Line of Fire (23/41) : Balaclava "1854" - The Charge of Light Brigade
For educational purposes
The battle of Balaclava, aka The Charge of the Light Brigade, was the famous engagement during the Crimean War in which a Russian commander attempted to lift the siege of Sevastopol by attacking with 25,000 troops.
The battle of Balaclava, aka The Charge of the Light Brigade, was the famous engagement during the Crimean War in which a Russian commander attempted to lift the siege of Sevastopol by attacking with 25,000 troops.
Transcript
00:00You
00:30The
00:46story of the Battle of Balaclava is filled with acts of heroic courage, including the
00:53victory against the odds of Sir Colin Campbell's thin red line and the dashing charge of the
00:59heavy brigade led by the remarkable Sir James Scarlet. But it is the men of the Light Brigade
01:07and their valiant, doomed charge who are now part of British military folklore.
01:29The exact reasons for the war in the Crimea were deep-rooted, but lay principally in the
01:47British government's fear of Russian expansionism. Russia had long harboured designs on the Balkans
01:54in southeastern Europe and her ambitious Tsar, Nicholas I, saw the crumbling of the Turkish
02:01Empire as the perfect opportunity to further press his claims. The capture of Constantinople
02:09would give Russia complete control over the entrance to the Black Sea from the Mediterranean
02:15through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. With an already secure and established naval
02:21base at Sevastopol, this would open the way for Russia's warships to dominate the Mediterranean
02:27and afford her massive influence over foreign trade routes, particularly those of Britain and
02:33France. Britain joined the Crimean War to defend her ally Turkey, to maintain the balance of power
02:40in Europe and to protect her extensive commercial interests in the Middle East. In the mid-19th
02:46century, Turkey was known as the sick man of Europe, so other great powers, Britain and France,
02:51wanted to make sure that Russia did not secure a huge victory and upset the strategic balance.
02:57On the 30th of November, 1853, the Russians attacked the Turkish fleet at anchor in the
03:04harbour of Sinope, near Constantinople, and destroyed it completely, with the loss of
03:114,000 Turkish lives. The British reacted to the news with outrage, and in an instant,
03:19the press was demanding action. They pilloried the Prime Minister, Lord Aberdeen. Unable
03:27to resist the enormous wave of public feeling, the British government delivered an ultimatum
03:33to Russia on the 27th of February, 1854. Russian troops must withdraw from Moldavia and Wallachia
03:42by the 30th of April, or Britain and France would be at war with Russia. This stipulation
03:49for peace was contemptuously ignored by Tsar Nicholas. So Britain set about building an
03:56army to defeat the Russians. Obviously, a full-scale war with a nation as
04:04vast as Russia was out of the question, and the War of 1854 was always seen as a short,
04:11sharp lesson to be handed out to the upstart Russians. Britain and France chose to concentrate
04:18on two fronts, a naval war in the Baltic, and in the areas where the main threat to
04:24their interests lay, the Crimea and the Russian bases at Sevastopol.
04:31Overall command of the British Expeditionary Force was given to Lord Raglan, the 66-year-old
04:38Master of the Ordnance. Raglan was appointed to his command because
04:44he'd had experience under Wellington. Wellington was the main military commander of the early
04:5019th century for the British, and it's on his reputation that the British army rested.
04:56Raglan had served with him, Raglan had been with him for eight years, and so he was appointed
05:02because he knew how to fight battles in the corners of Wellington.
05:06In all that time, in all the military jobs he'd had, not a single one was a command.
05:12He had never commanded troops in the field, and he'd been promoted time and time again
05:20on seniority. Having said that, of course, he was chosen
05:27because he was a man of considerable diplomatic tact, and this was, after all, a coalition
05:32war. He had to deal with allies, and on the whole he dealt with his allies pretty efficiently.
05:38Raglan was given five infantry divisions, numbering 26,000 men.
05:46Of these five divisions, only one of the commanders who led them was under 60 years of age.
05:54The addition of two cavalry brigades brought the total army strength to 28,000.
06:01It was these same cavalry who had earned the campaign its place in history, and it was
06:07among their ranks that the most interesting characters were to be found.
06:13Their overall commander was Lord Lucan, a hard-bitten, experienced cavalryman of 54 years.
