually 702 queries, much less non-compliant 702 queries.
01:01:13 Well, let me ask you this. This report ended in early 2021, and you started in mid-2022,
01:01:21 so that would be an entire year. So, during that time frame,
01:01:24 how many times did the FBI abuse its FISA authority? Do you know?
01:01:28 I don't have any period of non-compliance that I can report here from that period,
01:01:35 but I can tell you this. The court's opinion that covers the more recent period.
01:01:42 As you know, the government agencies typically need a warrant issued by a judge before they can
01:01:46 access American citizens' phone calls, texts, internet searches, and emails. However, the
01:01:51 government, in my opinion, has been able to query Section 702 acquired communications as an end run
01:01:56 around the Fourth Amendment. My colleague, Andy Biggs, representative from Arizona, has an
01:02:02 amendment to the current FISA reauthorization that would require the government to obtain a warrant
01:02:06 or to obtain a FISA court order prior to conducting a U.S. citizen query of information already
01:02:12 collected through the 702 FISA program. You know, you previously stated in a Senate hearing in
01:02:18 December that it would be unworkable to require the government to get a warrant before collecting
01:02:22 Americans' private communications. Yet, former NSA lawyer George Kroener recently estimated the
01:02:28 warrant requirement would force the FBI to get about three warrants a day. Now, Director Wray,
01:02:33 you've got more than 30,000 employees that work for the FBI. Are you seriously saying that three
01:02:37 warrants a day is too much of a burden for the FBI to protect our Fourth Amendment rights?
01:02:41 That's not what I'm saying. What I am saying is, number one, no court has found that the Fourth
01:02:47 Amendment requires us to use a warrant to look at information, to query information that's already
01:02:53 in our 702 holdings lawfully, and the only courts to look at it have gone the other way. That's
01:02:57 number one. Number two, the problem with the warrant requirement goes beyond any kind of burden
01:03:04 or delay that comes with it. The big part of the problem is that it's often only by running the
01:03:10 query that we get to see the information that tells us whether or not we would meet a warrant
01:03:15 requirement in the first place. All right, I've got one more question for you before my time runs
01:03:19 out. Investigation. All right. We have, looking at the breakdown of the FBI's $11.3 billion budget,
01:03:27 like last year, almost 60 percent of the budget is categorized as defense spending and only 40
01:03:32 percent as non-defense spending. To me, that seems odd. I read your mission priorities and I did not
01:03:36 see any reference to DOD. I mean, the FBI is not part of the Department of Defense and they are a
01:03:41 domestic law enforcement agency. Why is the FBI's budget categorized as 60 percent defense spending?
01:03:47 I believe the answer to your question, and I'm not an appropriations expert, but I believe the
01:03:53 answer to your question is what's so-called NIP funding, which is overseen by the Office of the
01:04:00 Director of National Intelligence. So a significant chunk of our budget is considered defense spending
01:04:07 because of it's part of the intelligence community budget, if you will. So it gets a little more
01:04:14 complicated than that, but I think that's the high-level answer to your question.
01:04:17 Okay. All right. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
01:04:21 Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First thing I want to say,
01:04:27 I think that your questions are important and I think a lot of people who haven't been involved
01:04:32 in law enforcement are not sure what 702 is and all of those issues. I was a former prosecutor,
01:04:39 investigative prosecutor, ran a strike force, so I know that and I've been working in the Intel
01:04:45 Committee in defense my whole career here, which has been over 20 years now. And I think you
01:04:50 answered the questions and I think those questions are right, that we've cleaned up 702 and it's
01:04:58 really happening. I'm not happy with the comments and he's not here anymore and I'll talk to him
01:05:03 personally to just to criticize you. I've worked with different FBI agents and you're as good as
01:05:09 any of them. You're good, you're quality and you're respected by your peers and that's what's
01:05:13 important. But we're in a serious situation in this country right now and with respect to what's
01:05:19 happening with China and what's happening with Russia and all these issues. And I'm really,
01:05:26 really worried about where we're going to go and I think we're at the worst spot. The Republicans
01:05:31 and Democrats are fighting each other all the time and this issue is both sides of the aisle
01:05:37 as far as what's going on in the country. What I would like you to do is talk about what FISA 702,
01:05:47 why it's so important and why it's one of the most dangerous issues we're dealing with.
01:05:51 And I think the FBI is being caught up right now and really President Trump, people who are
01:05:58 supporting him, the head can support him, that's fine. And I don't want to interfere to that,
01:06:03 that's whatever you want to do. But don't mess with the United States of America and our national
01:06:07 security because that's what you're doing. This is as serious as anything. I do a lot with the
01:06:12 Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. I work with them also in this regard. This issue is one of
01:06:17 the most important issues. So could you please say why it's so important that we pass this and
01:06:22 not get caught up in a Trump issue because he's mad. He authorized this law when he was president.
01:06:29 So come on, let's not play the hypocrisy. Could you please tell the public at this point or us
01:06:36 where we are and why it's so important? So Section 702 is indispensable in keeping
01:06:42 Americans safe from a whole barrage of fast moving foreign threats. It is crucial to identifying
01:06:52 terrorists in the homeland, working with or inspired by a rogues gallery of foreign
01:06:58 terrorist organizations who have publicly called for attacks against our country.
