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00:00I started working with a history fund after I understood the Iranian nuclear program.
00:05How did we get the first nuclear reactor?
00:09We gave it to them.
00:11We didn't get it when the country was ruled by the United States, because it was an American ally.
00:17Thank you very much for your kind words, Mr. President.
00:21During the Nixon administration, the Shabbatists were very enthusiastic about supporting the Shabbat nuclear energy program.
00:29At one point, the Nixon administration realized that Pakistan and Iran should form an alliance with Iran.
00:37There are some evidences that show that Shahu was thinking about buying arms and weapons,
00:43because he also thought that Iran and we were involved in this administration.
00:47He was the police, the judge, the prosecutor.
00:49The Iranians have always considered themselves as a dominant natural physiology in the Middle East.
00:55Why is it normal for you, for the Germans, for the British, to have atomic or hydrogen weapons?
01:03While for Iran, a single weapon is enough to solve the problem, while for the others it is quite normal.
01:11But the revolution that Shahu initiated by his government in 1979, interrupted the program before it began.
01:18A part of Iran's political agenda after the revolution was to stop the use of nuclear technology.
01:25So the biggest part of the period when Shahu was in power, in the 80s and 90s,
01:32was to destroy the world and the supply chain of nuclear weapons,
01:39which would not supply Iran with nuclear technology.
01:45And what we missed was the clandestine transfer from Pakistan to Iran in the 80s.
01:55Abdul Qadir Ghani is the father of the Pakistan nuclear program.
02:00He was the full trust and authority of the Pakistani government,
02:05from the creation of the program to the production of nuclear weapons.
02:09I was a CIA officer, an operational officer, for more than two decades.
02:15Most of my career was spent abroad.
02:18Ghani's network is important because only the development of the Pakistani program for decades
02:25was the means by which other countries could develop nuclear weapons, including Iran.
02:32Ghani, under the leadership of the Pakistani government, negotiated with the Iranian authorities
02:38and through Dubai, made a successful transfer of nuclear weapons to other countries.
02:44During the 1980s, the Iranian program was not profitable.
02:50He talked more about a requested program.
02:53During the 1990s, their program started to grow,
02:57when they decided to create the Armed and Armored Program.
03:10We can speculate what was the reason they did it.
03:13I think it was the US invasion of Iraq after Kuwait.
03:18Iraq and Iran had developed an eight-year war between them,
03:22while we defended the forces of Saddam for a few years.
03:26I think this was the reason for the ceasefire in Tehran,
03:30because they wanted to take arms more seriously.
03:35These countries and their terrorist allies were forming an alliance.
03:41They were arming each other to seek peace in the world.
03:45From 2003 to 2005, when they decided that Shabbat would be the holiday,
03:51they accepted the cancellation of their program.
03:54But in 2006, the Iranians came to the conclusion that Shabbat
03:58was a part of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,
04:01and they had no choice but to cancel it.
04:04This is why they think that they can cancel the program
04:07and start producing less uranium.
04:10However, they are producing more centrifuges
04:13and they are installed in their largest nuclear power plant in Natanz.
04:27For a journalist, a visit to these nuclear power plants
04:30and a visit in the winter to the Iranian nuclear power plant
04:33is a great event.
04:35The visit of the President to this plant today
04:38is a great event for us.
04:42The decision to negotiate with them for 10 years and after that
04:45will decide whether Iran can have 20 centrifuges or not.
04:49Of course, the Iranian company said no to them.
04:52Today, only 7,000 of their machines are working in this nuclear power plant.
05:08Natanz, Iran
05:17How many times have you been to Natanz?
05:20I haven't been there many times because I left last year,
05:23but I've been there quite a few times.
05:29Natanz is in the middle of a fire,
05:33where they are building a nuclear irrigation facility.
05:39You have to ask the people in the area
05:42why they are building such a big complex.
05:46There is a lot of artillery and air force there.
05:49It's better protected from the air force
05:52than any other nuclear power plant I've been to.
05:56The plant is in the middle of a fire.
06:04But Natanz is like any other centrifuge plant.
