For educational purposes
The Battle of Borodino, fought on September 7, 1812, was the largest and bloodiest single-day action of the French invasion of Russia.
Involving more than 250,000 troops and resulting in at least 70,000 casualties.
It was a pivotal point in the campaign, as it was the last offensive action fought by Napoleon in Russia.
The Battle of Borodino, fought on September 7, 1812, was the largest and bloodiest single-day action of the French invasion of Russia.
Involving more than 250,000 troops and resulting in at least 70,000 casualties.
It was a pivotal point in the campaign, as it was the last offensive action fought by Napoleon in Russia.
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LearningTranscript
00:00The Battle of Borodino was a day of unparalleled carnage, the bloodiest single day's fighting of
00:10the entire Napoleonic era. Ostensibly it was another victory for Napoleon, but today it is
00:18one of the most celebrated chapters in Russian military history. Borodino is the focus of Tolstoy's
00:24epic novel War and Peace. Tchaikovsky's famous 1812 Overture was written in tribute and the
00:32battleground itself is a National Museum. Borodino is the conclusive proof of the old
00:39military adage that you can win the battle but still lose the war.
01:25With the 1805 Treaty of Tilsit, which followed his brilliant victory at Austerlitz,
01:35Napoleon had placed strict economic controls against trade with Britain under the continental
01:41system. The continental system goes like this, nobody trades with Britain, that's the continental
01:48system, nobody trades with Britain. Having failed to defeat the Royal Navy, what Napoleon was going
01:54to do was actually destroy the British economy from within. After Tilsit in 1807, the Russians of
02:02course joined the continental system, and for a short time it does seem that Europe is going to
02:07be united, or most of Europe will be united under Napoleon in this continental system. But very soon
02:13the Russians discover that it's not altogether to their advantage, because the Russians were reliant
02:18upon Britain as a market for their hemp, for their flax, and in particular for wood, which the Royal
02:24Navy relied upon in order to build its ships. And without that export market, the Russians couldn't
02:30afford to import goods, and this obviously had a damaging effect upon their economy, and alienated
02:35them progressively from the French. Under pressure from the hard-pressed Russian merchants, the Tsar
02:41had begun to back out of this system. If Napoleon were ever to defeat the British, then the continental
02:49system must be enforced to the letter. The threat of war between France and Russia was escalated by
02:55a number of smaller tensions in the form of French intrigues with Turkey and Poland. The new Russian
03:03alliance with Sweden also heightened tensions. At this difficult juncture, the marriage of Napoleon
03:10to a Habsburg princess in preference to a Russian princess finally tipped the scales to all-out war.
03:17Napoleon had to force Tsar Alexander into a peace treaty and return superiority to France.
03:24Napoleon knows that he has a lot of enemies. He knew that if he didn't take good care to prepare
03:34in advance, the Russians would get the Austrians and the Prussians to join in against him. Napoleon
03:42went to the Prussians and said, Prussians, if you don't get on side for my attack on Russia,
03:48I will occupy Berlin, and I will put my own king in there, and I'll ensure that you are on side.
03:56The Austrians, he goes to the Austrians, and he says, Austrians, I beat you a few years ago,
04:00and I took away your Adriatic provinces. Well, I will give them back to you if you join me in
04:07my war against Russia. Oh, and by the way, I have an army of 200,000 men on your border,
04:13and I'll invade you if you say no. So he has a little bit of the carrot, a little bit of the
04:17stick, and the Austrians see where the wind is blowing, and they come on side. Napoleon's initial
04:25strategy in 1812 was simple. In his own words, it was to concentrate 400,000 men at a single point.