01:07:03 It helps us find out who these terrorists are working with and what they're targeting and
01:07:08 what we need to stop them before they kill Americans. 702 is crucial when countries like
01:07:16 China or Iran target dissidents and Americans here in the homeland. In Iran's case, literally,
01:07:22 even for things like kidnapping and assassination, 702 is what helps us know who to warn and help
01:07:30 disrupt the plot. 702 is crucial to our ability to warn and protect our critical infrastructure
01:07:38 from hackers in China, in Russia, Iran, including cyber threats to our electricity, our water,
01:07:47 our hospitals. So if Congress lets 702 lapse, which it's set to do now next week, it will
01:07:55 massively increase the risk of missing crucial intelligence during a time of heightened national
01:08:02 security threats across a whole multiple of fronts. And if we're blinded from seeing what
01:08:08 our adversaries are doing, who they're working with, I can tell you that's going to most
01:08:14 definitely have consequences for our ability to protect the American people. Because I can
01:08:19 assure you that none of our adversaries are tying their own hands. So now is not the time for us to
01:08:26 hang up our gloves to take away tools that we need to punch back and failing to reauthorize 702
01:08:33 or guiding it with some kind of warrant requirement would be dangerous and put American
01:08:39 lives at risk. And this is the director of the FBI. I don't know anyone who knows this law.
01:08:45 It doesn't feel strongly about this issue with respect to 702.
01:08:50 I would add to that there's a pattern across multiple administrations,
01:08:54 Republicans and Democrats alike. If you look at the professionals who have actually worked
01:09:00 with this authority and dealt with these threats from the working level to the
01:09:05 presidentially appointed level again across administrations, including a whole range of
01:09:10 my colleagues from the last administration, because after all, I was nominated by President
01:09:14 Trump and is overwhelmingly confirmed without a single Republican senator ever voting against me,
01:09:21 whether nominated by President Bush or President Trump, every single one of them
01:09:25 supports the importance of 702. And I think that should tell people something.
01:09:31 Well, I thank you for our country and what you're doing. I yield back.
01:09:34 Mr. Gonzalez.
01:09:37 Thank you, Chairman. And thank you, Director, for your service to this great nation. I want to
01:09:43 acknowledge the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force that recently was able to apprehend an individual
01:09:51 in Idaho that had ISIS related ties. It's exactly the type of things we need to do to keep Americans
01:09:57 safe. And so thank you for for your men and women for that. My first question is, if FISA were to
01:10:02 expire, would our southern border be more or less secure?
01:10:08 I think if FISA were to expire, it adds one more challenge to our ability to secure us from
01:10:15 foreign threats, including border related threats. I'll tell you, in my district, a lot of people
01:10:19 talk about the border. I live the border. We are we are on the border every single day. So people
01:10:24 throw throw rocks from afar. We're the ones that have to live it. My next question is, have there
01:10:29 been any cases where the DOJ prosecute prosecutors chose not to prosecute a case that your agency
01:10:36 that your bureau identified as a significant threat to the homeland or community interests?
01:10:41 I can't think of a specific case as I'm sitting here right now. I will certainly tell you that
01:10:51 disagreements between agents and prosecutors at the working level is something that that happens.
01:10:58 It's a healthy discussion that happens all the time when we think we have enough and prosecutor
01:11:02 doesn't think we have enough. I've seen that from both sides, having been a prosecutor, too.
01:11:06 But I don't have any specific case that I can think of that fits.
01:11:10 This is what I worry about is we have a case teed up that has identified a security threat to
01:11:16 either community or the homeland, and it doesn't go prosecuted and something bad happens. And we
01:11:21 look back and we see this, you know, something's going to happen. It's only a matter of when.
01:11:26 And I don't want us to be going playing armchair quarterback. How do we get ahead of some of these
01:11:30 issues? And I think there needs to be a closer relationship with the prosecutors and the agents
01:11:35 on the ground. One thing in that regard that we do that I've seen a big change in the FBI
01:11:41 since again, I was somebody who was in FBI headquarters on 9/11. So I'm well familiar with
01:11:46 a lot of this stuff. What I would say to you is today's FBI also works very closely with state
01:11:52 and local prosecutors, too. So if there's ever an instance where a charge in the state system
01:11:59 is a better way to quickly disrupt an attack, we're not shy about working with local prosecutors,
01:12:06 not just federal prosecutors. My next question, what is the FBI doing to combat the rise in
01:12:10 transnational criminal organizations, specifically the Venezuelan gang, the Randa Aguilar TDA?
01:12:16 So we're certainly tracking that particular gang TDA, as we would refer to it. We have
01:12:25 safe streets, violent gang task forces in all 56 of our field offices, which are focused
01:12:32 specifically on gangs and other similar violent criminal enterprises. And that's the vehicle
01:12:39 through which we are looking at TDA, whether it's leaders, members, associates. We have ongoing
01:12:45 engagement with intelligence committee partners, state and local law enforcement, in some cases,
01:12:50 foreign partners, in looking at whether it's their drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping
01:12:57 for ransom, different kinds of violent crime, different kinds of trafficking and smuggling,
01:13:02 even things like organized retail theft. So it's a real menu of different criminal activities.