06:07I've seen it all over the world,
06:10in Brazil, Russia, Japan.
06:13These plants are similar,
06:16but they have different features, their own centrifuges,
06:19their own culture, but the process is the same.
06:22But there are also monitoring activities of the agency.
06:25They are basic.
06:28You have to see what's going on and what's going on.
06:31Above all, you have to make sure
06:34that you produce low-industry uranium,
06:37and not high-level uranium or nuclear uranium.
06:45Iranian nuclear plants are used 24 hours a day
06:48by the OECD for this purpose.
06:51Every single gram of Iranian nuclear material
06:54is accounted for.
06:57The agency has a control over the material.
07:00There are no guarantees
07:03that the agency will not be harmed
07:06without getting noticed.
07:09The uranium that was in Natanz
07:12was very special uranium,
07:15called Natanz.
07:18It's a very special uranium.
07:21This is quite unique for us
07:24because that was the only place
07:27that had any sort of uranium
07:30in a state which had had nuclear weapons.
07:33We realized that they had tricked us.
07:36The uranium that was in Natanz
07:39had been bought from a company
07:42that never wanted to be a Q card.
07:46At that point of time.
07:53What I was impressed by
07:56was the sophistication,
07:59the control of the material
08:02and the manufacturing.
08:05It was really professional.
08:08It was not something
08:11that could be created in a few months.
08:15Around a centrifuge,
08:18uranium gas enters
08:21and you have a centrifuge
08:24and you get enriched uranium out.
08:27It separates the uranium
08:30and it spins so fast,
08:33300 meters per second,
08:36the same as the speed of sound.
08:39These are tremendous forces
08:42compared to a banana at one time.
08:45So it has to be very balanced
08:48in order to produce a small amount
08:51and explode.
08:54There was another problem.
08:57You had to reach the centrifuge
09:00to reach the temperature
09:03but it's very rotorish
09:06because it's made of carbon fiber
09:09and it expands.
09:12So you have to balance
09:15not only the rotation
09:18but also the temperature
09:21in a way that the parts don't burn.
09:24It has to be a very precise process.
09:27That's why centrifuges
09:30are very difficult to produce.
09:33You can copy them,
09:36but it's very difficult
09:39to produce a centrifuge.
10:06Iranians are very passionate
10:09about their centrifuges.
10:12They publish a lot of videos
10:15in April,
10:18when they have their big day.
10:31I am passionate because today
10:34Iran is one of the countries
10:37that can produce
10:39a large amount of carbon.
10:42Ahmadinejad, as its president,
10:45said that if the international community
10:48wants to deviate from Iran's path,
10:51they will resist.
10:54If they ask for more inspections,
10:57protocols and so on,
11:00Iran will say no.
11:04We can do uranium mining.
11:07Ahmadinejad said,
11:10who are these dirty guns
11:13that tell Iran not to do this?
11:16This is his slogan
11:19and this is the public opinion.
11:22In 2007-2008,
11:25the American government
11:28was in a very difficult situation
11:31because by this time,
11:34it was the entirety of Iraq.
11:37He couldn't do it.
11:40Condoleezza Rice said,
11:43Mr. President,
11:46you support the Muslim country
11:49for good reasons.
11:52He didn't want to listen
11:55to the Israelis
11:58and the Iranian government.
12:01In 2008, Iran is Germany
12:04and is using these dirty weapons.
12:07Iran's dirty ambitions must be stopped.
12:10We must stop all of this together.
12:13This is my message for you today.
12:18Israel said that it would bombard Iran.
12:21The government here in Washington
12:24is showing potential scenarios
12:27They were all very ugly scenarios.
12:30We believe that if they would have done it on their own, knowing their limits,
12:34I mean, their air forces are very good, but they are small,
12:38their distances are long, and their lenses are very expensive and forced.
12:42If they would have attempted an attack with an armed squadron,
12:46we would assume that they would assume that we would open the door for them.
12:51In a nutshell, it would have been a very successful government,
12:54which would have assumed that the collapse of the Sulmi was not the destruction of the Iranian nuclear system,
12:59but the collapse of the Sulmi would have been the end of the war with Iran.
