Documentary about the KGB and the nefarious doings in its battle with the Soviet Union.
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Short filmTranscript
00:00:00 [MUSIC PLAYING]
00:00:03 These men are members of the KGB working in North America.
00:00:20 This man is an illegal, a spy trained in Moscow
00:00:23 and sent to the United States.
00:00:27 This man is a defector from Cuban intelligence,
00:00:29 living in hiding under constant threat of death.
00:00:32 This man ran operations against the West from Czechoslovakia.
00:00:40 This man was trained by the most sinister department of the KGB
00:00:47 and sent to North America.
00:00:50 All of them received their orders from here,
00:00:53 number two Dzerzhinsky Square in Moscow.
00:00:56 This is the headquarters of the KGB.
00:00:59 From here, the KGB continues to carry out the mandate given
00:01:03 to the secret police by Lenin, who
00:01:05 said it was to be the sword and shield of the revolution,
00:01:09 the offense and defense of Soviet aims
00:01:12 throughout the world.
00:01:13 Ljubljana Prison is the center of the vast KGB bureaucracy
00:01:21 directly responsible to the Politburo for its operations
00:01:24 against the West.
00:01:29 Ever since Lenin took over the secret police
00:01:31 of his defeated enemy, the Tsar, the Soviet espionage apparatus
00:01:35 has mirrored the leadership under which it serves.
00:01:39 Under Lenin, in the early days of revolutionary turmoil,
00:01:42 it was known as the Cheka, and it
00:01:44 imposed the Bolshevik rule upon the nation,
00:01:47 setting up an international network of informers
00:01:50 and tracking down and liquidating
00:01:52 enemies of the new regime.
00:01:57 Under Stalin, the name of the secret police
00:01:59 was changed to GPU, and it became
00:02:02 the most effective instrument of mass murder
00:02:04 until the Second World War.
00:02:06 Stalin used the GPU to eradicate millions
00:02:12 of peasants in the Ukraine who protested
00:02:15 the creation of collective farms from their lands.
00:02:18 And during the mid '30s, Russia was
00:02:20 wracked by what became known as the terror, the mass purges
00:02:24 created by Stalin.
00:02:26 Show trials became a function of the secret police activities,
00:02:30 and more than 75% of the Soviet general staff
00:02:33 of the army and senior ministries
00:02:36 were arrested by the GPU, tried, and executed.
00:02:40 In 1953, Stalin died.
00:02:53 It was appropriate that the small band of survivors
00:02:56 at the top of the communist hierarchy
00:02:58 quickly arrested one of their own, Lavrentiy Beria,
00:03:02 the ambitious and coldly ruthless head
00:03:04 of the secret police, which by then
00:03:06 had become known as the NKVD.
00:03:09 It was Beria who had presided over the purges ordered
00:03:12 by Stalin.
00:03:14 He himself was executed.
00:03:18 In 1955, Nikita Khrushchev took full power.
00:03:22 The secret police became known as the KGB.
00:03:27 Under Khrushchev and his successors,
00:03:29 the KGB looked increasingly outward
00:03:32 to espionage and intelligence activities
00:03:34 in the rest of the world.
00:03:36 In the past decade, it has become a vanguard element
00:03:39 of Soviet expansion and activities
00:03:41 throughout the Third World, Western Europe,
00:03:44 and North America.
00:03:47 The KGB has become a massive bureaucracy,
00:03:50 reporting directly to the Politburo, the select body that
00:03:53 runs the Soviet Union.
00:03:55 Its functions are tied to the International Department, which
00:03:58 runs and finances both communist and non-communist organizations
00:04:02 in other countries, and to the Ministry of Defense,
00:04:05 with whom it shares espionage activities in other nations.
00:04:09 The KGB is organized into chief directorates.
00:04:12 From a separate headquarters in Moscow,
00:04:15 the first chief directorate controls
00:04:17 foreign espionage activities.
00:04:18 The second chief directorate is the largest and most important.
00:04:22 With a network of informers, it is
00:04:24 responsible for ensuring internal security.
00:04:28 The current head of the KGB is Yuri Andropov,
00:04:31 a key member of the Politburo, a close colleague of Leonid
00:04:34 Brezhnev, and one of the most powerful men in Russia.
00:04:39 As head of the KGB, Andropov controls
00:04:41 the most influential and sinister bureau
00:04:44 of the Soviet bureaucracy, whose main purpose
00:04:47 is the total control of the Soviet people.
00:04:49 For North America, the activities
00:04:57 of the first chief directorate are divided
00:04:59 into departments, which carry out
00:05:01 a wide range of activities from Soviet establishments located
00:05:04 across the continent.
00:05:06 [VIDEO PLAYBACK]
00:05:09 [WIND BLOWING]
00:05:13 [MUSIC PLAYING]
00:05:18 - Since 1933, this building has served as a Soviet embassy
00:05:32 in Washington.
00:05:33 It is a major center of espionage activity
00:05:35 in the United States.
00:05:37 This is Alexander Kluyev, listed as an attache at the embassy.
00:05:42 He is a KGB officer.
00:05:44 This is Boris Ivanov, a correspondent
00:05:47 with the Soviet news service TASS.
00:05:49 He is also a KGB officer.
00:05:52 During a recent hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
00:05:54 Committee, the principal witness was
00:05:56 Harold Brown, who at that time was Secretary of Defense.
00:05:59 Subject, US military posture and the defense budget
00:06:02 for 1980.
00:06:04 Present were Soviet TV reporter Yuri Soltan
00:06:07 and his cameraman, Anatoly Ivanov,
00:06:10 as well as Milo Shtulva, a correspondent for Izvestia.
00:06:13 Seen here is Dr. Mikhail Milstein,
00:06:19 who is now with the Soviet Academy of Science,
00:06:22 specializing in military affairs.
00:06:24 Next to Milstein, Yuri Kapralov, first secretary
00:06:28 of the Soviet embassy.
00:06:30 Then there was a man who identified himself
00:06:32 as Andrei Krutskikh.
00:06:34 The Soviet embassy lists him as an attache.
00:06:36 And this man, Viktor Tyutin, official title,
00:06:40 third secretary at the embassy.
00:06:44 American intelligence sources identify
00:06:46 both Krutskikh and Tyutin as being officers of the KGB.
00:06:51 In North America, there are dozens
00:06:52 of Soviet establishments, everything
00:06:54 from diplomatic missions to trade offices and businesses
00:06:57 that sell tractors or operate merchant shipping.
00:07:00 Since 1970, the number of Soviet officials in North America
00:07:04 has increased dramatically.
00:07:06 Until 1980, Richard Kinsey was deputy chief
00:07:09 of the Soviet desk in the FBI.
00:07:12 His duties were to closely monitor the activities
00:07:14 of the Soviets in the US.
00:07:16 The numbers have doubled in the last 10 years.
00:07:19 From 1970, when I left in early 1980,
00:07:24 the Soviet presence had almost doubled.
00:07:26 There was a time when I first was in the work
00:07:29 where we could almost go one agent on one
00:07:33 identified or suspected Soviet intelligence officer.
00:07:36 When I left, quite the contrary was true.
00:07:39 And we were vastly outnumbered, where our agents were
00:07:42 trying to cover three or four known or suspected intelligence
00:07:46 officers.
00:07:49 One of the basic requirements for Soviet diplomats
00:07:52 is to file travel plans whenever they
00:07:54 travel in the US or Canada.
00:07:57 It is a restriction that in the Soviet Union
00:08:00 is strictly applied to Western diplomats.
00:08:03 But for the Soviets in North America,
00:08:05 the theory and the practice seldom meet.
00:08:08 We find through our coverage of them
00:08:10 that they often deviate from those travel plans.
00:08:14 And surprisingly enough, we'll end up
00:08:17 traveling via the SAC base in Omaha, Nebraska
00:08:20 when their travel plans call for them to go through Kansas
00:08:23 or some other route.
00:08:25 And that's a violation of travel regulations.
00:08:27 If we bring it to the attention of the State Department,
00:08:29 then a strong note of protest is made to the Soviet ambassador.
00:08:34 Is there anything ever done about these strong notes
00:08:36 of protest?
00:08:39 They're filed.
00:08:39 The Soviet embassy in Washington is also
00:08:50 distinctive for another type of spying operation.
00:08:53 On the roof is a large antenna that appears harmless,
00:08:57 but is used to electronically eavesdrop on telephone
00:09:00 conversations in the Washington area.
00:09:03 One third of all local calls and most long distance calls
00:09:07 are transmitted by a microwave, which
00:09:09 can be plucked from the air by these Soviet antennae.
00:09:13 Literally millions of calls are recorded and put
00:09:16 through computers, which are programmed
00:09:18 to listen for certain key words or are activated
00:09:22 by the phone numbers of people who
00:09:24 are of interest to the Soviets.
00:09:25 In 1972, while negotiating a purchase of surplus grain
00:09:34 from the United States, the Soviet embassy
00:09:37 used its telephone intercept capability
00:09:39 to eavesdrop on conversations between the US
00:09:42 Department of Agriculture and grain dealers in the Midwest.
00:09:46 Because the Soviets were able to acquire inside information
00:09:49 about the US bargaining position,
00:09:51 they were able to outmaneuver the US negotiators
00:09:54 and sign a long-term contract for a record amount of grain
00:09:57 at very low prices.
00:09:59 Crop failures the next year in the US
00:10:02 drove consumer prices upwards, but the Soviets
00:10:04 were able to continue buying grain at the low prices
00:10:07 they had negotiated the previous year.
00:10:11 In San Francisco, the Soviet consulate
00:10:13 houses sophisticated electronic equipment
00:10:16 and occupies a commanding position
00:10:17 overlooking San Francisco Bay.
00:10:19 Our investigations determined that many of those antennae
00:10:22 were in such a position that they
00:10:24 had the capability of doing microwave intercept
00:10:27 in Silicon Valley.
00:10:30 About an hour's drive south of San Francisco
00:10:33 is the area that has come to be known as Silicon Valley.
00:10:35 It is perhaps the most highly concentrated area
00:10:41 of modern technology and research in the United States.
00:10:45 Its products include microcomputers, silicon chips,
00:10:48 and fiber optics, all vital component
00:10:51 parts of military hardware.
00:10:52 The San Francisco consulate has also
00:10:58 provided the Soviets with an easy access
00:11:00 to US military establishments on the West Coast.
00:11:04 For example, by observing the Polaris submarines being
00:11:07 refitted in clear view of a nearby seafood restaurant
00:11:10 frequented by the Soviets, the numbers
00:11:12 of American submarines then at sea can be determined.
00:11:17 In the Canadian capital, the Soviet embassy
00:11:20 is also equipped with antennae.
00:11:21 However, the most visible microwave intercept equipment
00:11:29 is not on the Soviet roof, but nearby on the roof
00:11:31 of the Polish embassy.
