On Friday, Acting Secret Service Director Ronald Rowe held a press conference about the assassination attempt against former President Trump.
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NewsTranscript
00:00Good afternoon, everyone.
00:13The assassination attempt of former President Donald Trump was a dark day for our country.
00:19I again extend my deepest sympathies to the family of Corey Comparatore and sincere wishes
00:25for a swift recovery for Mr. Copenhaver and Mr. Dutch.
00:30The Secret Service takes full responsibility for the tragic events of July 13th.
00:36This was a mission failure.
00:39The sole responsibility of our agency is to make sure our protectees are never put in
00:44danger.
00:46We fell short of that in Butler, and I'm working to make sure that this failure does not happen
00:52again.
00:53I'm focused on ensuring that the full resources of the Secret Service are utilized to safeguard
01:00our protectees, and I've implemented and will continue to implement changes to ensure that
01:05that happens.
01:08We are, and we will continue to cooperate with pending oversight investigations of the
01:12July 13th failure being done now by Congress, the Department of Homeland Security's Office
01:18of the Inspector General, and the independent review directed by President Biden.
01:24Additionally, the Secret Service's Office of Professional Responsibility is currently
01:30conducting a mission assurance review.
01:33As I stated, I am not waiting for the completion of those reports, and I've directed the Secret
01:40Service to take immediate steps to ensure our protectees are indeed safe, and I will
01:46summarize those steps in a moment.
01:49I am committed to pursuing accountability for the Secret Service's failure in Butler,
01:54Pennsylvania.
01:55But let me be clear.
01:57If policy violations by Secret Service personnel are identified by the agency's mission assurance
02:02review, those individuals will be held accountable.
02:07And they will be held accountable to our fair and thorough disciplinary process.
02:12The first part of that process is an investigation to identify whether policy violations occurred.
02:19Potential policy violations are referred to our Office of Integrity, and appropriate discipline
02:24is administered under our table of penalties.
02:28The facts will drive the outcomes of those investigations, and I promise accountability.
02:34And I will not rush to judgment nor ignore due process.
02:38Every single person within the Secret Service feels the weight of what happened.
02:43We are in an unprecedented threat environment and a high operational tempo during this presidential
02:49campaign.
02:51The men and women of the Secret Service are working incredibly hard and doing their jobs
02:56under difficult circumstances.
02:58They need to focus on their work, and they need to know that I have their backs.
03:03And that is my commitment to them.
03:06I want to thank our state and local partners.
03:09The Secret Service relies on local law enforcement for every protective event.
03:14Those valiant men and women work tirelessly protecting their communities.
03:18They know the people, places, and terrain that we operate in.
03:23We owe them our thanks, and simply put, we cannot do our jobs without them.
03:29And I know how important this relationship is.
03:32I spent four years in local law enforcement before joining the Secret Service.
03:37I know the long hours these men and women put in and the professionalism they bring
03:41to this partnership.
03:43And in that capacity, I was always proud to support the Secret Service's protective mission
03:48when called upon as a municipal police officer.
03:53In no way should any state or local agency supporting us in Butler on July 13th be held
03:59responsible for a Secret Service failure.
04:02Typically, the Secret Service refrains from commenting on ongoing investigations, but
04:08we know these are extraordinary circumstances.
04:11So please understand that the information provided today is based on what I know now
04:17to a degree of certainty.
04:19We will learn more as interviews are completed and further evidence is gathered and analyzed,
04:24and I will share more information as it becomes available.
04:28But I can say without a doubt that heroism was present that day.
04:33Secret Service agents rushed to the stage to shield the former president with their
04:37bodies within three seconds of bullets ringing out in an unflinching act of bravery.
04:44The Secret Service counter-sniper who neutralized the threat with a single shot undoubtedly
04:49saved countless lives.
04:52We're in a high operational tempo, and I need and I want our Secret Service workforce,
04:59the dedicated men and women of the Secret Service, I want to know and I want to make
05:04sure that they are uplifted so they can focus on carrying out the mission.
05:09They are worthy of trust and confidence, and they deserve your support.
05:15And let me take a moment to speak to the American people that are counting on us to do our job,
05:21to protect their ability to cast a vote for the candidate of their choice.
05:26The Secret Service's successes are largely unknown.
05:31You only know of our failures, and those have been documented, and all of them are undeniably
05:37dark days in our nation's history.
05:41But let me tell you about the dedicated patriots of the Secret Service.
05:45These public servants are the quiet professionals working in the background, day in and day
05:51out.
05:52They are standing the watch, providing a blanket of protection to the people that work in the
05:58White House, to the thousands of people who attend political rallies and nominating conventions,
06:04to the thousands of American citizens who line Pennsylvania Avenue every four years
06:08on inauguration day to see the new president and the new vice president.
06:13And they are out there right now doing this mission.
06:17They are focused, and they live their professional lives committed to the values of this agency
06:22– justice, duty, loyalty, courage, and honesty.