06:22He had no say in the choice of his two subordinates, and was mortified to learn that command of
06:28the light brigade had been entrusted to his brother-in-law, Lord Cardigan.
06:34The two men loathed each other, and made no attempt to conceal it.
06:40Command of the other cavalry formation, the heavy brigade, was less controversial.
06:46It was led by Brigadier General James Scarlet, a 55-year-old, and a man who was to fight
06:53with great distinction during the campaign.
06:58From February 1854, troops left Britain for the Crimean Peninsula amid scenes of wild
07:05enthusiasm from an excited public, eager to send off Her Majesty's army with a rousing cheer.
07:14But in August came news which should have signalled the end of the campaign before it started.
07:20Russia, alarmed at the massing of troops by Austria on its eastern frontier, withdrew
07:26from Moldavia and Wallachia, thereby complying with the terms of the British ultimatum.
07:33The four points that had been at the heart of the dispute had been met, and effectively
07:41what happens is the British government adds in a fifth point, which is the issue of breaking
07:46Russian sea power in the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean.
07:50So, when the Russians, at the last minute, decide that they can do without the Turkish
07:57provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia and pull out of the Balkan principalities, it doesn't
08:05matter anymore.
08:06No war is going to happen.
08:08The goal had become Sevastopol.
08:13Fortified by continued public support, the government instructed Raglan to attack Sevastopol
08:19and destroy the Russian fleet.
08:22The likelihood of achieving these ambitious orders was not aided by the fact that no invasion
08:28plan actually existed.
08:33Furthermore, little or nothing was known of the Russian strength, and even less had been
08:39learned about the terrain over which the Allied armies were about to do battle.
08:43The Allies, 27,000 British, 30,000 French and 7,000 Turks, landed unopposed at Kalamata
08:50Bay in the Crimea on the 14th of September, 1854.
09:14It was full five days before the disembarkation was complete, and the Allied army could begin
09:28its march south towards Sevastopol, which lay 35 miles away.
09:34If Raglan had been surprised that the Kalamata Bay landings had met no opposition, he was
09:40soon to see the reason why.
09:43Ranged along the south bank of the river Alma was the forbidding site of the waiting Russian
09:49army.
09:51Comprising 33,000 infantry and 3,400 cavalry, with 28 guns set in redoubts, the Russian
10:01It was commanded by His Highness Prince Alexander Menshikov, who had given the Tsar his personal
10:09assurance that the Allied advance would be checked, and the line at Alma held for at
10:15least three weeks, allowing time for the strengthening of the defences at Sevastopol.
10:21For the first time, the two great armies had sight of their enemy.
10:31The battle of the Alma began with a French attack, commanded by General Canrobert, which,
10:38although wildly enthusiastic, achieved little.
10:42However, the British leadership was not satisfied with the result.
10:47However, the British light and first divisions began to make steady progress, with the Cold
10:52Stream and Grenadier Guards advancing in splendid order up the slope, shattering the Russian
10:58lines with their volleys of fire.
11:01To the west, the French overthrew the Russian left flank, and victory was assured when the
11:07Highland Brigade, brilliantly commanded by Sir Colin Campbell, completed the route of
11:13the enemy right.
11:20The spectacular Allied triumph had taken only one and a half hours, and the Russians were
11:26in full retreat towards Sevastopol.
11:30The battle of the Alma was a very confused encounter, largely due to the mistakes made
11:35by the commanders on both sides.
11:38It was won by the officers actually in the battle line, men like Sir Colin Campbell and
11:45the Highland Brigade, leading their troops with initiative, and also by the determination
11:50of the British troops especially, with their never-say-die attitude.
11:59While the British took heart and rested, few could have known it.
12:04But there now came the turning point in the whole campaign.
12:09Lord Lucan, whose cavalry had not seen action at Alma, vigorously urged Raglan to send them
12:15in pursuit of the fleeing Russians, but Raglan refused.
12:20Lucan had seen that there was a golden opportunity to storm Sevastopol from the north, whilst
12:26the Russians were confused and unprepared.
12:29If they attacked the northern part, they were faced by an important star fort, a very
12:34important and strong fortification, and two small redoubts that had recently been built
12:40by the Russians on the Belbek River.
