MEDI1TV Afrique : Quelles perspectives politiques, sécuritaires et socioéconomiques pour l'Afrique en 2025 ? - 01/01/2025
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00:00Good evening, ladies and gentlemen, first of all, on behalf of all the teams of Mediain TV,
00:17we wish you all a happy new year, Inshallah.
00:21For this first episode of 1025 Questions of Action,
00:26what are the political, security and socio-economic prospects for the African continent for the upcoming year?
00:33Concerning the economic prospects of sub-Saharan Africa,
00:35the IMF predicts a growth that should go from 3.8% in 2024 to 4% in 2025.
00:43There is therefore this dynamic landscape with opportunities for growth and development,
00:48but also political and security challenges that persist.
00:53For the latter, West Africa and the Sahel remain prey to terrorist groups such as Boko Haram,
00:58Al-Qaeda and factions linked to the Islamic State,
01:00which continue to threaten stability, in particular in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso.
01:06The Al-Shabaab group in East Africa remains active in Somalia and Kenya,
01:12while the Ethiopian Tigray region is barely recovering from its recent conflict.
01:17Concerning the regional hot spots,
01:19still in Sudan, the ongoing war between the military factions continues to generate a humanitarian crisis
01:24without a clear resolution in sight.
01:26In any case, for the moment, we will see what 2025 will hide with our experts tonight.
01:32And in the Great Lakes region, the persistent instability of the Democratic Republic of Congo
01:36is exacerbated by armed groups in the eastern provinces.
01:39In Mozambique, Cabo Delgado remains unstable despite the increased efforts to stabilize the region.
01:44And this election year has no good omen for the stability of this country.
01:49Let's not forget our region of the Maghreb.
01:52To finish, Libya remains fragmented, while Tunisia is facing economic and above all political challenges
01:59with the second mandate of President Kays Seyed.
02:02And for the neighbour of the East, the country is more isolated than ever
02:09with epidermal reactions from Algeria's diplomacy in 2024
02:12and those against the neighbour of the North or its southern borders.
02:18So, under what auspices does 2025 for our African continent present itself?
02:23Tonight, in the company of my guests, I will start with Professor Mohamed Chkoundi,
02:28teacher, researcher, specialist in governance and development in Africa,
02:31at the Mohamed V University in Rabat.
02:33Professor Chkoundi, good evening and happy new year to you.
02:35Good evening, happy new year to you too.
02:37Thank you very much.
02:39It is a pleasure to welcome you again in 2024, 2025 and well before that,
02:43on the set of Questions d'Actu.
02:45This is our international relations expert, Professor Zakari Abouda.
02:51Let's introduce him, Professor Sana Saeeda.
02:53Thank you, Khadija. Thank you very much.
02:55Best wishes. This is Chkoundi. Best wishes, God willing.
02:58All that you wish for is good.
03:00God willing, then.
03:01All that we wish for, above all, is good for our continent.
03:05For the beginning of the year, what are the prospects for the Maghreb?
03:09We will start, perhaps, with the inter-Libyan dialogue.
03:11First, an overview of this year that begins for the Maghreb.
03:17Yes, I have the impression that we are reliving the 1980s,
03:21but in a different way.
03:22This is what we called the Axis policy.
03:26You know, at one point, there was what we call the Jarba Accords,
03:31between Tunisia and Algeria at the time.
03:34Morocco had concluded the Arab-African Accord with Libya,
03:38it was in this seat, 1984,
03:40whereas Mauritania was a bit torn between the North and the South
03:44and was also looking to see if there were any possibilities
03:46of projecting itself at the level of the Mediterranean.
03:48And this is extremely important.
03:50This was realized by its adhesion to the Arab Maghreb Union,
03:54which was established on February 17, 1989.
03:57Today, we have seen, for a few years now,
03:59unfortunate attempts to fragment this space,
04:05contrary to the objectives and the wishes,
04:07although even today, unfortunately,
04:10they are sent back to the Greek calendar,
04:12of fragmentation.