00:11:33 It is the Eastern Bloc nations, the Poles, the Czechs,
00:11:36 and the East Germans that play an important part
00:11:38 in the game of espionage.
00:11:42 William Kelly is the former head of the RCMP security service.
00:11:46 Intelligence services of Bloc countries
00:11:50 allegedly work independently of each other.
00:11:54 But that isn't true.
00:11:56 They work very closely with each other
00:11:58 and under the dominance of the Russian KGB.
00:12:03 There was a time when it was felt
00:12:08 that the KGB were too well-known around external affairs.
00:12:13 And they didn't think that the reception they'd receive
00:12:17 would be the best.
00:12:19 So they wanted to naturally recruit or penetrate.
00:12:24 And they decided that the Hungarians
00:12:27 could do the job under the circumstances
00:12:30 better than they could.
00:12:32 Developing countries make--
00:12:34 Ladislav Bittman was a deputy director of Czech intelligence
00:12:37 at the time he fled to the West.
00:12:40 Because there are many people who are afraid to get in touch,
00:12:46 to be associated with a Soviet diplomat, for example,
00:12:49 who is an intelligence officer and uses the diplomatic power
00:12:53 in most cases.
00:12:55 But they don't hesitate to develop a very friendly contact
00:12:59 with a Czech diplomat or a Polish diplomat
00:13:02 or an East German diplomat.
00:13:03 Because they think what the representatives
00:13:05 of these small countries can do.
00:13:07 And they don't realize that they do basically the same job,
00:13:12 only under a different color.
00:13:14 But--
00:13:17 How closely allied were you with the Soviet intelligence,
00:13:19 say?
00:13:20 They know everything that the Czechoslovak
00:13:24 or any other satellite service does.
00:13:27 On the East Coast of America, on Long Island,
00:13:29 is another Soviet diplomatic residence.
00:13:32 It is an estate near the town of Glencove,
00:13:34 which serves as a weekend and summer retreat
00:13:36 for Soviet officials of the nearby United Nations.
00:13:39 Soviet citizen Arkady Shevchenko often
00:13:45 stayed there while he was the undersecretary general
00:13:47 of the UN.
00:13:49 And all the top floors of the building
00:13:54 are full of the sophisticated equipment
00:13:59 for the--
00:14:01 to intercept all the conversation, telephone
00:14:05 conversation, anything which is going on around the area.
00:14:10 At least 15 or 17 technicians were working there
00:14:17 to do all this job.
00:14:19 The estate at Glencove and the electronic monitoring equipment
00:14:25 jammed into it also represent an interesting geographic choice
00:14:29 by the Soviets.
00:14:31 I might point out that the estate, while it's
00:14:34 located somewhat north of the establishment,
00:14:37 is very close to Grumman Aircraft
00:14:40 Factory, which is one of the United States'
00:14:42 main builders of sophisticated warplanes.
00:14:46 And it's sort of midway between the main plant
00:14:49 and a testing facility that Grumman
00:14:50 has further out on the island.
00:14:52 And those antennae are pointed toward both facilities.
00:14:56 The newest Soviet residence in New York
00:15:02 is a building in the Riverdale section of the Bronx.
00:15:05 They got permission to build on one of the highest
00:15:07 sites in New York City, situated at an elevation that
00:15:13 permits interception of phone messages
00:15:15 over the widest possible area.
00:15:17 Yet back in Washington, the Soviets
00:15:23 were not pleased with the location of their embassy.
00:15:27 So they asked for and again were granted permission
00:15:30 to build on another site at the corner of Belmont and Wisconsin
00:15:34 Avenue.
00:15:34 It is one of the highest locations in Washington.
00:15:47 Because it's so high here, we'd like
00:15:49 to get a good shot of Washington.
00:15:50 Can we get in?
00:15:51 It's forbidden.
00:15:52 If you want to take pictures, you must go to our embassy
00:15:54 and discuss this matter with our chief.
00:15:56 In Washington, they will have everything.
00:15:59 They can listen to all the conversation which
00:16:02 are going on from White House to any departments or Pentagon.
00:16:12 You have a good view from here anyway.
00:16:13 Yes, I think so.
00:16:15 Just on the roof of the building.
00:16:17 On the roof?
00:16:18 Yeah, I'll bet.
00:16:22 Much of the construction on the Soviet embassy complex
00:16:25 is already completed.
00:16:26 The new residences have been built
00:16:28 complete with antennae on the roof.
00:16:30 In Moscow, the Americans had requested permission
00:16:36 to build a new embassy to replace
00:16:38 their old and overcrowded facilities there.
00:16:42 In this instance, comparisons are useful.
00:16:45 The United States was eventually offered and accepted
00:16:48 a site on one of the lowest points of land in the city.
00:16:51 And after years of bureaucratic wrangling,
00:16:54 permission was only recently granted to begin construction.
00:16:58 In the United States, there is one place
00:17:17 that is more important for the KGB
00:17:20 than even the embassy or its consulates.
00:17:24 How important is the United Nations
00:17:26 to the Soviets in terms of espionage?
00:17:29 It's a nest of spies.
00:17:32 The KGB operations in the UN are controlled
00:17:35 by the first department of the first chief directorate
00:17:37 of the KGB.
00:17:39 This department directs all operations
00:17:41 against the United States and Canada.
00:17:44 The officers of the department operate
00:17:46 from the embassies and consulates.
00:17:48 Operations are also run from the UN itself,
00:17:50 where over 500 Soviets work.
00:17:54 The UN was formed to provide a forum for dialogue
00:17:57 between the nations of the world.
00:17:59 Each country sends its ambassadors and their staffs
00:18:02 to the debates which occur in the General Assembly
00:18:05 and Security Council.
00:18:07 Awarded diplomatic status, their representatives
00:18:10 live in the equivalent of embassies in New York City
00:18:13 and are expected to represent their country's interests.
00:18:17 But in the Secretariat building are
00:18:19 the international civil servants
00:18:22 without diplomatic status.
00:18:24 They are expected to be rigorously nonpartisan
00:18:27 in their administration of the UN's various departments
00:18:30 and worldwide programs.
00:18:33 In 1978, one of the most important Soviet defections
00:18:36 to the West occurred.
00:18:38 Arkady Shevchenko, who was the undersecretary general
00:18:41 of the United Nations, stunned his Soviet colleagues.
00:18:44 As the highest ranking Soviet in the UN Secretariat,
00:18:47 Shevchenko had knowledge of extensive Soviet espionage
00:18:51 activities in the United States.
00:18:53 So serious was the defection that two of the Soviet Union's
00:18:56 highest ranking ambassadors, Dubrinin and Tryanovsky,
00:19:00 demanded a meeting with Shevchenko and his US lawyer.
00:19:03 This is the first broadcast of a tape recorded at that meeting.
00:19:06 Ambassador Dubrinin reveals that Shevchenko
00:19:09 was privy to Soviet state secrets,
00:19:11 even though he was supposedly an impartial UN civil servant.
00:19:15 --that he read Pope's secret documents in his mission.
00:19:18 Up till the last day when he left,
00:19:21 it showed that there was no surveillance.
00:19:24 He gave me copies of this letter.
00:19:28 He refers to what he read, "a betrayal
00:19:31 of the ideals of the October Revolution, which is taking
00:19:34 place now in the USSR.
00:19:36 The monstrous abuses carried on by the KGB
00:19:39 compel me to take the decision to renounce my membership
00:19:42 in the CPSU, et cetera."
00:19:44 That naturally leads one to think
00:19:46 that he is in some abnormal state,
00:19:49 because a normal person or one acting at his free will
00:19:54 cannot make these explanations.
00:19:56 There was no need for him to stay in the foreign service
00:19:58 for 30 years or 20 years, and then finally find out
00:20:02 that he disagrees with the fruits of the October
00:20:04 Revolution.
00:20:06 The United Nations Secretary gives so many advantages
00:20:11 for the KGB to penetrate, actually,
00:20:14 almost all aspects of the American life,
00:20:17 because they, unlike diplomats, go and travel
00:20:24 across the country freely.
00:20:26 They even should not, under no obligation
00:20:29 to notify the State Department of American Mission
00:20:33 about their travel trips or participation anywhere.
00:20:37 Probably the most active intelligence gathering
00:20:41 functions are carried out by Soviets assigned
00:20:43 to the United Nations.
00:20:44 I say that for a number of reasons,
00:20:46 primarily that UN employees also have total freedom of movement
00:20:51 throughout the United States.
00:20:52 It's a golden mine for the Soviet Union
00:20:56 that it's so easy to have such a huge number of the people
00:21:01 involved in intelligence activity.
00:21:04 My estimate would be that the people who
00:21:06 are working for the Soviet intelligence in general,
00:21:10 in New York, about 300 or 350 persons
00:21:14 involved engage in all this activity.
00:21:17 In theory, the employees are there
00:21:19 to carry out the ideals and humanitarian causes
00:21:22 of the United Nations and run the bureaucratic machinery.
00:21:26 But Shevchenko quickly discovered
00:21:27 that even though he was one of the United Nations'
00:21:29 highest ranking bureaucrats and the head of his department,
00:21:32 the orders came from the KGB.
00:21:36 I had in my department 13 Soviets.
00:21:40 And at least seven of them are professional KGB officers,
00:21:47 because they didn't do anything.
00:21:49 They didn't work in my department.
00:21:52 They didn't receive orders from me as the head
00:21:55 of the department.
00:21:56 They received the orders from their bosses
00:22:00 in the mission from the KGB resident.
00:22:02 This man was one of those Soviets
00:22:07 working for Shevchenko.
00:22:09 His name is Valdek Enger.
00:22:11 He was placed in Shevchenko's department
00:22:13 not by the normal UN hiring practices,
00:22:16 but by the KGB resident or senior officer in New York
00:22:20 City who requested Shevchenko's help in placing
00:22:23 the spy in the United Nations.
00:22:25 I agreed with that.
00:22:26 But I think it was a mistake, because it
00:22:29 was very difficult to get rid of him later.
00:22:34 Because he transformed my office into a kind of a center
00:22:39 of gathering all these KGB guys and collecting
00:22:44 all these materials and all the things.
00:22:46 And he didn't do anything at all.
00:22:49 Whenever I asked him to do something for the department
00:22:56 or for the secretariat or to write something for me,
00:22:59 he was always reluctant or absent.
00:23:02 Or have this bunch of these KGB guys in my office.
00:23:06 I was-- I was absolutely--
00:23:09 I was mad about this situation.
00:23:13 Here, Enger is asking a US naval commander
00:23:16 to pass on secret documents.
00:23:18 Yes, Tim.
00:23:23 Oh, yes.
00:23:23 Fine, thanks.
00:23:25 Do you have the stuff?
00:23:26 Yes, I do.
00:23:27 You do.
00:23:28 OK, yes.
00:23:28 Now, you know what?
00:23:30 Proceed now to this round.