04:34It would be the largest armed force ever gathered together, the most ambitious operation devised in
04:41the annals of warfare. In total, some 800,000 men were actually mobilized. Napoleon hoped that the
04:50mere presence of this huge army would intimidate Russia into suing for peace without having to
04:55fight at all. Failing this, plan B was to smash the Russian forces with a single battle close to
05:03the frontier, forcing peace and the renewal of French supremacy in Europe. Napoleon wanted to
05:11kick the Russians into line. In order to do this, Napoleon wanted to go to Russia, not go far into
05:19Russia, just go to Russia, make the Russians come out to fight him, give the Russians a good
05:25kicking, and then the Russians fall into line. He doesn't want to invade Russia, he doesn't want to
05:30occupy Russia, he doesn't want to spend a lot of time in Russia, he just wants to give the Russian
05:35army a good kicking and have the Tsar fall into line. We're talking about a united Europe marching
05:43into Russia. The largest non-French national components going along with Napoleon were the
05:49Prussians, they had around about 40,000 men, the Austrians with about 40,000. The rest were an
05:54agglomeration of Poles, of which there were many, Italians, many other Germans, Spaniards, Portuguese,
06:01even a regiment of Egyptian Mameluke cavalry. So a rather diverse and polyglot formation, shall we
06:09say. In addition, it's worth bearing in mind that Napoleon's army was not made up of the best of the
06:15French forces. Many of the best French troops are actually in the Iberian Peninsula, where they've
06:19been tied down really ever since 1808 by a prolonged war of attrition against the Spanish
06:25people, the Portuguese backed up by the British. So there were relatively few veteran campaigners
06:30on the campaign of 1812. Napoleon had been campaigning for years, he'd been using people up,
06:35and he was relying on looking to younger and younger conscripts with less and less training
06:42to fill out the army. So Napoleon's army was big, it was really, really big, but it wasn't cohesive
06:50and it didn't have a lot of hardened veterans in it. The first Russian armies to oppose the Grand
06:59Army were under the command of Barclay de Tolly, who was of Prussian extraction, and was seen very
07:05much as one of the Russian Prussians, who were actually out of favor in the court at
07:11St. Petersburg at the time. And the other army was under the command of Prince Peter Bagration,
07:17and Bagration was ill-educated, ill-read. Barclay de Tolly is an intellectual soldier,
07:23he studied the works of von Bülow, he understands about lines of operation. Peter Bagration is the
07:29is the man of passion, the Georgian. He represents something of the spirit of Russia from the
07:36Caucasus. Napoleon hoped to use his mammoth army in a series of lightning maneuvers. Napoleon felt
07:45he would be able to force a decisive battle early in the campaign. He was certainly not prepared for
07:52a winter campaign, and definitely not one which stretched all the way to Moscow. It's very difficult
07:59to know whether Napoleon's campaign plan for 1812 was a good or a bad one, if only because we don't
08:04have any real documentary evidence that provides us with firm evidence of what he really intended to
08:10achieve. However, on the balance of probability, it appears that Napoleon did seek to engage and to
08:16destroy the bulk of the Russian field armies within about 200 to 300 miles of the frontier,
08:21and within two to three weeks of campaigning. However, his problem was that the Russians
08:26decided that rather than fight a pitch battle in that area and in that time, they would withdraw
08:31towards the east, using the great space and the resources of Russia, time in particular,
08:36in order to generate the capability to fight Napoleon under terms of their choosing rather
08:40than his. For every step back the Russians take, Napoleon takes a step further away from where he's
08:49strong. Every step Napoleon takes, his troops get hungrier, he's further from his supply nodes,
08:56he's further from France. Every step back the Russians take, they're winning.
09:07Had Napoleon's grand strategy gone to plan, the likelihood was that the Russian armies would have
09:13been destroyed and the French objectives swiftly achieved. However, Napoleon's designs were thwarted
09:20by the very size of his armies and by the ineffectual leadership of his relations. Prince
09:27Jerome was an abysmal example of military leadership, and together with Eugene, he managed
09:33to translate what should have been a lightning manoeuvre into a torpidly slow plod. What really
09:40made the campaign develop as it did was that Napoleon time and time again came close to
09:45engaging the Russians on at least three separate occasions. Napoleon almost grasped at the Russian
09:52armies only to find that he'd only caught their rearguard or that they'd managed to disengage
09:56during the night, and so he's continually reaching out for the Russians, trying to grasp them,
10:00sometimes grasping the rearguard and engaging that and thinking that's the real army, and then
10:05being drawn further and further by this failure. They just slip through his fingers time and time again.
10:10At 44 years of age, Napoleon no longer possessed the energy of his earlier campaigns. Indeed,
10:19nearly seven years before at the Battle of Austerlitz, he'd said, we are granted only a
10:25limited time for making war. I give myself another six years after which even I ought to stop. This
10:34was reflected in his actions at Vitebsk, where by allowing his troops one day's rest, he missed a
10:40prime opportunity to engage his foe in an action and allowed them to slip away to Smolensk. When
10:47Napoleon came to Borodino, he expected to have been burned out a year before. He knew how hard
10:55he worked. He knew how much he demanded of his body and of his mind, and he knew that he was
11:03burning out rapidly. And by the time he got to Borodino, Napoleon was a burnout case. Mentally,
11:11he was showing signs of megalomania, even paranoia. He was also rather lethargic and hesitant,
11:17especially at decisive moments, not least at Borodino. Physically, of course, it's also worth
11:22bearing in mind that Napoleon was not a particularly well-mannered 1812. He had a
11:25rather nasty bladder infection, he had cystitis. In addition, he had colds during 1812, hardly
11:31surprising perhaps when you're operating in a place like Russia. But nonetheless, when these
11:35things combined, his sort of mental lethargy or lassitude and his sort of physical debilitation,
11:42the outcome would hardly be positive for the French cause. Despite the tragedy that beset him,
11:48at Smolensk, Napoleon was finally able to bring the Russians to battle. At Smolensk,
11:53Napoleon threw his troops into a bloody frontal assault on the city. The Russians
11:59were able to mount a successful defence and then undertake a further retreat to safety.