12:43Now the French were reluctant to attack against the star fort, so there was a reluctance from
12:49the French to attack the northern part of Sevastopol.
12:52The object of the Allied attack on Sevastopol was to destroy the port city and sink the
12:55Russian fleet.
12:56Had the Allies captured the star fort and the cliffs to the north of Sevastopol harbour,
13:00they could have destroyed both the fleet and the city, and withdrawn well before the winter.
13:06Instead, with the French in complete agreement, Raglan opted to circumnavigate Sevastopol
13:13and attack the northern fort of the Russian fortifications.
13:17in complete agreement, Raglan opted to circumnavigate Sevastopol and attack from the south.
13:25In so doing, he spurned a gilt-edged chance and opened the way for the gruelling months
13:31of war which were soon to follow.
13:36It's important to remember, of course, that as far as the Allies are concerned, they don't
13:40know where Menshikov's army has gone after the Battle of the Alma.
13:45It's still in the field.
13:46It's not gone rushing into Sevastopol.
13:49They're in unknown country.
13:51They're not sure of their lines of communication.
13:54They haven't got very good maps.
13:56There are all sorts of reasons for being cautious, but with the wisdom of hindsight, it was a
14:01great opportunity missed.
14:04The Russian garrison of Sevastopol, commanded by Admiral Komilov, seized upon its good fortune
14:12and set about strengthening its defences, while Menshikov withdrew his army to the interior.
14:20The main priority for the British and French was to secure their lines of supply, which
14:26reached them by sea.
14:28So the Army of the East passed around Sevastopol towards the Chersonese Plateau, its objective,
14:34the two harbours Kamyesh and Balaklava.
14:40If the troops were to be supplied from England and France, it was essential that they should
14:45quickly capture a safe deep-water harbour.
14:48Balaklava was chosen as the target, and the harbour was secured by the British on September
14:5426th, after only token resistance from its defenders.
15:00With the port secure, the infantry moved onto the Chersonese uplands, to the south of Sevastopol,
15:07leaving the two cavalry divisions defending Balaklava.
15:12Crucially, it was decided not to attack Sevastopol immediately.
15:18Caen Robert and the French high command insisted on a full artillery bombardment of the town
15:24before an attempt could be made, and Raglan, ever mindful of the need to maintain the strength
15:30of the Anglo-French alliance, once again concurred.
15:35But it took eight days of back-breaking work to prepare the artillery batteries, time in
15:41which the Russian defences grew stronger as Allied morale weakened.
15:48The British and French allies were getting all of their supplies at that point by a long
15:54bad road from a port that was really ridden with disease.
16:02And they had to move everything up by road, but they had had this entire campaign a serious
16:07shortage of pack-horses, draft-horses and mules.
16:12And as a result, they were unable to get the supplies up these bad roads from the disease-ridden
16:18port well enough to properly supply their troops.
16:24The conditions before Sevastopol were very hard on the men in the siege lines.
16:30I mean, first of all, few of them had tents, and then there was the threat of cholera from
16:36bad water.
16:38And also, their diet was mostly salt meat, which is not actually a very healthy thing
16:42to be depending on.
16:52With the siege works completed, the artillery began its bombardment on the 17th of October.
16:58But despite a week of shelling which wrought death and havoc to Sevastopol, the Russian
17:04garrison would not yield.
17:09To add to the Allied problems, a new danger appeared.
17:14Intelligence reported that Menshikov's 25,000 Russian troops were massing in preparation
17:20for an attack on Balaclava.
17:23Unconvinced, Raglin was sceptical of the reports and made the fateful decision to disregard
17:30them totally.
17:31Raglin was sceptical when he first heard of the Russian attack because he'd heard this
17:37too many times before.
17:38There had been a series of false alarms, and he knew that it was in the best interest of
17:42the Russians to distract his attention from conducting the siege attack.
17:46And every time he moved his infantry out of the trenches, he held back the progress of
17:50his attack on Sevastopol itself.
17:52Consequently, he was unwilling to move until he saw clearly that the Russians were committed.
17:57He doesn't trust the reports he's getting, but he isn't compensating for it by putting
18:01out spies or by putting out cavalry to reconnoiter.