00:23:32 And just after the Essex Store Plaza--
00:23:36 Yeah?
00:23:37 --you'll see the phone booth, public phone booth.
00:23:41 Uh-huh.
00:23:42 Now, the second phone booth from the right,
00:23:44 if you look at the-- in front of you, you know, after the booth.
00:23:48 Just under the shelf, you'll see the small box, OK?
00:23:51 OK.
00:23:52 And follow the instructions completely.
00:23:56 And you'll find everything there, all right?
00:23:58 OK.
00:23:58 OK.
00:23:59 Right, I'll talk to you later.
00:24:01 Mm-hmm.
00:24:01 OK, bye-bye.
00:24:03 The head of the KGB operating out of the Soviet mission
00:24:06 to the United Nations has been identified
00:24:08 by Shevchenko as V. Kazakov.
00:24:12 Within the UN, the Soviets are also able to exert influence.
00:24:17 Viktor Lesyovsky is a KGB officer
00:24:20 who occupies the post of special assistant
00:24:23 to the Secretary General in the United Nations.
00:24:26 He chooses the speakers for the debates
00:24:28 in the General Assembly.
00:24:30 Vasily Solodonnikov is another KGB officer
00:24:34 who served as a senior secretariat official.
00:24:37 A man who served with Solodonnikov
00:24:38 at the International Relations Institute in Moscow
00:24:41 was Igor Glagolev, who was an advisor to the Politburo
00:24:45 before he defected to the West.
00:24:47 They were high-ranking members of the KGB.
00:24:52 They were not people who were reused by the KGB,
00:24:55 because KGB can use many people without their knowledge.
00:24:59 But they were just regular agents of the KGB.
00:25:04 And the trouble is that they control the staff of the United
00:25:09 Nations permanently, always.
00:25:13 Solodonnikov was an advisor to Joshua Nkomo and other rebel
00:25:17 leaders during the war in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.
00:25:20 He is now a key formulator of Soviet policy in Africa
00:25:24 and is their ambassador to Zambia.
00:25:27 Later on, he was assistant to the Secretary General.
00:25:31 And later on, he was director of the Institute of Africa.
00:25:37 And now he is the Soviet ambassador in Zambia,
00:25:42 where he masterminded the takeover of Zimbabwe.
00:25:46 And now he's organizing the takeover of South Africa.
00:25:48 Noel Field joined the State Department
00:26:06 as a Foreign Service Officer in 1926.
00:26:09 During the 1930s, he became a Soviet agent.
00:26:13 Lawrence Duggan was head of the Latin American desk
00:26:15 of the State Department and was a political advisor
00:26:18 to the Secretary of State.
00:26:20 He, too, was a Soviet agent.
00:26:22 Both Duggan and Field were brought
00:26:24 into a Soviet espionage ring by the same recruiter, a woman
00:26:28 of amazing persuasiveness.
00:26:30 I got them Noel Field.
00:26:34 And I got them Larry Duggan.
00:26:37 And I got them all, you know, sort of gesocked small fry,
00:26:43 like Ryan and, you know, technical personnel,
00:26:47 several women that were mail drops and so on and so forth.
00:26:51 And it was always done, for example, with women.
00:26:53 It was mostly done with sex.
00:26:56 I would always send somebody who was handsome.
00:26:58 And they generally went to bed with whatever it was.
00:27:03 And it worked.
00:27:06 During the 1930s, Heda Massing was Soviet espionage's most
00:27:10 effective recruiting agent in America.
00:27:12 This is her only television interview,
00:27:14 filmed shortly before her death in 1981.
00:27:17 During the 1920s, she married into the Communist Party
00:27:21 in Europe, falling in love with its intrigue and fellowship.
00:27:25 Her first husband was Gerhard Eisler, a top official
00:27:29 of the Communist International Espionage
00:27:31 Arm, the Comintern.
00:27:32 When you were 17 and you joined the Communist Party
00:27:40 or became a member of that circle,
00:27:43 was it an emotional rather than a political conversion?
00:27:47 Only emotional, not political at all.
00:27:51 Didn't understand a thing about politics.
00:27:54 As I said, I would have understood this one sentence.
00:27:58 It is a theory, an ideology, which has as its aim
00:28:08 a better life for all.
00:28:11 Well, that was good enough for me, a better life for all.
00:28:13 I'm amongst all.
00:28:16 But that was as political as it was.
00:28:19 Otherwise, it was emotional.
00:28:21 I married into the party.
00:28:24 But for somebody who didn't understand it,
00:28:26 you became one of their most effective operators.
00:28:28 Later, much, much, much later.
00:28:32 Much later when I understood much more.
00:28:36 And when I--
00:28:39 really, my effectiveness is so closely married,
00:28:43 connected to fascism.
00:28:45 I was effective because there was fascism.
00:28:48 And fascism had to be fought.
00:28:50 It took me a long time.
00:28:52 And I didn't want to realize it, that actually, I
00:28:55 was not fighting fascism.
00:28:57 It was all baloney.
00:28:58 The Russians used me.
00:29:00 But to admit that to yourself is, of course,
00:29:04 very degrading, self-degrading.
00:29:07 You hesitate very much to do that.
00:29:09 So for a long time, I pretended that I
00:29:12 believe that this is the way to fight fascism.
00:29:16 And I acted it out.
00:29:18 OK, well, let's go into some of the areas
00:29:20 where you were very successful.
00:29:21 You came over to America in the early 1930s.
00:29:25 What did you do?
00:29:26 And how did you get into that circle
00:29:28 where you could operate effectively?
00:29:30 Well, first of all, when I came, I knew people.
00:29:33 You see, I knew people.
00:29:34 I had met people in Moscow.
00:29:36 I met many Americans in Moscow.
00:29:38 I was a functionary.
00:29:40 For example, I was called on by the Comintern
00:29:42 to entertain important Americans when they came to Moscow.
00:29:48 So I had connections, personal connections.
00:29:52 The connections were with those in the American government.
00:29:56 So Heda Massing, closely controlled by the Russians,
00:29:59 working in New York City, and armed with a sharp wit
00:30:02 and a fierce determination, went on
00:30:04 to recruit Lawrence Duggan, one of the senior members of the US
00:30:07 State Department.
00:30:10 You know, the thing that is so interesting
00:30:12 is it wasn't difficult. I called him because I--
00:30:19 you know, he was a friend of Noel Field
00:30:23 and said that I wanted to see him.
00:30:25 And I went into the State Department, into his room,
00:30:29 and we made an appointment.
00:30:31 And I approached him directly, hard.
00:30:35 Larry, I said, you know, I needn't tell you about fascism.
00:30:39 You know it all.
00:30:39 You know it better than I because you see all
00:30:42 the material I don't see.
00:30:45 We want your help.
00:30:46 Will you help us?
00:30:49 And he said, yes.
00:30:51 I have certain conditions.
00:30:53 But yes, I will help you.
00:30:55 Now, I will give you all the material
00:30:58 that I think might be of interest
00:31:01 to you and the Russians.
00:31:03 He knew immediately who I was.
00:31:09 He was nobody's fool.
00:31:12 And only I will not give you the material per se.
00:31:17 I will dictate it to somebody, and the somebody
00:31:19 has to be English speaking and a very good shorthand.
00:31:26 There it was.
00:31:30 I couldn't believe it.
00:31:33 While recruiting Noel Field, Heda Massing
00:31:36 uncovered another Soviet spy ring in Washington,
00:31:40 of which she had been unaware.
00:31:43 I had worked on Noel Field for a long time.
00:31:47 I had listened to Wagner, which I hate.
00:31:50 I had read Freud, which I dislike,
00:31:52 and discussed fine points of Freud with him,
00:31:56 you know, really lying in my teeth.
00:31:59 And because I wanted him, I wanted to do a good job.
00:32:05 And I also liked the family.
00:32:08 I liked her better than him.
00:32:11 He was a little bit--
00:32:12 although he was rather good looking, you know,
00:32:14 very tall and very sort of gentleman-like, to me,
00:32:18 he was a little bit unappetizing.
00:32:21 It must have been the body smell.
00:32:24 I don't know what it was.
00:32:25 But anyhow, I liked her better.
00:32:27 She was also more honest.
00:32:29 She was a little dumb.
00:32:32 And one day, I said, you know, Noel,
00:32:35 it's about time that you have more or less agreed
00:32:39 that you will work with me.
00:32:41 Now, I think we ought to start.
00:32:43 And he said, you know, Heda, I wanted to tell you this.
00:32:51 I hesitated, because I know it will upset you.
00:32:54 But I have decided that I will not work with you.
00:32:58 But I would rather work with somebody
00:33:01 who does exactly the same thing you do,
00:33:05 who is, however, with me in the same department.
00:33:09 And it would be so much easier, technically,
00:33:11 to convey whatever I have to give to this person.
00:33:15 And I said, who is this person?
00:33:19 Of course, terrified.
00:33:21 Here was my investment of a one year studying Wagner and Freud.
00:33:26 Well, that's what you--
00:33:30 anyhow, I said, who is this man?
00:33:35 And he said, I don't think you know him.
00:33:36 His name is Alger Hiss.
00:33:38 He was an advisor to President Roosevelt
00:33:41 at the crucial Yalta Conference, and was
00:33:44 the man who flew to Washington with the historic charter
00:33:47 documents of the United Nations organizing conference in San
00:33:50 Francisco, where he had served as temporary secretary general.
00:33:56 Alger Hiss was a rising star in the State Department
00:33:59 and director of the Office of Special Political Affairs.
00:34:03 He was never far from center stage.
00:34:06 After allegations were made of his communist activities,
00:34:09 he appeared before the House Un-American Activities
00:34:12 Committee.
00:34:12 I am not and never have been a member of the Communist Party.
00:34:17 Throughout two famous trials and a conviction per perjury,
00:34:21 he has steadfastly proclaimed his innocence.
00:34:24 And today, there is a strong lobby in the United States
00:34:27 to overturn his convictions.
00:34:29 Mr. Chambers charged, except that I
00:34:32 knew him briefly.
00:34:33 Were you ever a communist?
00:34:34 No.
00:34:35 This man's memory is rather different.
00:34:39 Nathaniel Weil was a member of the same Communist Party
00:34:42 cell as Alger Hiss.
00:34:44 I want to ask you if you ever met Alger Hiss.
00:34:46 Oh, yes, about 30 times or so, 30 or 40.
00:34:49 Under what circumstances?
00:34:51 Well, I'm speaking about--
00:34:53 see, the cell met every week.
00:34:55 And attendance was a duty to be taken very seriously.
00:35:02 You had to have an extremely good excuse for not
00:35:04 being there.
00:35:06 So that if one assumes that I was in this unit for nine
00:35:11 months and that there was a meeting every week,
00:35:14 it works out to about 30 or 40 times.
