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00:00We can now bring in Patrick Burry, Senior Lecturer in Security at the University of Bath and former
00:05British Army Captain and NATO Analyst. Good afternoon. Thank you very much for joining us
00:10on the program today. Just yesterday, the US President Joe Biden was asked about a Ukrainian
00:15request to lift restrictions on long range weaponry. Biden responded, I made it clear what
00:21we prefer, what we would support and what we don't. What do you think, in your opinion, would
00:26be permissible for Washington? Good afternoon. I think if it's going to stay the same and the
00:32reason that that permission to use Western weapons essentially on Russian airbases inside Russia,
00:39the reason that hasn't been granted, I would be very surprised if it is.
00:43I personally can see the reasons why Russia have found a sweet spot, a strategic sweet spot where
00:49they can use their air forces at a standoff distance and use cheap glide bombs, which are,
00:55you know, it doesn't make sense to be intercepting them with a very expensive Patriot missiles, etc.
01:01to bombard and destroy Ukrainian energy infrastructure, water infrastructure,
01:05and even the front lines, too, because they've got dynamic targeting. So they found this spot.
01:11And of course, Ukraine, as we all know, are asking, you've got to let us shoot the archer,
01:16not the arrow. So hit the airbases. But Ukraine can't do that on its own at the moment.
01:22It doesn't have those weapons systems. And so they're reliant on the West and the UK,
01:28the US, France to give them clearance to strike Russian airbases inside Russia with Western
01:35weapons. And the problem here is that there is no precedent for this between two nuclear powered
01:42forces fighting what has become a proxy war. There's no precedent. And that's why I think
01:49the US better minds and myself with better intelligence have come to the conclusion that
01:54this is too risky. It's too risky because we have in the past over two years seen those repeated
02:02red lines being crossed by NATO allies. You're saying this is this is not going to happen.
02:09That's my hunch. I think I think given the reticence that that the US has shown here
02:17about granting this, it would have been granted if it happens. I could be wrong.
02:21But I think the other red lines, listen, Russia, and this is what plays into a lot of analysis,
02:26people saying, oh, well, you know, Russia said this, and it was a red line. And they have done
02:30a great job of using the nuclear threat as to scare off in particular, you know,
02:36well, certain European nations to scare them off over certain things. And the aid that has gone in
02:41to into Ukraine is from the West has been salami sliced too little too late. And it's had horrific
02:47consequences for the Ukrainians. You know, a lot of that could have gone in much sooner.
02:52There is a rules of the game here. It's happened in larger conflicts previously between two
02:57nuclear arm stations. And that is if one power invades another ally with its full conventional
03:04forces, that ally can respond with full conventional force inside that country.
03:08So that could have been the rule of the game back in when the invasion happens,
03:12that basically Ukraine could have been given everything it needed immediately to stop Russia
03:18inside Russia. But when it escalates onto a nuclear power sovereign territory,
03:24that is what nuclear deterrence is actually for. It's about protecting your sovereign territory.
03:29So that's why I think the calculation in the US is this would actually be quite risky.
03:34Secondly, if you look that actually there's been increases, been a reported sabotage
03:39operation on a Norwegian airbase, threats of sabotage, etc., against German air force bases,
03:45too. This is Russia bringing out its deterrence now and saying, in my view, anyway, look,
03:50we're serious about this. This will happen. You need to read the signals.
03:54Because I want to ask you about the Kursk incursion, which started just
03:57in August, not so long ago. But in that same month, Russia has advanced some 477 square kilometres
04:05into Ukrainian territory. This is Moscow's biggest increase. This is, of course,
04:10according to data supplied by the Institute for the Study of War. So has this bet
04:18on this Kursk incursion been too risky for Vladimir Zelensky?
04:23It's a really good question. When it first happened, people are watching it very closely,
04:27said, what are they doing? This is too risky. You're putting in crack units,
04:30which are needed in defence, essentially, and as a reserve into Kursk. And then given the amount
04:37of time it took the Russians to move forces around, I thought actually the Ukrainian bet had
04:42been a pretty good one. But I think the central tenet of this bet was that it would draw forces
04:49from what you're talking about, the Pokrovsk-Chasov Yar axis, which is where they're really advancing
04:55now. And it would draw forces off. And of course, what Putin has calculated is, is I am not taking
05:01forces away from my main effort. So he stripped forces out of other parts of the line. Yes,
05:06the Ukrainians were right about that assessment, the Russians are stretched, but he stripped forces
05:11from other parts of the line to deal with this, which is essentially just captured a few villages
05:15in Kursk. Whereas the real risk now, unfortunately, is Pokrovsk is a major logistical hub
05:22for them, like half of the front, essentially, down there. So that's the worry. He's managed to
05:28be able to not strip forces off the Pokrovsk axis. And what happens if Ukraine does lose Pokrovsk?
05:36It's, it's not good. It's not good. It's not good. I mean, it's an axis. I mean,
05:42they'll find other ways, but it depends. I actually think personally, I think that the
05:46advance on Pokrovsk may well slow down as it starts to move into the urban fight rather than
05:52the more rural fight where the Russians are advancing now. Because Patrick, we're also
05:56going to, we have winter that's around the corner. I mean, it is September, but in that part of the
06:00world, it gets cold a lot sooner. And then it's difficult to send in weaponry and get things
06:07moving, isn't it? Well, yeah, maybe in about six weeks, it gets wet first. And then, and things
06:15slow down and then it gets cold. So, you know, we'll see. Yes, it slows combat down. Of course,
06:22it does. But they need to stabilize the front down near Pokrovsk really soon because it's
06:28getting quite worrying, unfortunately. And hopefully they can. And the incursion into
06:34Kursk, one thought in the early days was for Ukraine to have an upper hand in any potential
06:41peaceful settlement, a dialogue to bring this war to an end. But now you're saying that
06:47that Kiev could be on the back foot? I don't, in the Kursk salient, essentially, there's still a
06:54bit of tit for tat going on. The Russians have pushed the Ukrainians out of some villages and
06:58Ukrainians are still attacking in other places. The big question is, look, you widened your line,
07:04you widened your front line and now you have to sustain that for Ukraine. And you put in
07:08really good units. Personally, I think that it probably made the most sense in terms of
07:14the main aim would have been to have take or one of the supporting and take the Kursk nuclear power
07:20plant on day one or day two and then trade for Zaporizhia coming up to winter, which the Russians
07:24hold would have made a lot of sense. But again, in these operations, you know, surprise operations,
07:31it's so difficult to know where you're going to get to on day one or day two.
07:34Patrick Burry, a fascinating conversation. Thank you very much for joining us on the program today.