12:05Napoleon had reached the critical point of his campaign. It was late August. His strategy of
12:18swift victory was in tatters and winter was closing in. His army, originally totalling
12:24over 400,000 men, had diminished to a mere 185,000. Casualties from battle had reduced
12:32the numbers, but desertion, starvation and sickness had also reaped a terrible toll on
12:38this once grand armée. Napoleon's lines of supply and communication were hugely overstretched,
12:46and each of these miles required protection, and thereby the loss of yet more soldiers from the
12:52Central Force. Rotting corpses of both soldiers and horses lined the roads travelled by the French,
12:59and the results of Russian scorched-earth tactics offered little succour. The French
13:06logistics system depended to a very large extent on requisition. We would call it plunder,
13:11and in many areas of Europe this had worked very well, in the Po Valley and the Rhine Valley,
13:17in those areas which were agriculturally very rich, but of course the further east you got
13:21in Europe, the more sparse were the supplies. And so what the Russians did was to simply burn the
13:28crops, burn the fields, kill the animals or dry the animals off, in front of the French army's
13:34advance. You burn your own country, you destroy the agricultural base of your own society,
13:41but at the same time you increase the difficulties of Napoleon and his army immeasurably.
13:46Napoleon was faced with two choices. He could either press on against a disorganised enemy
13:55and conquer Moscow, risking severe wintering in Russia, in the hope that Alexander would be forced
14:00to his knees, or retreat with the whole knowledge that he had been defeated strategically. Napoleon
14:08also received news of the attempted coup of General Mallet in Paris, as well as of bread
14:13riots and even outbreaks of Luddism in France. Thus, on the horns of a particularly unpleasant
14:19dilemma, and with his recurring cystitis infection playing up, Napoleon chose to grab
14:25the bull by those same horns and to journey further into the Russian interior and force their hand.
14:31One factor which appeared to operate in Napoleon's favour were the tensions which
14:39were becoming apparent in the Russian forces. The Russian commander, Barclay de Tolly,
14:45was of Scots extraction, who came from the part of Russia which had a large German population,
14:51although he was entirely Russian. There was a growing feeling amongst the Russian nobility
14:57and the Russian population that the Tsar should be separated from the German officers who were
15:02advising him. Unfortunately, Barclay was Minister of War. Barclay de Tolly is a man of mind, a man
15:11of intellect, and doesn't have the emotional appeal to the average Russian soldier. He was
15:18of Scots extraction, he'd been born in Germany, and to many Russians, especially in 1812 when
15:23they were retreating, his retreating policy looked more like being a traitor than actually being a
15:28patriotic Russian. The Tsar was now coming under pressure from the Russian nobility to appoint a
15:34full Russian general. He therefore looked to Kutuzov, who was the epitome of the Russian ideal.
15:40Mikhail Kutuzov was nearly 70 years old and the veteran of countless campaigns. He had been the
15:50Russian commander at Austerlitz, but was so overruled there by the impetuous Tsar that
15:55his reputation had survived intact. Of less importance than his appetite for champagne,
16:01rich food, ladies of easy virtue, and bad French literature, was his reputation for fighting,
16:07the very opposite of the embarrassing retreat so far seen in the conflict. As well as a brilliant
16:13motivator, Kutuzov was also closely associated with the great General Suvorov and his beloved
16:19cult of the bayonet. In short, he had all the characteristics of a Russian national hero.
16:25Kutuzov was coming out of retirement to lead the Russian army, and the Russian army was
16:32delighted. Because here was a great Russian, a real Russian, coming out of the pages of history
16:39to lead them on to victory. Kutuzov was a real Russian. He wasn't like Barclay, a Scottish
16:44surname and a German general. He wasn't like any of these guys with German surnames or Finnish
16:50surnames or Swedish surnames. He was a real Russian coming to lead the Russian army to
16:56victory, and that was just what the Russian army wanted to see. Kutuzov is like an icon.
