• last month
Yes, it was only Finland and, yes, it was only Ireland, but under Lee Carsley England already look more dynamic and front-foot than they have in years. With goals from Harry Kane, Declan Rice, and Jack Grealish over the international break, Adam Clery examines how the former Under-21 coach has transformed the national side in just two games.
Transcript
00:00Right, hello everybody, Adam Cleary here, your friendly neighbourhood tactics guy, and
00:10Lee Carsley, he's gone and fixed England forever, despite coming up against the footballing
00:15might of Timu Pukki and Seamus Coleman, they have swept away all before them, and life
00:21after Gareth Southgate looks very rosy indeed.
00:23Now in this video we're going to be looking at why this team looked so good and why I
00:27am rubbing my thighs in excitement, but despite the fact I don't normally like to do this,
00:32we must address the caveats.
00:35So A, yes it was only Ireland, B, yes it was only Finland, C, yes it is just in general
00:42only the Nations League Group B, D, such was the unavailability of certain established
00:47stars, Carsley was pretty much free just to play like a juiced up version of his under
00:5121 side, so they were always going to look a bit more cohesive, and E, such is the generalised
00:57desperation from you, me, every single person in this country, to see a more progressive,
01:03less conservative version of England, that we're always going to jump over any single
01:07success they have as proof that we are really good and probably should have won the Euro,
01:12so yeah, but, that being said...
01:19Alright then, so this was the XI that lined up against Finland, and there were changes
01:24from the XI that lined up against Ireland, but they were mostly at the back, we had the
01:27same sort of core attacking unit, and what I dearly, dearly hope is going to be a theme
01:32every single time we talk about Lee Carsley's version of England, as opposed to Gareth Southgate's
01:36version of England, is the positional freedom these players have, and I'm going to go big
01:41right at the very start of this video to explain what I mean by that, ok, this was Bakayo Saka's
01:47heat map against Finland, very easy to see that he was the right sided attacker in all
01:52this, he had most of his touches and his contributions in this area of the pitch, which is where
01:55Bakayo Saka likes to be, but look at all the other random places dotted about this map,
02:01he gets on the edge of the box, he gets in behind, he gets fully on the left hand side,
02:05he drives into the box from the opposite side, that is someone who is playing with a large
02:09degree of positional freedom, yes he has his role and he knows where he's supposed to be,
02:13but he's also enabled to problem solve mid-game, where do I need to go to make things happen?
02:19And why that's so different to what we're used to seeing with England, is this is his
02:23heat map from the European Championship Final against Spain. Now here he is playing the exact
02:27same position, except that is the only position he is playing, he has to get on the ball here,
02:32he has to contribute here, and he's not really able to get round or to float into the middle
02:36or to go out to the opposite side, he has a very specific and clear job. And alright,
02:41ok, I know it's not really fair to compare playing Spain in the European Championship
02:45Final versus a Nations League game against Finland, so let's make that a more applicable
02:49comparison, this is the Denmark game. Now here, unlike the final, England had more of the ball,
02:56they did dominate large parts of play, Denmark sat deep and presented them a problem with which
03:01to solve, but Saka was only allowed to do it from this position, he wasn't drifting into the centre,
03:06he wasn't swapping sides, he wasn't going to find the ball, that was still his job. And just to
03:11really ram this home, we go back to the heat map against Finland, it's night and day, those are
03:16two completely different ways of utilising that player. And I've just used Saka as an example here,
03:21it was true of pretty much every single player on the pitch for England, like yes they have this
03:25starting structure, he sets them up with how he wants them to sort of attack teams, but from there,
03:31they are free, they are enabled, they are encouraged to work it out as they go. And that
03:37meant that there was a lot of fluidity to this formation, like Jack Grealish was listed as the
03:42number 10, he was playing off Harry Kane, but if you give Jack Grealish the choice, what does he
03:46like to do? He actually likes to be in this left hand channel, like this half space between the
03:50central area and wide, because he does all his best creating there, he can dribble through, he can
03:55unpick defences, and if the opposition are really deep, he likes to go all the way out to the left
03:59hand side and sort of interchange with whoever's out there. And if we look at his heat map, then
04:04blimey, would you look at that, he was starting in this central area, but he spends loads of time in
04:09this left hand channel, and was also free to get all the way out to that side. And if Grealish is
04:13free to sort of operate out here a bit more, then that leaves this space here for Declan Rice. And
