Minds On – Nathalie Tocci, il futuro di un mondo insicuro
(Adnkronos) - Nel nuovo episodio di “Minds On”, serie prodotta da Adnkronos e Centro Economia Digitale, Giorgio Rutelli e Rosario Cerra intervistano Nathalie Tocci, direttrice dello IAI, Istituto Affari Internazionali. Una conversazione a tutto campo sui nuovi equilibri globali, a partire dai concetti di “Securenomics”, de-coupling, de-risking: la globalizzazione è davvero finita o dovrà cambiare forma? Si è parlato poi di difesa: del summit Nato a Washington, del possibile nuovo commissario europeo all’industria della difesa e di cosa potrà fare l’Unione in caso di elezione di Donald Trump alla Casa Bianca. L’esperta ha poi affrontato le questioni del Green Deal europeo schiacciato tra i sussidi statunitensi e cinesi, del Piano Mattei e della (non) indipendenza energetica italiana ed europea, e delle tecnologie di frontiera come chiave per il successo economico e politico.
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00:00Welcome to a new episode of MindsOn. I'm Giorgio Rutelli and today I'm joined by Rosario Serra, President of Centro Economia Digitale,
00:16who together with ADN Kronos created this format called MindsOn to discuss the challenges of our time.
00:23Our guest today is Nathalie Tocci, Director of IAI, the Institute of International Affairs. Welcome.
00:29Thank you.
00:30Now I'll leave Rosario with the task and the honour of asking the first question.
00:35First question. Let's face the question straight away. Let's talk about globalization.
00:41Globalization, as we know it, is in fact over. We're talking about globalization in which we were very attentive to the long-term chains
00:54and, above all, to efficiency rather than security.
00:59Today we find ourselves in a situation in which there is a radical change in this globalization,
01:07that is, we are moving towards a kind of regionalization, that is, nations that in some way share strategic values and interests,
01:19that come together and compete with equal realities.
01:26In this context, this strategic concept of Securonomics emerges.
01:32Securonomics is essentially the attention to economic security,
01:38trying to produce more at the central level and to avoid strategic dependencies.
01:45Among other things, this is the strategy that the British Labour Government would implement.
01:53So, in the coming years, that should be the strategy.
01:56From this point of view, the European Union has adopted what it has called the strategy for economic security,
02:04which has been a great change compared to a period of, let's say, a certain naivety of Europe,
02:11compared to the chains. Do you think we will be able to implement this strategy?
02:20Well, first of all, on a very brief reflection of a fairly general nature.
02:25It was rightly said that globalization, as we have known it, is no longer there, it will no longer be there.
02:33That globalization belonged to a world, let's call it the open world, the world of the international liberal order,
02:40the world in which it was thought that interdependence was exclusively a source of prosperity,
02:47of peace, of efficiency, of many beautiful things.
02:50Then what happened, not only in recent years, but in the course of the last 20 years,
02:58there have been several narrow closures, let's say.
03:01On September 11, the crisis of security, the global financial crisis and the first discussion of globalization.
03:10The various facets in the crisis of liberal democracy, and therefore from Brexit to the first election of Donald Trump.
03:19The pandemic, and therefore the second discussion of globalization,
03:24and in this case, the insecurity generated by interdependence.
03:32And then the two wars, the one in Ukraine, the one in the Middle East, and perhaps those that will come in Asia Pacific.
03:41So, to deal with this dilemma, that on the one hand the open world is no longer there,
03:49but on the other hand we cannot afford a closed world.
03:53And so it is about navigating these contradictions between opening and closing.
03:58In reality, we see that from time to time new concepts and new terms emerge.
04:04And so we have talked about strategic autonomy, strategic responsibility,
04:10we have talked about economic security, we have talked about Secure Economics,
04:14we have talked about de-risking, and so on.
04:17All these concepts are essentially based on three things.
04:22On the one hand, you have to dilute your potentially dangerous dependencies.