01:13:09 I'd ask that you take a hard look at this, because no one's talked, very few people are talking
01:13:13 about TDA right now. In three years, we're going to be talking about TDA no different than we're
01:13:18 talking about MS-13. And it's going to be the communities that get ahead of it that create
01:13:22 these task forces, that utilize these task forces at the local, state and federal level to combat
01:13:27 these Venezuelan gangs. Once again, I live the border. We're year four of this. Year four is
01:13:33 much different than year one. The people that are coming over are different people. They're
01:13:37 different actors. To that point, I was just out in West Texas. I did a swing through West Texas.
01:13:42 I'm seeing a significant increase in oil theft in West Texas. All my sheriffs are asking for help.
01:13:47 Are there any opportunities to expand the FBI oil field theft task force?
01:13:53 So, absolutely. We're very proud of the work that our West Texas offices are doing in terms of the
01:14:01 Permian Basin oil field task force. It's created due to the fact that I think something like 40%
01:14:07 of the oil in the US comes from the West Texas region. And so that task force has not only state
01:14:16 local law enforcement participation, but we also have, which is a bit innovative, cleared oil field
01:14:24 security personnel, you know, typically they're former law enforcement as well, but also on the
01:14:30 task force. And it's a way to kind of track oil field crime to ensure that investigations move as
01:14:38 quickly as and effectively as possible. It is a complex, in a form of critical, it's a form of
01:14:45 critical infrastructure threat. And it's something we're very focused on.
01:14:48 Director, this is a threat that I'm seeing is correlated directly to the open border. I'm seeing
01:14:54 more and more foreign nationals, in particular Cubans, that are here illegally that are
01:14:59 operating in this space. And so we need to, once again, as this border crisis expands, we need to
01:15:05 get ahead of this. And I'd ask that you consider taking a hard look at that oil field task force.
01:15:10 With that, Chairman, I'm out of time and I yield back.
01:15:14 I want to now recognize the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Laurel.
01:15:18 Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Cartwright. My apologies for dashing in and
01:15:25 eventually dashing out. There are several hearings, so trying to make as many as I can.
01:15:31 And Director, so pleased that the President's budget for 2025 increases funding to hire
01:15:39 additional FBI personnel, helping to bolster your capacity to deter cybercrime, combat foreign
01:15:46 intelligence activity against the U.S., improve the National Instant Criminal Background Check
01:15:51 system. And I know my colleague, Mr. Morelli, discussed that issue. First of all, I should say
01:15:56 thank you to you for making a visit to New Haven, Connecticut, just a few weeks ago. And really
01:16:04 delighted to have you there with the opportunity to be in a field office, if you will, and to talk
01:16:11 about the FBI's work in my state and to piggyback off my colleague's comment. What I wanted to do
01:16:17 was to address the work with task forces. I view what you are doing with regard to state and local
01:16:33 government is overall infrastructure. Like we have a public health infrastructure. We rely on
01:16:39 state laboratories, et cetera. And when you look at defunding those efforts, you look like at the
01:16:46 collapse of the ability to move forward with regard that the CDC has the inability to move
01:16:52 forward. But I think sometimes, I think some of my colleagues are unaware of just how frequently
01:16:57 the FBI works in very close partnership with state and local law enforcement to be able to deal with
01:17:04 crime. If you could talk about what are the lessons learned by both the FBI and state and
01:17:11 local law enforcement about ways in which the task forces that were mentioned maximize that
01:17:17 effectiveness in fighting a crime. And I don't know if there are any stories that are especially
01:17:22 worth highlighting, but I would finally add what happens because there are many, as you know,
01:17:29 would look to defund the FBI. And a lot of discussion about that. Cut back on the resources.
01:17:37 What does that mean to the support of that national infrastructure, if you will,
01:17:44 that you rely on and they rely on you in order to deal with violent crime and other things in the
01:17:52 U.S.? If you could comment on that. Sure. I think one of the things that a lot of people don't
01:17:58 fully appreciate is how integrated today's FBI is with state and local law enforcement and how
01:18:04 dependent, frankly, state and local law enforcement is on us when it comes to fulfilling our shared
01:18:10 mission of keeping Americans safe. You mentioned the task forces through our safe streets and
01:18:16 violent crime task forces. We've got thousands of police officers and sheriff's deputies who
01:18:22 from hundreds of different departments and agencies that serve on our task forces taking,
01:18:28 you know, as I said, I think earlier last year we took together 50 violent criminals and child
01:18:35 predators off the streets per day, every single day, all year long, 365 days a year when you
01:18:41 average it out. A cut to our budget means a cut to our efforts to do that work, which means more
01:18:49 of the burden then gets shifted on the state and local law enforcement to handle those threats
01:18:53 alone. I could go the same thing through multiple other threats because we have task forces on
01:18:59 terrorism, cyber, child exploitation, et cetera. But it's not just arrests. I think if you talk
01:19:04 to chiefs and sheriffs like I do every week, you will hear constantly a refrain about how much they
01:19:10 depend on the FBI for things like our technology and our expertise. So it's the DNA testing,
01:19:16 it's cellular analysis, it's all sorts of complex forensic expertise that small departments in this
01:19:24 country don't have. But they lean on us to provide that. And that's one of the first things that they
01:19:30 cite. You talk about our CJIS division in West Virginia, which is the one that is responsible
01:19:36 for NCIC background checks when some officer is stopping somebody on the streets. That's how they
01:19:42 know whether the person is dangerous or not. Or fingerprint identification. Or the threat reporting
01:19:49 that comes into our national threat operating center, which are often threats to life, school
01:19:53 shootings, whatever else it happens to be, that we're then pushing out to state and local law
01:19:58 enforcement. Cuts to those programs means all those ways state and local law enforcement is
01:20:05 flying blind. And then you've got things like training, right? A lot of people don't know this.
