"On the 27th of March, 1977, one of the worst disasters in aviation history took place at Los Rodeos airport in Tenerife..."
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LearningTranscript
00:00On the 27th of March, 1977, one of the worst disasters in aviation history took place at
00:19Los Rodeos Airport in Tenerife. The collision of two fully loaded Boeing 747 airplanes on
00:26a runway was an unprecedented and horrifying incident... an incident which, ultimately,
00:32was traced back to just a few momentary misunderstandings and communication failures.
00:41The day of the crash was a busy one for Los Rodeos Airport. This tiny island airport consisted
00:48of only a single runway, with one taxiway alongside it. It normally saw relatively little
00:55traffic and certainly very few large airliners. However, on the 27th of March, 1977, Los Rodeos
01:04was inundated with flights as multiple planes were diverted from the nearby Gando Airport
01:10on Gran Canaria, which had closed due to a small bomb exploding inside a flower shop
01:16in the terminal. Among those diverted flights was KLM flight 4805 from Amsterdam, and Pan American
01:25flight 1736 from Los Angeles. Both were bound for Gran Canaria, but were forced to divert
01:33and land at Los Rodeos instead. These were just two of many planes which had been diverted
01:39to the tiny airport in Tenerife. In fact, the taxiway was so full of parked aircraft
01:46that there was no space for planes to actually taxi along it. Instead any aircraft that wished
01:52to take off had to use the runway itself to taxi into position, further complicating operations
01:58for a tower crew who weren't used to dealing with so many flights. On top of that it was
02:05a Sunday, and just two people were on duty in the tower at the time. They were reliant mainly
02:11on sight and radio communication as the airport had no ground radar, and, worse still, as the
02:19day went on a thick fog descended on the area reducing visibility to near zero. The controllers
02:26in the tower couldn't see the planes they were directing, and the pilots in the planes could
02:31barely see the runway or signage on the ground. All of this only increased the delay suffered by
02:38each of the diverted flights. For the passengers of those diverted flights the wait was an interminable
02:44one. There was no way to know how long they would be held there in a cramped airport with limited
02:50facilities. In fact there was so little space inside the terminal that passengers on board
02:56Pan American Flight 1736 were forced to wait on board the aircraft in sweltering heat. Rather
03:04than wait and see what happened one passenger from the KLM flight decided they'd had enough.
03:10Robina van Lanshout actually lived on Tenerife. The diversion had worked out well for her. Rather
03:16than waiting and reboarding she simply went home from the airport, not knowing as she did so that
03:22this decision would save her life. For the other passengers, mainly holidaymakers who did not live
03:29on Tenerife, the only option was to wait... and wait they did until around 5pm when their destination
03:37airport was declared safe and reopened. Quickly the waiting passengers reboarded and flight crews
03:44made ready to depart. As the logjam of planes at Los Rodeos began to clear the KLM plane was
03:50directed to get into position at the end of the runway ready for takeoff. At the same time the
03:56Pan American flight was instructed to taxi down the runway and leave at the third exit. This was
04:03to prove easier said than done, however. Navigating an unfamiliar airport in a thick fog the Pan
04:10American pilots missed the third exit and crawled onwards at a snail's pace towards the fourth.
04:17At this point the two Boeing 747s were essentially facing one another on the same stretch of runway.
04:25The KLM was at the far end ready for takeoff. The Pan American was taxiing slowly towards it
04:31in search of an exit. The only thing between the two aircraft was a thick bank of fog.
04:38Staring out into that fog from the flight deck of the KLM plane was Captain Jakob Veldhausen
04:44van Zanten. Knowing that he and his crew were getting close to KLM's limit on continuous working
04:50hours Captain Veldhausen van Zanten was extremely keen to get moving... so keen, in fact, that he
04:57actually disengaged the brakes and started to roll the plane forward without waiting for authorization
05:03from the tower. His first officer at this point jumped in to remind him that they didn't have
05:09clearance to take off, prompting Veldhausen van Zanten to bring the plane to a reluctant halt.