06:29This is who we are, and this is what we do, and we will earn back your trust.
06:35I'll now provide a timeline of the visit to Butler, Pennsylvania.
06:45On July 8th, personnel assigned to the agency's Pittsburgh field office conducted planning
06:49meetings and a site walk-through with law enforcement partners and campaign staff.
06:55On July 10th, Secret Service counter-sniper and technical security personnel arrived in
07:00Pittsburgh and began advanced planning for their teams.
07:04July 12th, the build-out of the campaign rally site began and continued through the early
07:09morning hours of July 13th.
07:13In the morning of July 13th, a site briefing was conducted with Secret Service personnel
07:18and law enforcement partners supporting the event.
07:22Secret Service personnel took their posts, and a technical security sweep of the protective
07:26site commenced prior to the site's opening to event staff, vendors, and to the public.
07:33At 12.30 p.m., the Secret Service opened the protective site to event staff and vendors,
07:38and then a 1 o'clock magnetometer screening of the estimated 15,000 people attending the
07:43campaign rally event staff and vendors began.
07:48At 5.30 p.m., former President Trump arrived at the campaign rally via Secret Service motorcade,
07:54and at that time, he met with supporters in a secure backstage area within the protective
07:58site.
07:59At 5.45 p.m., a local Butler County Emergency Services Unit counter-sniper team member texted
08:06the Secret Service counter-sniper team leader about a suspicious person and sent two photos
08:11of the individual, later identified as the assailant.
08:16At 5.53 p.m., the Secret Service counter-sniper team leader texted the Secret Service counter-sniper
08:21teams that local law enforcement was looking for a suspicious individual outside of the
08:26perimeter lurking around the AGR building.
08:31At this time, Secret Service personnel were operating with the knowledge that local law
08:35enforcement was working on an issue of a suspicious individual.
08:40The concept of local law enforcement working on such issues is common at sites, and on
08:45July 13th, there were over 100 calls for support.
08:51At 6 p.m., former President Trump took the stage to begin remarks, and based on what
08:56I know right now, neither the Secret Service counter-sniper teams nor members of the former
09:01President's security detail had any knowledge that there was a man on the roof of the AGR
09:06building with a firearm.
09:07It is my understanding that personnel were not aware the assailant had a firearm until
09:12they heard gunshots.
09:15At 6.11 p.m., a member of the former President Trump's protective detail contacted their
09:20Pittsburgh field office counterpart to inquire about the radio update that there was an issue
09:25local law enforcement was looking into near the perimeter.
09:29At 6.11 p.m., the assailant's first volley of three shots was fired, and within three
09:34seconds, the former President's detail rushed the stage and covered former President Trump,
09:40shielding him with their own bodies.
09:43The four through eight shots took place over the next several seconds.
09:47Fifteen and a half seconds after the assailant's first shot, a Secret Service counter-sniper
09:51fired a single round that neutralized the assailant.
09:57That concludes a quick brief summary of the timeline.
10:02And with that, I'll turn it over to our staff here to begin.
10:07Any questions?
10:08Director, we're going to start with Fox News.
10:09David Spohn, Chief of Staff.
10:10Hi, sir.
10:11Thank you for doing this.
10:12You said earlier this week to Congress that you – let me start again.
10:18You said earlier this week to Congress that you don't want to tip anything on the scale
10:22as far as disciplinary action is concerned.
10:25I need to ask you, since you testified, has anyone been suspended with or without pay?
10:30Has anyone been fired?
10:32And will you tell us, as people are disciplined along the way, or is this something we're
10:37going to need to just constantly be asking, or will you update and tell us five people
10:41have been fired, six people, seven people?
10:45What can you tell us?
10:46Sure.
10:47Thank you for that question, David.
10:48So as I said in my opening statement, there are going to be – there's the Mission
10:54Assurance Review.
10:56If – that Mission Assurance Review is looking into if there were policy violations.
11:01At that point now, if in fact there were policy violations, at that point now it'll go into
11:07a parallel path of a disciplinary type of investigation.
11:12Those are internal investigations that deal with employee matters, so we're not going
11:20to be able to provide real-time updates or continuously to provide you updates on that.
11:26But what I will tell you is that these are very thorough investigations, and if in fact
11:30there were policy violations and they are substantiated, those employees will be held
11:35accountable.
11:36I think, if I just may, sir, people want accountability.
11:37You may not be able to tell us names or positions or something, but will you be able to say
11:38that people have been disciplined?
11:39People want to hear that there's some accountability here.
11:40I will be able to, at least at a high level, begin – I will be able to provide you with
11:41that information.
11:42And then, if I may, and I appreciate this, Fox Digital obtained some new video of somebody
11:43on the roof, which we believe is the assailant, that was running back and forth while President
11:44Trump was speaking.
11:45What do you make when you see that?
11:46How does that go with this timeline here?
11:47Yeah.