04:18what does Declan Rice like to do? He likes to start here, be involved in the build up, help move
04:22teams up the pitch, but find the freedom to make these runs into the half space and possibly even
04:27attack the box. And you look at his heat map, and that's exactly it, he's having most of his touches
04:32in this deeper area, but he's got that freedom to move around and explore and try and find the
04:38space. And then of course what happens is you've got Bakayo Saka and Anthony Gordon, two players
04:42who like to receive the ball wide, but ultimately want to drive into the box and become a goal
04:46threat. They now have somebody alongside them in these areas who they can do overloads with,
04:52they can do little interchanges of play, they can start getting in behind, they can drive at the
04:57fullback, they can cut in, they can all very easily rotate around, and that's much harder to play
05:03against. What was quite refreshing to see from England was they sort of gave themselves this
05:06front five, which is sort of fairly normal, most teams give themselves a front five, but against
05:11such a compact, narrow defensive block as Finland had, they also went genuinely really narrow and
05:17they pushed Finland even further back, allowing loads of room for the two fullbacks to get up.
05:22You combine that with Gomez just being like a perfect tempo setter, sit in the hole on your own
05:27player, and England basically played in this sort of shape. And the game was just like one constant
05:33example of how England took this sort of very structured, basic starting shape, but then began
05:39improvising within it to start to unpick Finland. If you just look at it here, you can see everybody's
05:45where they're supposed to be. Kane is the centre forward, Saka and Gordon are the wide players,
05:49but they've come in a little bit narrow. Grealish and Rice are both playing as these sort of
05:53advanced number eights, Gomez is sitting behind them to offer a bit of protection, and the fullbacks
05:57they're now pushing up, not too far, but just enough to still give England width and give them
06:02options out wide. But what follows shows you the fundamental difference between how England played
06:06under Southgate, which was very rigidly structured, versus how they're going to play under Carsley,
06:11which is jazz. Around like 60 seconds after they have been in this structured shape,
06:17this is the positions England find themselves in trying to open up Finland. Jack Grealish,
06:22who was the number 10, is now the furthest left most player, Anthony Gordon is advanced and a
06:27little bit more inside than he is, Alexander-Arnold's come up to support, Declan Rice has come
06:31all the way over to provide another body. Rico Lewis, the left back, is now in the half space
06:37in the channel, making sure there's an option there. Declan Rice, who was the opposite side
06:42number eight, now makes an overlapping run outside Anthony Gordon on the left wing to try and pull
06:47the defender away for him. This doesn't work, so Gordon comes back in field and finds the right
06:52back in central midfield, Trent Alexander-Arnold. Now, fair play to Finland, they keep their shape
06:57and England can't really find a way through here, but over the next sort of 20 some seconds as
07:02they're trying to problem solve this situation, Harry Kane ends up with a touch of the ball over
07:07on the right hand side. Alexander-Arnold comes back into this area, plays a crossfield pass to
07:11Grealish, who's now the left most player. Like, it doesn't guarantee your goals or ensure you're
07:17always going to create chances, but it's just night and day compared to how England were playing
07:22just a few months ago. And I did just mention them both there, but no players better sort of
07:27show you what this system is capable of than Trent Alexander-Arnold and Rico Lewis. The pair of them
07:33just had, like, almost entirely free rolls in this system, which does make sense because when your
07:37plan is to have this basic structure and then to improvise within it, the full backs are the least
07:42likely to be marked and also in very dangerous positions to be able to do things. Like, I'll show
07:47you Lewis's heat map first of all, because the kid understands time and space better than
07:52fucking Professor Brian Cox. Like, he kept popping up so many times in where he was supposed to pop
07:58up, but he would come in field to help with the build-up, he would join in to help Gomez, but he
08:02would also just go into any gaps that appeared in the final third. Like, there was one or two times
08:07when Harry Kane was dropping out of that position that he ended up as the centre forward. But as
08:12for Trent Alexander-Arnold, that was not just his best performance in an England shirt,
08:17that might be my favourite ever performance from a right back in an international game,
08:25which I'll admit is an incredibly niche thing. Now, I appreciate this is becoming a very heat
08:29map heavy game, but as we are talking about sort of, like, positional movement and where players
08:33were able to get to, kind of have to do that. So I'll show you his first of all, just to sort of
08:38demonstrate the impact he had on the game. Now, obviously, it does help they were playing Finland
08:43and he didn't really have to do any defending, but just put that out of your mind for a second.