01:20:09 The FBI is, for example, responsible for training all the civilian bomb techs. The bomb techs for
01:20:15 every police department in the country that have bomb techs are trained by the FBI in our facility
01:20:22 in Huntsville. And cuts to our ability to provide that training means impacts on our ability to
01:20:29 train bomb tech personnel. But it's all sorts of other training. We provide all sorts of training
01:20:36 to state and local law enforcement at Quantico. And as I said, I'm talking with chiefs and sheriffs
01:20:42 in one way or another pretty much every week. And there's only two ways the conversation goes.
01:20:48 Thank you, Director, for all the great things the FBI is doing for us. We need even more.
01:20:53 And just, Director, we need even more. I have yet to meet a chief or sheriff who wants the
01:20:59 FBI to give them less. And so I think people need to understand that cuts to our budget don't just
01:21:05 hurt the FBI. They hurt all those state and local law enforcement partners, many of whom, unlike the
01:21:10 FBI, have recruiting challenges and retention challenges. They're all down in terms of their
01:21:15 headcount. They've got their own budget challenges. So hurting us compounds their challenges and makes
01:21:21 it harder for them to protect the neighborhoods and communities that we're all working together
01:21:26 to try to protect. I'll just make a final comment to you. I think it would be critically important
01:21:32 for what you've just said and for members to understand and maybe talk with, hear from their
01:21:40 local law enforcement folks and understand what the connection is between state and local law
01:21:48 enforcement and the FBI. I think we see a lot less movement in the direction of saying,
01:21:54 let's defund, let's eliminate, let's do all of these things when we look at the overall
01:22:01 law enforcement infrastructure of the United States, which is part of our national security
01:22:07 and defending the homeland and doing whatever we want in that direction. Thank you so much for your
01:22:12 service. Really appreciate it. Mr. Raderholt. Thank you, Director Ray.
01:22:22 It doesn't always get a lot of media coverage, but there's been a lot of hostility against churches
01:22:27 and religious organizations at alarming rates over the last few years. There was a report that was
01:22:35 published back in February of this year that showed that more than there's been 430 incidences
01:22:43 of hostility or violence against churches across the United States. That's a hundred percent increase
01:22:49 from 2022 and 800 percent increase from 2018. I guess my question to you is, what is the Bureau
01:23:01 resources are being dedicated to explore and address this concerning trend that we're seeing?
01:23:09 It's a really good question. I would say the threats to houses of worship that we're seeing
01:23:17 cut across a variety of settings. I say that with the perspective of somebody who, when I was a line
01:23:24 prosecutor, one of my most significant cases was against a guy who was a serial church arsonist
01:23:30 and went all over the country burning down churches, including right up in our mutual
01:23:35 neck of the woods in Georgia, where he killed in Banks County, he killed a firefighter and
01:23:41 almost killed another one. I've always taken those cases particularly seriously.
01:23:48 I would say there's a couple of things. We're seeing terrorist attacks against churches.
01:23:54 Just in the time that I've been FBI director, we've thwarted multiple attacks against churches
01:24:04 and synagogues. I can think of an ISIS-inspired plot against a church in Pittsburgh. I can think
01:24:10 of synagogues in Colorado and Las Vegas area, just as a few examples. There's also, I would say,
01:24:19 a range of threats from a perspective of abortion-related violence. A lot of people
01:24:30 historically have focused on abortion-related violence when it comes to pro-choice facilities.
01:24:36 But in fact, if you look at our work post the Dobbs opinion, it's been a while since I looked
01:24:43 at our numbers, but I think something like 70% of our abortion-related violence cases were,
01:24:48 after the Dobbs decision, were against what I would have called houses of worship or pro-life
01:24:56 facilities. In fact, just yesterday, we had a case, a guy got seven and a half years in a great
01:25:03 case that our folks did against a guy who firebombed a facility up in the Madison, Wisconsin
01:25:09 area. We're tackling it depending on what the motivation for the threat is. Sometimes it might
01:25:15 be some ISIS-inspired type attack. Some cases it might be some domestic ideology. In some cases,
01:25:23 it might be something else altogether. In addition to our investigative work and working with state
01:25:27 and local law enforcement on that, we are also, in every field office, I find that there's a whole
01:25:35 lot of outreach and engagement with houses of worship in that area so that the folks in those
01:25:43 houses of worship know who to contact, what to be on the lookout for, that kind of thing.
