‘Untenable’: Lawyer Discusses Idaho’s Restrictions On Emergency Abortion Care With Clarence Thomas

  • 4 months ago
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00:00 General Preliger. Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court,
00:04 Emtala's promise is simple but profound. No one who comes to an emergency room in need of urgent
00:11 treatment should be denied necessary stabilizing care. This case is about how that guarantee applies
00:17 to pregnant women in medical crisis. In some tragic cases, women suffer emergency complications
00:23 that make continuing their pregnancy a grave threat to their lives or their health. A woman
00:28 whose amniotic sac has ruptured prematurely, for example, needs immediate treatment to avoid a
00:33 serious risk of infection that could cascade into sepsis and the risk of hysterectomy.
00:38 A woman with severe preeclampsia can face a high risk of kidney failure that could require
00:43 lifelong dialysis. In cases like these where there is no other way to stabilize the woman's medical
00:49 condition and prevent her from deteriorating, Emtala's plain text requires that she be offered
00:54 pregnancy termination as the necessary treatment. And that's how this law has been understood and
00:59 applied for decades. That usually poses no conflict with state law. Even states that have sharply
01:05 restricted access to abortion after dobbs generally allow exceptions to safeguard the mother's health.
01:11 But Idaho makes termination of felony punishable by years of imprisonment unless it's necessary to
01:17 prevent the woman's death. I think I understood my friend today to acknowledge several times that
01:22 there is daylight between that standard and the necessary stabilizing treatment that Emtala would
01:26 require. And the Idaho Supreme Court recognized the same thing when it specifically contrasted
01:31 the necessary to prevent death exception and said it was materially narrower than a prior Idaho law
01:37 that had a health exception that tracked Emtala. The situation on the ground in Idaho is showing
01:42 the devastating consequences of that gap. Today, doctors in Idaho and the women in Idaho are in an
01:48 impossible position. If a woman comes to an emergency room facing a grave threat to her
01:53 health but she isn't yet facing death, doctors either have to delay treatment and allow her
01:57 condition to materially deteriorate or they're airlifting her out of the state so she can get
02:03 the emergency care that she needs. One hospital system in Idaho says that right now it's having
02:08 to transfer pregnant women in medical crisis out of the state about once every other week.
02:13 That's untenable and Emtala does not countenance it. None of petitioners' interpretations fit with
02:19 the text and so they have tried to make this case be about the broader debate for access to abortion
02:24 in cases of unwanted pregnancy. But that's not what this case is about at all. Idaho's ban on
02:30 abortion is enforceable in virtually all of its applications. But in the narrow circumstances
02:35 involving grave medical emergencies, Idaho cannot criminalize the essential care that Emtala requires.
02:41 I welcome the court's questions. General, are you aware of any other spending clause legislation
02:50 that preempts criminal law? With respect to criminal law in particular, Justice Thomas,
02:57 I'm not immediately thinking of relevant cases. We have a whole string side of cases in our brief
03:01 at page 46 that reflect times where the court has recognized the preemptive force of spending
03:06 clause legislation, including in situations where the funding restrictions apply to private parties
03:11 so that could include the Coventry health case, for example. Lee Deadwood is another example of
03:16 this. But I'm not immediately recalling how that would apply in criminal law. Of course, this court
03:20 hasn't drawn those kinds of distinctions in recognizing the force of the supremacy clause.
03:24 Now, normally when we have a preemption case, it's a regulated party who is involved in the suit and
03:34 they use it as an affirmative defense, for example, in Wyeth or something. In this case, you
03:43 are bringing an action against the state and the state's not regulated. Are there other examples of
03:50 these types of suits? Sure. I mean, there are numerous examples where the United States has
03:55 sought to protect its sovereign interests in situations where a state has done what Idaho
03:59 has done here and interposed a law that conflicts. So I'd point to Arizona versus United States as
04:04 an example of that. United States versus Washington. There are a number of cases where this
04:09 court has recognized that the federal government can protect its interests in this kind of preemption
04:13 action. And as I mentioned before, the court has a long line of cases recognizing that that
04:18 preemption principle applies in the context of federal funding restrictions that apply to private
04:23 parties too. But even when the party that you're bringing the action against is not the regulated
04:29 party? That's correct, because what Idaho has done here is directly interfered with the ability of
04:34 the regulated parties who have taken these funds, federal funds with conditions attached, from being
04:39 able to comply with the federal law that governs their behavior. Now, this was an essential part
04:43 of the bargain that the federal government struck with hospitals in substantially investing in their
04:47 hospital systems. And what the state has done is said, you, through our operation of state law,
04:53 are no longer permitted to comply with this fundamental stabilization requirement in
04:56 Emtala in this narrow category of cases. Well, normally, wouldn't it be the regulated party
05:03 that would actually be asserting the preemption that you're talking about?
05:08 Certainly, I can imagine situations, for example, where a regulated party would assert
05:13 a preemption defense and to say the state law itself is preempted to the extent that it prevents
05:18 that party from being able to comply with federal law. But I'm not aware of any principle or
05:22 precedent in this court's case law to suggest that that's the only way for the government to
05:26 protect its sovereign interests. That is the normal way, though.
05:28 I think that that's often the fact pattern of particular cases.

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