Bloodletting the state for individual gain: How our misleaders have left us in the lurch | Blunt Thoughts
#BluntThought
#AMShow
#AMNews
#MyJoyOnline
https://www.myjoyonline.com/ghana-news/
Subscribe for more videos just like this:
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UChd1DEecCRlxaa0-hvPACCw/
Follow us on: Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/joy997fm
Twitter: https://twitter.com/Joy997FM
Instagram: https://bit.ly/3J2l57
Click this for more news:
https://www.myjoyonline.com/
#BluntThought
#AMShow
#AMNews
#MyJoyOnline
https://www.myjoyonline.com/ghana-news/
Subscribe for more videos just like this:
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UChd1DEecCRlxaa0-hvPACCw/
Follow us on: Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/joy997fm
Twitter: https://twitter.com/Joy997FM
Instagram: https://bit.ly/3J2l57
Click this for more news:
https://www.myjoyonline.com/
Category
🗞
NewsTranscript
00:00 Welcome back on the AM show.
00:01 My name is Benjamin Akakpo,
00:03 and these, what I'm about to share with you next,
00:05 are my blunt thoughts, unfiltered.
00:09 They are what they are.
00:11 And I've titled them today,
00:13 Bloodletting the State for Individual Gain.
00:17 How our misleaders have left us in the lurch.
00:21 Bloodletting the state for individual gain.
00:25 How our misleaders have left us in the lurch.
00:28 Today I'll talk about two crucial matters,
00:30 COCOBOT and what is happening there in the IMF program,
00:32 together with a host of state-owned enterprises,
00:35 and where they've ended up vis-a-vis our IMF package.
00:39 And I'll also look at that infamous Trafigura scandal
00:43 that has now saddled us as a country
00:45 with a $140 million debt.
00:49 But who benefits?
00:50 And why do we always end up with these judgment debts?
00:54 What's going on?
00:56 Bloodletting, it's a bit of a phenomenon.
00:59 In ancient times, they would even use leeches and stuff
01:02 to get blood out of people surgically.
01:05 At other times, it also had to do with mass killings
01:09 and all of that.
01:10 I chose that word specifically because of our misleadership
01:14 and how they bleed us dry as a people.
01:18 They get the debt, they incur the debt,
01:20 we pay, the ordinary taxpayers.
01:22 Who can't even afford three square meals in a day?
01:26 Well, let's come to the board.
01:27 Let's start with Cocobot.
01:28 Cocobot's financial oversight.
01:31 Now, in recent times,
01:32 we've heard from finance minister Ken Oforiata,
01:34 who has said both the governor of the central bank,
01:37 Dr. Ernest Addison, and the minister of finance
01:40 will now be on the board, as though it were a novelty.
01:44 We're also setting up a desk at the finance ministry
01:46 that will interact with the finance division of Cocobot
01:49 to make sure the issues of fertilizers, cocoa roots,
01:51 and all are brought into an ambit of discipline.
01:54 But really, is that the case?
01:57 Have these entities not had representation
02:00 on the board of Cocobot?
02:02 What is this going to change?
02:03 Or are we merely dancing to the tune of the IMF?
02:07 And in terms of discipline,
02:08 how has the finance ministry itself been disciplined?
02:12 We all know the tale of the tape,
02:13 to the point where there were people
02:14 who were receiving salaries
02:16 who were not even working at this ministry,
02:18 but were being paid salaries.
02:19 Let's go to the next slide.
02:21 Now, what government told the IMF
02:24 is what you see here.
02:25 We'll publish a turnaround strategy approved by cabinet
02:28 for Cocobot by end of June, 2023.
02:30 It will include an immediate announcement
02:32 of joint ministerial supervision of Cocobot
02:34 by the ministry of finance and the ministry of agriculture,
02:37 and we'll phase out quasi-fiscal spending of the board,
02:40 and this would require announcement of termination
02:42 of the road concession agreement
02:43 with the ministry of roads and discontinuation
02:46 or rationalization of fertilizer input subsidy programs,
02:50 including high-tech.