11:48So it affirms to me – and again, I'm not going to be able to tell you names or positions
11:49or anything, but I will be able to provide you with that information.
11:50And then, if I may, sir, people want accountability.
11:51You may not be able to tell us names or positions or anything, but I will be able to provide
11:52you with that information.
11:53And then, if I may, and I appreciate this, Fox Digital obtained some new video of somebody
11:54on the roof, which we believe is the assailant, that was running back and forth while President
11:55Trump was speaking.
11:56And then, if I may, and I appreciate this, Fox Digital obtained some new video of somebody
12:13on the roof, which we believe is the assailant, that was running back and forth while President
12:14Trump was speaking.
12:15What do you make when you see that?
12:16How does that go with this timeline here?
12:17Yeah.
12:18So it affirms to me – and again, and you heard this from the FBI, and they're still
12:19conducting interviews and looking at this.
12:20It even just affirms to me that this was a failure.
12:21We should have had better protection for the protectee.
12:25We should have had better coverage on that roof line.
12:28We should have had at least some other set of eyes from the Secret Service point of view
12:32covering that.
12:33That building was very close to that outer perimeter, and we should have had more of
12:37a presence.
12:39And so, as far as the timeline of him running back and forth, I know the FBI has provided
12:46a bit of a chronology as well, and so I'd have to go back and look at that.
12:51But the bottom line is this, David.
12:53This was a Secret Service failure.
12:55That roof line should have been covered.
12:57We should have had better eyes on that.
12:58Thanks, Director.
12:59We're going to go to The Washington Post.
13:00Keri Stein, next question.
13:01Yeah.
13:02Thanks so much for doing this.
13:03I have just a quick follow-up.
13:07Can you describe – you said there were 100 calls for support.
13:12What kind – who those calls came from and what those looked like?
13:15And also, moving forward, do you anticipate, and if so, would any different changes in
13:20protocol between how Secret Service communicates or works with local law enforcement, specifically,
13:28as they work to secure events or other things?
13:31Yeah.
13:32Thank you for that question.
13:33So with regards to calls for support, it was a very hot day that day.
13:37There was a lot of not only EMS-type of calls to address people, but there were people that
13:45needed some other type of law enforcement assistance.
13:49This happens – candidly, it happens a lot at outdoor rallies, especially on hot days.
13:55So there was a lot of traffic, radio traffic, on the local net about, hey, I need EMT here.
14:04So there was a lot of people that were needing assistance.
14:08With respect to the interoperability, so one of the things that I've directed is I've
14:14commissioned a task force, and that task force is going to be leveraging the resources of
14:18the Department of Homeland Security.
14:19It will be co-chaired, in all likelihood, by someone from the Secret Service and someone
14:25from CISA.
14:27And I think we're also going to bring in some state and local law enforcement.
14:31The interoperability challenge, it's not an easy fix.
14:35It's not as simple as just trying to figure out the local frequency of the agency you're
14:40working with and then typing that into your radio network.
14:44It requires a substantial technical fix.
14:49In the meantime, before we can get to that, what I need to have is I need to make sure
14:53that our folks, when they're out there, we use a counterpart system.
14:57On the day in Butler, we had a Pennsylvania State Trooper in our security room.
15:02They also had a unified command post that had some of the other agencies that were on
15:06site that day.
15:07It is plainly obvious to me that we were not, we didn't have access to certain information,
15:15not by anybody's fault.
15:17It just so happened that there was a sense of urgency, that there might have been radio
15:21traffic that we missed.
15:23We have to do a better job of that.
15:24So moving forward, in addition to this task force that we'll provide more information
15:28on next week as we begin to stand that up, I've also directed all of our SACs, our special
15:35agents in charge of field offices across the country, to reevaluate where we put our security
15:40rooms.
15:41If a state or local sets up a unified command post, maybe we need to be in that room as
15:47well as opposed to just being in another room and relying on that counterpart system.
15:53It was so apparent to me that in this incident, in the final 30 seconds, which has been the
15:58focus of what happened before the assailant opened fire, there was clearly radio transmissions
16:05that may have happened on that local radio net that we did not have.
16:10And so we have to do a better job of co-locating, leveraging that counterpart system, and this
16:15is going to drive our operations going forward.
16:17So you didn't hear it or that it made it over to you?
16:22We did not, it did not make it over to us.
16:24So whether we, we did not hear it, it just did not make it over to us.
16:28It did not make it to us.
16:30And I go back to my opening statement, where the members of the detail, they did not, all
16:35they knew that the issue, that the locals were working an issue at the President's three
16:41o'clock, which would have been off to his right, which is where the shot came from.
16:45To clarify on the hundred calls that you got roughly that day, I understand a lot of them
16:56were heat related.
16:57How many specifically were suspicious people?
17:01Was this the only call, the eventual shooter that was a suspicious character?
17:05And then also just to, can you clarify, did you guys have a drone on site?
17:11Did you try to use it?