17:02He's the Russian version of Nelson. He's been wounded so many times. He's been shot through
17:08his head, and he survives. And the Russians actually see him almost as an embodiment of
17:13the spirit of Russia. Kutuzov immediately decided to pitch a defensive battle in order
17:20to save Moscow. Public opinion and the Tsar demanded little else. It's counterintuitive to
17:28suggest to an 18th or early 19th century Russian nobleman that allowing the French invader to tread
17:36on the holy soil of Mother Russia is the way to win. Chivalric ethics, chivalric zeal are saying
17:46to the Russians, you must fight. You must conduct a battle. Don't retreat. Don't walk away. Don't
17:51just let Napoleon defeat himself. You must go out and conduct a battle and use a lot of sabers and
17:57steel and artillery. Bang, bang. That's what the Russians want to do so that they'll feel like
18:02they're attacking Napoleon. So the Russians abandoned the wise policy of just letting
18:09Napoleon come, and they have to fight a battle. It was Kutuzov's chief of staff, General Bennigsen,
18:16who actually surveyed the route from Moscow running forward in the general direction of
18:21Smolensk. And he saw near the village of Borodino an excellent choke point where there were no
18:26flanks, where streams and rivers actually constricted movement. And he advised Kutuzov
18:32that this would be the place to stand and fight. In addition, it's worth remarking that Bagration's
18:38chief of staff actually knew the battlefield from his youth. So it was an area with which
18:44one of the commanders, our most important subordinates, was actually personally familiar,
18:48although whether this was actually significant on the day is rather more open to question.
18:52Touring the site on the 3rd of September, accompanied by a huge eagle wheeling above,
18:59Kutuzov chose to make a stand on the east bank of the Kalachka River, just to the south of Borodino.
19:07The battlefield lay in picturesque rolling countryside. It occupied an area roughly two
19:14miles square between both the Moscow-bound old and new Smolensk roads. The Kalachka River bisected
19:22the ground with the shallow, marshy Semenovka stream running off in a southward direction,
19:27between the two halves of a low ridge. Borodino village itself lay on the new Smolensk road. Over
19:36on the western bank of the Kalachka and was a relatively weak defensive position. Presuming
19:43the French would advance on his right flank, Kutuzov immediately put his troops to work,
19:47fortifying the northern section of this low ridge. With the gentle glacis and commanding a field of
19:55fire both marvellous and deadly, this was to hold a battery of 18 cannon and became known as the
20:01famous Rayevsky Redoubt. The southern ridge was also strengthened by the construction of three
20:08V-shaped Bagration fletches. To help strengthen the position, General Bennigsen ordered the
20:15construction of a defensible observation post, the Shevardino Redoubt. A short way back on the
20:21new Smolensk road, the main Russian artillery battery was placed by the village of Gorky.
20:27The 1st Army of the West was given responsibility for the Russian right flank,
20:34and General Barclay positioned his troops. The lifeguard Jaegers were in Borodino village.
20:41Bagavut, Tolstoy and Dokturov's 2nd, 4th and 6th Corps held the line down to the Rayevsky Redoubt.
20:49The Redoubt itself was defended by a section of 7th Corps under General Rayevsky,
20:56who were also stretched down as far as Semenyovskaya village. The entire flank was
21:02supported by the mobile reserves of the 1st Cavalry Corps and Platov's much feared Cossacks.
21:09A more sedentary reserve, consisting of 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Corps,
21:14was placed immediately behind the infantry. Bagration's 2nd Army then took responsibility
21:22for the left flank. The area of the Bagration fleshes was seen by Lieutenant General Borodzin,
21:28who placed the 7th Combined Grenadier Division inside the defences,
21:32with the 27th Infantry Division of Nevorovsky behind. Initially, both 5th and 3rd Corps were
21:41placed in the centre as a strong reserve for the left, along with the 26 batteries
21:46of the artillery reserve and the local militia, the Moscow Opolcheny. The latter, barely armed,
21:54untrained but eager civilians, were assigned the role of carrying off the wounded and
21:59intercepting any deserters. However, Kutuzov then realised that Napoleon was also perfectly
22:07able to advance on the southern, old Smolensk Road, and was forced to deploy Tuchkov's 3rd
22:13Corps from the reserve, along with 1,500 Cossacks and 7,000 of the Opolcheny. Four further Jäger
22:22regiments were sent to cover the area between Bagration and Tuchkov, whose force was cunningly
22:28concealed in a dense wood. Unfortunately, this giant ambush was foiled by the ever-helpful
22:36General Bennigsen, who, in order to allay Jäger fears and without consulting Kutuzov,
22:42ordered 3rd Corps to reveal their whereabouts and close up behind them.
22:46Expecting an attack along the new Smolensk Road and against the advice of Barclay,
22:52Kutuzov had built up an overly strong right wing and an extended, weaker left wing. He did,
23:00however, feel confident enough to inform the Tsar that the position I have taken up at Borodino
23:06is one of the best you could find. I am confident we shall win. Napoleon, riding out on the 5th of
23:15September to survey his opponents, was of an entirely different opinion. The Russians assumed
23:23that Napoleon would be stupid. The Russians assumed that they could put General Barclay
23:30out there and that Napoleon would go for General Barclay the way a bull goes for a red cape in a
23:37bullfight, and that just when Napoleon was about to hit Barclay, then Bagration would come and hit
23:44him in the flank. The Russians did not take into account that Napoleon wasn't singing from their
23:49song sheet. Napoleon sees Barclay, Napoleon sees Bagration, and Napoleon says, I'm going right
23:57between the two. He's going to commit himself to a long, slow infantry assault across open ground.