04:13Algeria, Tunisia, of course, we will say,
04:16we will probably come back to the conjunctural allies,
04:20but also with Libya,
04:22which is trying to adapt to regional dynamics,
04:25but at the same time, it has not yet, in my opinion,
04:27found its strategic path and the strategic cap,
04:30let's say, the compass.
04:31It is losing its compass.
04:32Whereas Mauritania, I believe,
04:34we must salute the wisdom of its leaders,
04:36since they understood, let's say,
04:39these vain attempts to divide in order to reign better
04:43and to be afraid, let's say,
04:45of ways to once again de-root
04:47the South Sub-Saharan depth of Morocco.
04:51That said, there are still instabilities,
04:54but there are also potential fears.
04:57A Libya that is not yet stable.
04:59For the moment, we will come back to that.
05:00So, precisely, do you think that,
05:02according to the elements of 2024,
05:05would we be heading towards a reunification of Libya in 2025?
05:10What can, in the end, the inter-Libyan dialogue bring
05:13in a crisis that will have lasted 14 years?
05:17Absolutely.
05:18The fear is the following.
05:19It is that the country is at least divided into three parts,
05:22with the Cyrenaic, with also, I think, Fizna,
05:26or rather Fizan, and the other region of the Tripolitane.
05:30This is the first clue.
05:31And so, there is a fragmentation that is pronounced.
05:33Two, the external interference is still there,
05:37and alas, the country is not yet out of this external influence.
05:42The third clue is recent,
05:44because Morocco has worked in its long-term strategy
05:48through a certain mediation,
05:50although Morocco officially says
05:52that it is rather a facilitator of the dialogue
05:56between the Libyans themselves.
05:59The communiqué of, so to speak,
06:01the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
06:03which is part of the High Council of State,
06:05and at the same time,
06:06the parties that have contributed to this recent dialogue,
06:09which means that the clues, unfortunately, on the ground,
06:12indicate that, for example, the legislative elections
06:15that must prepare the ground
06:17to nominate a president of the state,
06:20will not be for tomorrow.
06:22So, I fear that the year 2025
06:24will not be a year when this appointment will be exhausted.
06:28What do you think of mediation?
06:29You talked about foreign interference.
06:31There is also a mediation,
06:32and here we are faced with a mediation, first of all, neutral,
06:35and without any interference.
06:37It is just the preparation of a platform for dialogue,
06:42of the role of Morocco in 2025.
06:44Do you think we are heading
06:46towards the continuity of this mediation,
06:48Morocco's mediation, which is very particular
06:50and which remains unique in its kind,
06:52in terms of the political crisis in Libya?
06:57I strongly believe so, for several reasons.
06:59Which ones?
06:59I will cite one, for example,
07:01by meeting with Libyans
07:03within the SESAD,
07:04the community of the Sahel-Ossarian states,
07:06and that Morocco necessarily has projections
07:08to give, at the request of His Majesty,
07:10an extended seat on the territorial level.
07:13And I am talking here about the initiative on the disengagement,
07:15since, by extension,
07:16Libya is also a Sahelian country,
07:18it must be said, or Saharo-Sahelian.
07:21The other indication, which I perceived
07:23as a positive indication,
07:25was that the Department of Foreign Affairs of Libya
07:29considered Morocco as a brother country,
07:32even though it had some criticisms to address to the other party.
07:35This means that Moroccan mediation,
07:37neutrality,
07:39but also the Moroccan assembly,
07:42that is, it offers opportunities
07:45for the Libyan parties.
07:47There is no mercantile interest,
07:50or an interest, let's say,
07:54calculated.
07:55The essential thing for Morocco
07:57is to save Libya today,
07:59but at the same time,
08:00there still remains, with this perspective,
08:02to restart a Maghreb integration,
08:05or how much today, of course.