04:27This dilution in some areas, let's think of the energy sector,
04:31in relation to Russia, reaches the point of de-coupling,
04:35that is, the total cessation of a potentially dangerous relationship,
04:40such as the dependence on fossil fuels, in particular on gas, in Europe, in relation to Russia.
04:48If you dilute or even do a de-coupling, a decoupling, on the one hand,
04:53it is obvious that you have to do at least two other things.
04:56On the one hand, you have to diversify your economic relations with other countries,
05:01and this is where the theme of this diversification comes into play.
05:06In what way does it intersect with the revisitation of a globalization
05:12that is perhaps more, in quotation marks, regionalized?
05:16And on the other hand, there is the theme of increasing your internal production.
05:21So, in a way, you have to compensate for the dilution, on the one hand,
05:25with diversification and with the increase in internal production.
05:29So, the certain fact is that this thing will be done.
05:37What is much more uncertain is how it will be done,
05:40because in reality it is a strategy that can be tackled in very different ways.
05:47It can be tackled in a, let's say, rather humble way,
05:51increasing taxes and that's it.
05:53And in reality, in part, that is what is being done.
05:56You can have a higher level of ambition
05:59and implement an industrial policy,
06:02reimagine different economic partnerships with other countries,
06:08which is not easy.
06:10Then maybe we'll go back to the extent to which,
06:12in the open world, what was done?
06:15Free trade agreements were signed.
06:17These free trade agreements, let's say,
06:19no longer apply to the majority.
06:21So, if you have to diversify your economic relations,
06:24what is the substance of this diversification?
06:27What is the substance of these new economic partnerships?
06:30So, let's say, the real question is not so much
06:34whether this will be on the agenda.
06:36Yes, it will be.
06:37The real question is what will be the level of ambition
06:41and, above all, the dynamics of internal politics.
06:44Because while this agenda is determined from the outside to the inside,
06:48the dynamics of internal politics in the European Union, I mean,
06:53largely determine how this priority will be addressed.
06:58Here, instead, I would move on to a topic related to defence.
07:03And in front of us is the NATO Summit in Washington,
07:08in which there will be more or less the debut,
07:10in the sense that it is not a real debut,
07:12because it will actually take office on the 1st of October,
07:17but there will be the debut of Mark Rutte,
07:19the former Dutch Prime Minister,
07:21who was appointed NATO Secretary General.
07:23And so this is a very relevant topic,
07:28because, of course, among other things,
07:30it is a NATO Summit that takes place in the United States
07:33on the eve of the American elections.
07:36Instead, looking at Europe,
07:39the question of defence is a question that is put in front of the new Commission.
07:44Ursula von der Leyen had spoken of a defence commissioner
07:49to be established in this new Commission.
07:51Obviously, it would be a commissioner to the defence industry,
07:54because we know that it is very difficult at the moment
07:57to share armies, etc.
08:01So, what is the status at the moment,
08:05on the one hand, of NATO and of this new summit,
08:10of this role entrusted to Mark Rutte,
08:14and on the other hand, of Europe,
08:16which should, in theory, build a new identity even in defence?
08:21So, first of all, maybe a couple of words about Rutte.
08:25First of all, it took us a long time to get to this decision.
08:30Let's remember that Jens Stoltenberg's mandate was extended twice.
08:37And so, finally, we get to this decision,
08:41and it is a good decision,
08:43in the sense that Mark Rutte is, first of all,
08:46as is evident, a politician with a vast experience.
08:51He was Dutch Prime Minister for several years.
08:56He managed, let's say, complex phases,
08:59especially, I think, at the level of the European Union,
09:03in the course of the European Union.
09:05In short, let's say, he is a person who negotiates well,
09:09he is a pragmatist, essentially,
09:11he is a person of common sense,
09:13he is not, how to say, he is not drawn, let's say,
09:17by ideology, either on one side or the other.
09:20So, from a certain point of view,
09:22it is good news for NATO.
09:24Good news for NATO,
09:26when NATO desperately needs good news.
09:30Because, as I was just saying,
09:33it is a NATO that faces a potential, let's say,
09:38return of Donald Trump,
09:40and let's remember that already the first administration of Donald Trump,
09:44it is true that then, how to say,
09:46has failed much more than it has bitten.