24:04Napoleon figures he's going to lose 20,000 men doing it, but Napoleon figures he can afford to
24:12lose 20,000 men at the Battle of Borodino if it will get him a decisive defeat of the Russians.
24:19So Napoleon looks at the ground and says we're going to go straight up the middle across an
24:25open field with no cover and let the might of French arms win. Napoleon's plan for the Battle
24:34of Borodino is, I think, unimaginative and risk-averse, certainly. He could have done
24:39things that would have been bold, maneuverist, and would have avoided the rather bloody,
24:43attritional battle that followed, but I think what dominates Napoleon's considerations at
24:47Borodino is the fear that once again the Russians are going to slip through his fingers,
24:52as they had done three times before during the campaign of 1812. His initial move, in fact,
24:58came late in the afternoon of the 5th, and saw the 35,000 troops of I and V Corps set
25:05out against the Shevardino Redoubt, an hors d'oeuvre before the real fight. General commands,
25:12I Corps, was to move directly on the Redoubt, and Poniatowski's Polish V Corps undertook a
25:19flanking maneuver around to the south. The roar of the artillery preceded the actual encounter,
25:26which took place as the sun faded over the horizon, darkness only adding to the confusion.
25:33As chance would have it, Nevorovsky's 27th Division had drifted over to the Redoubt
25:39during the day, boosting Russian numbers to 18,000, and once again they put up a truly
25:46dogged defense. A murderous musketry duel developed between the two forces, only brought
25:54to a close when compounds dragged up four cannon pieces open-fly at close range, shattering the
26:01ranks of the Russian infantry and bringing the Redoubt under French control. Further troops
26:08were fed into what was fast becoming a general action involving the southern wings of both
26:13armies. The 2nd Grenadier Division recaptured the Redoubt for the Tsar, and the 2nd Curassiers
26:20slaughtered an entire French infantry regiment. However, as midnight approached, it became clear
26:28that the Russian position was no longer tenable. Prince Poniatowski was making steady progress
26:34from the south, and the divisions of Friant and Morant were closing in from the west.
26:40The order to fall back to the regular line of the Second Army was given,
26:46and battle drew to a close. The French at last held strong over the Redoubt.
26:51In total contrast to the heated act of September 5th, barely a shot was heard on the 6th. Both
27:01forces, it seemed, were preparing themselves for the storm ahead. Napoleon surveyed the Russian
27:08lines astride his horse, L'Embellie, and refined his strategy accordingly. He further concentrated
27:16his troops on the Russian left, placing two-thirds of his army there, totalling 85,000 men. Davout's
27:251st Corps, supported by Murat's cavalry, were to deliver the initial blow. 2nd and 8th Corps,
27:32and the forces under Morant, were placed above, up as far as the Kalochka. The Imperial Guard
27:39was held in reserve. North of the Kalochka, the responsibilities fell to Eugene's 4th Corps,
27:48who were to take the village of Borodino, and then make the first assault upon the Rayevski Redoubt.
27:54Rayevski's Redoubt enabled Bagration to put a large battery of guns right in the middle of his
28:08line, providing artillery cover to his infantry. Now, Redoubts were usually built to allow the
28:16gunners to actually pull their guns out at the last minute. And Rayevski ordered that a real
28:21wall be constructed on the Redoubt, because he had no intention of abandoning this position at
28:25all. The Russians were there, and they were going to stay there, and they were going to
28:28die fighting by their guns. It was the linchpin of the entire Russian position at Borodino.
28:33On the Russian side, the 6th saw Kutuzov untroubled by further doubts. His battle
28:42plan was set in stone. Instead, he organised the strengthening of the Rayevski Redoubt,
28:48and then toured his army, giving speeches to individual regiments,
28:52exhorting them to defend our native soil, and serve loyally and honourably to the last drop
28:59of your blood. Russian Orthodox clergy with holy banners had also travelled with the Russian
29:05soldiers, giving the army a sanctified aura as they blessed soldiers and regimental colours
29:11alike with holy water, raising religious fervour to fever pitch as they paraded the famous icon
29:18of the Black Virgin of Smolensk as night drew in before the real day of reckoning.
29:23The calm was broken at 6am on September 7th when the French gunners thundered into action. Their
29:32Russian counterparts were not long to reply in kind, and battle once again commenced.
29:38Napoleon's leading divisions duly rolled into action, their drums beating the pas de charge.