18:09The man responsible for the defence of the vital port at Balaclava was Sir Colin Campbell.
18:17To secure its defence, a line of six redoubts had been constructed along the causeway heights
18:22to the north of the port, about 800 yards apart, and manned mostly by Turkish troops.
18:301,200 Royal Marines with 26 guns were placed on the eastern side of the Balaclava gorge,
18:38and at the entrance to the gorge were ranged the 93rd Highlanders, W Battery Royal Artillery
18:45and a battalion of Turks.
18:49The nearest cavalry was half a mile to the south, under the command of Lord Lucan.
18:56With the troops available, they were reasonably well organised, because the main task was
19:04to pursue the siege of Sevastopol.
19:07We only had limited forces.
19:10So Ragan, who was responsible for the defence of the eastern side of the Allied line and
19:17for Balaclava, bearing in mind his priorities, had arranged the defences fairly well.
19:23But the other troops which were needed to defend Balaclava were simply kept too far
19:28back and so, as the battle unfolded, it took a long time to get the British infantry especially
19:33into line.
19:35The Russians had done their homework well.
19:39They realised that the nearest infantry reinforcements available to Campbell were on the Chersonese
19:45Plateau, perhaps two hours away.
19:49Menshikov planned a massive attack on the redoubts from the west, sending a total of
19:5425 battalions and 78 guns to seize the position.
20:02Three more columns were to assault from the east, whilst further infantry and cavalry
20:07lay in reserve to the north, in the North Valley and Fediyukhin Hills.
20:15Although Raglan remained unconvinced of a potential attack on the redoubts, Lukin, in
20:21command of the cavalry, was much more concerned.
20:27The Allies had six redoubts at Balaclava, six little fortresses.
20:31Each one had British 12-pounder naval guns, manned by Turkish gunners.
20:38And the Turkish gunners were considered, in the racial theory of the time, to be reliable
20:44purely because they were ethnically Turkish and people thought that ethnic Turks make
20:49good soldiers.
20:52And there was little attention given to the fact that they were poorly led, they were
20:56very exposed in these little fortresses, and they had not got a lot of motivation to
21:02stay where they were and fight their guns against the Russians from these exposed positions.
21:08The first Russian shells hit number one redoubt on the 25th of October.
21:18With surprise on their side, the Russians quickly overran the redoubts.
21:24And by 7.30am, the situation had become hopeless.
21:29The Russians now controlled all of the redoubts along the causeway heights.
21:35It was then that Raglan appeared on the scene and, after surveying the battlefield from
21:40the Eastern Escarpment, sent orders to the 1st and 4th Divisions of Infantry to march
21:46in support of Sir Colin Campbell.
21:49He also ordered Lucan, with his cavalry, to withdraw to the south of the last redoubt,
21:55where they could be protected by artillery fire from the surrounding hills.
22:02Lucan was less than pleased to receive Raglan's instruction.
22:06It left the 93rd Highlanders, only 550 strong, positioned on a small ridge north of Kadikioi,
22:14between the Russians and the entrance to the Balaclava Gorge.
22:22Sir Colin Campbell, alert to the danger of the situation, managed to augment his meagre
22:27troops with 40 sick or wounded guardsmen, plus a few Turks from the redoubts and the
22:33artillery of W Battery.
22:36But before long, the Russian guns from the captured redoubts began to find their range.
22:43So Campbell ordered the 93rd to form up on the reverse slope of the ridge.
22:50Four eager squadrons of Lieutenant-General Ryzhov's Russian cavalry soon charged along
22:55the North Valley, between captured redoubts 4 and 5, directly towards Campbell's 93rd.
23:07Campbell formed his men into two ranks, still on the reverse side of the slope.
23:12And as the Russian cavalry thundered towards them, he had his two lines of men make a sudden
23:18dramatic appearance at the crest of the ridge.
23:22The 93rd were on what's called a reverse slope.
23:26That meant that as you looked at the hill where they were, you couldn't see them, because
23:32they were just the other side of the hill.
23:35And what this meant was that as the Russian cavalry advanced across the plain towards
23:39his men were suddenly able to reach the crest and unleash volleys into the cavalry, surprising
23:45them and confusing them.