00:35:17 But Heda Massing, trying to recruit Noel Field,
00:35:20 had no idea that Alger Hiss was also working for the Soviets.
00:35:23 Each of the communist cells were small
00:35:25 and carefully separated.
00:35:26 In this case, both Alger Hiss and Heda Massing
00:35:29 were trying to recruit the same man.
00:35:32 I met Alger Hiss because Noel called me a week
00:35:36 after I'd been there in New York and said,
00:35:39 can you come to Washington?
00:35:41 I have a dinner date for you and Alger Hiss at my house.
00:35:46 And I said, of course I'll come.
00:35:48 And I came.
00:35:49 And I met him.
00:35:51 And the beginning was that he said,
00:35:54 so you are the girl that is trying
00:35:59 to take Noel away from me.
00:36:02 And I said, well, you are the man who is trying
00:36:06 to take Noel away from me.
00:36:08 And then I said, I suppose--
00:36:12 I don't know the exact words--
00:36:15 don't forget, after all, I'm female and I'm a fighter.
00:36:19 And I won't let that happen so easily.
00:36:23 And he grinned.
00:36:25 And then we had all sorts of conversations.
00:36:28 We stood alone, he and I, at the window and spoke.
00:36:33 And the farewell was that I said, or he said--
00:36:40 and I don't remember who said what--
00:36:44 but I think he said, whoever gets
00:36:48 Noel, after all, we are working for the same boss.
00:36:53 [MUSIC PLAYING]
00:36:56 More than 90% communist agents are blackmailed.
00:37:10 These people are not ideological supporters.
00:37:14 But they are brutally blackmailed.
00:37:16 Was this what you looked for when you were in the Czech
00:37:18 intelligence?
00:37:19 Yeah, that's right.
00:37:20 The ability to blackmail people?
00:37:21 That's right.
00:37:21 That's right.
00:37:22 Yeah.
00:37:23 Like that you were forcibly trapped.
00:37:26 And we know the way that you were trapped,
00:37:27 it was a homosexual entrapment that you were entrapped
00:37:30 in which the Czechs got you.
00:37:32 This is correct, right?
00:37:33 This man was blackmailed while on embassy duty
00:37:36 in Prague, Czechoslovakia.
00:37:38 As an Air Force cipher clerk, he was
00:37:39 in a position to seriously compromise
00:37:42 NATO readiness secrets.
00:37:45 It was a stupid thing to do, and I did it.
00:37:46 I got caught doing it by somebody that shouldn't have.
00:37:52 I've gone through this rigmarole for over a year
00:37:54 after we left Prague.
00:37:57 I haven't heard from anybody since that time.
00:38:00 Most Americans are very naive, politically very naive.
00:38:04 And so I think it's, in many cases,
00:38:07 very easy for a communist intelligence officer
00:38:11 to get in touch with important Americans
00:38:14 to seduce them in one way or another
00:38:19 and later to blackmail them.
00:38:22 I was not contacted in Czechoslovakia
00:38:24 until about a month or two before I ever left the country.
00:38:28 When you say contacted, you were contacted--
00:38:30 By the Czechs.
00:38:31 By the Czech intelligence service.
00:38:32 Well, I don't know who they were.
00:38:33 I'm just saying I was contacted.
00:38:35 Yeah.
00:38:36 I assumed that they had to be--
00:38:37 What do you mean when you say contacted?
00:38:39 What form did that contact take?
00:38:41 It was just a meeting on the street.
00:38:44 Of a man just walked up to you?
00:38:46 And what did this man say?
00:38:48 Well, he indicated that they had had photographs of me
00:38:50 and that he would contact me at some future date.
00:38:53 Well, can you tell me, what did the Czech intelligence
00:39:01 service ask you for or want you to do?
00:39:06 There was no discussion at all.
00:39:07 It was just the fact they confronted me with the fact
00:39:13 that they had pictures and photographs of me
00:39:15 doing this almost exactly like the other individuals
00:39:17 in the process.
00:39:18 That was the whole extent of it.
00:39:19 There was nothing asked for or given.
00:39:22 When you say the fellow that was involved in the situation--
00:39:25 In the--
00:39:26 In the photographs?
00:39:27 Yeah.
00:39:27 Yeah.
00:39:28 He was the other man with whom you were having this affair with.
00:39:31 Right.
00:39:33 And he defected.
00:39:34 And as a result, that was how they found out about you.
00:39:35 That's right.
00:39:36 Right.
00:39:38 And you were never asked for secret documents?
00:39:42 There was just a man that came up to you in the street in Prague
00:39:47 and said that we have photographs of you
00:39:49 and we're going to ask you for something--
00:39:51 At a later date?
00:39:52 At a later date.
00:39:53 And it was never indicated what they wanted
00:39:55 or how often or how soon or whatever?
00:39:56 What kind of information could you
00:39:58 have theoretically given them?
00:40:00 Oh, God knows.
00:40:01 God knows.
00:40:08 [MUSIC PLAYING]
00:40:12 In Moscow, the KGB targets not only low-ranking officials.
00:40:17 Sometimes their blackmail extends right to the top.
00:40:20 John Watkins was the Canadian ambassador
00:40:22 to the Soviet Union in the late '50s
00:40:25 when he was targeted for recruitment.
00:40:27 Two KGB defectors, Nosenko and Golitsyn,
00:40:31 have revealed that Watkins was under KGB control,
00:40:35 but the story has never before received official confirmation.
00:40:39 William Kelly is the former head of the RCMP security service.
00:40:43 They knew he was a homosexual.
00:40:44 He knew that they knew he was a homosexual.
00:40:48 Were you saying that he was being blackmailed by them?
00:40:52 In a kind of a way, yes.
00:40:54 That he knew that they could embarrass him
00:40:56 if he didn't cooperate.
00:40:59 While in the Soviet Union, Lester B. Pearson,
00:41:02 later to become Canadian prime minister, and John Watkins,
00:41:06 met with Khrushchev at his Dacha on the Crimean Sea.
00:41:10 The meetings were arranged by the Soviets
00:41:12 to increase Watkins' prestige in Pearson's eyes
00:41:15 and to speed his promotion to positions with access
00:41:18 to sensitive information.
00:41:19 When you find that a man like Watkins, an ambassador,
00:41:30 was a homosexual, and you knew the pressure that was being
00:41:34 placed on homosexuals in Russia at that time,
00:41:40 he was an obvious target for KGB.
00:41:44 And he was surrounded by the KGB.
00:41:47 Watkins' handler was Anatoly Gorsky,
00:41:50 alias Professor Nikitin, who had controlled the Soviet agents
00:41:54 Philby, McLean, Burgess, and Blunt in Britain.
00:41:59 Soon after Pearson's visit, Watkins
00:42:01 was transferred back to Ottawa as assistant undersecretary
00:42:04 of external affairs.
00:42:06 External affairs chairs the committee
00:42:08 that controls all of Canadian intelligence matters.
00:42:12 He died of a heart attack on October 10, 1964, in Montreal,
00:42:16 after being interrogated by the RCMP.
00:42:19 For over 10 years, Tom Fox was head
00:42:22 of US military counterintelligence
00:42:24 in charge of breaking major Soviet operations
00:42:26 in America and Europe.
00:42:28 Well, the Soviets are like any good headhunting business
00:42:33 organization that's looking for good talent.
00:42:37 The Soviets will establish a relationship
00:42:40 with the individual, determine the individual's needs,
00:42:45 desires, strengths, and weaknesses,
00:42:47 and try to exploit that.
00:42:50 David Barnett was a former employee
00:42:52 with the CIA whose business was facing bankruptcy.
00:42:55 His solution was to approach the KGB.
00:42:58 In exchange for money, he compromised several CIA
00:43:01 operations and the lives of the agents involved.
00:43:04 He was instructed by the Soviets to obtain positions
00:43:07 with several congressional intelligence committees
00:43:09 in order to pass on inside information.
00:43:12 For his services, he received $92,000.
00:43:16 But the Soviets used subtler methods for recruiting.
00:43:19 At the time when he was a congressional assistant
00:43:21 with access to US naval readiness secrets,
00:43:24 Jim Kappes was approached by a Soviet official offering him
00:43:27 the opportunity to write articles for a leading Soviet
00:43:30 press agency.
00:43:32 I, as a staff member, had access to most
00:43:36 of the classified materials that might
00:43:37 have been presented to the committee from time to time.
00:43:41 How were the approaches first made?
00:43:44 Initially, it was strictly social.
00:43:46 Later, of course, the meetings were arranged.
00:43:49 They were arranged for just the two of us.
00:43:50 They were arranged primarily at bars.
00:43:54 What exactly did he suggest you should do?
00:43:57 In the beginning.
00:43:58 He suggested that I write articles for him,
00:44:01 theoretically, to be translated and published
00:44:03 in the Novosti Press, which is a Soviet press service.
00:44:08 Of course, later it became more obvious
00:44:10 that the type of stories that he was seeking
00:44:12 were those that were based on classified information
00:44:15 or information that was not generally known to the public.
00:44:18 In attempting to recruit agents, the KGB
00:44:21 also uses the services of the International Information
00:44:24 Department, which controls TASS, Pravda, Izvestia,
00:44:28 and the Novosti Press Agency.
00:44:29 A man who is familiar with the procedures of recruitment
00:44:36 is Yuri Bezminov, who served with Novosti in India
00:44:39 before defecting to the West.
00:44:41 During my 12 years with Novosti, it was quite clear to me
00:44:47 that about 70% to 80%--
00:44:48 it's hard to count--
00:44:50 percent of the Novosti employees are at the same time
00:44:54 either full-time officers of the KGB
00:44:57 or part-time co-operative agents like myself
00:45:01 when I was working for the Novosti.
00:45:03 For Soviets like Yuri Bezminov or Carlo Tuomi,
00:45:06 an illegal sent to America to recruit agents,
00:45:10 the methods of recruitment are deceptively easy.
00:45:13 How do you recruit somebody?
00:45:15 What do you do?
00:45:18 You recruit them by establishing a friendship.
00:45:21 But you don't recruit them as a Soviet spy.
00:45:27 You're supposedly working for some corporation, which
00:45:32 is interested in the trade secrets of a competing
00:45:35 corporation.
00:45:36 Or maybe you're asking information
00:45:39 on behalf of a friend who's writing a technical book.
00:45:44 So--
00:45:45 Is this what you were told in Moscow,
00:45:46 that you should not say that you're working for the Soviets,
00:45:48 that you should work for a company or--
00:45:51 Right, right.
00:45:52 You come out as a Soviet intelligence agent
00:45:56 only when you recruit the person on ideological basis.
00:46:01 In the 1930s, no one was more successful in recruiting
00:46:05 young Americans than Ada Massing.
00:46:07 She recruited at the highest levels of government
00:46:09 and discovered that the ideological approach worked
00:46:11 best with the privileged in America.
00:46:14 It would be almost impossible to recruit the working class.