29:45The first action came when Prince Eugene's 4th Corps stormed into Borodino village,
29:52catching the lifeguard Jaegers stationed there completely unawares and routing them in a few
29:59short minutes. As they scrambled across the bridge to safety on the east bank of the Kolochka,
30:05the French muskets took their terrible toll, and the regiment lost some 30 officers and over half
30:12its men, a disordered start for the Tsar. Meanwhile, 1st Corps had advanced on the
30:19Bagration fletches, and Poniatowski's outflanking manoeuvre seemed to be going well, as he had
30:25already expelled the Russians from the village of Utitsa. The advance guard of 1 Corps under
30:32General Kompans marched through the storm of fire and descended upon the fletches. Casualties were
30:39already piling up, and Kompans himself was carried from the battlefield after only 90 minutes,
30:46just as the southernmost fletch fell to his men. General Ermolov commented that it was only the
30:53superiority of the bayonet in the hands of the Russian soldiers that enabled them to maintain
30:58this resistance for so long. Just when it seemed victory was a foregone conclusion,
31:05the tide of the battle changed. Poniatowski's advance was checked by Tuchkov's artillery
31:11batteries, and the hail of musket fire from the Russian Jaegers. Barclay freed the 2nd
31:18Corps of General Bagovut from inactivity, and sent them down to support Tuchkov on the left.
31:24As his soldiers streamed down the line, eager to get some action, Bagovut dropped off two regiments
31:31and various artillery pieces to his hard-pressed colleagues on the way. The French 1st Corps were
31:39now expelled from the fletches following a ferocious counter-attack by the 7th Combined
31:44Grenadier Division, supported by a mixture of Dragoons, Lancers and Hussars. Around this time,
31:51Prince Eugene also made the first assault on the Rayevsky Redoubt, and was repulsed with little
31:58difficulty. The Rayevsky Redoubt, the Grand Redoubt, had 20 guns and a whole lot of muskets
32:05in it. The muskets were there to defend the guns, and it meant that 20 reasonably large artillery
32:14pieces fired on the French as they tried to engage the Russian infantry. It meant that the Russian
32:23guns were not encumbered by being behind the Russian infantry. They were right up in front.
32:28There was nothing at all to come between the Russian guns in the Redoubt and the attacking
32:34Frenchmen. No cover for the attacking Frenchmen. The Rayevsky Redoubt came to represent one of the
32:40focal points of the Battle of Borodino. It had the effect of sucking men and materiel into the centre
32:47of the battlefield away from the flanks, which remained by Borodino standards at least relatively
32:52quiet throughout the day. So what you've got is this maelstrom in the centre of the Russian line,
32:58with attack after attack coming from French infantry and then later from French cavalry,
33:03surging up the slope, being blasted to pieces. Indeed, for one part of the battle, the French
33:09actually found that they had to, because they'd run out of infantry essentially in this area,
33:12keep thousands of horsemen of cavalry standing directly in front of the Rayevsky Redoubt in
33:19order to hold a gap in the centre of their own line. And for about three hours, these French
33:24cavalry simply sat there, being smashed to pieces by the artillery in the Rayevsky Redoubt and the
33:28artillery pieces that supported it, at enormous cost, obviously, both in men and horses. Thousands
33:34of men and thousands of horses fell without a single attack actually being launched during
33:38this period. As the decision loomed, the battle increased in intensity, particularly for the
33:45Bagration Fletches. Napoleon sent in the cavalry of Montbrun for support, and before long,
33:52Junot's 7th Corps were to join them. Part of the Young Guard was also sent to stabilise the
33:58Polish positions at Utitsa, so Napoleon had already committed the majority of his reserves
34:04well before midday. General Rape, a French haidicon, also received his 22nd battle wound at this time.
34:14Ten o'clock came, and the French drew their forces together for a tremendous push against
34:20the Russian left centre. Three infantry corps, supported by two cavalry corps and the massed
34:26fire of 250 artillery pieces, were to make a determined assault upon the area surrounding
34:33the Fletches. The French guns created havoc amongst the Russians, but paled when compared
34:40to the carnage wreaked by Bagration's 300 guns on the French troops as they rushed up the slope
34:46towards the fortifications. Marshal Ney alone was wounded four times in this episode, but of
34:54great significance to the Russians was that General Bagration had to be carried from the
34:59field wounded. This event so demoralised the men of Generals Borodzin and Bagovut that they
35:06temporarily gave up their positions. Sensing victory was in their grasp, the French cavalries
35:13swept in under the flamboyant command of Joachim Murat, the King of Naples, hoping to develop a
35:19Russian retreat into a rout. Murat cut a remarkable figure, bedecked in oversized riding boots and
35:27great golden spurs, a fantastically embroidered light blue jacket, dark ringlets flowing under
35:34a fancy Jacobean hat, and topped with a long white feather. More importantly, he was also a
35:41great horseman and soldier. Drawing back in fine order however, the Russians countered this new
35:48threat by forming orderly squares, which repeated cavalry charges had little prospect of disrupting.