23:47I mean, technically Sir Colin Campbell should have formed his men into square, which would
23:50have done two things.
23:51It would have protected their flanks and also prevented them from being ridden down by the
23:55cavalry.
23:56But such was their determination, the thin red line as it's recorded, and the efficiency
24:01of their musketry, that the cavalry were simply scared away.
24:04If you deploy into square, three out of four sides of the square cannot engage to their
24:11front.
24:12By deploying into line, every single rifle could be used.
24:18Lord Raglan watched the superb performance of Campbell's 93rd from his position above
24:24the battlefield.
24:26Expecting them to be overrun, he had ordered Lucan to send cavalry support to Campbell.
24:33Lucan therefore ordered Sir James Scarlet to detach eight squadrons from his heavy brigade
24:39and ride towards Kadikioi.
24:42In doing so, he paved the way for another of the morning's glorious actions.
24:48Scarlet, as ordered, moved off from the foot of the Sapunay ridge towards Kadikioi with
24:56his eight squadrons.
24:59Their advance took them to the south of the hastily struck Light Brigade camp, which had
25:05been vacated only a few hours earlier, and then past a large vineyard.
25:12It was here that Scarlet first saw what must have been an unexpected sight.
25:18The remainder of Rzhov's cavalry, all 2,000 strong, who had left the north valley and
25:25were heading directly towards them.
25:32As with the four squadrons of Hussars who had attacked the thin red line, confusion
25:38appeared to beset the Russian charge at the crucial moment and, inexplicably, Rzhov halted
25:45his 2,000 cavalry only 100 yards from Scarlet.
25:51It gave Scarlet the breathing space he needed and afforded him the completely unexpected
25:56opportunity to engage a stationary, if numerically superior, enemy.
26:03This was to be the famous charge of the heavy brigade.
26:08The Russians didn't have a clear plan.
26:10They stopped on the height above where Scarlet was and they didn't, therefore, know exactly
26:18what to do.
26:19They were, therefore, static and that's important.
26:21You'd never receive a cavalry charge in a static position.
26:26Without orders from their officers and without a clear plan, they basically stood and waited.
26:33From their point of view, therefore, it was indecision.
26:36From Scarlet's point of view, it was bravery and clear decision.
26:42He charged uphill with a small number of troops and the very fact that he did so against a
26:48cavalry which was numerically superior but static was the crucial factor.
26:56Scarlet, Lieutenant Elliot and the trumpeter, and Scarlet's huge orderly Chagog were first
27:03to the Russians, at least 50 or 60 yards ahead of the Inner Skillings and the Scots Greys.
27:10The remarkable brigadier general was soon deep inside the Russian ranks, thrusting and
27:15slicing with his sword.
27:18Within seconds, the brass-hatted Inner Skillings and the bare-skinned Scots Greys joined in
27:24the frantic fight for life.
27:31Incredibly, only ten minutes after Scarlet had crashed into the Russian ranks, the five
27:37squadrons of British cavalry, just 500 strong, had gained the ascendancy over the 2,000 Russians
27:45and their formation began to crumble.
27:48A final assault on their right flank by the 4th Dragoon Guards was decisive. The Russians
27:54began a disorderly retreat towards the causeway heights.
27:59The charge of the heavy brigade worked, although it was never a charge, because Scarlet's troopers
28:06were mounted on very big horses and they were very big men. They moved uphill at a steady
28:10trot and simply barged the Russians out of the way. The Russian cavalry they charged
28:14into were mostly Cossacks and light Hussars. It was rather like the household brigade riding
28:19down a pony club gymkhana.
28:24So the British had won a tremendous second victory in the developing Battle of Balaclava.
28:30Spirits were high and the Russians were in some disarray. However, less than two hours
28:37from now, disaster would befall the unfortunate light brigade.
28:56Rzhov withdrew his confused and battered cavalry to the relative safety of the North Valley's
29:01eastern end, where they joined the eight guns of the 3rd Don Cossack Field Battery.
29:09In close proximity were a further 22 Russian guns, making a formidable 30 pieces of artillery
29:17ranged on three sides of the valley. It was to be 90 long minutes before the first British
29:25moves were made to engage them.