17:13And if not, like, why did you not use the locals offer of the drone?
17:17Sure.
17:18So as I understand it now, based on the information I have, there were other calls for, of suspicious
17:23individuals.
17:24And your other question was about drones?
17:26Drones, yeah.
17:27You had a drone on site, a super service drone, and what was the reason you didn't use it?
17:32And then also there was an offer from the locals of somebody had a drone.
17:36Right.
17:37So we did not have a drone on site.
17:41We did not put a drone up.
17:45Based on the information I have right now, I am aware that there was a request from a
17:49local agency to offer to fly a drone on that day.
17:55And that is also part of the mission assurance review that I've asked to get some better
17:59insight in.
18:00One of the other changes that I implemented when I became the acting director is we are
18:04now going to leverage the use of unmanned aerial systems at sites now.
18:09So we are putting those assets out and, you know, we should have had better line of sight
18:17on some of those high ground concerns.
18:19We thought we might have had it covered with the human eye, but clearly we are going to
18:24change our approach now, and we are going to leverage technology and put those unmanned
18:28aerial systems up.
18:34Thank you so much for doing this.
18:36You mentioned that there were text messages from Butler ESU to U.S. Secret Service countersnipers.
18:42I'm curious if that is routine.
18:44You know, there were two communication channels at the Butler rally, and you referenced earlier
18:49this week it appears that information was stuck or siloed at the state and local channel.
18:54What was the plan to relay information from locals to the Secret Service initially?
18:58What is the protocol?
18:59And I just have one follow-up.
19:00Sure.
19:01So, Nicole, we use that counterpart system, right?
19:04And so the teams, especially on the tactical side, when it comes to the tactical, our counter-assault
19:12team, they actually had an embed with them from the local TAC team, and they had that
19:18radio net as well with Pennsylvania State Police.
19:23With respect to the countersnipers, they were using cellular or telephone text communications.
19:30At this point, moving forward, what I have directed now is that everybody should be using
19:34the radio net, and if we don't have the ability to pipe in or leverage that counterpart system,
19:40that's one of the things that we're looking at now.
19:43We should be able to have direct comms with the people that are supporting us, and that's
19:47moving forward.
19:48That's what I have directed.
19:49So, just to clarify, U.S. Secret Service countersnipers did not have radio communications?
19:54Not with the local CS folks that were providing support.
20:00They basically had an area of responsibility independent from where our countersnipers
20:05were secure.
20:06And just a last thing, did the U.S. Secret Service countersniper teams that arrived on
20:10site on July 10th ever relay line-of-sight concerns?
20:15What came of that?
20:16And can you confirm that this was the first 2024 campaign event that countersniper teams
20:21were assigned to the former president?
20:23Sure.
20:24As part of their advance, they identified those line-of-sight, those high-ground concerns,
20:29and there's a division of labor.
20:31With respect to whether or not this was the first time, it was.
20:35It was the first time Secret Service countersnipers were deployed to support the former president's
20:40detail.
20:42I'm going to go to Eileen Sullivan from the New York Times.
20:45Hi.
20:46Hi.
20:47Thank you so much for doing this.
20:48I have a question about the review that you did, the picture that you showed in the Senate
20:53the other day of the vantage point that the local snipers had.
20:57How do you know that that's the window that they were actually posted at?
21:01Because they're saying that they're on a completely other side of the building.
21:06And related to that, has the Secret Service actually interviewed the snipers that were
21:10in the AGR building?
21:12So thank you for that.
21:13So once the FBI had released the Butler Farm Show site, we were able to take custody of
21:22it and we sent the full resources of our Office of Investigations, which included the Forensic
21:28Services Division.
21:29We did a full site reconstruction, and this is part of our ongoing mission assurance review.
21:35And as part of that, that also included the plotting and also trying to identify where
21:42not only our personnel were, but also where state and local law enforcement were.
21:48And then the second part of your question was?
21:50Well, so, I mean, how did you identify where they were?
21:54And have you interviewed the local snipers?
21:57So the mission assurance, we will start.
22:00We're starting with our federal personnel and working out.
22:02We will get, if they're willing to be interviewed, we will ask for the local law enforcement
22:07on site to be interviewed that day.
22:10How we went back and reconstructed that was based on what we had based on the ops plan
22:15and then also based on what our own folks, as they understood it, on the day of.
22:21Well, but I mean, you talked a lot about how you may not have been as specific as you need
22:26to be.
22:27So how do you know that they were in that window?
22:29So I think what we'll do is we'll let the mission assurance play that out and we'll
22:40look forward to interviewing them and definitely getting their side of the story.
22:45But what I also want to reiterate is this was a Secret Service failure.
22:50And so they should not be blamed.
22:53We're not trying to shift blame to anybody.
22:56And that's the important takeaway, that we need our state and local partners out there
23:00doing this with us every day.
23:02Thanks, Director.
23:03We're going to go to Peter Thomas of East East.