02:52 Next slide.
02:54 Let's get into the next slide.
02:56 Then we look at the corporate governance structure
03:00 of Cocobot.
03:02 It has a board of directors appointed
03:03 by the government and governs Cocobot,
03:06 and it is composed of government nominees
03:09 from various professions,
03:10 including a representative of the workers of Cocobot,
03:13 two representatives of the Cocoa Coffee
03:15 and Chernat Farmers Association,
03:17 Cocoa She, as we call them.
03:19 Ministerial responsibility is exercised
03:22 by the minister of food and agriculture
03:25 and a finance minister and governor of the central bank.
03:30 They have always had representation on the board.
03:34 So why paint the picture
03:37 as though something radically different were happening
03:41 and that we were now going to make these moves
03:44 to streamline everything?
03:47 You knew, but we'll get to the losses,
03:49 and then you'll realize what the tail of the tape is.
03:51 Next slide.
03:52 Now, you look at the IMF program
03:56 and the eight SOEs, state-owned enterprises,
03:58 identified as being exposed to substantial financial risk.
04:02 You look at some of those that have been giving us issues
04:04 in recent times, for example, the ECG,
04:05 we're talking about them today,
04:07 the Ghana Water Company Limited, the VRA in the mix as well.
04:10 It appears our energy sector is in quite a state.
04:14 Cocobot is there, Tor, GNPC, Ghana Gas, Bost.
04:18 I find it so worrying because many of these entities
04:21 are in our power supply chain, energy supply chain,
04:24 and they are wobbling.
04:25 And as for Boston, the rest,
04:27 we can still purchase the iPhones
04:29 at the prices we are purchasing them,
04:30 even in the state of our economy.
04:32 Next slide.
04:33 Now, then you come back to the front, okay?
04:39 And Cocobot has accumulated annual losses for many years
04:42 on the back of, this is what they told us,
04:44 high rollover cost of outsanding cocoa bills,
04:47 high purchase price to cocoa producers
04:49 compared to its operational costs
04:51 and elevated quasi fiscal operations.
04:54 That is fertilizer provision, rural roads development.
04:57 But what do we do?
04:58 Do we cut these off?
04:59 And what will be the consequences for that sector?
05:01 Next slide.
05:02 Let's look at the trajectory though,
05:05 in terms of the statement of financial performance
05:07 between 2012 and 2021, about a nine year period,
05:11 as far as Cocobot is concerned.
05:13 And the source, by the way, is the Auditor General's report
05:16 and estimates from Ghana's IMF program.
05:19 So you look at the figures in billions of CDs,
05:22 and you would see a negative trend.
05:24 In 2012, negative 0.09, 2013, negative 1.2.
05:31 And then there is some betterment in 2014.
05:35 Again, in 2015, there's a bit of a dip,
05:38 but still in the positive.
05:39 Then we slide into negatives all the way till now,
05:43 negative 0.19, negative 0.39,
05:46 all the way to 2021, negative 2.4,
05:50 one of the worst we've ever seen.
05:52 This is the performance of the institution
05:54 we're talking about.
05:55 This is their performance.
05:56 Next slide.
05:57 Then you look at the loans they have protracted
06:02 within that same period.
06:03 Now in 2012, in billions of CDs, 11 billion,
06:08 2013, 12.1, it came down a bit to 10 billion in 2014,
06:13 fell to 9.8, 7.8 billion in 2016.
06:17 And it's been on the rise ever since.
06:19 As of 2021, 19 billion CDs,
06:23 yet that institution is still bleeding dry.
06:27 Let's go to the next slide.
06:28 Then you look at phasing out the quasi-fiscal activities,
06:33 the cocoa farmers dilemma.
06:35 There's fertilizer provision, like I was mentioning.
06:37 Are you going to cut that off?
06:38 Are you going to take away the rural roads development
06:41 or the mass spraying of cocoa farms,
06:43 providing high yield seedlings to farmers,
06:45 rehabilitation of cocoa roads?
