NTSB Chair Homendy Details Damning Report On MDTA's Failure To Test Structural Risks In FSK Bridge

20 hours ago

During a press briefing on Thursday, NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy spoke about the Maryland Transportation Authority's failure to conduct a risk assessment of the Francis Scott Key Bridge prior to its collapse.

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Transcript

00:00As part of our investigation, we completed a vulnerability assessment of the Francis Scott Key Bridge ourselves

00:10to determine how susceptible it was to collapse from a vessel collision,

00:15taking into account engineering and shipping advances since the key bridge first opened in 1977.

00:24This vulnerability assessment is essentially a mathematical risk model

00:29used to determine how susceptible a bridge is to collapse from a vessel collision, and it's not new.

00:38The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, or AASHTO,

00:44developed and published the vulnerability assessment calculation

00:49for new bridges on the National Highway System in 1991

00:54in response to our investigation of the Sunshine Skyway bridge collapse in Tampa Bay, Florida.

01:02The State of Maryland was on AASHTO's Executive Committee at the time

01:08and served on AASHTO's Highway Subcommittee on Bridges and Structures,

01:13which developed those standards in 1991 and revised them in 2009.

01:21Included in the 1991 standards was a recommendation from AASHTO

01:27that all bridge owners conduct a vulnerability assessment of existing bridges

01:32to evaluate the risk of catastrophic collapse in the event of a vessel collision and take action.

01:41AASHTO reiterated that recommendation to states again in 2009,

01:46and I want to read the quote from the AASHTO guidance in 2009.

01:52All remaining existing bridges over navigable waterways with commercial barge and ship traffic

02:00should be evaluated using a vulnerability assessment

02:05in accordance with risk analysis procedures contained in this guide.

02:10The vulnerability assessments would meet NTSB recommendations to AASHTO, FHWA,

02:16and other federal agencies for improved bridge safety

02:20based on previous vessel collision accidents involving bridge failures.

02:25AASHTO continues on.

02:27Based on the vulnerability assessment evaluations of existing bridges within the state system,

02:34a screening process based on the estimated annual frequency of collapse

02:39can be used to identify and rank high-risk bridges

02:43and to prioritize vulnerable structures for potential rehabilitation,

02:48retrofit, peer protection countermeasures, or replacement.

02:54The Maryland Transportation Authority never ran the calculation on the Key Bridge,

03:01and as of October 2024, they still haven't on the Chesapeake Bay Bridge.

03:08Had they ran the calculation on the Francis Scott Key Bridge,

03:13the MDTA would have been aware that the bridge was almost 30 times greater

03:22than the risk threshold AASHTO sets for critical essential bridges, 30 times greater,

03:31and almost 15 times greater for Pier 17, which the DALI struck, as well as Pier 18.

03:41What's frustrating is not only did MDTA fail to conduct the vulnerability assessment on the Key Bridge,

03:49they did not provide, nor were they able to provide, the NTSB with the data needed to conduct the assessment,

03:59including the characteristics of vessel traffic passing under the bridge, vessel transit speeds,

04:06vessel loading characteristics, waterway and navigable channel geometry, water depths,

04:13environmental conditions, bridge geometry, peer protection systems,

04:19and ultimate lateral capacity of the bridge piers.

04:23We asked them for that data. They didn't have it.

04:27We had to develop that data ourselves with the help of our federal partners at the Federal Highway Administration,

04:34and I want to take a moment to thank the team at the Federal Highway Administration

04:40for all their assistance on this investigation.

04:45We conclude in our report that had the MDTA conducted a vulnerability assessment of the Key Bridge

04:52based on recent vessel traffic, the MDTA would have been able to proactively identify strategies

05:00to reduce the risk of a collapse and loss of lives associated with a vessel collision with the bridge.

05:10Like the Key Bridge, other bridges throughout the United States were designed before AASHTO's 1991 guidance.

05:18To understand the scope of that risk, we asked the Federal Highway Administration to identify bridges

05:25that cross navigable waterways and are used by ocean-going vessels like the DALI

05:32and gather information about protection devices in place for those bridges, like dolphins, like fender systems.

05:40We then narrowed that list based on when the bridge was built,

05:45whether it had a vertical clearance of at least 80 feet, and whether it had substructures such as piers in a waterway.

05:53We also evaluated vessel traffic transiting under the bridges.

NTSB Chair Homendy Details Damning Report On MDTA's Failure To Test Structural Risks In FSK Bridge

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