35:56At this stage a stalemate seemed to be developing, and the French commanders made repeated requests
36:03that Napoleon should send in the old guard to finish off the Russians for good. The French
36:10Emperor, seemingly apathetic and devoid of his usual mental energy, refused. He would need to
36:17leave this hostile land sooner or later, and they were his only wholly intact force, his devoted
36:24corps d'élite at that. To throw them into battle would severely compromise his chances of a successful
36:31retreat. Throwing the Imperial Guard into the battle might have made a real difference. If it
36:36put it into the battle early in the day, in particular when there was a moment to do so,
36:40the Russians might very well have been smashed on the battlefield. Napoleon has a strategic reserve,
36:47a strong strategic reserve. The question is, should he have used it for the tactical purpose
36:54of affecting the course of the Battle of Borodino? The answer for Napoleon is no. If I use up the
37:02guard today at Borodino, I won't have them tomorrow when I need them again. While the guard exists,
37:08Napoleon exists. And if he makes a mistake, if he attacks with that guard, and the guard is destroyed,
37:13then so too is Napoleon. It's precisely what happens at Waterloo, his guard is destroyed.
37:20Napoleon is a long, long way from home. He's in the middle of a hostile country. What is he to do?
37:25Is he to commit the guard and run the risk of losing everything? And he hesitates. The stalemate
37:33caused by Napoleon's refusal to commit the guard gave both commanders a chance to lick their wounds.
37:39Kutuzov used the approach to reinforce his weakened centre with Tolstoy's Fourth Corps,
37:45and sending Uvarov's cavalry forces on a diversion into the village of Borodino.
37:51Uvarov temporarily routed General Delzon's cavalry, and in doing so caused another appeal
37:59to Napoleon for reinforcements, just as he was about to order a fresh attack. This not only gave
38:06the Russians more breathing space, as it took the French more than an hour to recover their
38:10composure after this irritation, it also cemented Napoleon's decision to reserve the
38:17Imperial Guard for later action. 2pm approached, and the Grand Armée diligently readied itself
38:25for a further sledgehammer blow on the Russian centre, and the Rievsky Redoubt in particular.
38:31Three of Prince Eugene's infantry divisions were to provide the frontal assault,
38:36with a concentration of 400 artillery pieces providing a devastating bombardment as cover.
38:43Unable to locate his cuirasser reserves, Barclay could not strengthen his forces within and around
38:51the Redoubt. They would be without cavalry support for the time being at least.
38:56And the only way for the French to be able to attack the Russians without being massacred by
39:04the guns of Rievsky's Redoubt was to go into the Redoubt and kill everybody inside. So Prince
39:12Eugene, the French cavalry commander, is given the task of attacking the Redoubt, and the only side
39:19where there are not a lot of muskets, a lot of guns pointing at you, is the back. And Prince
39:25Eugene goes around the back of the Redoubt, comes in from the direction where the guns are not
39:32pointing, and he kills all the gunners. Eugene's infantry soon arrived to consolidate the success,
39:38and were met by a scene of untrammeled horror. The dead and mutilated, both men and horses,
39:45lay six or eight deep within, and completely filled the ditches and entrances. The Redoubt
39:55was firmly in French control, and a sizeable breach had therefore been opened in the Russian
40:00lines. Was this to be the decisive event Napoleon so needed? Just as Eugene was about to throw all
40:08the available French cavalry into the fray and exploit the opportunity, the Russian General
40:14Barclay somehow managed to muster two cavalry corps and foil his opponent. The Russian infantry
40:21formed squares once more, and one of the most stubborn cavalry battles of history duly began.
40:27It was only thanks to the superior strength of the Russian horses that the defence was a success,
40:34and the infantry were able to withdraw safely to a new line. By now both sides were battle-weary,
40:41and the tempo of battle slowed. This most malevolent of days still had more surprises
40:49to spring. Aware of ebbing French energy, Kutuzov ordered the forces of V Corps to
40:56mount a counter-offensive. The ever-vigilant French I Corps became alert to this, and was
41:03able to stop the Russians with the assistance of a further 80 guns from the artillery reserve.