13:03Israel is much more concerned about the Iranian nuclear program than the United States.
13:08This is normal, because of the size of the country.
13:11We live in Tel Aqsa, America lives a thousand miles away from Iran.
13:16The two countries are in agreement on the collapse.
13:19There is no doubt that the two countries think that Iran should not have the necessary military capacities.
13:25We have different opinions on how to achieve it and when action is needed.
13:37The origin of the corruption, Israel, will be revealed by the face of God.
13:42We take very seriously the leaders of the countries who are fighting for the destruction and destruction of our people.
13:50If Iran will secure weapons of mass destruction, now or in the future,
13:55it will mean that for the first time in the history of mankind, Islamic fanatics,
14:00secular fanatics, will have in their hands the most destructive and the most dangerous weapons.
14:05Therefore, the world should prevent this.
14:12The Israelis believe that the Iranian leadership has taken the decision to develop weapons of mass destruction
14:17when they think that it is possible to achieve peace.
14:20The view in the United States is that the Iranians have not made this decision yet.
14:25For me, this does not make any difference.
14:28I mean, it really does not make any difference.
14:30And in reality, it has not developed.
14:32Only if you interview him, I think, you know, from our standpoint,
14:39the decision of Iran not to develop weapons of mass destruction is the main objective.
14:46Once you have the ability to acquire the material,
14:48once you have the ability to produce weapons of mass destruction, we have reached the goal.
14:57President Bush once said that he did not want the president to deal only with two options,
15:03bombing or the bomb.
15:07He wanted more options so that he or his successors would never get to that point where that's all you've got.
15:18We wanted to be the most energetic in solving this problem,
15:21so that the Israelis understand that this is our goal.
15:25The intelligence cooperation between Israel and the United States is very good.
15:29It means that the Israelis go to the Americans and therefore the Israelis understand
15:33that they do not want Israel to bomb Iran.
15:36They propose to do it differently.
15:40And then the American intelligence community starts working seriously
15:44together with the Israeli intelligence community.
15:48One day, a group of intelligence officers and soldiers met in the office of President Bush
15:54and told him that they had an idea.
15:56It was a risky idea and could not work, but they told him what it was.
16:03Moving forward in my analysis of the codes,
16:12without forgetting the photos that were published by the veterans in 2008,
16:17as a propaganda of Ahmadinejad and the shining centrifuges.
16:27The photos of Ahmadinejad, who was standing among the centrifuges in Natanz,
16:31offered us some very interesting data.
16:34There was a lot of information that could be learned.
16:46First, the photos show a lot of individuals who participated in the Ahmadinejad program.
16:53In a very beautiful photo, Ahmadinejad is shown showing his face.
16:58You can see his face, but not what is shown on the computer.
17:03One of the scientists who was behind him, was blind for a few months.
17:10In one of those photos you can see a part of the computer screen.
17:14We call it the SCADA screen.
17:18The SCADA system is a computer program.
17:21This program allows the operator to monitor the process.
17:26What you could see, was a more detailed view of the configuration.
17:35There were six groups of centrifuges, of which there were 164 entries.
17:42And guess what?
17:44It was absolutely clear that this piece of code was attacking an enemy.
17:55There were 164 groups, there were 164 elements.
18:09Were you able to do this in a physical test, or was it just a code analysis?
18:14We can't build our own uranium enrichment plant,
18:18but we did find a few pieces, a few models.
18:26Then we used an air pump, and this was used to improve the concept.
18:32We needed to demonstrate a little bit more, to show people what we had built.
18:37We thought of a few different things we could do, and we agreed to build a rocket.
18:43We could create a program that would launch the rocket,
18:47and the command was to launch it after five seconds.
18:55The program would launch the rocket, but it wouldn't launch, and everything was uncertain.
19:00We showed everyone that this was a piece of code,
19:03and the command was to launch it after five seconds.
19:06We knew this would happen.
19:08Then we would infect the computer with Stuxnet, and we would run the test.
19:25The Kyber Network
19:47This was a program that was supposed to exist only in the Kyber network.