09:49But failing in the case of NATO,
09:53which is at the end of the fair,
09:55an alliance that holds on to a key word,
09:58which is trust.
10:00And therefore, questioning,
10:02even just fearing the possibility
10:04that Article 5,
10:06which is the article of collective defense of NATO,
10:09may come less,
10:11is actually something, how to say,
10:13they are not just words,
10:15they are potentially, let's say,
10:17they have a potentially devastating impact.
10:20So, it is a route that will have to navigate, let's say,
10:24it will have to pilot a NATO
10:28in a potentially extremely complex phase
10:31and, of course, as we know,
10:33infinitely more complex than it was in 2016,
10:37when Donald Trump arrived at the White House for the first time,
10:41because the European continent was at war.
10:44And so, we know,
10:47or we can imagine at least two things.
10:50The first, which concerns in a much more specific way
10:54and in the short term, NATO.
10:57So, what would,
10:59excuse me, Ukraine,
11:01what would NATO do
11:03where Trump,
11:05even before arriving at the White House,
11:07maybe between November and January,
11:10where he was to be elected,
11:12would make a phone call to Vladimir Putin,
11:17basically granting exactly what Putin asked,
11:22which, by the way,
11:24at the peace conference in Switzerland,
11:28Putin basically said what the terms of the surrender would be.
11:32I don't call it peace, I call it surrender.
11:35And Trump, possibly,
11:37probably, would say,
11:39well, I don't care.
11:41And so, let's say,
11:42what would NATO do in that kind of scenario,
11:45so specific to Ukraine?
11:47Would the other countries,
11:50the other NATO allies,
11:52be able to fill the void left by the United States?
11:55And this, of course,
11:56then intersects with the even broader question of
12:00can a NATO, in quotes,
12:03Europeanize itself
12:05to the extent that the United States should do,
12:09I don't say that,
12:10because I don't think it's plausible that Trump
12:12would totally, how to say,
12:14make a ceasefire with NATO.
12:16In reality, I don't think it's plausible.
12:19In reality, it's not at all probable.
12:22But, certainly,
12:24a, how to say,
12:25a progressive commitment by the United States,
12:29furthermore, I add,
12:31both under a possible Trump administration,
12:34but also under a possible Biden administration,
12:37in the sense that there are structural forces
12:40that push the United States
12:42to assume less responsibility
12:44in the European theater.
12:47So, let's say,
12:48a NATO that, in some way,
12:50has to dust off an old plan,
12:53which was the idea of the European pillar in NATO,
12:57which was an idea that was feared
12:59between the 90s and the early 2000s,
13:02then it was essentially cornered.
13:04So, taking those ideas back in hand,
13:07and this, in reality,
13:09leads to your second question,
13:11which concerns a possible
13:13European defense commissioner.
13:16As you rightly said,
13:18a European defense commissioner
13:20is a commissioner for the industry
13:23of European defense,
13:25which, however, is extremely important.
13:28The point is that this commissioner
13:30can be either,
13:32I put it quite brutally,
13:34about half of the current
13:36commissioner, Thierry Breton,
13:39that is, the current commissioner
13:42for the industry,
13:44who sees in his current portfolio
13:47both defense and space,
13:49but also all other industries.
13:51So, it could be either a halving,
13:53let's say, of Breton,
13:55or, and this is the real question,
13:57let's say, interesting,
13:59where, but it won't be a decision
14:01now, because it will probably be
14:03a decision taken in the next 6-9 months,
14:05where there should be a new
14:07European fund for defense,
14:10meaning the famous Eurobonds
14:12of defense,
14:14if there should be a
14:16Next Generation EU for defense
14:18for 100 billion,
14:20managed by this commissioner,
14:23well, then, it becomes a little
14:25more interesting, and it becomes
14:27more interesting because it becomes
14:29one of the components that can make
14:31this idea of a European pillar
14:33within NATO real and true.
14:38Perfect. Let's stay at the European level
14:40and let's stay at the level of the funds.