29:31After the Russians were broken up by the heavy brigade and by the heavy brigade's artillery
29:36support, nobody stopped them as they moved off down the valley and reformed. The light
29:44brigade, for instance, allowed them to just walk away. And the Russians were able to move
29:50off down the valley, reform their cavalry, and sight their guns to protect the cavalry's
29:58flanks and sight their guns up in front of the cavalry. So, the Russians were able to
30:04form up a very strong defensive position because nobody bothered to chase after them.
30:15Raglan was desperate to take advantage of the heavy brigade's victory, but he was frustrated
30:20in his plans by the painfully slow progress of the infantry divisions, originally ordered
30:26onto the plain to support the 93rd Highlanders. Raglan had intended the infantry to join with
30:33the cavalry and recapture the redoubts still occupied by the Russians, but he eventually
30:39lost patience and, at 10.15am, sent the order to Lucan,
30:46Cavalry to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights. They will
30:52be supported by the infantry, which has been ordered to advance on two fronts.
31:00It was now that confusion and uncertainty began to take a grip on the proceedings. Lucan
31:06formed up the light and heavy brigades at the west end of the north valley, between
31:11the Fediukin hills and the causeway heights. He now expected to be ordered against the
31:18Russians, who had been previously defeated by the heavy brigade, but with the additional
31:23guns the Russians were now in well-prepared positions which could not be attacked without
31:29infantry support. What Lucan could not see, however, owing to
31:36the undulation of the terrain, was Russian artillerymen attempting to carry away guns
31:42from the redoubts on the causeway heights, and it was against these men that Raglan expected
31:48Lucan to attack. While Raglan, from his position, could clearly observe the situation, Lucan
31:57was completely unaware of the fate of the guns and stayed still while he awaited the
32:02arrival of the infantry he needed to move against his objective.
32:07Raglan became increasingly annoyed with Lucan. The tragedy of the light brigade was about
32:13to be played out. Lucan did not react to the order which he
32:17received at 10.15 from an ADC, sent from Raglan, which intended him to attack the heights and
32:23stop the Russians taking away guns which they'd captured from the redoubts that morning. It
32:30wasn't until he got the next order, which is the final order, which is carried down
32:34by Captain Edward Nolan, at approximately 10.40, that he reacted and began to organise
32:41what later becomes the charge of the light brigade. Raglan called forward the noted horseman
32:52Captain Edward Nolan, a man with an uneven temper and excitable nature, and issued him
32:59with his second order to be delivered to Lucan. Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance
33:06rapidly to the front and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. Troops of horse
33:13artillery may accompany. French cavalry is on your left.
33:20It was Raglan's unfortunate decision to entrust Nolan with the order which directly led to
33:25the disaster which was to follow. Lucan, who could not see the guns being carried away,
33:34received the order with a mixture of bewilderment and deep concern, as to all intents and purposes
33:40he was being ordered to charge formed artillery head-on, a suicidal mission. Lucan insisted
33:48Nolan return to clarify the command. Nolan replied, Lord Raglan's orders are that the
33:57cavalry should attack immediately, to which Lucan snapped, attack, sir? Attack what? What
34:06guns, sir? Lucan, of course, was justified in his uncertainty. He had not seen and could
34:14not see the guns in the redoubts on the causeway heights. But by now, Nolan was in a state
34:21of high excitement, and with mounting insubordination, he thrust his arm out in the direction of
34:27the guns awaiting in excellent position at the end of the North Valley, the wrong valley.
34:35There, my lord, is your enemy. There are your guns.
34:40It's possible that the personality of Nolan was important because he wasn't able rationally
34:48to explain to Lucan exactly what the order meant. It was the practice of ADCs who carried
34:55messages to be able to explain and answer questions. They weren't there to change the
35:00order, they were there to explain it. But in this case, there is a question mark as
35:06to whether the clash between, essentially, an overbearing lieutenant general and a rather
35:14impertinent captain did not stop that process being carried out as it should have been.
35:21Although Nolan has been blamed in part for the mistake of the charge of the Light Brigade,
35:26I think this is really unfair. He was a very experienced cavalryman. He was a military
35:32theoretician who had written a book on the tactical use of cavalry. And it may be that
35:37he actually tried to change the order, redirect the movement, once he saw where the Light
35:43Brigade was going.