19:51And it was supposed to infect the physical parts of a factory,
19:54and it was supposed to cause physical damage.
19:57Real physical damage.
20:04At this point, people were very worried about us.
20:06We found a virus that could infect people,
20:09and we thought this was a Hollywood scenario.
20:12We were surprised when people started talking about such things.
20:15Stuxnet
20:19At this point, you must have had a theory as to who had created Stuxnet.
20:25It wasn't lost on us that there were probably only a few countries in the world
20:30that had the motivation to sabotage an Iranian plant for uranium enrichment.
20:36The American government would be on our list.
20:38Undoubtedly, the Israeli government would be on our list,
20:42France, Germany, or other countries in this list.
20:45But when we couldn't find information that would show us for sure
20:48that the virus came from these countries.
20:51There are no tell-tale signs.
20:53The aggressor doesn't leave a message with the name of the virus
20:55that shows who they are.
20:57And to find such a message, it could be fake.
21:00It's very hard to perceive why they created this
21:02when it was a computer code.
21:04Studies have shown, we believe,
21:06that the virus was a collaboration between the American government and the Israeli side.
21:11Yes.
21:12Did you have any evidence to prove that this is true?
21:17I don't think I can tell you in front of the camera.
21:21Can you ask why?
21:23No, I'm sure I can ask, but I'm not going to answer.
21:28And in the case of the seven bombs,
21:30the observation is that this situation should have been taken seriously.
21:35The civilians who were interested in telling the story of the Stuxnet
21:39refused to talk about the role of Tel Aviv and Washington.
21:43Fortunately, while Washington is a secret city,
21:47it is also a city where information is spread.
21:51They are regulated as winter regions,
21:53and little is known about where they are.
21:56In fact, the spread of information would have killed their hope.
22:00Finally, after talking to some people before you,
22:03we have found a way to confirm the American role of Stuxnet.
22:07In order to get the details of the operation,
22:10we have to find a way to mask the source of the information.
22:14Shall we start?
22:15Yes, Nisi.
22:17The first thing to do is to keep it a secret.
22:20Now everyone knows about Stuxnet.
22:22Why don't we talk about it?
22:26It's a covert operation.
22:28No, we know what happened and we know who did it.
22:32Maybe you don't know what happened.
22:35I'm talking to you because I have to report a secret information.
22:39I'm also talking to you.
22:42Do you think it's a covert operation?
22:45No, I'm not like Edward Snowden.
22:47I think he's lying.
22:49He's spreading false information.
22:51Unlike Snowden, who was contracted,
22:53I was a part of it.
22:55I believe that the agency and the information it will reveal
22:58will be confidential.
23:00But we're talking because everyone is reporting a secret information
23:03and we have to correct it.
23:05We have to understand these new weapons.
23:07The risk is very high.
23:09What do you mean?
23:11We did Stuxnet.
23:14It's a fact.
23:16We saved you from the disaster
23:18and we're still on the edge.
23:22It was a colossal operation,
23:24a multi-national cooperation.
23:28In the US, it was CIA, NSA and the military cyber command.
23:35From Britain, we use the agency's information
23:37from all over the world about Iran.
23:40But the primary partner was Israel.
23:42That's the fact that they were directed by Mossad.
23:44And the technical work was done by the agency 8200.
23:48Israel is the key to the story.
23:52The traffic in Israel is unprecedented.
23:58Yossi, how do you see the history of Stuxnet?
24:01I wrote about the Israeli information service
24:04in the agency and the Mossad
24:06when I was only 30 years old.
24:11In 1982, I was a correspondent from London
24:15and I was reporting for a terrorist judge.
24:18This is a better name for the subject of terrorism,
24:21even though it's a bit long, but not too long,
24:24as long as it's constantly being covered.
24:28We are in Israel.
24:30We live in a very rough country,
24:32where democratic values,
24:34traditional values are very rare.
24:37But Israel is different
24:39when it's a free, democratic and traditional society.
24:43It's a modern country,
24:45people who have the same mentality
24:48as their American compatriots
24:50or their Western European counterparts.
24:53But on the other hand,
24:55you see a lot of scenes and events
24:57that are in the middle east,
24:59terrorist, radical, fanatic, religious zealots.