01:25:53 Let me just say, thank you for the mention of that, but targeting and threatening of churches
01:25:58 and religious organizations is something that cannot go unnoticed. I would just
01:26:02 implore that you would make sure that you do investigate and you try to make sure that this
01:26:10 is a focus of the Bureau. The names Phoenix, Holly, Harriet, Christopher X, Ahil, they're
01:26:24 names that were given to the DC-5. Those were the five unborn children whose remains were salvaged
01:26:34 by a whistleblower after their lives were brutally ended by late-term abortionists here in the
01:26:39 Washington, D.C. area. There's evidence that suggests federal crimes may have been committed
01:26:45 in their deaths through violations of the partial birth abortion ban and the born alive infant
01:26:51 protections. As you know, this is the law of the land and the administration has the duty to
01:26:56 enforce the law. Without prejudice to political philosophy are those in violation of law.
01:27:03 Instead of seeking justice for these babies or answers to whether federal crimes are committed,
01:27:09 I'm concerned that some of the administration have decided to weaponize the FBI and its resources
01:27:15 against pro-life Americans by investigating and arresting individuals for the FACE Act violations.
01:27:22 Is the Bureau aware of the DC-5 case? If so, is the Bureau investigating the DC-5 case?
01:27:31 As I sit here right now, I'm not familiar with the specific case. I can follow up
01:27:37 with our folks on that. I will tell you when it comes to FACE Act enforcement, more generally,
01:27:45 we've used that authority in both directions. In fact, I know that we had a case not that long
01:27:54 ago where we secured FACE Act and conspiracy indictments against four individuals who were
01:28:00 invoking the Jane's Revenge movement and who targeted pro-life facilities in their area.
01:28:07 We don't care which side of the abortion issue you're on. There's a right way and a wrong way
01:28:15 to express your passionate views, but violence and threats against facilities is not it. We'll
01:28:22 go after it no matter which side somebody is on. I'd like to get your commitment to use funds to
01:28:28 investigate this DC-5 case. Well, I'm happy to find out where we are with that. Like I said,
01:28:33 I'm not familiar with the specific case, but we obviously want to make sure that if there's any
01:28:38 properly predicated investigation we can conduct. If you could get back with us,
01:28:42 let us know what y'all are doing on that. Thank you. Thank you. You're back.
01:28:45 Let me do a little polling here. Do we need a second round of questions?
01:28:56 Anyone here?
01:28:58 I want to keep it as short as we can because I want this gentleman back at work.
01:29:07 So, Mr. Collad, you're on. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
01:29:14 Director Wray, on page 16 of your budget request, you talk about civil rights. So,
01:29:22 the FBI has the primary responsibility to investigate all alleged violations of federal
01:29:26 civil rights laws. Then you talk about color of law violations in there, which is any person
01:29:32 using the authority given to them by a government agency to willfully deprive someone of a right.
01:29:36 So, you talk about the FACE Act and voter suppression, etc. Have you ever investigated
01:29:44 a Second Amendment rights violation? I mean, you've got the Bruin decision, which struck down
01:29:51 a New York law, which took away people's Second Amendment rights. And I've never seen anyone in
01:29:57 government ever prosecuted for violating citizens' Second Amendment rights. Can you think of any
01:30:04 time when the FBI has actually used color of law to prosecute someone for violating someone's
01:30:10 Second Amendment rights? Well, not as I sit here, but obviously, we're a 115-year-old organization
01:30:18 with 38,000 employees and something like 300 offices all over the United States. So, I'm
01:30:24 no doubt that there could be any number of investigations that I wouldn't be aware of.
01:30:28 Okay. All right. Then you have a request in your budget for $284,000 for official reception fund.
01:30:42 That is almost six times what the United States attorney himself receives. I mean, his is $50,000.
01:30:50 The ATF is $36,000. The DEA is $90,000. U.S. attorneys are $19,600. But the FBI is $284,000.
01:30:58 Why? Why is the FBI literally six times what Attorney General Merrick Garland's reception
01:31:06 funds are? I don't know that I could tell you. As I sit here right now, I know that we have a lot
01:31:12 of engagement with foreign partners, and that could be a big driver. But I can't, as I sit here
01:31:18 right now, give you the specifics, but I'm happy to have my staff follow back up with you.
01:31:22 I would appreciate that very much. And then, lastly, the Department of Justice is asking for a
01:31:28 1.25% increase, totaling $467 million. All right. But the FBI is asking for a 6% increase, totaling
01:31:36 $629 million. So the FBI is asking for literally a 350% increase in funding, more than the overall
01:31:44 Department of Justice is. In fact, if the total spending for the DOJ is going up $467 million,
01:31:50 and the FBI is asking for $629 million, then the DOJ actually has to take a cut somewhere in order
01:31:57 for the FBI to get their increase in funding of at least $162 million. So what on earth,
01:32:05 what justifies that kind of an increase for the FBI?