08:07Speaking of Maghreb integration,
08:09there are two allies,
08:10and I will take up your term
08:13that you used a few moments ago,
08:16you spoke of a conjunctural alliance,
08:18or conjunctural allies, to be exact.
08:21Conjunctural allies of absolute power,
08:23when I say absolute power,
08:25either in the hands of the Presidency,
08:27or of the Presidency,
08:29or of a people hiding behind a Presidency.
08:32Is it this conjuncture
08:34that unites Tunisia with Algeria, for example?
08:38I conceive things like this,
08:40truly, because, first of all,
08:42Mr. Kayseri was not at all
08:44known before his election by default,
08:47I stress this, it was in 2019,
08:49because there were no real opponents,
08:51who were already in prison.
08:54Mr. Tebboune himself
08:55came to power by default,
08:57in the absence, precisely, of Mr. Bouteflika,
09:00who was forced to resign
09:02after the events of February 2019,
09:05so he found himself in the same situation.
09:07And each with a particular political agenda.
09:10Why do I say conjunctural?
09:12Because this so-called rapprochement,
09:15so I even avoid alliance,
09:16is not based on logical,
09:19sociological and profound considerations,
09:21of the populations of both sides.
09:23Were they consulted on, for example,
09:25the declaration of Carthage,
09:27which dates from December 2022,
09:28and which had constituted the prelude
09:30for so-called Maghreb,
09:33carved on the map,
09:33without Morocco and without Mauritania?
09:35I said it earlier,
09:36he understood the game,
09:38he preferred neutrality,
09:39and here is Mauritania,
09:42its president and his majesty
09:44meet in the United Arab Emirates
09:46to once again push the train
09:48of integration and cooperation
09:50from south to south.
09:50This is the most important.
09:52And the conjunctural in the sense
09:53where the question of legitimacy
09:55arises today
09:57in relation to the two leaders.
09:59We do not have...
10:00When we talk about legitimacy,
10:01a little reminder for the events of 2024,
10:04the two countries have held presidential elections,
10:06whose result was known in advance,
10:09but which also have another point in common.
10:11Yes, there are many points in common.
10:12In any case, when it comes to democracy
10:14in these two countries,
10:15Tunisia and Algeria,
10:16it is the abstention rate.
10:18And it was a plebiscite,
10:20in reality.
10:20That is to say, we knew from the start,
10:22when we put in prison,
10:23when we dissolve the parliament,
10:25when we put in prison all the opponents,
10:28including those who played a very positive role
10:31in the change that Tunisia has experienced
10:33in the context of what we call
10:35the Jasmine Revolution
10:36from 2011, etc.
10:38Truly, what is to be regretted
10:41is that all the achievements of this happy change,
10:44at some point, Tunisia was given as an example
10:46of a democratization in the course of a transition.
10:49Today, all this has been sanded,
10:51has been completely sanded.
10:52Algeria, the big question today,
10:54there is the hand of oil and gas today,
10:56but in 10 years, in 15 years,
10:58today, we will have to make projections
10:59what Algeria would be like
11:00in the face of the inflation of this resource.
11:03Did we prepare the conditions for the relief?
11:05Internal.
11:06There, for the internal affairs of the country,
11:10there are really questions to be asked
11:12about the viability of this system.
11:16When we organize attempts,
11:19Mrs. Khadija, to remove opponents abroad
11:23without citing their names,
11:24when we see the incarceration of a Goncourt,
11:27who is 75 years old,
11:29and his only misfortune, simply because
11:31he dared to tell the truth
11:32about the Moroccan Sahara, etc.
11:34You are talking about history with a capital H.
11:36So there, indeed,
11:38there are many questions to be asked
11:39about the future of these regimes.
11:41I am talking about well-intentioned political regimes.
11:42The other challenges are also of an external or foreign origin.