08:47You can only play what's in front of you. He was on the touchline quite a lot, which is where you
08:50would expect to see him and that enables him to put crosses into the box, which we know he's very
08:54good at. But just look at how frequently he was more in field, getting into these creative
09:00playmaking positions, these number 10 positions, how often he just found himself going all the way
09:05over to the left-hand side, because there seemed to be an opportunity for him there. And obviously,
09:09when you're on your right foot, you can play a very different type of cross from that area.
09:13He was joining in with Gomez in the build-up. He was rotating with Grealish as the number 10. He
09:18was getting outside of Saka. He was giving him a way to come back in. He was doing everything. And
09:23if you give Trent Alexander-Arnold that sort of platform, there's few better players in the world
09:29at it. The obvious example to use would be England's second goal, because that pass from
09:33a deep unmarked position is just absolutely out of this world. But there was a bit in the first half,
09:37which appealed to me as a nerd slightly more. It was a chance that he actually gets from this
09:43right-hand half space. He picks the ball up after it's been circulated around and has a shot. But if
09:48you just rewind 10 seconds before that, the chances initially created from him picking the ball up in
09:54the left-back area near halfway and playing it over the top to Saka. They'd both gone out to the
10:00opposite flank, not because the manager had told them to do it, but because they thought they could
10:05make something happen there. And they were nearly right. But while it's all getting pinballed around
10:09the box and Finland are throwing themselves in front of potential shots, he doesn't just stay
10:13there. He then comes back out to this side because again, he thinks he can make something happen
10:18there. And he's nearly right. Now, I must apologise because I am sort of short-changing you with this
10:24video. Like none of this structure, none of this freedom can exist without at least one player
10:29who sort of is more disciplined and still plays within that sort of principle and still does
10:34those sorts of things. But his job primarily is to make sure that all the gaps are covered. And that
10:39was Angel Gomez. And I should be doing a whole 20-minute segment about how he's just so good on
10:44the ball and how his body position enables him to beat presses and how you can give him the ball in
10:48any situation, how he makes a system like this completely tick. But I'm not going to do that.