23:06Director, thank you for taking the time.
23:08Just a couple of questions, if you could walk us through some things to help us better understand.
23:12Have you gotten to the bottom of why there was no one stationed on the roof from a law
23:18enforcement perspective and why there was no one there to secure the building to make
23:24sure no one could get up there?
23:26Have you gotten any clarity on why those two lapses in security were in place?
23:33And I have a couple of quick follow-ups.
23:34Sure.
23:35It's something that, again, having been there the day after I was named the acting director,
23:42I wanted to put eyes on and go up there and see it.
23:46And looking at that site, it really – seeing how close that site was to the stage, seeing
23:57where it was, it definitely raised a lot of questions in my mind that there should have
24:01been physical presence, if not on the roof, that there should have been better security
24:05to prevent anyone from getting up on that roof.
24:09So moving forward, I've directed our Office of Protective Operations and our Special Operations
24:17Division now that when we are operational and we have counter-snipers out there, that
24:23we're working with locals and that they, in fact, will also be out present.
24:29At the very least, the presence of a law enforcement officer can deter a lot of bad activity.
24:36Having been a local police officer, I will never know how many crimes I prevented just
24:41by being there, just by walking the street and being out there.
24:45And so moving forward, one of the things that we want to do is we want to deter people from
24:49even thinking about trying to do something like this again.
24:52And the only way we can do that is leveraging not only the resources that we have, but the
24:57resources of our state and locals, and putting them out there in an overt presence.
25:01Two very quick follow-ups.
25:02You talked at length at the hearing the other day about the system that did not operate
25:08that could detect drones.
25:09Can you describe a little bit of how that works?
25:13Does that go in the sky itself to detect the drones?
25:18And then finally, the interoperability issue.
25:21I'm clear in terms of that Secret Service radios were not communicating with the locals,
25:27but you had people in the command post, right, who in theory could hear and know some basics
25:33of what was going on.
25:35Is that, am I understanding that correctly?
25:37So with respect to the counter-UASPR, I don't want to get into too much sensitive information,
25:44but what I can tell you is it allows, that asset allows the geolocation to be able to
25:52plot where a drone is within a certain distance of how we set up.
25:56So think of it as like geofencing, and then being able to pinpoint and detect where that is.
26:04And with respect to the agency that was, you know, we have, we had Pennsylvania State Police,
26:09but it appears that there was, there was really a big sense of urgency going on, and the state
26:16and locals were doing everything they possibly could to try to find the assailant.
26:21He had already come to their attention.
26:22They were actively trying to find him.
26:25And I believe everyone was doing their level best to try to locate him.
26:30But there could have been other agencies that were putting out radio transmissions, and
26:35this is something that we'll work with the FBI to get, you know, further on.
26:39But those radio transmissions might have just been back to the unified command post and
26:43maybe not have made it over the Pennsylvania State Police here.
26:47But that's something that we're going to look into, and definitely something that we are
26:52moving forward.
26:53We definitely want to remedy this going, going, going forward.
26:55But you see the service personnel in the command post had some sense that something was going
27:00on based on what they were being told about the radio transmissions?
27:02That, yes, that they were working an issue at the three o'clock of the stage.
27:06We'll go to Andrew Boosworth with Reuters.
27:11Thanks for doing this.
27:12I wanted to ask you about changes moving forward.
27:15Former President Trump has said he wants to continue having outdoor rallies.
27:19What specifically will be different at the next rally that wasn't the case in Butler?
27:23And if I could ask a follow up to, do you have information in the 30 seconds after the
27:30gunman was confronted on the roof by a local law enforcement officer that there were local
27:34law enforcement trying to communicate with the Secret Service that there was someone
27:37on the roof with a gun and that that transmission was the one that was missed?
27:41OK, so with respect to the former president wanting to get back out there, listen, it's
27:46a campaign season, right?
27:48Secret Service want to be out there.
27:50They want to be whether it's an indoor site or an outdoor site.
27:54It's on the Secret Service to make sure that we create a secure environment.
27:58And you know, listen, we identify challenges, we identify concerns, and then it's on us
28:04to figure out what we need to do to mitigate that.
28:07So if there are going to be future campaign rallies outside, it's going to be on us to
28:13make sure that we are providing all the assets and resources to make sure that those sites
28:17are indeed secure.
28:19With respect to the radio transmissions, you know, based on what the FBI, my colleague
28:26from the FBI testified the other day, and they are working on isolating some of those
28:31radio frequencies from the state and locals, that there was somebody who did in fact radio
28:37out that they had seen the individual with a weapon.
28:40What I can tell you is that that piece of information, that vital piece of information,
28:46and by no fault of anyone, it was a very stressful situation.
28:49It did not make it over.
28:51Our detail, our counter snipers, everyone that was there that day, were operating under
28:56the assumption and under the last bit of information they had received that there was an issue
29:03that the locals were working at the three o'clock.