14:43Let's talk for a moment about the Green Transition.
14:46Europe has become a world leader
14:49in terms of the regulation system,
14:51also for a very refined strategy
14:54regarding climate change.
14:59Having said that, however,
15:01we have found ourselves focusing
15:04especially on the question
15:06and the dissemination of technologies,
15:09while the United States,
15:11with the latest policy,
15:13which is that of the IRA,
15:15have substantially changed the scenario,
15:18that is, we have gone from a buy strategy
15:21to a make strategy,
15:23of all this technology
15:27related to green innovation.
15:33What did the European Sovereignty Fund do?
15:37It had to be the one that, in a way,
15:40helped this change.
15:43There are indications,
15:46broadly speaking,
15:50that the new European scenarios
15:53understand that, in order to do this,
15:56we need a targeted industrial policy
15:59and a centralised economic capacity.
16:06So, it's interesting the way
16:09you put it between the buy and the make.
16:15In the past, I used to describe it
16:19in a similar but different way.
16:23Basically, Europe and the United States,
16:26naturally both interested in the energy transition,
16:31how do you do the energy transition?
16:34You create a price differential
16:37between black and brown on one side,
16:40so hydrocarbons on one side,
16:43and green on the other side.
16:46In Europe, this price differential
16:49is achieved by taxing black and brown.
16:52So, whether it's the ETS,
16:55whether it's externally the SIBAM,
16:58or other forms of taxation and regulation,
17:02the United States creates
17:04exactly the same price differential
17:06by subsidising green,
17:08and this is where the industrial policy comes into play.
17:11So, why this difference?
17:14Let's be honest,
17:16the United States has a lot of,
17:19and this has to be said,
17:21because otherwise we'd look like masochists in Europe,
17:24the United States has, naturally,
17:27a political and fiscal condition on one side,
17:31and a monetary condition on the other,
17:33which Europe doesn't have.
17:35What do I mean by politics?
17:37There would never have been an agreement
17:40between Europe and the United States
17:43to pass such an ambitious plan,
17:46aimed at the energy transition,
17:49through the idea that taxes should be raised.
17:52It's totally antithetical to the political system
17:55of the United States,
17:57especially in this moment
17:59that we know to be of extreme political polarisation.
18:03So, in reality, the only way
18:05to find a balance
18:07was through a gigantic spending programme,
18:11and a gigantic spending programme
18:13that wasn't even called green, climate,
18:16no, they called it the Inflation Reduction Act,
18:19which gives it another name,
18:21which has absolutely nothing to do
18:23with what you're doing.
18:25In reality, yes, it was aimed at climate,
18:27it was also very much aimed at China,
18:29because we know these two things
18:31are closely linked,
18:33being a competition with China,
18:35a technological competition
18:37in which green technologies
18:39have an absolutely top-level role.
18:42In the case of Europe,
18:44first of all, initially,
18:46we didn't think of this
18:48with an eye towards China,
18:50we thought of all this,
18:52in quotation marks,
18:54exclusively with an eye to climate
18:56and the energy transition.
18:58And so, we made this price differential
19:00with the instruments we had at our disposal.
19:03But here comes the real point.
19:05We realised that, however,
19:07by creating this differential
19:09only through, let's say,
19:11taxation measures,
19:13I'll put it as a non-economist,
19:15but just to be clear,
19:17it naturally risked,
19:19and in fact, it caused
19:21a whole series of stomach aches.
19:24And so, the idea came into play
19:26that we also need
19:28an industrial policy,
19:30we need new funds,
19:32the Fund for Sovereignty.
19:34What did it end up doing?
19:36It ended up running out of money.
19:38And so, let's say,
19:40a consistent fund
19:42on sovereignty, on transition,
19:44we want to call it
19:46the Inflation Reduction Act,
19:48it's fine, we can call it
19:50whatever we like,
19:52but basically it serves
19:54as a framework within
19:56the next financial pluriannale
19:58of the European Union
20:00on this, on defence,
20:02on the other issues we have,
20:04on technology, we'll talk about that later.
