John Cornyn Slams Proposed Sensible Classification Policy: 'There’s Not A Lot Of Secrets Being Kept’

  • 3 months ago
Earlier this month, Sen. John Cornyn (R-TX) questioned officials on proposed policy related to security clearance during a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing.

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00:00and I know Senator Cornyn's been an advocate on this as well. Senator Cornyn, you're up.
00:04Well, let me start with where Senator Wyden left off, and Senator Warner,
00:10the Sensible Classification Act that we passed last year. Part of that required studies and
00:17recommendations on the necessity of security clearances. I believe the testimony we've heard
00:22was that there are four million people with security clearances in America.
00:28If four million people are supposed to keep the nation's secrets, it seems to me that there's a
00:34lot of not secrets being kept. I mean, the things are not secrets. And we've learned that some of
00:41the FTEs require a security clearance without regard to actually the necessity of that person
00:48getting a security clearance and the like. So what I wanted to ask is, have the agencies that
00:55you oversee begun the studies on the necessity of security clearances, including a description of
01:02how the agencies will make sure that the number of security clearances granted will be kept to
01:07a minimum? Let me start with you, Dr. Dixon. I actually don't know the answer to that
01:10question. I will go back and find out whether the studies have begun.
01:14That concerns me. You're the Deputy Director of National Intelligence. You don't
01:19have that information? That particular one, no, sir, I do not.
01:23Any of the rest of you have any knowledge of any studies that have been
01:29done or are in the process of being done as required by the statute?
01:35Okay. Well, that's kind of not a great start. Let me go back.
01:44As I understand it, the Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency was established in 2018. Of
01:50course, the NBIS, the personal vetting system was supposed to be the end-to-end IT infrastructure to
01:58enable the comprehensive personal vetting on a single platform. It was originally supposed to
02:09be completed by 2019. That was five years ago at a cost of $700 million, but here we are five years
02:17later and the program's not operational and $850 million has been spent. Can any of you tell us
02:26when the NBIS will become operational?
02:35We have delivered some NBIS capability to date. At this time, as part of the 90-day effort,
02:42we are rebaselining to make sure we understand exactly...
02:46That means you're starting over?
02:47We're not starting over. As I think you've heard some of the other witnesses talk about,
02:51we're looking to make sure that we can use what has been built. We are exploring exactly what
02:58needs to happen going forward to ensure we meet the full level of capability that is expected
03:03from the system. At this time, we are in the process of refining exactly our understanding
03:08of that timeline. I commit to... In other words, you can't tell us at this point?
03:13I cannot tell you at this point. What I can commit to is that we will keep this committee
03:17informed as those estimates take shape. We are going through the process, as I discussed,
03:23to work with the Undersecretary for Acquisition and Sustainment as part of that. We are rebaselining
03:28the program. We will have an independent cost estimate. All of these are things that I commit
03:32to keeping the committee informed on as this work takes shape. It couldn't happen in 90 days. This
03:37is a month-long effort, but we are fully committed to making sure that you have the full visibility
03:42as it comes together. You can't tell us when the NBIS will be operational at this point.
03:49As I look at the new NBIS program manager and program executive officer has identified,
03:57it looks like, four main reasons why this program is overdue and over budget.
04:06One was the trouble with requirements. The second is too much focus on technical debt.
04:12The third is poor contract management, and the fourth is insufficient time and criteria for
04:18review. The GAO, the General Accountability Office, has conducted multiple studies and made
04:24a variety of recommendations. Are those recommendations being implemented in the
04:32current efforts? Senator, yes, they are. We are taking corrective action on those. That's
04:38one commitment that I make to this committee and to my agency. Who is in charge in the sense that
04:48there needs to be somebody held accountable? As long as everybody is accountable,
04:53no one is accountable, who is in charge of making sure this program is back on track
04:58and will be delivered as promised? I believe that as the program sponsor,
05:05the Undersecretary for Intelligence and Security has responsibility. It's a shared responsibility
05:11with the Undersecretary for Acquisition and Sustainment to ensure that this program is
05:16sufficiently overseen and that we are doing this soundly and in line with the requirements as they
05:21have been stated. So the Department of Defense is responsible? The Department of Defense is
05:25responsible, and we are fully committed to making sure that this is the path to success for NBIS
05:30as we move forward. It's no surprise to me that a program as complex as this is overdue
05:42and over budget when apparently the most basic requirements were never identified initially.
05:49Is that correct? I think the requirements were outlined in Trusted Workforce 2.0. I think what
05:55we had was a breakdown in how those requirements were being managed into technical requirements for
06:01the development and how we were taking account of the delays in that process. And that is something
06:06that we are seeking to remedy immediately with more proactive oversight from the Undersecretary
06:11of INS's office in partnership with DCSA as we look to make sure we put this on a sound foundation.
06:17My time is overdue.

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