11:49Algeria, in 2025, Professor Choukandi,
11:52more than ever, in the face of these choices
11:54of a foreign policy,
11:56I do not find it qualifying.
12:00But the least we can say
12:03is that there is a lack of reflection and wisdom.
12:07You know, the scenario of Algeria
12:11resembles, with a few exceptions,
12:13that of South Africa.
12:15That is, it is the finitude,
12:17the end of a single party.
12:19The end of a party that has presided
12:21over the destinies of countries
12:22since independence, in a way.
12:24That is, it is the abolition of this historical shame
12:27which has always been used
12:29as a source of legitimacy for the powers in power.
12:32That is, compared to Algeria,
12:33we have always governed with this source of legitimacy
12:36as we have played a very important role
12:38in the liberation of countries,
12:40while the country, after its independence,
12:42has had enormous opportunities
12:44so that it can first develop,
12:46so that it can convert the divine blessing
12:50embodied in oil and gas
12:53into development, in a way.
12:55Something it has not done.
12:56And so, now, in addition to what Professor Zakaria Abou-Dahab said,
13:01Algeria, in the midst of an expansion period
13:04of everything that is fossil energy,
13:06a source of fossil energy,
13:07namely oil and gas,
13:09Algeria gives the impression
13:11that it has less and less partners.
13:13It has less and less support abroad
13:15and it has less and less support inside.
13:18That is, there is a loss of confidence
13:20at the internal level
13:21and a loss of confidence at the external level,
13:23in a way.
13:24So the country has no choice
13:26but to reorient, rectify the shot.
13:28Rectify the shot,
13:29that is, to hear reasons.
13:31To hear reasons,
13:32that is to say, to review its internal policy,
13:35its internal policy,
13:36that is to say, to review the governance mode.
13:40Is this decision of the President
13:45to release the prisoners
13:46just before the end of the year,
13:48by the way, 2024,
13:50a signal to announce
13:53perhaps a radical change?
13:55Yes, sir.
13:56Or was it just a palliative care?
13:59Because the situation
14:00was really starting to boil
14:03because of this hashtag
14:05which became very, very abundant,
14:08which rose in the trend.
14:11Yes, there are concerns at the internal level
14:13that the situation is exploding.
14:14Because, as I just said,
14:16there is an erosion of this confidence capital,
14:18in a way.
14:19The Algerians, they waited too long,
14:22they listened to this regime too much,
14:24they were much more puzzled
14:26at the internal level,
14:27at the level of internal prosperity,
14:29at the level of the diversification
14:31of the economic structure,
14:32at the level of human development,
14:34at the level of the improvement
14:35of the quality of the educational system.
14:36And there was nothing, in a way.
14:38From abroad, it's the same.
14:39We see, that is to say,
14:40there are countries that, in principle,
14:42they are in a phase of reconfiguration
14:46of their cards,
14:47let's say, of their partners' cartography
14:49concerning the sources of energy supply.
14:52Most countries, they think less and less
14:54about Algeria because they consider it,
14:55it's not because we have it
14:57after Algeria or whatever,
14:58they don't consider it as a reliable partner.
15:01That is to say, as you said earlier,
15:04they think and perceive Algeria
15:06as a lunatic partner,
15:08with a lunatic behavior.
15:09It can change behavior
15:11overnight.
15:12It can make a decision today
15:14and another decision tomorrow.
15:15So there is no stability
15:17in terms of supply sources.
15:18And so, suddenly, Algeria has no choice
15:20but to completely review
15:22first its mode of internal governance
15:24to reassure the population
15:25and avoid overflow
15:27and at the external level, of course,
15:29to completely review,
15:30like what the countries of
15:32South Africa are doing.
15:33Most of the countries of South Africa,
15:34including South Africa,
15:36the Zimbabweans are completely reviewing
15:38their foreign policy.
15:39That is to say, they have felt
15:41this wind of change
15:42that is blowing over
15:44the whole of Africa.