01:32:08 So what I would tell you is, and we certainly appreciate the Department's support,
01:32:13 including the Attorney General's support for our budget request,
01:32:17 you know, the effect of the fiscal year 2024 budget that was appropriated to us is the equivalent of
01:32:26 about $1,000 per position cut. It's about a $500 million cut in our ability to get our job done.
01:32:33 And so when you look across the range of threats that we are responsible for protecting
01:32:38 Americans from, violent crime, 50 bad guys per day, every day, ransomware, 100 different ransomware
01:32:46 variants that we're investigating, the Chinese, 1,300% increase in Chinese economic espionage,
01:32:54 the Chinese hacking program, which outnumbers us by well over 50 to 1, fentanyl, we seized
01:33:00 270 million persons worth of fatal fentanyl in the last two years. And so the range of
01:33:08 threats that the FBI is statutorily responsible for protecting Americans from is significant.
01:33:14 And the impact of the '24 budget is such that most of what our budget request that you've talked
01:33:21 about there calls for is to put us back on track so we can keep doing the hard work of keeping
01:33:26 bad guys away from those people.
01:33:28 Okay. So what are the technical adjustments? $192 million for technical adjustments and
01:33:33 $286 million in adjustments to base. What is that?
01:33:38 I think the adjustments to base is sort of appropriation speak for the point that I was
01:33:45 just making about getting us back on track in terms of the positions that essentially we would
01:33:50 lose because of the impact on our cost of operations of the '24 budget.
01:33:56 And the technical adjustments?
01:33:58 That part, again, I'd have to go back and look at the specifics, but I can tell you that
01:34:02 most of our budget is to get us back on track. We have a few enhancements specifically on cyber,
01:34:10 counterintelligence, and NICS, but that's essentially the this year, that's essentially
01:34:15 our budget.
01:34:16 All right. Thank you. My time's expired. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
01:34:19 I yield myself five minutes. Mr. Director, let me ask you about the global terrorist networks
01:34:27 that you've mentioned. You recently testified that the threats, quote, "have gone to a whole
01:34:35 other level," quote, and that foreign terrorists, including ISIS and al-Qaeda,
01:34:41 have renewed calls for attacks here in the U.S. Could you expand on that?
01:34:52 Yes, sir. So first off, I would say even before October 7th, I would have told you,
01:34:58 and I was telling other committees, that we were at a heightened threat level because across a
01:35:04 range of different terrorist vectors, we were, like I said, at a heightened threat level.
01:35:09 After October 7th, though, is when we went to a whole other level. And part of that is that
01:35:15 we've seen a rogues gallery of foreign terrorist organizations calling for attacks on us. You've
01:35:23 got Hezbollah expressing support and praise for Hamas and threatening to attack U.S. interests
01:35:28 in the region. You've got al-Qaeda issuing its most specific call for an attack against us,
01:35:35 against the U.S., in the last five years. You've got AQAP, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,
01:35:42 calling for jihadists to attack Americans and Jewish communities in the U.S. You've got ISIS
01:35:48 urging its followers repeatedly to attack Jewish communities in the U.S. And the irony is that,
01:35:55 as anybody who has studied terrorism knows, these are terrorist organizations that don't typically
01:36:00 see eye to eye, but they seem to be united in one thing, which is calling for attacks on us.
01:36:05 And so you add on top of that my concern, which I have repeatedly flagged, which is that when you
01:36:12 look around the world at foreign terrorist organizations, you can see in Afghanistan the
01:36:18 concern about whether it's al-Qaeda or ISIS-K growing strength and reconstituting. And of
01:36:25 course we've lost some of our ability to gather intelligence on the threat there. You can look
01:36:30 at Africa and look at ISIS and al-Shabaab and the growth of those organizations there. In fact,
01:36:37 al-Shabaab is now the best funded branch of al-Qaeda. You could look at Syria and ISIS's
01:36:44 repeated efforts to free some very dangerous fighters that are in the prisons there. And so
01:36:50 then you look at things like the attack we just had in Moscow, an attack in Iran, before that
01:36:55 ISIS attacks. And so when organizations like al-Qaeda, like ISIS, express an intent to conduct
01:37:04 attacks against us, it's something we need to take very seriously. And so that's part of why I've
01:37:10 highlighted this as a heightened threat. This is not a time for panic. It is a time for heightened
01:37:16 vigilance. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Wray, the topic of anti-FBI rhetoric raised its head
01:37:32 today and I wish to associate myself with the comments of Mr. Ruppersberger,
01:37:38 that I am dismayed about it and particularly that it found its way into today's hearing.
01:37:44 And I regret that it has become fashionable in some corners to attack the FBI. This is an elite
01:37:56 law enforcement agency. The top law enforcement agency in this country protects us from all manner
01:38:04 of mayhem, from child predators, cyber threats, drug trafficking, gang violence, international
01:38:13 terrorism, Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Qaeda, ISIS, al-Shabaab. These are men and women that have
01:38:21 dedicated their lives to the protection of American citizens. They don't deserve to have
01:38:26 threats leveled against them with anti-FBI rhetoric ginning them up. Last week, a man
01:38:33 crashed an SUV into the security gate at the FBI's Atlanta Field Division building. He then resisted
01:38:41 efforts by FBI agents to bring him into custody. Although this investigation is still under underway,
01:38:48 I am concerned about threats to FBI agents and FBI facilities in the field, particularly in light of
01:38:56 anti-FBI rhetoric from far too many public officials. And I'd like you to comment on that.