00:46:19 Almost impossible.
00:46:20 Of America.
00:46:21 Yeah.
00:46:23 But it would be easy to recruit the intellectual and middle
00:46:26 class.
00:46:28 But what does the Communist Party have to offer the elite?
00:46:32 Great ideas.
00:46:34 The freedom of all time.
00:46:37 Marxism.
00:46:39 A different economical system.
00:46:42 Thoughts.
00:46:43 New medical experiments.
00:46:46 New-- the world.
00:46:48 The world.
00:46:49 You see, the Soviet Union has never changed its goal.
00:46:54 Never.
00:46:55 You know, its goal as a phrase, it still
00:46:58 wants to dominate the world.
00:47:01 You know that.
00:47:02 It has never changed that.
00:47:03 [MUSIC PLAYING]
00:47:07 In the late 1950s, when Fidel Castro
00:47:22 was taking his revolution out of the mountains
00:47:25 toward the ultimate victory of Havana,
00:47:27 the world watched what was believed
00:47:29 to be a popular uprising of the people.
00:47:32 There is not communism or Marxism in our ideas.
00:47:38 Our political philosophy is representative democracy
00:47:45 and social justice in a well-planned economy.
00:47:50 But the revolution provided a new base
00:47:52 for the KGB and the Communist intelligence networks.
00:47:57 Ladislav Bittman was a deputy director
00:47:59 with Czech intelligence.
00:48:01 Years after the revolution, the Czechs
00:48:03 helped to build up the Cuban intelligence service.
00:48:07 And then, I think in the early 1960s,
00:48:11 the Soviets took over completely when
00:48:13 Cuba was really in the hands of the Soviet bloc,
00:48:17 of the Soviet Union.
00:48:20 Here at the Cuban mission to the United Nations in New York
00:48:23 City, where 98 Cuban nationals work, at least half
00:48:28 are members of the DGI, the Cuban intelligence service.
00:48:33 This man is Nestor Garcia.
00:48:36 Until the summer of 1980, he was officially
00:48:38 listed as the first secretary to the Cuban mission.
00:48:42 But in reality, he was chief of station for Cuban intelligence
00:48:45 in New York City.
00:48:49 In Moscow, the direct responsibility
00:48:51 for running Cuban intelligence is assigned to Department 11
00:48:55 of the KGB, the same department that
00:48:57 controls the Czechs, Poles, and other European communist
00:49:01 intelligence agencies.
00:49:04 Since the late 1960s, Soviet KGB officers living in Havana
00:49:09 have directly run the operation of Cuban intelligence.
00:49:14 As a result of two years research,
00:49:16 the connections team has been able to ascertain
00:49:18 these startling facts.
00:49:21 Cuban intelligence was taken over by the Soviets in 1969.
00:49:26 At that time, it became and has remained totally financed
00:49:30 and controlled by the KGB.
00:49:32 Now living in hiding, this man is the highest ranking Cuban
00:49:36 officer to defect to the United States.
00:49:39 This is the first known television interview
00:49:42 that a DGI officer has given.
00:49:44 In Moscow, I was trained in recruiting of agents
00:49:50 in infiltrating the CIA in counterintelligence.
00:49:56 Was all your training directed at the United States?
00:50:00 All your training in Moscow directed at the United States?
00:50:03 Even if the work dealt with operations in Italy, France,
00:50:10 England, Canada, it was ultimately
00:50:14 directed against the United States.
00:50:16 In the case of a plan of sabotage
00:50:19 against an American embassy, the physical layout of the plan
00:50:24 had to be known.
00:50:26 Was there any other installations
00:50:28 at embassies that were looked at for sabotage?
00:50:30 All the big American companies.
00:50:39 Since the late 1960s, General Seminov of the KGB
00:50:43 has controlled the DGI from Havana for the Soviets.
00:50:47 General Seminov, the Soviet chief,
00:50:54 would be the one who would give the order.
00:50:56 So the Russians controlled Cuban intelligence,
00:51:00 actually controlled?
00:51:01 Totally and absolutely.
00:51:03 The second most important base of Cuban intelligence
00:51:10 in North America is the Cuban consulate in Montreal.
00:51:14 From here and other Cuban diplomatic missions,
00:51:17 the DGI conducts intelligence and espionage operations
00:51:20 through a spy network designed to increase the KGB's
00:51:24 penetration of North American life.
00:51:26 You saw the files of these people in Havana, correct?
00:51:36 [SPEAKING SPANISH]
00:51:37 Yes, I know many.
00:51:39 Were they working, for instance,
00:51:40 trying to get defense secrets from America?
00:51:44 Yes, definitely so.
00:51:45 What else?
00:51:46 [SPEAKING SPANISH]
00:51:49 Political information, economic information,
00:51:52 leftist movements in the United States, on the blacks.
00:51:55 [SPEAKING SPANISH]
00:51:58 Industrial plants of the United States, like power plants
00:52:03 and so on and so forth.
00:52:04 Why would they be interested in power plants?
00:52:07 This information is necessary to resolve it.
00:52:11 This former DGI officer was shown
00:52:13 the official list of the 12 Cubans stationed in Washington
00:52:17 at the Cuban interest section.
00:52:19 How many on that list do you know as being in intelligence?
00:52:23 [SPEAKING SPANISH]
00:52:25 There are four on that list?
00:52:27 Certainly.
00:52:27 Certainly.
00:52:28 Have you ever heard of a Mr. Ricardo Escartan?
00:52:31 [SPEAKING SPANISH]
00:52:33 He's an intelligence officer.
00:52:35 How about Mr. Juan Carbonell?
00:52:37 [SPEAKING SPANISH]
00:52:39 Juan Carbonell is another intelligence officer
00:52:42 who was in Jamaica.
00:52:44 [SPEAKING SPANISH]
00:52:47 Also.
00:52:47 Mr. Martinez?
00:52:48 [SPEAKING SPANISH]
00:52:50 Yes, this is another officer of the DGI.
00:52:54 Six months after this interview, Ricardo Escartan
00:52:57 was expelled from the US for espionage activities.
00:53:00 But the other DGI officers, Carbonell, Arboleda,
00:53:04 and Martinez, are still operating in Washington.
00:53:07 In the mid-1960s, the black ghettos of America
00:53:14 erupted in flames and violence in an apparently
00:53:17 spontaneous protest.
00:53:19 The riots did not need instigation
00:53:21 by outside elements.
00:53:23 Yet once the conditions were ripe,
00:53:25 revolutionaries of the left moved in,
00:53:27 funded and supported by the Cuban DGI.
00:53:32 One such revolutionary was Philip Luce.
00:53:36 What was the nature of your meeting with Fidel Castro?
00:53:39 Our nature, first of all, was we met a number of times.
00:53:44 But our first meeting dealt with what
00:53:46 the group would do in Cuba.
00:53:49 Secondly was what we could do in the United States
00:53:52 once we returned.
00:53:54 And third of all, we received over $20,000
00:53:59 to bring back to the United States.
00:54:01 The next year, we were engaged in tremendous riots
00:54:07 in New York City, which then spread to Cleveland,
00:54:11 to Los Angeles, to other areas.
00:54:15 Education at Juncture was vital, not only to our cause,
00:54:20 but to the cause of the Cubans.
00:54:22 We trained people on the use of weapons.
00:54:25 We also trained people on how to stand
00:54:28 on top of their tenement buildings
00:54:30 and throw down garbage cans filled with bricks.
00:54:33 We also taught them how to make Molotov cocktails.
00:54:36 As a matter of fact, the Cubans at that time
00:54:41 said to us, your revolution is your own revolution.
00:54:45 But while we were in Cuba, they gave us
00:54:50 money to bring back to the United States
00:54:52 to be utilized in terrorist activities.
00:54:55 They also invited us to the embassy,
00:54:57 wherein they gave us money to send young Americans
00:55:00 to Cuba who were later trained in terrorist activity.
00:55:04 We went to the Cuban embassy on a number of occasions
00:55:08 to get funding.
00:55:09 We said that we understand who the enemy is
00:55:26 and that we're going to attack.
00:55:28 In the 1960s, Bernadine Dorn was one
00:55:31 of the leaders of the violent, radical group
00:55:33 known as the Weathermen.
00:55:35 On December 3, 1980, in Chicago, Bernadine Dorn
00:55:39 surrendered after 10 years in hiding.
00:55:42 With her was another Weatherman, Bill Ayers,
00:55:45 with whom she had been living.
00:55:47 They held a press conference and stated
00:55:49 their continued commitment to radical change.
00:55:52 Resistance by every means necessary is happening
00:55:56 and will continue to happen within the United States
00:55:58 as well as around the world.
00:56:00 And I remain committed to the struggle ahead.
00:56:03 The man with Bernadine Dorn, Bill Ayers,
00:56:06 was one of the key members of the Weathermen
00:56:08 during the 1960s.
00:56:10 A man who knew Ayers well during those years
00:56:13 was Larry Grathwald, a former member of the Weather
00:56:16 Underground, which had developed close ties with the Cubans.
00:56:21 Well, when the Cubans viewed the revolutionary struggle
00:56:26 in the United States, they recognized the fact
00:56:29 that the left, as it existed in '69 and '70,
00:56:33 was not capable of overthrowing the government by itself.
00:56:38 Consequently, they had hoped that the group itself
00:56:44 would be able to attack the system from within
00:56:48 and provide assistance to the international movement,
00:56:53 the international communist revolution.
00:56:56 As a Weatherman, if I became cut off
00:56:59 from the main body of the organization, the Weather
00:57:01 Underground organization, I could make contact
00:57:05 or reestablish contact by going to the Cuban embassy in Mexico
00:57:09 or Canada and asking to--
00:57:13 as an example, I wanted to get in touch
00:57:15 with Bernadine Delgado.
00:57:18 That was the code word, Delgado.
00:57:20 And I would tell him that I'm Larry Delgado,
00:57:22 and I can be reached at such and such a phone number
00:57:25 or at such and such an address.
00:57:27 And the Cubans would make the connection
00:57:28 and put me back in contact with the Weathermen.
00:57:30 How do you know this?
00:57:33 I don't--
00:57:34 How do you know this information?
00:57:36 Bill Ayers gave me those instructions,
00:57:38 and it was either February or March of 1970 in Detroit.
00:57:43 The Cuban DGI is organized into seven departments
00:57:47 and subdivided into geographic sections, the largest one
00:57:51 being the United States section.
00:57:54 It controls North American operations,
00:57:57 including the UN, diplomatic posts, and radical groups.
00:58:00 During the 1970s, hundreds of young Americans
00:58:08 circumvented US travel regulations
00:58:10 to go to Cuba to harvest sugar cane and experience
00:58:14 the Cuban Revolution firsthand.
00:58:16 As a cover for the recruitment of the Weathermen,
00:58:19 the DGI organized the Venceramos Brigades.