15:45So the wind of change
15:46has blown over the Sahel
15:48last year, Professor Shukondi.
15:51Today, we are heading
15:53towards a reorganization
15:56of West Africa,
15:58with the exit of these countries
16:00from the Sahel,
16:01from the economic community
16:03of the states of West Africa,
16:05towards a regional confederation.
16:08What is the impact
16:09on the regional reconfiguration
16:13of our continent in 2025?
16:14So we already see
16:16the consequences, sometimes,
16:19of the fact that we can't
16:21resolve certain crises in time,
16:23like, for example, the security crisis.
16:25The fact that several countries
16:27of Africa, of the Sahel,
16:31have not been able to resolve
16:33the security problem,
16:34it has generated state codes
16:36as a mechanism of change,
16:37of course.
16:38Since the state codes,
16:39there have been tensions
16:40between a regional economic community
16:43that has its history,
16:44that has made its time,
16:45that has traveled a long way
16:47in terms of integration processes.
16:48We know that the African Union
16:50needs regional economic communities
16:52to be able to implement
16:54the elements related to the
16:56Agenda 2063 of the African Union.
16:58But at the same time,
16:59these countries,
17:00when we see the demands
17:01of these three countries
17:02that have formed the alliance
17:03of the states of the Sahel
17:04and then the confederation,
17:06the transition from the alliance
17:07to the confederation,
17:08is symptomatic.
17:09That is, they are dealing
17:10with the will of these countries
17:12to go much further
17:13in the integration process.
17:14Because the alliance is,
17:16we are working together
17:17to collectively raise
17:18the security defects,
17:19the confederation,
17:20that is, we go beyond
17:21the security defects response.
17:22And so,
17:23there are huge geopolitical reconfigurations
17:24at the level of West Africa.
17:25Now,
17:26there are questions that arise.
17:27There are questions that arise
17:28because when we see
17:29the countries of Africa,
17:30of the Sahel,
17:31they have also made their way
17:32in terms of security integration.
17:33They have also made their way
17:34in terms of the relationship
17:35of the state
17:36to natural resources.
17:37We see that the three countries
17:38in question
17:39are the Sahel,
17:40the Sahel,
17:41the Sahel,
17:42the Sahel,
17:43the Sahel,
17:44the Sahel,
17:45the Sahel,
17:46the Sahel,
17:47the Sahel,
17:48the Sahel,
17:49the Sahel,
17:50the Sahel,
17:51the Sahel,
17:52the Sahel,
17:53the Sahel,
17:54the Sahel,
17:55the Sahel,
17:56the Sahel,
17:57the Sahel,
17:58the Sahel,
17:59the Sahel,
18:00the Sahel,
18:01the Sahel.
18:04The three countries in question,
18:05Nigeria,
18:06Burkina Faso,
18:07and Mali,
18:08have reviewed their mining code.
18:09That means
18:10that there is not just
18:11an attempt
18:12to reappropriate
18:13the security process,
18:14there is also
18:15to take external help and to no longer undergo international conditions.
18:20Now, what interests us here, the question that arises, is to know the nature,
18:24we are at the beginning of 2025, the questions that arise, that is, the relationship.
18:30First, the relationship between the CEDEAO and the countries of the United States.
18:36Because the CEDEAO, the three countries in question, belonging to the United States,
18:42they participated in this evolution of this integration process,
18:46there was free movement of people, and we see Mali, Nigeria,
18:50Nigeria shares the same borders, and we are the same for Mali.
18:54That is, there is a common destiny, in a way,
18:57if only in relation to these people who cross these borders without hindrance, daily.
19:03So what would the situation look like?
19:06Because certainly there are tensions between the CEDEAO and the countries of the United States,
19:11so maybe there will be restrictions.
19:13These restrictions are costly in terms of economic growth, in terms of economic activity.