05:15No, I know that, he said. Go ahead, ask. The first officer got in touch with the tower controllers
05:22who responded with a description of the route the flight was to take once it was off the ground.
05:28Crucially, this did not include permission to take off. It was merely the tower clarifying
05:35where the KLM flight would go once it was in the air. The first officer read back this guidance,
05:42ending with the words, we are now at takeoff. The tower responded, okay, stand by for takeoff.
05:50I will call you. At the exact same moment the Pan American flight, still taxiing down the runway,
05:57chimed in to remind everyone that they were still on the runway. The two radio calls conflicted,
06:03resulting in a burst of static that obscured all but one word. The only thing that the crew of the
06:09KLM plane heard was the word okay, something which Captain Veldhausen van Zanten took to be permission
06:17to begin takeoff. We're going, he announced as he started the aircraft down the runway.
06:24Even as the KLM began to roll there was doubt in the cockpit. The flight engineer questioned
06:30Captain Veldhausen van Zanten. Is he not clear, that Pan American? he asked, a question to which
06:36Captain Veldhausen van Zanten simply replied, oh yes, and continued with the takeoff.
06:43If there were further reservations on the part of the other crew nobody gave voice to them.
06:49Captain Veldhausen van Zanten was a senior pilot with more than 10,000 hours of experience.
06:56Nobody else on board challenged his authority as the KLM plane gathered speed. The Pan American
07:04pilots saw the KLM bearing down on them through the fog just moments before impact. They had time
07:10to begin turning but could not avert a collision altogether. For his part Captain Veldhausen van
07:17Zanten did attempt an early takeoff, perhaps hoping to just barely pass over the top of the
07:23Pan American aircraft. The move was unsuccessful. The KLM flight smashed through the Pan American
07:30plane and then crashed into the runway itself, exploding in a massive fireball. The Pan American
07:37flight also burned intensely, but 61 people from that flight were able to survive and evacuate,
07:44many having to jump to the ground from the aircraft's wing, some of them enduring horrific
07:49injuries in the process. In this incident survivors were in the minority. 583 people were
07:58killed, including every single person on board the KLM flight. The fires on the runway were so intense
08:06that they simply could not be controlled for hours after the collision.
08:13Multiple investigations were launched in the aftermath of the disaster.
08:17All agreed that human error had played a significant part. Captain Veldhausen van Zanten's
08:24impatience had combined with a reluctance on the part of his fellow crew members to challenge
08:29someone so senior, so experienced, and so high profile within the company. Added to this were
08:35the simple radio miscommunications that had taken place. With all this in mind KLM accepted
08:42responsibility for the disaster and paid compensation to the families of the victims.
08:48One of the most significant changes to result from the accident was the standardization of
08:53language used in radio communications. No longer would pilots be able to rely on colloquial phrases
09:00like OK. Instead they would have clear protocol for communication, including always reading back
09:07the instructions that they were given to make sure they had been heard correctly, and never
09:11using the word takeoff unless clearance for takeoff was being given. The hierarchy within
09:17the cockpit of a plane was also addressed. Now the airline industry fosters an atmosphere of
09:23cooperation and mutual decision making. Pilots are not just able but encouraged to challenge
09:29their superiors when they think something is wrong, and those superiors are required to
09:35actually listen to their crew and answer any concerns they have.
09:40In the years which followed the disaster several memorials were put in place around the world.
09:46The disaster affected many thousands of people. Whole families had been lost,
09:51friends torn apart, and peaceful lives transformed in a matter of moments... and
09:56none of it would have happened at all were it not for a few seconds of impatience,
10:01a single muddled radio call. At least as a legacy of such great loss there are now rigorous
10:08guidelines governing all air traffic control communication, designed to ensure that never
10:14again can such a small misunderstanding cause such massive devastation.
10:30you