41:08Meanwhile, Prince Poniatowski, still skirmishing against the Russian left flank, had received news
41:17that the Redoubt had been taken, and was roused to launch one further assault on the Russians
41:22at Yutitsa, who were by now in a dangerously exposed salient. He made good progress against
41:30the remaining Russian forces, and by 5pm they had withdrawn, falling back to the line now taken by
41:37the rest of the Russian army. The fighting finished almost by mutual consent of the exhausted soldiers,
41:44and, able to fight no longer, the Russians retreated to safety, their numbers depleted,
41:51but essentially intact. I think that the Russians at Borodino did extremely well. To survive that
42:02battle and to be able to withdraw a large part of their army intact was a genuine achievement. The
42:08Russian army at Borodino was smaller than the French army, so under these circumstances,
42:12and not least because the initial Russian deployment was a rather bad one, with the
42:16main weight of its forces on the right wing rather than the left where the French actually
42:20attacked, that the Russians were able to survive this battle is a testimony both of the capabilities
42:26of their commanders, in particular Barclay de Tolly, but even more so perhaps the moral resilience
42:32of the ordinary Russian peasant soldier. These were not useless, unto mention, as Hitler might
42:40have characterized them a century and a bit later, these were capable, determined, resolute troops,
42:47as good, I would say, man for man, as any of the Frenchmen opposite them. In achieving the victory
42:54at Borodino, the French alone had fired over 90,000 rounds of artillery, and the infantry
43:01had spent an estimated 2 million cartridges. The Russians suffered an incredible 44,000 casualties
43:09to the French 30,000, numbers which were not experienced on such a scale again until the
43:16horrors of Flanders during the First World War. More than 50 generals were lost by the two forces,
43:23and the surgeon-in-chief of the Imperial Guards had personally carried out over 200 amputations.
43:30It has been calculated that over 30% of all combatants received a wound of some form. I think
43:38you can explain the appalling casualties for both sides of Borodino in two different ways. One is
43:44by reference to the mechanics of the battle, if you like, the formations which were used, the
43:50weapons which were used, the battle plans, if you like, all the things that actually happened on the
43:55day. But I think there's a much more important and broader explanation for the casualties, which is
44:01that both sides were willing to sustain such casualties. Armies like this do not stand for an
44:07entire day and slug it out at the cost that they did sustain on the 7th of September, unless they
44:14are fighting with enormous passion, belief, even hatred. By the end of the Battle of Borodino, Karl von
44:21Clausewitz, great Prussian philosopher of war as he was to become, actually remarked that less than
44:27one-third of the soldiers who'd started on that battlefield at the beginning of the day was still
44:31standing there. So what you're looking at is two armies standing face-to-face and beating each other
44:38to a pulp. Despite a gain of a half-mile, a slight tipping of the scales in Napoleon's favour, and
44:48the opening of the road to Moscow, this was at the very best a Pyrrhic victory. The only way Napoleon
44:55can get what he came for, the only way he can get the Tsar to give in, to participate in the
45:00continental system, to stop trading with Britain, is to force the Tsar by going to Moscow, knocking
45:07on the Tsar's door and saying, give in. So Napoleon picks up his exhausted, bedraggled army, and he picks
45:16up his own exhausted, pained carcass, and he heads for Moscow. As is notorious, within a few days of
45:23arriving, fires begin in the city, and soon they consume up to 60% of Moscow. So there is Napoleon
45:31in the burning spiritual capital of the Russian Empire, his lines of communication stretching back
45:39to Poland and to Prussia, with intact Russian armies hovering on his flanks, his own strength
45:46diminishing by the day. Effectively, what's happened is that the Russians have proved, both to themselves
45:54and to the French, that they can stand up against the French in battle for a full day and not be
46:00decisively defeated. And to be able to do that, in particular given the disaster of Austerlitz
46:06back in 1806, when the Russian army had been destroyed, was important to the Russian people's
46:11self-respect, and said to the French, we can fight you, we can stop you, you will not defeat us. It was a
46:18statement of intent, it was a statement of moral capability. Furthermore, reinforcements were being
46:26raised across the country, and much buoyed by Borodino, the Tsar stood firmer than ever against any sort of peace.
46:37At the end of the day, Napoleon may have won the Battle of Borodino in some technical sense.
46:44What did it get him? Nothing. Napoleon assembles a huge army, the Grande Armée. He's got half a million
46:51people in this army, he's got another 175,000 people watching his flanks, he's united all of
46:58Europe, all of continental Europe in this effort. He has gone to Borodino, he has won his battle as
47:04far as he's concerned. He carries on to Moscow, and what does he get? Nothing. Indeed, some historians
47:11have argued that if the Battle of Borodino had been lost by the French, as long as they hadn't
47:15been annihilated in the process, they would have been better off, because they would have been
47:19forced to retreat back to Smolensk, which was their base of supply. And from Smolensk they could
47:23have either tried again the following year, or they certainly would have found themselves much
47:27closer to Poland, and a degree of relative safety. Whereas by being drawn further into Russia, into
47:33Moscow, and then forced to retreat all the way back to Poland during the depths of a Russian winter,
47:39essentially they consigned themselves to disaster. This was a pyrrhic victory, with a capital P.
48:19you