00:58:22 The organizers, tour guides, and hosts
00:58:25 were officers of the DGI who used the occasion
00:58:28 to train young American radicals.
00:58:32 Cuban intelligence was well prepared for the Venceramos
00:58:35 Brigades when they arrived.
00:58:38 Every time that a Venceramos Brigade contingent
00:58:42 arrived in Cuba, all the operational of the DGI
00:58:49 had to drop what they were doing and go to work
00:58:52 on the Venceramos Brigade.
00:58:54 We had to investigate, collect background
00:58:57 to see who could be recruited, what
00:59:02 information could be obtained.
00:59:04 Do you know of young Americans who
00:59:07 were recruited in the brigade to work for the Cuban intelligence
00:59:12 who came back to America and were secretly
00:59:15 working for the Cubans?
00:59:18 Yes, and they are still working.
00:59:20 Still working for the Cubans in America?
00:59:24 Yes, definitely.
00:59:25 The brigade was established with the sole purpose
00:59:28 of providing a cover for the Weathermen
00:59:30 to get their people to Cuba for training,
00:59:34 and that that's why it existed.
00:59:36 As a matter of fact, when our people came back
00:59:39 off the first Venceramos Brigade in, I think,
00:59:42 it was February of 1970, the criticism
00:59:47 that the Cubans had made about the Venceramos Brigade
00:59:50 indicated that the majority of people being sent there,
00:59:53 they felt were useless.
00:59:54 They really weren't helping them harvest sugar cane.
00:59:57 But that it was justified in the sense
01:00:00 that here was a means to train and politicize Weathermen
01:00:04 contacts in Weathermen.
01:00:06 Cuba somehow had the ability to bring out
01:00:10 young people at that time, the feeling of communism
01:00:14 with a mambo beat, or somehow that what
01:00:19 was happening in Cuba was totally
01:00:20 different from what was happening
01:00:21 anyplace else in the world.
01:00:25 This was the main reason of the interest
01:00:28 showed by the Russians in trying to control the DGI,
01:00:32 because the Cubans could work far more easily
01:00:35 than the Soviets.
01:00:37 Weren't the Weather people aware that they
01:00:40 were being used by the Soviets in some way?
01:00:43 No.
01:00:44 They viewed the Cubans as being the vanguard
01:00:47 of the international communist revolution.
01:00:50 Now, the vanguard essentially means
01:00:52 that the Cubans are at the very tip of the spear.
01:00:55 They're the leadership.
01:00:58 The Russians are being used by the Cubans.
01:01:01 Now, this is the Weathermen's rationalization
01:01:03 of this interaction between the Soviets and the Cubans.
01:01:08 The Cubans said, you've got to become active.
01:01:10 You've got to start doing things.
01:01:12 And planning a national action to protest
01:01:15 the beginning of the Chicago 8 trial
01:01:18 and to commemorate the riots during the Democratic National
01:01:22 Convention of '68 and to protest the war in Vietnam
01:01:28 is not action.
01:01:29 Action requires that you confront the system violently.
01:01:34 So when the Weathermen got back from Cuba,
01:01:36 they changed the national action to the Days of Rage.
01:01:39 [MUSIC PLAYING]
01:01:42 The Days of Rage in October 1969 was an attack
01:01:48 on the city of Chicago and its police department.
01:01:50 [SHOUTING]
01:01:53 For four days, anti-war protesters,
01:01:56 urged on by agitators of the Weathermen,
01:01:58 rioted in the streets, engaging in violent confrontations
01:02:02 and pitched battles with the police.
01:02:04 [MUSIC PLAYING]
01:02:07 Quebec during the 1960s was rocked by terrorist bombings
01:02:16 and confrontations between the police
01:02:19 and French-Canadian separatist demonstrators
01:02:21 supporting the FLQ.
01:02:22 [MUSIC PLAYING]
01:02:25 DGI contacts within revolutionary organizations
01:02:30 like the FLQ had built an international terrorist ring.
01:02:36 It was late March or early April of 1970.
01:02:40 I was in Buffalo, New York.
01:02:43 The FOCO there consisted of five people.
01:02:46 Bill Ayers and Naomi Jaffe were two of those people.
01:02:50 Bill and Naomi left and went to Canada.
01:02:53 Where at in Canada, I don't know,
01:02:55 to meet with members of the Quebec Liberation Front
01:02:59 with the objective of establishing closer ties
01:03:02 with them and cooperating in actions, if possible,
01:03:07 on both sides of the border.
01:03:09 And they also received--
01:03:11 it was either $2,000 or $3,000 from the Quebec Liberation
01:03:15 Front that had been sent from Cuba for the weathermen.
01:03:19 It was an attempt in 1965 by a group of blacks
01:03:26 who had gone to Cuba under my auspices
01:03:28 to blow up the Statue of Liberty.
01:03:31 The Black Liberation Front, which
01:03:33 had been formed in Cuba in 1964, was the prime mover
01:03:37 behind this plot.
01:03:39 The bombing was prevented, however,
01:03:41 when the police recovered the explosives from their hiding
01:03:44 place in the Bronx.
01:03:46 Amongst those arrested was Michelle Duclos,
01:03:49 a member of the French-Canadian separatist organization,
01:03:52 which provided the explosives to the Cuban-trained extremists.
01:03:56 She pleaded guilty to illegally transporting dynamite.
01:04:01 We know that the weatherman underground organization
01:04:07 went to Cuba and utilized the same kinds of techniques
01:04:10 that we utilized.
01:04:12 These people did engage in direct bombing and killing
01:04:18 in the United States.
01:04:19 So I fear it.
01:04:20 And yet, most of them haven't been heard
01:04:21 from for a long, long time.
01:04:23 That's right, but they're still out there.
01:04:24 They're underground.
01:04:25 And the question is, over a long period of time,
01:04:29 what does it take to activate them?
01:04:31 [MUSIC PLAYING]
01:04:39 [SCREAMING]
01:04:43 [GUNSHOTS]
01:04:47 [SHOUTING]
01:04:51 [GUNSHOTS]
01:04:57 The biggest Cuban intelligence efforts
01:05:02 against the United States do not take place in North America.
01:05:05 It is in the Caribbean and Central America
01:05:08 where the Cuban DGI, backed by the Soviet KGB,
01:05:12 are actively assisting revolutionary movements
01:05:14 hostile to the United States.
01:05:16 [GUNFIRE]
01:05:20 [GUNSHOTS]
01:05:23 Cuba, Jamaica, united we will win.
01:05:28 Cuba, Jamaica, united we will win.
01:05:32 Cuba, Jamaica, united--
01:05:34 In 1978, the government of the Caribbean island
01:05:37 of Grenada was replaced by a Marxist regime
01:05:40 led by Morris Bishop.
01:05:43 The government of the criminal dictator Eric M.
01:05:46 Gary has been overthrown.
01:05:48 All police stations are hereby ordered
01:05:52 to put up a white flag as a symbol of surrender.
01:05:56 One by one, the governments that have been called right wing
01:05:59 dictatorships are being attacked and replaced
01:06:01 by left wing dictatorships financed by the Cubans.
01:06:06 Brother Morris Bishop, the long night of terror,
01:06:12 the long night of repression and hardship has ended.
01:06:17 In Grenada, one of the first acts of the new government
01:06:22 was to bring in Cubans to build a new airport.
01:06:25 The airport, like the island itself,
01:06:27 has military importance to the Cubans
01:06:30 and ultimately to the Soviets.
01:06:33 Grenada's proximity to the Venezuelan and Middle Eastern
01:06:37 oil tanker routes to the US make it
01:06:39 an important strategic location.
01:06:42 And in Nicaragua, where the Sandinistas overthrew
01:06:45 the regime of Anastasia Somoza, over 3,000 Cubans
01:06:49 moved in immediately after the revolution.
01:06:53 On the first anniversary of their takeover,
01:06:56 the new government staged a celebration
01:06:58 for visiting guests, like Fidel Castro, whose ambassadors
01:07:02 to Nicaragua, Lopez Diaz, and to Grenada, Torres Rizo,
01:07:07 are top DGI officers.
01:07:09 One of the speakers was Morris Bishop of Grenada.
01:07:12 In 1981, we will be able to speak not just
01:07:17 of revolutionary Cuba, not just of revolutionary Nicaragua,
01:07:26 but also of revolutionary El Salvador,
01:07:32 and revolutionary Guatemala, and Honduras.
01:07:35 [SPEAKING SPANISH]
01:07:41 El Salvador, Guatemala, Puerto Rico.
01:07:45 One after the other, the revolutionary movements
01:07:48 of the islands and the Central American nations
01:07:50 are being assisted by the Cubans,
01:07:53 and behind them, the Soviets.
01:07:56 Puerto Rico is an important area for Cuban activities.
01:07:59 Electronically linked with Navy installations
01:08:01 on the US mainland, Puerto Rico is
01:08:03 crucial as a submarine tracking base.
01:08:07 Using top secret undersea monitoring equipment,
01:08:10 Americans are able to keep track of Soviet submarine actions
01:08:13 on the entire Atlantic coastline.
01:08:15 In April 1980, 10 FALN Puerto Rican revolutionaries
01:08:26 were arrested outside Chicago, Illinois.
01:08:28 With them was a van filled with explosives and arms.
01:08:32 They were convicted on February 11, 1981,
01:08:35 of seditious conspiracy for a wave of bomb blasts
01:08:38 that have killed five people and wounded at least 100 others.
01:08:43 Does Castro run the Puerto Rican movement in the United States?
01:08:46 SÃ.
01:08:47 Yes.
01:08:48 [SPEAKING SPANISH]
01:08:50 I know many operations.
01:08:52 [SPEAKING SPANISH]
01:08:55 That were done through the center of New York,
01:09:02 where they received money, explosives, weapons,
01:09:11 recruitment that was made for them
01:09:13 to work in the United States.
01:09:16 Soviet naval activities in the Caribbean and the Atlantic
01:09:23 are of increasing strategic significance,
01:09:26 as is Havana's harbor to the Soviet fleet.
01:09:29 In addition to surface ships, submarines
01:09:32 are a vital part of a growing armada.
01:09:34 For submarines are hard to detect
01:09:49 as they lie off America's shores armed with nuclear missiles.
01:09:52 Fishing ships are another part of the Soviet armada
01:10:01 off the shores of North America.
01:10:04 Often used for electronic intelligence gathering,
01:10:06 the fishing ships also serve as shields,
01:10:09 protecting the submarines below from the radar and sonar
01:10:13 of the anti-submarine forces of the Americans and Canadians.
01:10:17 It was on one of these ships that Boris Stern served.
01:10:22 The submarine kept contact with my ship.
01:10:28 When we came near Newfoundland, the captain
01:10:34 had a radiogram on the submarine location.
01:10:40 My ship, the fishing ship, covered the submarine
01:10:45 from the airplanes above.