35:45Lucan, possibly flustered by the confusion and Nolan's highly insubordinate manner, made
35:52the fatal decision to attack the guns at the end of the North Valley. The third dons Cossack
35:58battery and not the guns being carried off from the redoubts on the causeway heights.
36:05He rode over to his hated brother-in-law, Lord Cardigan, and informed him of his decision.
36:12Cardigan tersely pointed out that a battery of guns on three sides awaited them, to which
36:19Lucan replied, I know it, but Lord Raglan will have it, and we have no choice but to
36:26obey.
36:28Lord Lucan hated the Earl of Cardigan. Lord Cardigan hated Lord Lucan. Lou Nolan hated
36:38the Earl of Cardigan and Lord Lucan. And Lord Raglan couldn't get a grip on any of them.
36:47And the result was that nobody wanted to take orders from anybody else. Nobody wanted to
36:51help anybody else. And everybody just sank into this morass of hatred and bloody-mindedness
36:57in which nobody would do what they were supposed to do.
37:01There can be little doubt that the lack of mutual respect between the British commanders
37:07had a substantial influence on the disaster of the charge of the Light Brigade. Especially
37:15the real personal animosity between Lucan and Cardigan meant that they couldn't really
37:20speak to one another. They just simply wouldn't communicate effectively.
37:25There was therefore no attempt to rectify the order. Cardigan, with the words, the brigade
37:32will advance, gave his order. And the three lines of the Light Brigade began to ride slowly
37:41down the valley. Behind them were Lucan and Scarlet with the Heavy Brigade.
37:48Despite Lucan's exhortation to maintain a walk, the 600 men of the Light Brigade soon
37:56began to trot, leaving the Heavy some way behind. It was then that a famous and dramatic
38:03scene occurred. Captain Nolan, who had sought and been granted permission to ride with the
38:1017th Lancers in the Light Brigade, suddenly galloped forward ahead of Cardigan, yelling
38:15frantically and waving his sabre. Had he at last realised that Cardigan and his cavalry
38:29were about to attack the wrong guns? Was Nolan's extraordinary behaviour a desperate attempt
38:36to redirect the charge away from the waiting Cossack battery and towards the redoubts on
38:41the causeway heights? History will never know, for as Nolan surged forward, he was
38:51shot through the chest, therefore becoming the first fatality of the charge.
38:59Soon, the Light Brigade were thundering along the valley, and the awful slaughter began.
39:07Behind the smoke and the dust of the Light Brigade, Lord Lucan and the Heavies were struggling
39:15to keep up. Before long, a dangerous gap had opened up between the two brigades, and Lucan
39:22was faced with an agonising decision. Should he press on and try to join the Light Brigade,
39:29which he could see being cut to ribbons before him? Or should he halt, cut his losses and
39:36cover their inevitable retreats?
39:38In the end, the Heavies were forced to retreat, and Lord Lucan was killed.
39:52After the retreat down the North Valley, Lucan could see little point in continuing,
39:58and so ordered the Heavy Brigade to halt. Meanwhile, the Light Brigade, with Lord Cardigan
40:07at its head, continued to display the dauntless courage and discipline which were to characterise
40:13every Victorian army.
40:17In the Light Brigade action, the Russian cannon would have started firing at a range of around
40:211,000 yards using single solid shot, which would have skipped along the ground and knocked
40:26out of their way anything they ran into. Somewhere under 300 yards, they'd have switched over
40:31to grape shot, firing one or two pound balls in a tightly packaged shotgun-like round.
40:38And if they got a chance to fire under 50 yards, they might have switched to canister
40:41shot, which is musket ball-sized, multiple round.
40:46From the time that the Light Brigade came within range of the Russian guns, they were
40:53constantly being killed, man after man and horse after horse, by a storm of grape shot.
41:01They kept on being hit by these goose-egg-sized balls the closer they came to the Russian
41:08guns, over and over again, until they could actually ride past the guns.