10:54This was both a selection and a performance of such significance for England. I'm going to give
11:00him his own dedicated video. So I would just rush what I have to say about him if I try and stick it
11:06into this video. So just take it as read, Gomez was probably the most important player on this
11:12pitch. And I will explain why sometime. The one thing I do want to touch on in this video is the
11:18role of Harry Kane. Because coming out of the Euros, he did not look good. There were people
11:23saying that maybe his time as the focal point of the English attack is coming to an end. And you'd
11:29think in this sort of free-flowing dynamic system where every single player is capable of playing
11:34multiple positions and goes exploring and improvises during the build-up,
11:38he would be a bad fit. But actually, he is perfect for this. Now, this bit is a little graph-heavy,
11:45right? So just sit down, strap in, go with me on this, right? This is Harry Kane's heat map from
11:50last night. And unlike most of the other players, it's actually not that different to what we
11:54normally see. But just to give you a basis of comparison, one of the most disappointing games
11:58I've ever seen England play, and in particular Harry Kane, that Slovenia game at the end of the
12:03Euros, right? And that's his heat map from that game as well. You can see, yes, he wants to be a
12:08box presence, but he also goes looking for the ball. But the difference is not him, it is everybody
12:14else. Because here are all of Harry Kane's completed passes from that Slovenia game. You'll
12:19see despite how much he goes looking for it, he never does anything of any significance when he
12:25finds it. You can see he's never able to play people in, in better positions. He's never able
12:29to get any link up going in and around the box for all of his movement, for all of his attempts to
12:34get on the ball. It's more or less totally pointless. Now, somewhat annoyingly, Opta, without whom I
12:39would simply never be able to make a single video, have not yet published the exact same graph for
12:44the Finland game. But if we look at all the locations of his successful passes, which is from
12:49who scored, which is a slightly different graph, you'll see that he is at least completing passes
12:54in and around the final third, as well as deeper. And thankfully, while I don't have the graph,
12:58I do have eyes. And so many times in that Finland game, Harry Kane would drop into the positions he
13:04likes to get on the ball. And all of a sudden, when he looks up, he does not see players rigidly stuck
13:10in their positions. He actually sees options. This is at about the hour point of the game. Harry Kane
13:16has done one of his patented deep drop offs to try and receive the ball and evade his marker,
13:21and he gets his head up. And what is in front of him? Left back Rico Lewis is here, who will very
13:26happily receive this ball to feet for a quick bit of interplay, despite there being a defender
13:31right behind him. Number 10, Jack Grealish is all the way out on the left hand side,
13:34completely unmarked. And because he's there, left winger Anthony Gordon is now in a central position,
13:40making a run between the defenders. And if Kane's just got it in him, he can split the lines here
13:45and find him, which he does. And it creates a chance for Anthony Gordon. And you just never,
13:49ever saw anything like that happening in the Euros. Every time Kane dropped off, all he would
13:55see is the big yawning hole that he had vacated. Like one winger would be over there, and one
14:01winger would be over there, and Bellingham would be in the middle, marked by four defenders,
14:05and not a single player would have made a run beyond him. Now, I must conclude by being sane
14:11for a moment and say, does this mean England are now amazing and are going to win the lot?
14:15No, of course it doesn't. Like they were playing Finland and they were playing Ireland. Other
14:20teams, better teams, would find ways to exploit this England side in ways the Gareth Southgate
14:26side could never be exploited. Like it's an inherently more risky way to play, but it's a
14:32lot more fun. The real tests are going to come against sides that will see Rico Lewis making
14:37these runs, and we'll see Alexander-Arnold taking up these positions and start licking their lips
14:41at the possibilities rather than wondering how they're going to deal with it. But I do think
14:45if nothing else, and this ultimately proves to be a disastrous way of playing, I do think
14:50after sort of all those years of Southgate's pragmatism and conservatism, it's probably a
14:55good thing for us as a footballing nation to have this style of play now. Because to be blunt,
15:02if they were going to bring in yet another coach who was going to do all the pragmatic stuff first
15:05and make them hard to beat and just hope things went right at the other end of the pitch, then
15:11why are any of us doing this? Like it's supposed to be fun. But anyway, yes, on that note,
15:16your thoughts on this new England side, I would dearly, dearly love to hear them. So please do
15:20get them in the comments below. We do try and read every single one and respond to as many of
15:24them as we can. If you're too good for that though, you can get me on all the social medias
15:28at Adam Cleary, C-L-E-R-Y. And this is the last time I'm going to mention it. If you did see any
15:35of the running stuff I've been doing and you sponsored the charity thing we were doing, we
15:41broke £4,000 for that. And that was almost entirely, entirely you guys. So from the just
15:49massive chamber of malice I call a heart. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Yes. Until next time
15:56though, this was England. That's Lee Carsley. Why do we affix ball onto the end of every
16:00manager who plays a certain style? I've been Adam Cleary. Goodbye.

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