01:10:49 These ships have also been used to provide
01:10:51 Irish terrorists with arms.
01:10:53 My ship, this is a fishing ship and not a military ship.
01:11:04 At 2 o'clock at night as my ship came near Ireland,
01:11:09 two boats with Irish people came to the ship,
01:11:13 and the KGB officer on our boat, Misha Boulanger,
01:11:18 gave them a very big box, we think, of arms.
01:11:23 Soviet espionage efforts in North America
01:11:30 are designed to assist the capabilities
01:11:32 of their submarines in the Atlantic and Caribbean.
01:11:36 Some of these efforts have seemed trivial,
01:11:38 yet the results are still affecting
01:11:40 Canadian and American security.
01:11:43 This Canadian civil servant was targeted by the KGB.
01:11:47 He was at first offered small payments
01:11:49 for unclassified information, but the promise of larger sums
01:11:53 soon led to his acquiring more sensitive strategic documents,
01:11:56 such as classified naval maps of old wrecks
01:11:59 that lay on the bottom of the Atlantic
01:12:01 along the Canadian coastline.
01:12:02 William Kelly was head of the security service
01:12:09 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police at the time.
01:12:12 (indistinct)
01:12:14 Well, now these maps were of extreme importance
01:12:18 to the Russians, and particularly
01:12:21 for their submarine commanders,
01:12:24 because when there was the patrol boats
01:12:29 of the Canadian Navy on the surface,
01:12:32 the submarine would know it, and to avoid detection,
01:12:35 that's all the submarine had to do,
01:12:37 was settle down alongside of a wreck,
01:12:40 so that when the patrol boat above would make contact
01:12:43 with some sounding device, with the bottom of the ocean,
01:12:47 with some metal down there, he'd look on a map
01:12:49 and he'd say, "Oh yes, this is just a wreck."
01:12:52 And he'd move on, leaving the submarine
01:12:55 to continue its patrol safely.
01:12:57 (airplane engine roaring)
01:13:09 (explosion)
01:13:11 - In the 1950s, an obscure, unassuming photographer
01:13:27 lived alone in Brooklyn, operating his business
01:13:30 from a storefront.
01:13:31 Rudolph Abel attracted little attention
01:13:35 until it was revealed he headed a Soviet spy ring
01:13:38 operating in America.
01:13:39 He was caught and sentenced to 30 years in prison.
01:13:45 - Do you feel that you received a fair trial?
01:13:50 - I would refer that question to my attorney, Mr. Donovan.
01:13:53 - Our American system of trial by jury
01:13:59 is the fairest system in the world.
01:14:00 - In the world of espionage, Abel was known as an illegal,
01:14:07 a spy who lives under an assumed name
01:14:09 and is controlled by Department S of the KGB.
01:14:12 It is Department S that selects the agents
01:14:19 who quietly blend into the societies of other nations
01:14:22 and lead seemingly normal lives,
01:14:24 while secretly carrying out orders
01:14:27 passed to them from Moscow.
01:14:28 (explosion)
01:14:33 (explosion)
01:14:36 This is part of a television program
01:14:39 about the black riots in America in 1968.
01:14:42 It was produced by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.
01:14:47 The end credits are interesting
01:14:49 in that the sound man on the film crew, Rudy Herman,
01:14:52 was a KGB illegal.
01:14:54 He was Colonel Rudolph Herman,
01:14:59 whose cover story bears many similarities
01:15:01 to that of Colonel Abel.
01:15:04 Both men entered the US through Canada
01:15:06 and both pursued careers in the film industry.
01:15:09 Rudolph Herman went first to Toronto,
01:15:11 where he lived quietly with his family
01:15:13 in a small house on Sutherland Avenue.
01:15:15 He was ordered to take a job
01:15:18 with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.
01:15:20 In 1969, Colonel Herman was ordered by Moscow
01:15:26 to move from Toronto to New York
01:15:28 and set up as a photographer
01:15:30 while he organized his network of espionage
01:15:32 in the United States.
01:15:33 His appearance has been disguised
01:15:37 and his voice electronically altered.
01:15:39 When Herman was finally caught by the FBI,
01:15:58 Richard Kinsey was Deputy Chief of the Soviet Desk
01:16:01 at FBI headquarters in Washington.
01:16:04 - He had been sent on meetings,
01:16:05 or had been sent to meet people in Canada, for one thing.
01:16:08 - Yes, he had.
01:16:09 - Do you know anything about why he was sent up to Canada?
01:16:12 - I'd prefer not to go into that.
01:16:17 - Colonel Herman traveled to Quebec City
01:16:21 where he went to Laval University
01:16:22 and met with a Canadian economics professor
01:16:25 named Hugh Hambleton.
01:16:27 Hello, are you Professor Hambleton?
01:16:28 - Yes, I am, yeah.
01:16:29 - Hugh Hambleton is a specialist in petroleum economics.
01:16:33 He has been named by Colonel Herman
01:16:35 as a long time trusted source.
01:16:38 Professor Hambleton met Herman many times
01:16:40 and supplied him with information.
01:16:42 This interview was filmed with hidden cameras.
01:16:47 - My friend is from...
01:16:47 - How did you meet Rudy Herman?
01:16:48 - I came to Laval, as I remember.
01:16:51 I mean, I am pretty honest, 'cause I...
01:16:52 - When did he come to Laval?
01:16:53 - Well, I don't know the guy.
01:16:54 He exists, you know, he faces the...
01:16:56 I'm trying to...
01:16:57 I'm being honest, I don't remember this guy.
01:16:59 I just know I knew him at Laval.
01:17:01 I certainly didn't know him anywhere else.
01:17:03 - Well, Herman met Hambleton
01:17:05 at least a dozen times in Canada.
01:17:07 And in 1975, they met in Haiti
01:17:10 where Hambleton passed Herman information
01:17:13 about the Chinese embassy.
01:17:14 - He must have come there to see you.
01:17:16 - There was a top secret FBI RCMP operation
01:17:20 targeting Professor Hambleton and Colonel Herman
01:17:23 codenamed Red Pepper.
01:17:25 - What was the reason for the meetings
01:17:28 between Herman and Hambleton?
01:17:30 - Again, you're getting into
01:17:32 what is still a sensitive area.
01:17:33 I can say this, that Colonel Herman
01:17:36 was ordered to contact Hambleton by his own admission,
01:17:41 by his superiors in Moscow.
01:17:43 But beyond that, I would not like to go.
01:17:45 - Professor Hambleton is not as naive as he might appear.
01:17:51 During World War II,
01:17:52 he worked for Free French Intelligence.
01:17:55 After the war,
01:17:56 he worked for Canadian Intelligence in Germany.
01:17:59 But then in the late 1940s,
01:18:01 he met in Ottawa with Vladimir Borodin,
01:18:04 a senior recruiter for Soviet Intelligence.
01:18:07 - You met Borodin on the 48th, did you not?
01:18:10 - From 1956 to 1961,
01:18:25 Hambleton had top secret security clearance
01:18:28 when he worked for NATO in Paris.
01:18:30 Professor Hambleton has also made two trips to Cuba.
01:18:36 He met with a leading Cuban intelligence officer,
01:18:40 Ricardo Escartin, who has recently been expelled
01:18:44 from the United States for espionage activities.
01:18:47 In 1975, he made a trip to Moscow.
01:18:52 - How come you went to the Soviet Union?
01:18:54 I didn't go to the Soviet Union.
01:18:56 - But you didn't go to the Soviet Union at all?
01:18:57 - No, I didn't go to the Soviet Union at all.
01:18:59 - Later, he confessed to making a 10 to 12 day trip
01:19:02 to the Soviet Union in 1975,
01:19:06 where in his own words,
01:19:07 he was under considerable pressure from the KGB.
01:19:11 Subsequently, the RCMP raided Hambleton's Ottawa residence
01:19:15 and seized a shortwave radio and code books.
01:19:19 Professor Hambleton was just one
01:19:21 of Colonel Herman's contacts.
01:19:23 Herman has provided the FBI with significant leads
01:19:26 on Soviet agents operating in North America.
01:19:29 His espionage activities were of the utmost importance.
01:19:34 - My job would be without any importance.
01:19:38 I would definitely not spend such a long time
01:19:41 in the United States.
01:19:42 And besides, you know, during my years of service,
01:19:48 I was several times promoted.
01:19:52 - Now Colonel Herman is somewhere in hiding
01:19:55 in the United States, an illegal who came to the surface.
01:19:58 Carlo Tuomi is another example
01:20:02 of an illegal sent to America by Moscow.
01:20:06 You were known as an illegal.
01:20:08 What exactly is an illegal?
01:20:10 - Illegal is a foreign agent
01:20:14 who enters the country with forged documents
01:20:22 and establishes himself as a citizen of that country.
01:20:27 Little by little acquires all the documentation
01:20:35 and driver's license, birth certificates, credit cards
01:20:40 and so on, finds a job, gets all the credentials
01:20:45 and all the background, future references.
01:20:52 As a bona fide citizen of that country.
01:20:56 Of course in this case-
01:20:56 - That's what happened to you, right?
01:20:58 - That's right.
01:20:59 - And you got all this from Moscow
01:21:00 when you were trained as a spy at a spy school in Moscow?
01:21:03 - That's right, that's right.
01:21:04 That was a major part of my schooling.
01:21:07 - In case of North America, Canada and the United States,
01:21:12 what is much more dangerous are these so-called illegals
01:21:15 who are smuggled into these countries.
01:21:17 That is people who come here under a new identity
01:21:22 and they live as citizens of these countries
01:21:27 and they would start operating really in case of war
01:21:32 between the Soviet Union and the United States, for example,
01:21:37 or in the time of a very serious crisis
01:21:41 when, for example, the diplomatic relations would be broken.
01:21:45 In case of war, I would be, among other illegals,
01:21:50 the only means by which the Soviet Union
01:21:59 could get any military intelligence from the United States
01:22:04 because all their diplomatic means,
01:22:08 all their open means would be cut off.
01:22:12 - And at the time you were with Czech intelligence,
01:22:14 there were actually agents sent over here
01:22:18 who were to just sit and wait.
01:22:20 - That's right, yeah.
01:22:21 Very many.
01:22:23 - The Soviets use many routes
01:22:26 to secretly place their illegals.
01:22:28 The Soviet fishing fleets,
01:22:30 which regularly stop at North American ports,
01:22:32 have often provided the KGB
01:22:34 with a secure means of landing their spies.
01:22:37 Boris Stern was a photojournalist
01:22:39 with the Soviet fishing fleet
01:22:41 and recalls an incident he once witnessed.
01:22:45 - One time we left a man in St. John's, Newfoundland.
01:22:50 He had been kept in hiding on my boat.
01:22:53 I thought, the other people on our boat thought,
01:22:56 he was an illegal being dropped into Canada.
01:22:59 - You believe that this was a case
01:23:01 of dropping a spy off in Canada?