20:06What is the problem,
20:08the difficulty of this moment?
20:10And that's why I was saying
20:12that the agenda is determined
20:14by external challenges,
20:16how they are dealt with
20:18is determined by politics,
20:20internal political dynamics.
20:22A new Fund for Sovereignty,
20:24which may not be
20:26100 billion, but 200,
20:28300, 400 billion,
20:30there's something,
20:32because we have to remember
20:34that the budget of the European Union
20:36is a seven-year budget,
20:38so it covers
20:40a rather long period of time.
20:42Naturally,
20:44at the base,
20:46the idea that there should be
20:48more integration,
20:50more Europe,
20:52is a strongly European agenda.
20:54A Europe
20:56where, as we know,
20:58there is the rise of the right,
21:00sovereignism, populism,
21:02nationalism, and all kinds of things.
21:04This is the Europe
21:06that is agreeing
21:08on such a significant increase
21:10of the European budget,
21:12big question mark.
21:14And if it doesn't agree
21:16at the European level
21:18on something like this,
21:20and this has to be done
21:22and will be done, because
21:24the United States is doing it,
21:26the Chinese are doing it,
21:28so of course we shouldn't do it.
21:30What is the problem and the risk?
21:32The States are doing it.
21:34But which States are doing it?
21:36And how are the States doing it?
21:38Through what has already happened,
21:40the loosening of the rules
21:42of state aid,
21:44the States are doing it
21:46if they can afford it.
21:48And so there is the risk
21:50that a less European agenda
21:52that is not able to reach
21:54the level of ambition
21:56to agree on a new measure
21:58like this,
22:00will make everything fall
22:02on the States.
22:04The States are doing it
22:06if they can afford it.
22:08Those who cannot afford it,
22:10that is, ours,
22:12are not doing it.
22:14And this resets
22:16a centrifugal dynamic
22:18within the European Union
22:20Well, now I would bring
22:22the speech a little further south,
22:24we talked about Europe, the United States,
22:26I would talk about Italy
22:28in the Mediterranean,
22:30and Italy in what can be called
22:32the enlarged Mediterranean,
22:34but in general Italy
22:36and its relations with North Africa,
22:38with the Middle East,
22:40the Mattei plan,
22:42which is a project of this government
22:44to build interconnections,
22:46especially energy-related,
22:48with these countries
22:50that face the Mediterranean
22:52or that are part
22:54of a larger region.
22:56How do you assess
22:58this plan in general,
23:00but also what is happening
23:02in recent months?
23:04There have already been
23:06some concrete moves.
23:08Italy certainly has a geographical advantage
23:10in being potentially
23:12an energy hub
23:14and also of interconnection
23:16But how do you see
23:18this plan
23:20in the coming years,
23:22also in relation
23:24to what you just said,
23:26on the fact that it will not be easy
23:28to find, instead, in Europe
23:30and with Europe,
23:32spaces for investment,
23:34common debt,
23:36expansion of energy security
23:38that at the moment
23:40Europe does not have?
23:42First of all,
23:44I think that
23:46it is essential
23:48to develop
23:50and strengthen
23:52relations
23:54with the so-called
23:56global south.
23:58You might ask
24:00why now?
24:02Actually,
24:04even before,
24:06now much more,
24:08because the international system
24:10is changing.
24:12The open world
24:14had,
24:16according to a whole series
24:18of rules,
24:20a certain structure
24:22of power at the base
24:24and it was essentially
24:26a unipolar world
24:28in which the only real center
24:30of power
24:32from the end of the Cold War
24:34were the United States.
24:36The world is no longer there.
24:38It is not easy to understand
24:40how we can describe it.
24:42There are those who say it is multipolar,
24:44there are different centers of power,
24:46there are those who say that there is
24:48a new form of bipolarity
24:50that revolves around the United States
24:52and China with other poles
24:54that tend
24:56from one side or the other,
24:58whether it is Europe that tends
25:00towards the United States, whether it is Russia
25:02that tends towards China.
25:04There are those who say that not even this can fully
25:06describe what is happening.