19:18Isn't that going to, in the end, or the answer to that would be, among other things,
19:25this process of Atlantic Africa, which opens new horizons, concretely, to these countries,
19:32first to have a certain independence, sovereignty over their mining mines,
19:38and direct outputs to Western markets,
19:42and for once, the road is open to the direct export of their mining resources.
19:49You are absolutely right, because the Atlantic process works as a reparative mechanism,
19:54and as a conciliatory mechanism, and as an integrationist mechanism, in a way.
19:59It is like the process of the African countries arriving in the Atlantic,
20:02it can operate as a trans-regional community,
20:05that is to say, a new African regional economic community, we can call it that,
20:09which transcends the CEDEAO, which transcends the United States,
20:13and which ensures that the USA and the CEDEAO no longer remain in the current geopolitical tensions,
20:19geopolitical tensions that can be extremely costly for them,
20:23but they will be obliged to cooperate in the context of what I call this trajectory of decoupling.
20:30A trajectory of decoupling, because the process of African mines in the Atlantic
20:34does not create a vertical trajectory.
20:37The dreaming countries of the Atlantic cooperate with each other in their ability to meet common challenges,
20:42such as security challenges, piracy, kidnapping, compared to Nigeria.
20:47The ability also to set up a collective intelligence to transform resources,
20:53because Africa needs the transformation of resources to be able to meet all the challenges,
20:57and horizontal, because the dynamic leads the countries of the Sahel.
21:03It does not leave them in abundance, it does not let them deliver themselves,
21:07it leads them, and so it ensures that they can benefit from what I also call this economy of mutualization.
21:13That is to say, there is an African country that sets up infrastructures,
21:17and there is another African country that has the right to benefit from these infrastructures.
21:21We are in a process of mutualization, and as I told you last time,
21:24the process of mutualization is even able to allow these countries,
21:28the countries of the Sahel and the African countries of the Atlantic,
21:33to raise funds collectively, in a way.
21:36Especially in a moment, we are in a historical moment,
21:38marked by the economic fragmentation,
21:41the powers that cannot come to an agreement,
21:43the financing that is drying up more and more.
21:47Yes, there are risks too.
21:48It is very difficult to risk raising funds and financing needs
21:53when insecurity weighs on the continent.
21:56I would like to finish this program on the perspective of 2025.
22:00Today, it is Africa facing terrorism.
22:02Terrorism still prevails in Africa,
22:05and it is the continent that suffers the most terrorist attacks in the world.
22:10And today, what we are saying,
22:12a few years ago we were also discussing the phenomenon,
22:15but I have the impression that the metastasis is there,
22:18and that countries that were perhaps safe from terrorism,
22:27today are suffering the violent attacks of violent extremism.
22:32Quite simply because the causes of terrorism,
22:35despite a few shy advances, have not been dealt with.
22:39So when we deal with a crisis in an evidential way,
22:43it comes back again.
22:45We have to deal with the crisis in a structural way.
22:47What are the main sources of terrorism?
22:49We now have everything that is vulnerability.
22:51First, there is institutional vulnerability,
22:53when a state is unable to establish its authority over the entire territory.
22:58Mozambique, for example.
22:59For example.
23:00Cabo Delgado.
23:01Among others, yes.
23:02Among others.
23:03The second reason is in relation to everything that is social fragility.
23:05I can say a word about Mozambique quickly.
23:07Everything that is social fragility.
23:08The third reason, we are in a geopolitical context,
23:11a new context from a geopolitical point of view.
23:14We are heading towards an ecological transition.
23:17What does an ecological transition require?
23:20It requires the extraction of all that is strategic mining.
23:23Strategic mining, if we make a diagnosis of strategic mining,
23:27they are very concentrated in the hands of a handful of countries,
23:30like China, 80%.
23:32The rest is Africa.
23:33So when we look at the European Union,
23:35it does not have a lot of strategic mining.
23:37So that means that there is an intensification of rivalries between powers in Africa.