25:10I knew that Israel was under the influence
25:13of the Iran nuclear program.
25:16I came to the conclusion
25:18that if we have a virus that infects Iran's computers,
25:21it's just one more element in this big picture,
25:25based on previous precedents.
25:34In 1991, I was a pilot of F-16 aircraft.
25:38We were told that, unlike our country,
25:41where we do aerial combat
25:43and land small aircraft,
25:45we had to prepare for a mission
25:47to destroy a target.
25:49Nobody told us
25:51what this strategic target was.
25:54It was 1,000 km away from Israel.
25:57So we trained ourselves
25:59for this mission,
26:01which was very difficult.
26:03At that time,
26:05we didn't produce fuel in the air.
26:08There was no satellite for navigation.
26:11The fuel was on the limit.
26:15Shfar, watch out!
26:21But at the end of the day,
26:23we accomplished the mission,
26:25which was to destroy the Iraqi nuclear reactor
26:30in the outskirts of Baghdad,
26:32in a plant called Osirak.
26:34So Iraq couldn't fulfill its ambition
26:37to have a nuclear bomb.
26:41Amos Yadlini, General Yadlini,
26:44was the head of the military
26:46information service.
26:48The largest unit in this organization
26:51is the unit 8200.
26:53They buy cell phones,
26:55they buy fax machines,
26:57they work in computers.
26:59In the first decade
27:01when Yadlini was the head
27:03of the military information service,
27:06the unit 8200 was not
27:08the largest unit in the world.
27:13So they recruited very talented people,
27:16people from the army or outside,
27:19who could contribute
27:21to the development project
27:23of a unit for the cyber warfare unit.
27:27In the 19th century,
27:29there was only the army and the navy.
27:32In the 20th century,
27:34they built the air force
27:37In the 21st century,
27:39the cyber warfare
27:41will be the fourth dimension of war.
27:44It's another type of weapon
27:46that serves for short distances,
27:48it works at high speed
27:50and in a very low signature.
27:52This is a very good opportunity.
27:55And the super fighters
27:57are the ones who have to change
27:59the way we think about warfare.
28:02Finally, we are just one more
28:04and we will change our weapon
28:06for the future of the war
28:08that we are fighting now
28:10and for the war of tomorrow.
28:12We have trained our soldiers better,
28:14we have trained them better
28:16to cope with the challenges
28:18that America is facing today,
28:20which will face tomorrow
28:22and will come with us soon.
28:25At the end of Bush's administration,
28:27people around the government
28:29would like to see President Bush
28:31invest in cyber offensive weapons.
28:35Stuxnet was founded in the Defense Department.
28:38After the Secretary of Defense,
28:40Robert Gates,
28:41reviewed this program and said
28:43that it should not be part
28:45of the Department of Defense.
28:47He said that the program should be
28:49in the management of secret authorities
28:51in the field of intelligence.
28:53The CIA contributed a lot
28:55to this operation,
28:57while much of the code
28:59of the NSA Security Council
29:01and the 8200 Security Council
29:03were working together
29:05with a new position
29:07that was created by the Russians
29:09called the American Cyber Command.
29:11It is interesting that
29:13the Director of the NSA Security Council
29:15would have a second role
29:17as the commander
29:19of the American Cyber Command.
29:21And the American Cyber Command
29:23is located in Fort Meade
29:25in the United States with the NSA.
29:30I ordered that for a year
29:32I would be responsible
29:34for air operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
29:37After this service,
29:39when I returned home,
29:41I was asked to work
29:43in the American Cyber Command.
29:45The Cyber Command
29:47is a military command
29:49in order to protect
29:51combatants in cyber space.
29:53The reason why the military
29:55decided to have a cyber command
29:57in the United States
29:59was because it was
30:01being called Operation Backshot Yankee.
30:03In the autumn of 2008,
30:05we found some hackers
30:07inside our secret networks.
30:09While it was not a success
30:11to defend things
30:13inside our networks
30:15and outside the world,
30:17we had a lot of confidence
30:19that we were successful.