25:08It is a bipolar world
25:10because there are a whole series of countries
25:12precisely in that global South
25:14that do not want to tend from one side or the other
25:16and play their game a little bit.
25:18All these things are true
25:20at the same time.
25:22So,
25:24the voice of this global South
25:26that is being heard more and more
25:28in different ways.
25:30We have, I don't know,
25:32from a South Africa
25:34that
25:36opens the trial
25:38against Israel
25:40to the International Court of Justice,
25:42to an India
25:44that is a member of the BRICS
25:46but is also a member of the
25:48Quad
25:50together with the United States,
25:52Japan and Australia.
25:54There are a whole series
25:56of examples.
25:58There is Kenya
26:00that is now in charge
26:02of a mission to bring
26:04the order to Haiti.
26:06There are a whole series of examples
26:08that give a little bit the meaning
26:10of this world in which there are other actors
26:12that play their game.
26:14And so, in a world
26:16in which we don't sing it, we play it alone,
26:18it is evident that, in some way,
26:20having and strengthening relations
26:22with the countries of Africa,
26:24the countries of the Gulf, the countries of
26:26the Middle East is very important.
26:28This is the premise of the reasoning.
26:30So, the intuition is correct.
26:32What is the problem?
26:34There are two.
26:36On the one hand,
26:38it is perhaps more important
26:40that there is no money.
26:42The money that has been put
26:44into the Motei Plan, we know,
26:46is largely
26:48funds that already existed.
26:50There was a climate fund that already existed
26:52and that has been,
26:54let's say,
26:56renamed,
26:58directed to another end.
27:00This climate fund was,
27:02in large part, aimed at
27:04external financing to Italy.
27:06So, in large part,
27:08there is our usual problem
27:10as Italy, which, perhaps,
27:12we also have good ideas,
27:14but we don't have the money to realize them.
27:16This, in reality,
27:18in what way is this government
27:20trying
27:22to mitigate
27:24this problem a little bit?
27:26By attracting others.
27:28Let's see how
27:30the G7, the Italian Presidency,
27:32has tried to involve
27:34the other G7 countries,
27:36which perhaps have some more money
27:38than we do,
27:40precisely
27:42in this kind of project.
27:44Today,
27:46let's say, it is a story,
27:48if we really want to be
27:50generous,
27:52half-full glass, half-empty glass,
27:54in the sense that, yes,
27:56these things,
27:58a little more than
28:00connecting some points
28:02that already existed, I don't know,
28:04there was an initiative
28:06of the G7 for a partnership
28:08for infrastructures in Africa,
28:10so this is connected to the Mattei plan,
28:12but there are not many
28:14new funds behind
28:16all this. So, for now,
28:18precisely, at most,
28:20there has been, let's say, a coordination work.
28:22The second problem
28:24is the objective,
28:26because
28:28the objective of all this exercise is
28:30to what extent is it really
28:32aimed at
28:34the development in Africa,
28:36the energy transition, the infrastructures,
28:38and to what extent
28:40is it linked to
28:42the other real objective,
28:44which is the containment of migration.
28:46To the extent that there is this second component,
28:48and it is quite transparent,
28:50and it is transparent to the eyes of our
28:52speakers, of course,
28:54the credibility of what we are
28:56trying to do is, at least,
28:58a little undermined.
29:00So, to sum up,
29:02excellent idea, it must be done,
29:04but also here, how
29:06things are done,
29:08how much you put in, who you work with,
29:10and, in the end,
29:12what you are really trying
29:14to achieve, are equally,
29:16if not even more important.
29:18Look, the last question
29:20I would like to ask you about the thing
29:22that is at the centre, which is
29:24technological innovation,
29:26and, above all, high innovation,
29:28the disruptive one.
29:30It is evident
29:32that in the last 10-15 years
29:34this has been
29:36a strategic factor
29:38in geopolitics.
29:40I am only thinking about the comparison
29:42between the United States and China,
29:44which is very evident.
29:46In all this new scenario,
29:48both the United States and China
29:50use high innovation,
29:52both from an economic point of view
29:54but also from a military point of view,
29:56and it is evident
29:58that the contrast is on this.