01:39:03 To what extent are you seeing an uptick in threats against the FBI? And what does that do to morale
01:39:11 within the agency? Well, you asked a couple of different questions there. I guess let me start
01:39:17 with the threats because that's ultimately what matters the most. You know, rhetoric is rhetoric
01:39:22 and there's a lot of heated rhetoric in this country across a range of issues. But when it
01:39:28 comes to threats and threats of violence, that's something we take extremely seriously. And we have
01:39:33 seen a substantial jump in threats towards FBI personnel and facilities from fiscal year 22 to
01:39:40 fiscal year 23. In fact, we created a dedicated unit to try to deal with those issues. You
01:39:47 mentioned the Atlanta field office one. I won't discuss that specific case, but just last year
01:39:52 in our Cincinnati field office, we had an individual wearing a tactical vest armed with an
01:39:57 AR-style rifle and a nail gun, tried to forcibly enter and attack our personnel. And after he was
01:40:07 thwarted in reviewing his devices and his postings, he was calling on people to kill
01:40:12 federal law enforcement and to fight, in his own words, a civil war. And unfortunately,
01:40:18 this is part of a broader phenomenon that we see in the country right now, which is an uptick in
01:40:24 violence against law enforcement, not just FBI, but state and local law enforcement. And we've had
01:40:32 breathtaking paces of violence against law enforcement. Having a badge is dangerous enough
01:40:40 as it is. It shouldn't make somebody a target. And some of these threats target law enforcement's
01:40:46 family members, which is despicable. Like I said, these are dangerous jobs. And I talk every week.
01:40:56 One of the things I, to state and local law enforcement, are going through a lot of the
01:41:00 same thing in their own way. I call every, one of the things I started doing when I started this job
01:41:06 was every time an officer or a sheriff's deputy is killed anywhere in the country,
01:41:11 in the line of duty, I call the chief or the sheriff myself to express my condolences on
01:41:18 behalf of the FBI. And we talk about the individual's family and career and everything else.
01:41:25 And I have made 381 of those calls since I started as FBI director, 14 just so far this year.
01:41:35 We've lost, in 2021, we lost three of our own. Two agents killed in Miami and a task force
01:41:42 officer ambushed right outside of our office in Terre Haute, Indiana. So violence against
01:41:49 law enforcement is real. It's appalling. And it's something we take very seriously.
01:41:54 Now, when you talk about morale, which is the other part of your question,
01:41:57 obviously no one likes to see the organization you've dedicated your lives to unfairly attacked
01:42:05 and criticized. But our people are more focused on the people we do the work with, the people we do
01:42:12 the work for, and the work itself. And I don't get too hung up, and I think our folks don't get too
01:42:18 hung up on rhetoric. Our focus is on do people want to work with us? You bet they do. They're
01:42:25 applying in droves. It's gone up. Recruiting has gone up significantly since I've been director.
01:42:29 Do they want to work with us on task forces? State and local police departments, who are all down in
01:42:34 terms of their headcount, are sending more and more task force officers to work on our task
01:42:39 forces. And it sure as heck isn't because they don't have enough work in their home department.
01:42:43 Do people want to turn to us for help? You bet they do. I see business leaders more and more
01:42:50 turning to us with cyber attacks and Chinese economic espionage. I see the public calling our
01:42:55 public access line in West Virginia more and more turning to us for all manner of tips and threats.
01:43:02 It's almost like we sort of defaulted into becoming like a national 911 center. So do people
01:43:08 want to work for us? More and more. Do people want to work with us? More and more. Do people
01:43:12 want to turn to us for help? More and more. And so that ultimately is what our folks really care
01:43:18 about. Would we prefer not to be criticized? Of course. Director Wray, thank you for your comments
01:43:23 and thank you for your work. Yield back, Mr. Chairman. Someone yields back. Mr. Klondyte,
01:43:28 is our time. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Chairman's recognized. And I want to thank the
01:43:36 large number of law abiding agents within your agency who work hard for the American people
01:43:43 every day. But we can't ignore the violations that have occurred within the FBI by some individuals
01:43:52 and the policy changes that were necessitated by those abuses. And for some on the other side,
01:44:00 to talk about anti law enforcement rhetoric when morale is at an all time low in local law
01:44:08 enforcement offices because of the defund the police movement on the left. It is rich. It is
01:44:16 rich to hear this come from the other side. So my colleague who spoke critically about the
01:44:25 performance of some in your agency, Mr. Ray, was doing so with a love for country, a love for the
01:44:37 Constitution, uh, and a desire to see the confidence of the American people in their institutions
01:44:48 restored after it has been so eroded by the performance of some within your agency acting
01:44:58 in violation of the law and in violation of policies. So, um, I'm happy to take up what
01:45:06 amounts to a large chunk of my time to stand up for my colleagues who have left and who are under
01:45:12 criticism from members of this very subcommittee. Um, and to restate that
01:45:19 there is a First Amendment. We have a right to criticize when there is evidence of wrongdoing.