29:06That's the bit of information that we had, not anything about a weapon.
29:11We go to Holmes, Library of the CNN.
29:15I wanted you to address, or if you can, describe the Pittsburgh Field Office and their level
29:21of experience, especially in preparing for events like this, and also have they explained
29:26their thinking and how they defined the perimeter that day?
29:29Sure.
29:30Thanks, Holmes.
29:31You know, our Pittsburgh Field Office, I don't think there's anybody in the Secret Service
29:37who is feeling this more than the men and women of our Pittsburgh Field Office.
29:43And I've met with them, and they are down right now.
29:51And so when I've met with them the other day, it was very difficult.
29:59It's difficult for them.
30:01They feel like they let their colleagues down.
30:03They feel like they let the country down.
30:06And they are wearing this, and it is, it's open.
30:10You can see it.
30:11It's an open wound that they are carrying.
30:14They are a very experienced office, and what I will say is they are cooperating with the
30:22mission assurance.
30:24They understand the gravity of this situation, and they are definitely, definitely down right
30:31now.
30:32I wonder if I can, one follow-up, you testified about one of the Secret Service's failures
30:39was an assumption that day.
30:41I'm curious, how does the Secret Service even make assumptions regarding protection?
30:47Because it seems antithetical to the entire protection mission.
30:52Yeah.
30:53So when I said it's a failure to challenge our assumptions, meaning the assumption that,
30:58hey, that's going to be addressed, or that's going to be covered by state and local.
31:02So earlier this week, I convened a call with all of our special agents in charge of all
31:06of our field offices, and I expressed to them, listen, we need our state and local counterparts,
31:12but we also have to be very direct, very clear about what our expectations are about what
31:17we need from them.
31:19Whether it's a particular asset, whether it's particular numbers of personnel, we need to
31:24be very clear so that they have an understanding of exactly what we need from them.
31:30That is, that's on us.
31:32We need to be better communicators and articulate exactly what we need to mitigate any challenges,
31:38concerns, or anything that we identify during that advanced process.
31:42And so I have full confidence in our SACs in the field.
31:45I have full confidence in our state and local counterparts that moving forward now, we're
31:50not going to have this assumption that, oh, we think that they have it.
31:53No, we're going to work together.
31:55We're going to have good, hard, fierce conversations about what we're going to do, and then we're
32:00going to go out there, and we're going to make all of these venues secure moving forward.
32:04We'll go to Ryan and Barbara, and then you can call us internally.
32:11Thank you, Acting Director.
32:12One thing, for starters, I was hoping you could elaborate a little bit on a portion
32:16of the timeline in which you address a communication between the Secret Service detail and the
32:23personnel at the Pittsburgh Field Office.
32:25It just struck me as a little vague, and I was curious if you could elaborate on what
32:29that communication was.
32:30So the former president's details, they had an advanced person on the ground who was responsible
32:36for the site.
32:37The radio transmission goes out about locals working an issue at the 3 o'clock.
32:44The member of that detail called their Pittsburgh Field Office counterpart, hey, what do you
32:51know about this?
32:52Right in the middle of that phone conversation, the shots begin firing, so that's the context
32:58of it.
32:59Sorry if I missed, could you say how they became aware of the locals working an issue
33:05in the first place to even have that conversation with them?
33:08That was the radio transmission that was put out by our security room.
33:10I got it, okay.
33:13Just to follow up, I'm curious about, you mentioned that this was the first event where
33:19Secret Service countersnipers had been assigned as part of the security for former President
33:25Trump.
33:26To what extent do you think that factored into what were ultimately shown to be the
33:30failures?
33:31Just that this was a first time, at least in a while in his capacity as a former president,
33:36that they were there on the site?
33:38The novelty of it, sorry.
33:40Sure, sure.
33:42So let me just clarify one thing.
33:45This was the first time that Secret Service countersnipers, but the former president had
33:49campaign rallies, has actually been getting state and local resources.
33:53So tactical assets, countersnipers from state and locals.
33:58So with respect to why they were there in Butler, listen, we evaluate our threat landscape
34:04every day.
34:05We calibrate based on that threat.
34:09We evaluated a threat stream that we have, and we put our Secret Service countersniper
34:15personnel out there.
34:16And looking back, it was very fortunate that we did.
34:22But the former president will have countersniper coverage moving forward, as will the president,
34:28the vice president, Senator Vance, and then we'll await the eventual Democratic vice presidential
34:34nominee.
34:35We are going to put full resources out there to make sure that our campaign cadence now
34:43is obviously picked up, and we're going to make sure that we have all the resources out
34:48there to address any challenges that we have.
34:55As you're doing this review, are you looking at the days leading up to this event and the
34:59instructions that you gave to state and local and federal partners?
35:03I know in the past there used to be a PowerPoint presentation that was given before events like
35:09people who were part of each unit in the Secret Service would stand up, go through the mission,
35:14who was assigned to them, what they'd be doing.