06:47 Which one are you going to cut out?
06:48 And what will be the impact?
06:49 But we only hear because of the irresponsibility
06:52 that has continued ad infinitum, like a fan belt.
06:56 These should not be touched,
06:58 but now the proposals are to touch them
07:00 because of misleadership, lack of fiscal discipline.
07:04 So the finance ministry shouldn't come
07:06 and be painting a picture
07:07 as though they were not in the know.
07:08 They were from day one.
07:10 Next slide.
07:11 Now I want us to move from the cocoa bud situation
07:15 and segue neatly into another issue
07:17 that is a grave matter of concern,
07:19 because while we've bled with cocoa bud
07:21 and a lot of our SOEs, here too, we're bleeding.
07:24 So what is the Trafigura deal all about?
07:27 Let's break it down for you.
07:28 The 26th of January, 2021, the GPGC,
07:32 a majority owned Trafigura entity,
07:35 obtained a final award in its favor
07:37 against the government of Ghana
07:38 in arbitral proceedings in England.
07:42 The award was for approximately $140 million.
07:46 Think of that, quantify it in the sense
07:49 of how much we are getting from the IMF,
07:51 even in the second tranche.
07:52 That is over one sixth of that figure.
07:55 Now it arose out of a written agreement
07:58 for the installation and operation of two power plants,
08:00 which Ghana, as the tribunal found,
08:02 had unlawfully terminated prior to the expiry
08:05 of the contractual term.
08:06 I've heard Boakye Daku speak,
08:08 listen to what he has had to say,
08:11 followed his statement and all of that.
08:13 It's interesting how we try to distance ourselves
08:15 from these, because if you're a leader
08:17 and these things happen, I don't know.
08:18 We always try to pass the buck.
08:20 Who takes responsibility?
08:22 Next slide.
08:22 But in terms of the recent developments,
08:26 even before we get to the other historical antecedents,
08:29 May 24th, 2023, Trafigura received an email
08:32 from White and Kaye stating that it expected
08:34 to receive instructions to act for Ghana
08:37 and seeking to agree on a revised timetable
08:39 in relation to its applications.
08:41 Then June, 2023, Ghana issued an application
08:44 to set aside the order.
08:45 This order was subsequently dismissed.
08:47 21st July, Ghana filed the objections it wished to raise
08:51 in relation to making the ICO's final.
08:53 And in August, Trafigura made an application
08:57 for a receivership order in relation
08:59 to Ghana's leasehold interest
09:00 in one of the London properties, Regina House,
09:03 or Regina House, whichever way you want to put it.
09:05 Next slide.
09:05 And then we go back to the historical antecedents
09:10 I spoke about, which now have left us
09:12 with this albatross around our necks.
09:15 2015, February, the GPGC entered into negotiations
09:18 with the government of Ghana for the provision
09:20 of a fast-track power generation solution.
09:22 You know what was happening at the time
09:24 and why we needed some of these.
09:26 Then the 21st of May, the VRA issued an excavation permit
09:29 to the entity for the Abwaze site.
09:32 The 3rd of June, parties executed the EPA.
09:35 Then in July, Parliament ratified the EPA.
09:38 And in April, the GPGC executed a contract
09:41 to dismantle the Vorta plant in Italy
09:43 and work to dismantle the Gorizia plant commenced.
09:48 Then we go to the next slide.
09:49 Then in 2017 and beyond, here's what happened,
09:55 which has led us here.
09:56 The VRA informed the GPGC that it had,
09:59 quote, "decided not to proceed with the leasing
10:01 of the bone land for the project."
10:03 This was where our woes began.
10:05 And then in April, news reports emerged
10:07 that the new administration was taking steps to review
10:10 and to terminate existing PPAs entered into
10:13 by the previous government.
10:14 Next slide.
10:15 So you look at the trajectory then
10:19 from the 28th of August, 2017,
10:22 the AEG's advice at the time
10:24 versus what advice was given currently.
10:28 Four PPAs with a combined capacity of 1,810 megawatts
10:31 should be deferred until 2018 to 2025.