23:41Just these elements, these geopolitical mutations,
23:44they can intensify this insecurity in a way.
23:47Hence the importance for Africa to improve its resilience.
23:50The improvement of African resilience lies in what?
23:53It lies in the creation of stabilizing resources.
23:56What are stabilizing resources?
23:57It is to further strengthen Afro-African integration.
24:01In relation to Mozambique,
24:02Mozambique is a country that is currently crystallizing three crises,
24:06or even more.
24:07There is the terrorism crisis at Cabo Delgado,
24:10if I may say so, in the north.
24:11This crisis has just been adjusted to a natural disaster.
24:15The natural disaster in the north as well.
24:18And the north is extremely rich in energy resources,
24:23gas, and strategic mining, graphite and so on.
24:2730% of the world's graphite reserves are in Mozambique.
24:30And at the same time, the third crisis, the political crisis.
24:34Because in South Africa, as I told you earlier,
24:36we are witnessing the end of a single party.
24:38Younger populations are contesting the single parties.
24:41This was the case in South Africa.
24:43The contestation of the ANC, which for the first time in its history,
24:47did not have an absolute majority.
24:49This was the case in Namibia.
24:51For the first time, the SWAPO only had 53% in the presidential elections.
24:56And for the first time in Mozambique,
24:58we are witnessing a huge drop in the popularity rate.
25:03There are even the results of the elections that are contested.
25:06So, for the young people who go down to the streets,
25:09it is not Freiremo who won.
25:11It is Podemos, the opposition party.
25:13And so, this opens up another crisis.
25:15And Mozambique has a very important role,
25:17we must not forget it, as a corridor for Zambia,
25:20for Zimbabwe, for South Africa,
25:22at the level of the eastern part of South Africa,
25:25at the level of Gauteng and Mopalanga.
25:27So, it is a systemic and multidimensional crisis.
25:30Well...
25:33Yes, 2025 does not present itself under the best auspices for Africa,
25:37but a final word,
25:39and I count on your legendary optimism,
25:42Professor Boudahem,
25:44on this year that begins.
25:46In my opinion, it is true,
25:48there is a complexity,
25:50like a cavern to man,
25:52at some point, we are a little lost,
25:54but there are still some islands of stability,
25:58and countries coming out of the water.
26:00I take as an example Rwanda, for example.
26:02We can ask ourselves questions.
26:04It is part of South Africa.
26:05Nigeria too.
26:06Absolutely.
26:07Nigeria, with all the reforms that have been undertaken,
26:09and of which the whole region depends.
26:11And we are African.
26:12Morocco, we are also one.
26:14Nevertheless, it is true that there are Africans,
26:16there is no need for Africans.
26:17But the question of surrendering, it is relevant.
26:19The question of governance,
26:20since one of the prejudiced questions,
26:22it is important at the level of Rwanda.
26:24I think there is a certain...
26:25Kagame, it is true,
26:26but it has blemished the country.
26:27It must be said,
26:28the Rwandans themselves,
26:29who have testified on quite a few occasions,
26:32effectively today,
26:33the quality of the services provided,
26:34the administration.
26:35Education.
26:36So there are prerequisites.
26:37There is the wish, it must be said,
26:38and in particular,
26:39I address myself in relation to the EU,
26:41which has become a confederation.
26:42With these perspectives,
26:44there are a lot of challenges,
26:45but I believe that the will is there,
26:47so let's hope that 2025
26:49will probably also be a year of take-off
26:51for quite a few countries,
26:53including the states of Sahel.
26:55Thank you very much.
26:56You're welcome.
26:57Thank you, Mr. Boutarab.
26:58Thank you to you as well, Mr. Shkondi.
26:59It is always a pleasure to welcome you.
27:00This is the end of this first episode of Questions d'Actu.
27:04Thank you for your loyalty to the show.
27:06Have a very good evening,
27:07and once again,
27:08have a very good year to all of you.