41:13The first line was only 100 yards from the Russian guns when they loosed off a final,
41:19dreadful volley of grape shot, which ripped the line asunder, leaving only 150 men remaining
41:26on horseback. Incredibly, Lord Cardigan was among them, and he rode almost contemptuously
41:34between the guns before coming face to face with the Russian cavalry waiting behind the
41:39artillery. Cardigan, his objective reached, his duty done, wheeled his horse around and
41:47cantered back up the valley.
41:51No sooner had the Light Brigade's fortunate survivors arrived at the guns than they were
41:56faced with a further desperate battle for life, as the waiting Russian Cossacks fell
42:01upon them, yelling wildly. Bravely, the Light Brigade fought on, sabring the gunners. A
42:09series of bitter hand-to-hand fights ensued.
42:25The shattered remains of the Light Brigade returned in battered and bleeding groups down
42:30the North Valley. Lord Cardigan, ever the military man, sought out Lucan to complain
42:37bitterly about the behaviour of Captain Nolan. He then drew up what was left of his exhausted
42:44command. The recriminations began almost instantly.
42:50Raglan argued that his order was perfectly understandable in the light of what had happened
42:56that morning. Lucan had been on the plane since five o'clock in the morning. Lucan,
43:01as the cavalry commander, therefore knew everything that had gone on that morning, and his argument
43:07and indeed his criticism of Lucan was that he did not interpret the order in the light
43:12of what had happened on the plane that morning. In Raglan's mind, there was no question that
43:18the guns to be taken were the guns that were in the redoubts, and therefore Lucan should
43:23have known that. Lucan took the view that what was written down was what he had to do.
43:30If Raglan's order had been clearer, if Lucan had communicated better with Cardigan, or
43:35even if Cardigan had simply displayed some initiative rather than charging straight
43:40at the guns, then certainly things could have worked out better.
43:45Raglan did not give a clear order. Raglan did not have a good enough eye for terrain
43:52to understand that Cardigan didn't have a clear picture of the battlefield. Raglan,
43:58who had never commanded troops in the field before, and who had no training, issued an
44:03unclear order to Cardigan, who had never commanded troops in the field before and who
44:09had no training. The people caught in between, Lord Lucan, who had some combat experience,
44:16and Captain Nolan, who had some combat experience, the people who transmitted the order from
44:22Raglan to Cardigan were not in a position to help the other leaders out, because they
44:30didn't have enough of the picture.
44:33The charge of the Light Brigade lasted approximately 25 minutes and covered a distance of a mile
44:40and a quarter. 673 men started out on the doomed journey towards the guns, the finest
44:48brigade of light cavalry Britain could muster, and all desperate to see action. When it was
44:56over, the brigade could boast only 195 fully fit men. 118 men were unaccounted for and
45:08247 more were walking wounded, unable to bear arms. 475 horses had been killed, with a further
45:1642 injured. The Light Brigade had paid a terrible price for its ride to glory.
45:31At the end of the battle, the Russian tactical commander, General Lip Randy, interviewed
45:35one or two British prisoners and he suggested they'd done a very brave thing, but he was
45:39convinced they were drunk. He was horrified when he realised they were sober. The Russians
45:44could not understand how men could carry out such an operation stone-cold sober.
45:52Cardigan was a hero, because he carried out what he'd done bravely, without a doubt. Lucan
45:57was the person who had misconceived what the order meant, and Raglan therefore blamed him
46:05in the long run.
46:14A day that had started so well for the British had ended in disaster. The Russians had all
46:34but destroyed the Light Brigade. They had captured the guns from the redoubts. They
46:40still held part of the causeway heights. The British were left to reflect on a series
46:46of missed opportunities and misunderstandings. In any direct sense, there are very few lessons
46:53to be drawn from what happened at Balaclava, because everyone knew the charge of the Light
46:58Brigade was a horrific mistake, and the lessons from that were self-evident. Britain had to
47:04throw off the idea that just because Dad was an Earl, therefore you were an effective combat
47:10leader. And the Crimean War, and Balaclava in particular, helped prove to the British
47:16people and the British leaders that that was no way to run an army.
47:27Cannon to the right of them, cannon to the left of them, cannon in front of them, volled
47:31and thundered, stormed at with shot and shell, boldly they rode, and well, into the jaws
47:38of death, into the mouth of hell, rode the 600.
48:08Thank you for watching.