10:34 The three PPAs with a combined capacity of that
10:36 should be deferred beyond 2025.
10:38 And the 11 PPAs with a combined capacity
10:41 of 2,808 megawatts, among them,
10:44 the GPGC EPA should be terminated.
10:46 And the project would result in costs of $115 million plus
10:51 if implemented with its attendant high tariffs.
10:55 Next slide.
10:58 Then the basis of that position
11:00 had to do with the illegality for want of capacity
11:03 to enter into a PPA,
11:05 failure to obtain siting and construction permits,
11:07 installation of used plant contrary to policy.
11:10 So they said it was used, it wasn't new.
11:11 And then failure on the part of the GPGC
11:13 to fulfill its CPs and other conditions subsequent.
11:16 Some have asked whether these were enough
11:18 to go down that road.
11:20 Next slide.
11:21 And then getting ready to wrap the conversation,
11:25 the basis for the AG's understanding of the position
11:28 were these.
11:29 If this agreement was terminated by the GPGC
11:33 due to the government of Ghana's breach of its obligations
11:36 under the agreement or the government of Ghana's default,
11:39 or the government of Ghana terminated the agreement
11:41 contrary to the provisions of the agreement,
11:44 that the government of Ghana would have to pay
11:46 an early termination fee of an amount
11:49 equal to capital recovery charges
11:51 multiplied by the amount of energy the GPGC equipment
11:54 would have produced.
11:56 And then if the GPGC equipment continued to operate
12:00 at the guaranteed capacity for the remaining term,
12:02 the early termination payment up to a maximum of 24 months
12:06 within 90 days after issuing of the termination notice
12:10 by the GPGC.
12:12 And this was how we found ourselves where we do now.
12:18 In the lurch, because the decisions,
12:22 and that is what boggles my mind sometimes,
12:25 we make these decisions and you ask yourself
12:29 the stories we've been hearing about some judgment debts
12:34 brought to bear intentionally
12:37 because someone is going to round the bend
12:39 and line his or her pocket.
12:41 Is that what is happening?
12:43 I don't know.
12:44 I'll leave it to you to read between the lines.
12:46 But we've had judgment debt upon judgment debt
12:49 from NDC to NPP and NPP back to NDC.
12:52 What is going on?
12:54 If we were to tally the number of judgment debts
12:56 we have suffered as a country and what it has cost us,
13:00 believe you me, we wouldn't need the sort of money
13:04 we're taking from the IMF, the drop in the bucket,
13:07 the paltry sums we are getting from them.
13:09 But we've come to our knees as a country
13:11 because of these misleaders.
13:14 Ganafour, if we continue on this trajectory,
13:18 there may be a point where there'll be no Ghana
13:21 because we would have incurred so much debt
13:23 that future generations will have nothing.
13:26 Let us be wise.
13:29 Let us wake up.
13:30 Let us smell the coffee that is brewing, percolating.
13:34 Because if we don't get our actions right
13:36 and we allow misleaders like we've seen with CocoBot,
13:39 like we've seen now with the hypocrisy
13:41 of the IMF transactions and what we claim
13:44 have been happening when we had oversight responsibility,
13:47 like we've seen with Trafigura,
13:48 where now we are going to lose some $140 million.
13:52 If we don't get our act together,
13:54 only God knows what will happen to us,
13:57 not even to talk of future generations' posterity.
14:00 I share my thoughts on some of these matters
14:02 because I love Ghana.
14:04 Ghana is the only home we have
14:06 and we must protect it and defend it.
14:09 I do this for God and country.
14:10 My name is Benjamin Akapu
14:12 and these are my blunt thoughts shared with you
14:13 raw, hot, unedited, undiluted.
14:18 Speak up to the misleaders and call them to order.
14:22 Thank you for watching.
14:23 (dramatic music)
14:26 (dramatic music)
14:28 (dramatic music)
14:31 (dramatic music)
14:34 (dramatic music)
14:37 (dramatic music)
14:39 (dramatic music)