35:16I understand that did not happen in this case and hasn't been happening for some time prior.
35:21Is that something you think was missing here?
35:24Is that something you might review and bring back?
35:26And do you also think the Secret Service is too reliant on state, local, and federal partners?
35:33I mean, you have almost 2,000 HSI agents helping in events coming this fall.
35:38That's a third of their workforce, and it takes a lot from state and locals as well.
35:42So first, would you bring back the PowerPoint?
35:45Do you think there should have been more planning?
35:47And are you too reliant on state and local and other partners?
35:51Thanks, Julia.
35:52So that will be part of the mission assurance, the communications and what was communicated
35:56leading up to it.
35:59What I can tell you now, based on information I have, is there was, and what you're referring
36:02to is what we call a police meeting, where we bring all the agencies together that will
36:06be directly supporting a particular visit.
36:10We know that there was a police meeting.
36:12We know that there were agencies from the various jurisdictions were present.
36:19The ones, and when I say that, the ones that were the primary ones identified with providing
36:24support and were going to be involved in the advanced planning process, meaning they were
36:28going to provide a counterpart, kind of like what you said, the PowerPoint.
36:32If you're going to be conducting the site, this is special agent so-and-so, and here's
36:37their contact info.
36:39And then usually at the end of that meeting, everyone kind of goes off and they form up
36:44and they go over how they're going to go out and do the walkthroughs and identify some
36:49of the things.
36:50The thing that did happen, did they do a PowerPoint?
36:54Based on the information, I don't know about the PowerPoint.
36:56I can tell you that there was a police meeting.
37:01With respect to the PowerPoint, I certainly think that visuals are always good.
37:06I think that if we're not using it, we certainly will.
37:11But that goes back to my direction that we have to be very specific about what we're
37:16communicating and what our expectations are moving forward.
37:20With respect to the reliance on state and local law enforcement, listen, there are 700,000
37:27full-time law enforcement officers, over 700,000 full-time law enforcement officers
37:32in the United States.
37:33The majority of prosecutions in the criminal justice system in the United States are done
37:38by state and locals.
37:39That's a result of criminal investigations that they do every day in their communities
37:43to keep them safe.
37:45Over 135 officers died last year serving their communities, federal, state, and local.
37:5347 of them died by violent means, gunfire.
37:58There's not an over-reliance on them.
37:59They're out there every day securing their communities.
38:02They know the terrain.
38:03They know the people.
38:04More importantly, they know the local laws.
38:07If you're in a state where it's open carry, we're going to rely on them to enforce local
38:12laws.
38:13I, as a federal agent, cannot go out there and enforce the laws of the Commonwealth of
38:17Pennsylvania.
38:18I need those state and local law enforcement officers.
38:21So I would push back on that.
38:23With respect to leveraging other federal partners, when we were in the Department of Treasury
38:27and I was a brand-new agent, I would stand post during a campaign year with agents from
38:32ATF, IRS criminal investigations.
38:36We were all one big happy family, customs.
38:39Customs moved over to DHS just like we did.
38:44So we do this every four years.
38:45We rely on those partners.
38:47We use them during national special security events like the Democratic National Convention,
38:51the United Nations General Assembly, the presidential inauguration.
38:56Those are whole-of-government security operations, which the Secret Service is the lead planning
39:00for.
39:01And we're going to bring in partners from across the government.
39:04I don't feel that it's an over-reliance.
39:06It's something that we have done going back to our days at Treasury.
39:10And we're going to continue to do that.
39:12We need those partners, and we need those state and local officers.
39:15Can I follow up here?
39:16Sure.
39:17There's something I didn't understand.
39:18You're talking about that time period where locals understand that this person is a threat,
39:24but it's before Secret Service finds out, understands communication issues.
39:28Were they not standing right next to them, or were they in two separate command centers?
39:32So we had our security room, and then they had a unified command post, and we had a Pennsylvania
39:38State Police officer representative in our security room.
39:42But there was no Secret Service agent in the unified?
39:44No, there was not.
39:45Are there typically two separate command centers?
39:48That was unique.
39:49As I understand it, that's an emergency management model that they use.
39:55And as I mentioned in that conversation with our special agents in charge in the field,
40:01I've directed them, hey, we need to rethink where we put our security room.
40:04If the large majority of our partners are in a unified command post or in a different
40:11location, we need to probably be there, too.
40:14And so we have to rethink where we put our security rooms, and we are, in fact, doing
40:21that now moving forward.
40:22So let's go ahead.
40:23Ellen Gilmer with Bloomberg.
40:24We'll do the poll.
40:25And if there's time to follow up, we'll do the poll.
40:26You've got to take your mic.
40:27Thanks so much.
40:28Appropriators in Congress this week delayed consideration of DHS's budget for Fiscal 25.
40:35They want to know more about what Secret Service needs.