01:45:29 We have a responsibility to the taxpayers of this country when there are individuals within
01:45:35 your agency who violate the rights of American citizens. And so I needed to stand up for my
01:45:47 colleague. Uh, and I do want to, but I do want to ask as part of FISA, I have an amendment that
01:45:56 would codify a policy of the Bureau related to about collection abouts. So the FBI has decided
01:46:07 not to engage in what amounts to a collection of upstream communication from companies that
01:46:18 operate internet cables that interconnect with ISPs local networks to include the collections
01:46:22 of communications about a target. Um, you would, why did you all stop abouts collection?
01:46:31 Well, I will confess to you, it's been a little while since I looked at that issue.
01:46:37 It was very much on our mind back around the time of the, um, the last reauthorization,
01:46:44 as I recall. Um, I think again, my memory is not perfect on this, but I think it was a judgment
01:46:51 that the, um, that the benefits from having that, uh, were outweighed by, in our view,
01:47:01 the potential that, um, the authority could result in a compliance violation of some sort.
01:47:07 Do you have any intention? Again, my memory is a little fuzzy on that. So we, that big caveat.
01:47:12 Do you have any intention of resuming abouts collection at this time?
01:47:16 No. Um, a decl- a since declassified set of, uh, FISA court opinions from 2011
01:47:26 shed a light on the pervasiveness of the collection at the time and noted that it resulted in,
01:47:32 uh, tens of thousands of wholly domestic communications collected each year,
01:47:36 due to what was described as technical limitations in the implementation of,
01:47:40 of abouts collection. Um, so would it in any way interfere with department, uh,
01:47:48 policy or activities to codify the practice of the FBI and their suspension of, of abouts collection?
01:47:58 Well, I, again, without, I'd have to review any specific legislative proposal. Um, um,
01:48:04 we have tried to put in place a whole range of policies and system enhancements, and I think,
01:48:09 uh, the effort on, uh, and a number of the legislative reform proposals that are,
01:48:15 are swirling around, uh, up in Congress right now is, are intended to, um, uh, similar language to
01:48:22 what you're using to sort of lock in, uh, reforms that we've put in place. Um, and I think as a
01:48:28 general matter, that's something that we're in favor of, but the specific issue, I'd have to
01:48:32 take a closer look, but we're happy to do that. I appreciate that. Yield back.
01:48:37 Does Mr. Rupper? Yes, I want to respond to a couple of comments. First thing, let me say this.
01:48:43 I respect everybody on this board. You have the, on the, in this hearing. Yeah, we all have
01:48:49 different points of view. We look at things differently, but I also look at the big picture
01:48:53 too. My specialty throughout my life, most of it, um, other than being a county executive or
01:48:59 something, has been law enforcement. And when you're in law enforcement, you, you're trained,
01:49:05 you develop relationships and you learn a lot. And one of the most important things is for federal,
01:49:10 state and local to work together. And I think that the comments that were made, and I respect that
01:49:17 individual. I said that before I even talked about it and I do respect him because he's a hard worker.
01:49:23 He served at the Naval Academy and I was just shocked that his whole, the whole, uh, five
01:49:29 minutes or whatever he had, it was, it was in criticizing someone who I happen to respect.
01:49:34 And I think a lot of other people respect who has one of the hardest jobs in America.
01:49:39 What bothers me is that we are probably in one of the worst situations for national security in the
01:49:45 history of our country. And he's a major part of dealing with those issues. And I would hope
01:49:51 that someone with his expertise and smarts, and he's very smart. And I will talk to him personally
01:49:56 because I know him personally, but that would spend doing this and not talk about what are we
01:50:01 going to do with this issue or that, which everyone else here has talked to him about.
01:50:04 And I just was, was shocked. And, and, and, and believe it, I get probably more heat from my left
01:50:10 than I get from you all. And, and, but that's just my politics. And that's the way each one of us has
01:50:16 our different point of view. Mr. Clyde, he didn't mind in the beginning when he started, he asked
01:50:22 good questions. He didn't, he didn't have the experience that some of us have in law enforcement
01:50:27 or dealing with you all and that type of thing. But he, you try, you, you wanted to know,
01:50:31 you ask good questions and I respect that. I don't, whatever your, your conclusion is,
01:50:36 I respect it. I might not like it, but I respect it. So I just wanted to respond a little bit on
01:50:41 why I felt it was really important to stand up for somebody who I think is qualified.
01:50:46 He's doing a good job and the FBI has really, in my opinion, grown. And I love the fact that
01:50:52 they're now working with federal, state, and local as a team. And that makes them a lot better.
01:50:56 Gentlemen, yield back.
01:50:59 Yes, I do.
01:51:02 That concludes today's hearing. We want to thank our witness, Director Ray, for being here.
01:51:09 Without objection, members may have seven days to submit additional questions for the record.
01:51:15 The subcommittee now stands adjourned.