30:02All this is changing
30:04the geostrategic alliances,
30:08and how is it changing
30:10compared to high innovation?
30:12And, above all,
30:14what role will India play,
30:16which is a country
30:18that is strongly
30:20developing,
30:22and which,
30:24let's face it,
30:26the most experienced managers
30:28of the big international realities
30:30are starting
30:32to get scared.
30:34So, I wanted to hear
30:36your opinion on this.
30:38First of all, I absolutely agree
30:40on the role that
30:42technology and innovation
30:44play in this context.
30:46Again,
30:48to make a comparison
30:50with the past,
30:52let's take the Cold War.
30:54The Cold War also had many
30:56facets, but there was one
30:58dominant dimension
31:00of strategic competition,
31:02which was the nuclear dimension.
31:04Then, yes,
31:06there was much more,
31:08maybe for the first two decades
31:10there was also an issue of economic competition,
31:12an issue of strategic competition,
31:14which of the two political systems
31:16would have had the best,
31:18but all this
31:20declined, especially
31:22in the nuclear dimension.
31:24In this case,
31:26competition in the United States and China
31:28essentially declines
31:30on the technological issue,
31:32which, as you rightly said,
31:34also has its military implications,
31:36but that is the essence
31:38of competition.
31:40So, it is absolutely central.
31:42What does this mean?
31:44On the one hand,
31:46competition also generates
31:48potentially positive results.
31:50For example,
31:52we were talking about the Inflation Reduction Act.
31:54If there had not been
31:56the dimension of
31:58competition with China,
32:00the Inflation Reduction Act
32:02would not have existed.
32:04If it had only been
32:06for climate reasons,
32:08it would not have existed.
32:10It is also a competition
32:12that can contribute
32:14to bring something
32:16to the great global challenges.
32:18So, it is not all negative.
32:20Of course,
32:22there is also a lot of
32:24potentially negative,
32:26and above all,
32:28what is the problem and the difficulty?
32:30The fact that the great challenges
32:32of the 21st century,
32:34which are technological, demographic
32:36and climatic,
32:38are all transnational.
32:40By definition,
32:42a transnational challenge
32:44requires multilateral
32:46and global governance.
32:48This is not a context
32:50that naturally facilitates
32:52solutions, approaches
32:54and multilateral
32:56arrangements.
32:58So,
33:00this is the real problem.
33:02On India,
33:04it is a big question mark
33:06because it is quite evident
33:08from a demographic point of view
33:10and from a point of view
33:12of the growth rate.
33:14Because while we see
33:16a China that,
33:18accompanied by a demography
33:20that is now declining,
33:22is assisting,
33:24it will continue to grow,
33:26naturally more than us,
33:28but it will no longer have
33:30those growth rates
33:32as it did years ago.
33:34So, in a way, it is a curve
33:36that is flattening,
33:38but it is slowing down.
33:40India is not.
33:42India is at the beginning
33:44of its ascent
33:46and we do not know
33:48from a political and strategic
33:50point of view
33:52how it will decline.
33:54Will it be an India
33:56that will prevent competition
33:58with China
34:00where, in any case,
34:02democracy will prevail
34:04and the last elections in India
34:06are, in fact,
34:08an unexpected good news?
34:10I mean, there is one of those cases
34:12when there is an election result
34:14that you did not expect,
34:16that is the best test
34:18to say that democracy
34:20still exists.
34:22When everything is so obvious
34:24and the result confirms
34:26the expectation,
34:28you get a little scared.
34:30So, in fact, there was a surprise in India.
34:32So, does that India prevail
34:34with which its growth
34:36is actually something that adds,
34:38that contributes to what
34:40could be global solutions
34:42or not?
34:44Today we have, let's say,
34:46discordant signals from one side
34:48and the other, and probably
34:50we will not have a definitive answer
34:52for many years yet.
34:54Thank you, Nathalie Tocci,
34:56for sharing.
34:58And thank you for following us.
35:00See you in the next episode
35:02of Mindzone.