40:37I know you said Tuesday, obviously, every agency head is always going to say they need
40:40more resources, but can you be kind of specific about what resource needs there may be, particularly
40:45when we're looking at the technology issues, radio transmissions, the CUAS system?
40:49Sure.
40:50So following this, we have had tremendous support from the Department of Homeland Security
40:54and from the Secretary, and we have, in fact, looked at all of these needs.
40:59Given this dynamic, high-threat environment that we're operating in, in order to meet
41:06this, we can meet this now.
41:09But it is going to require additional investments and resources, and we are having those conversations.
41:15We certainly have been – we've had great support, not only from the department, but
41:21also our Appropriations Committee – committees, and we are working through kind of what our
41:27needs are right now.
41:29We will have future conversations about this, and we are appreciative that everyone is really
41:34coming together to make sure that we have what we need to meet this high threat.
41:38And since Senator Pence is going to bring up that whole tough topic, should Secret Service
41:42be in DHS?
41:43Is that a conversation that you think is productive at this time?
41:47Listen, that's not for me to weigh in on, but what I will tell you is, you know, there's
41:52also a lot of discussion about why should the Secret Service do criminal investigations.
41:57And what I will say is this.
41:59We were founded in 1865 as an investigative entity.
42:04It's in our DNA.
42:06I firmly believe that the best protection agents learn those skills being criminal investigators.
42:13You learn how to interact with people.
42:15You learn organizational skills.
42:17You learn to be analytical.
42:19Those are all traits that you need to have when you're on a detail.
42:23Moreover, if you look at where we are today, buildings, communities, everything is interconnected.
42:32We have a particular expertise in cyber and in cybercrime and critical systems protection.
42:38And so when you overlay that, that investigative skill set that we have, it's more than just
42:44securing the President or our protectees in a brick and mortar setting.
42:47It's also protecting them from things that make them vulnerable due to cyber.
42:53And so the only way to learn those skills, to be able to detect, to be able to analyze,
42:59to be able to make sure that we are hardening not only cyber systems, but hardening a building
43:04that is fed by cyber systems.
43:06The only way to gain that experience, that knowledge, is to be able to do criminal investigations.
43:11Additionally, it is within our investigative authority to follow up on threats.
43:16People make threats to the President and the people we protect every day.
43:20We need to have that domestic and international network of field offices to be able to track down those threats.
43:26And if necessary, bring those people to justice and present them to a U.S. Attorney's Office.
43:31So this, you know, I know there's been a lot of talk.
43:35Should we or shouldn't we? Should we do this? Should we be in DHS?
43:40The bottom line is this.
43:42If you want the Secret Service to continue to be the Secret Service and be effective at what it does,
43:47it needs to be doing investigations and it probably needs to be in the Department of Homeland Security
43:53until Congress or others have an opportunity to weigh in.
43:56Director, for the last question, we're going to go to the pool for those who can't hear you.
44:00Just a quick question.
44:02There's a report that a whistleblower has alleged that you personally directed cuts to the Counter Surveillance Division,
44:08which led to the Threat Assessments Team failing to perform its duties that it typically would before the Butler rally.
44:16Is that accurate? Is that allegation accurate?
44:19So I've recently, I've become aware of this.
44:22We got a congressional letter on it.
44:24What I can tell you is that the Counter Surveillance Division, they do a fantastic job.
44:31They have a very specific mission set.
44:34A lot of that mission set is here in the National Capital Region, focused on permanent protective sites.
44:40But they do go out and they support, when requested, they go out and support former details.
44:47I know that there's been allegations that I personally cut or that I, let's see, that I denied requests.
44:56The Counter Surveillance Division has been out there supporting the former president's detail at some very high-profile events.
45:05They continue to provide that support and they're out there providing support right now.
45:10So we're going to respond to the letter that we received and we'll be sure to make that,
45:17I'm sure they will be able to share that response when the committee says it's okay to respond.
45:23Is that a no, though? Did you cut funding personally?
45:25I did not, no.
45:27Did you finally figure out how he got that gun on the roof?
45:31Did it fit in the backpack?
45:33We're working to determine that.
45:35That's something that the FBI is working on.
45:38There's a couple of, I don't want to speculate as to exactly how he would have gotten it up there.
45:57So we have already trained numerous details to be able to mobilize to pick up multiple candidates.
46:05Most of the presidential campaign activity usually picks up coming out of the conventions.
46:11So we are prepared for this.
46:13It's just that now we are in such a heightened, dynamic environment.
46:17We're actually making sure that we are probably putting everything we can to make sure that we don't have a mission failure.
46:25It is incumbent upon everyone in the Secret Service.
46:27We all understand the gravity of this situation and we are rising to meet this moment.
46:32And we are certainly, as we go into the Democratic National Convention,
46:35as we await picking up another candidate with the eventual naming of a vice presidential nominee from the Democratic side,
46:43we are going to staff that and we are going to make sure that we have all the resources and assets necessary to provide that level of protection.
46:53Thank you, everyone.