01:23:03 - Yes.
01:23:06 - Within the KGB, there is another department
01:23:09 which controls illegals.
01:23:11 Department V conducts what are known within the KGB
01:23:14 by the macabre description, wet affairs,
01:23:17 assassinations, sabotage, and other violent acts.
01:23:21 It is the department that takes care
01:23:22 of the dirty work of the KGB.
01:23:25 Until he defected to the West,
01:23:29 Arkady Shevchenko was a senior Soviet at the UN.
01:23:33 - That has been the department
01:23:37 which operates in the secret,
01:23:41 which is even unbelievable for the Soviet secret society.
01:23:45 - Have you ever known--
01:23:46 - All these operations are--
01:23:47 - Have you ever known of any department V people
01:23:49 in North America?
01:23:51 - Yes, it was in New York, in the Soviet mission in New York
01:23:53 in the middle of the '60s.
01:23:55 And one of my friend who happened also
01:23:59 to be working with the KGB,
01:24:01 he told me, look, you know,
01:24:05 this man looks so quiet, calm,
01:24:08 and even respectable as someone.
01:24:10 If you look at him, you would never believe
01:24:13 that he really, what he is really doing,
01:24:16 and to what branch or to what department of the KGB
01:24:20 he himself belonged.
01:24:21 It is the most sinister thing in the world
01:24:24 which he is doing.
01:24:25 - This man was a member of Department V.
01:24:30 He was trained in Moscow and sent to Canada
01:24:33 where explosives had already been hidden for his use.
01:24:36 - Well then fine, let's do an interview.
01:24:40 I mean, okay, well--
01:24:41 - He refused to be interviewed.
01:24:43 After months of work, the Norfolk investigative unit
01:24:46 traced him to a small town where he now lives in hiding.
01:24:49 - In the KGB, and you were sent over to North America
01:24:53 to engage in espionage acts,
01:24:55 and you decided for one reason or another
01:24:57 not to go through with this.
01:24:59 And however--
01:25:01 - Sobotka was sent to Edmonton in Western Canada
01:25:04 where he spent four years working
01:25:06 and acquiring all the credentials
01:25:07 of a normal Canadian citizen.
01:25:09 In 1965, the call came from Moscow.
01:25:13 He was ordered to go to a Toronto suburb
01:25:15 and observe a house and its occupants.
01:25:17 The house was at the time inhabited
01:25:19 by one of the most famous defectors of all, Igor Gusenko,
01:25:23 who fled the Soviet embassy in 1945.
01:25:26 His defection led to the uncovering
01:25:28 of Soviet spy rings in North America
01:25:31 and was a severe setback for Soviet espionage.
01:25:34 20 years after it occurred,
01:25:36 Department V of the KGB was still
01:25:38 sending its agents looking for him.
01:25:41 - He come so close.
01:25:42 My life, of course, was very, very,
01:25:45 and if I opened door, I never opened door.
01:25:48 Never opened door in my house.
01:25:51 - Possibly went to the wrong house?
01:25:53 - I don't know, really don't know.
01:25:56 So he could be come in the wrong house or something,
01:25:59 but I never myself opened door.
01:26:02 - Sobotka had been activated by KGB agent Oleg Komenko,
01:26:08 who at the time was working as a counselor
01:26:10 at the Soviet embassy in Ottawa
01:26:12 and was traveling with the Russian Moiseyev ballet
01:26:14 on a North American tour.
01:26:16 Strategically placed in Western Canada,
01:26:20 Sobotka was ordered to plan, in the event of war,
01:26:23 the destruction of the key refining and pumping stations
01:26:26 that supply much of North America with its energy.
01:26:29 Edmonton is also a center of top secret cold weather testing
01:26:32 for Canadian and American forces,
01:26:34 and Sobotka was ordered to find all he could
01:26:37 about these facilities.
01:26:39 He had other important missions,
01:26:40 one of which was to act as a link between Moscow
01:26:43 and a KGB sabotage network in North America.
01:26:46 - I would presume it was no accident
01:26:48 that you were sent out to Edmonton
01:26:49 with oil refineries and all that sort of thing.
01:26:51 - No, it's fine.
01:26:52 - It was not an accident you were sent there?
01:26:55 - No, no.
01:26:55 - And I would presume that there was--
01:26:58 - They had their plans on it.
01:27:01 - That I must really go.
01:27:02 (dramatic music)
01:27:27 - This house off Massachusetts Avenue in Washington, DC
01:27:30 is an office of the Soviet military attachés.
01:27:33 Some of these men have legitimate business there.
01:27:36 However, most military attachés in reality
01:27:39 are spies of the GRU, operating closely with the KGB.
01:27:44 Working under the Ministry of Defense,
01:27:48 the GRU specifically confines its activities
01:27:51 to espionage in military matters.
01:27:54 The first chief directorate of the KGB, however,
01:27:57 has ultimate authority over the GRU espionage networks.
01:28:01 During World War II, Carlo Tuomi was recruited
01:28:07 into the Soviet military intelligence.
01:28:09 He was born in Michigan, a Finnish parent who left America
01:28:12 and went to the Soviet Union while he was still a boy.
01:28:15 His boyhood knowledge of America made him
01:28:17 a natural candidate to become a Soviet spy
01:28:19 sent back to the US as an illegal.
01:28:23 - I was trained to collect
01:28:25 military information about the United States armed forces
01:28:33 with special emphasis on naval affairs
01:28:39 and shipment of arms.
01:28:42 Locations of docks and warehouses,
01:28:48 specifically in the harbor of New York
01:28:51 where these arms were being stored and handled
01:28:56 and from where they were being shipped to foreign countries.
01:29:01 - In other words, you were a spy.
01:29:03 - That's true.
01:29:04 I studied the United States in general,
01:29:11 the geography, economy, government, armed forces.
01:29:18 The woman who was my English instructor,
01:29:23 I've been born in Brooklyn,
01:29:27 was a graduate of Columbia University,
01:29:30 had an excellent command of modern American English.
01:29:35 - What about the American culture?
01:29:39 I mean, how were you trained so that you would feel at home
01:29:42 in America once you got there from Moscow?
01:29:47 - Well, the basic way of getting me in touch
01:29:52 with American reality and culture
01:29:57 was by showing American movies.
01:30:01 For movies, you can learn quite a bit.
01:30:03 People behave, how they dress, how they talk.
01:30:08 So that's a very important way to train an agent
01:30:12 who is to operate in that particular country.
01:30:16 One of the agents, he was not an instructor,
01:30:20 but he was more administrative personnel.
01:30:25 He took me to a storehouse,
01:30:27 which looked really like an American clothing store,
01:30:32 where they picked the clothing, the right size.
01:30:39 Well, the suits and overcoat had to be adjusted.
01:30:45 - Were these American clothes
01:30:47 that were shipped over to the Soviet Union?
01:30:48 - Yeah, they were American clothes.
01:30:50 A lot of them were from Macy's.
01:30:53 I entered the United States by train.
01:30:58 I took a train from Montreal to Chicago.
01:31:03 So Canada was used as a stepping ground
01:31:09 to enter the United States.
01:31:12 - Is Canada a usual way
01:31:14 that the Soviets put spies in the United States?
01:31:17 - It is considered the easiest way.
01:31:22 - Soviet agents in the US went to great lengths
01:31:26 to create what is called his legend or his cover story.
01:31:30 - This legend, for the later years where I was employed,
01:31:35 especially in New York and in Milwaukee,
01:31:40 the Soviet diplomatic intelligence agents
01:31:45 had done a lot of groundwork.
01:31:48 They had studied these different places.
01:31:50 They took pictures from the outside.
01:31:55 They had even some pictures taken inside of these places.
01:32:00 - In Moscow, Tuomi was shown these photographs
01:32:03 of a lumber company in the Bronx,
01:32:05 where he was supposed to have worked,
01:32:06 and of a general electric plant,
01:32:08 where he was also supposed to have been employed.
01:32:11 - They had been taken by Soviet diplomatic personnel,
01:32:16 in most cases working for the UN.
01:32:22 Instructions for me originated in Moscow
01:32:26 and were sent in coded form to Soviet intelligence agents
01:32:31 who were posing as UN diplomats,
01:32:35 and they were processed by these diplomat spies,
01:32:40 and then sent to me by letter with a New York postmark.
01:32:49 - Did you ever get money from Soviet officials
01:32:54 working with or for the UN?
01:32:56 - Definitely.
01:32:57 They left the drops, magnetic containers like this,
01:33:03 I usually received $3,000 at a time.
01:33:08 It was always in advance.
01:33:11 Once I received 5,400, which was in advance.
01:33:16 This container--
01:33:19 - How was the container used?
01:33:21 - Well, the top of the container is magnetized,
01:33:25 and then it is left at a predetermined place.
01:33:31 Which is called a drop, under a railroad bridge,
01:33:36 under an elevated, inside a support of a bridge or something,
01:33:42 and it was never lost.
01:33:49 This was a very reliable gadget.
01:33:53 - And this was used all over New York City?
01:33:55 Or in places in New York City?
01:33:57 - Yes, I had four different drops.
01:33:59 - As this FBI photo shows,
01:34:01 Tuomi met with his Soviet handler, Alexei Galkin.
01:34:04 He then took a cover job at Tiffany's Jewelers in New York.
01:34:08 Beneath this subway bridge in the Bronx
01:34:11 was one of the drop points he had for messages.
01:34:13 Another was the Hudson River train line.
01:34:16 Another was under this railroad bridge
01:34:21 in Queens at 69th Street.
01:34:23 Another on this telephone pole in Yonkers.
01:34:28 Once he was well established,
01:34:29 Tuomi was ordered to take a job
01:34:31 where he could carry out surveillance of the docks
01:34:33 at the Port of New York.
01:34:34 Eventually, he was caught by the FBI
01:34:36 and became a double agent.
01:34:38 When you were caught by the FBI,
01:34:41 did you try to signal your Soviet handlers
01:34:43 at the UN or in Moscow that you had been caught?
01:34:45 - Not immediately, because I couldn't.
01:34:50 It was in my mind, but I couldn't do it immediately.
01:34:56 I did send a signal to the center,
01:35:01 which is Soviet intelligence,
01:35:04 military intelligence headquarters in Moscow.
01:35:07 I sent a signal three months after I had been caught by the FBI.
01:35:12 - How did you send the signal?
01:35:15 What means?
01:35:16 - I sent the signal by inserting it in a message,
01:35:26 which I wrote under the control of the FBI.
01:35:31 But I got away from the FBI agent for a few minutes
01:35:39 to write that message using the washroom.
01:35:46 - And was this a hidden writing technique that you used?
01:35:49 - Yes, I had an extra sheet of chemically treated paper,
01:35:56 which was used for secret writing.
01:35:58 And I used that in the washroom.
01:36:02 There was an internal struggle inside of me.
01:36:04 I was torn apart.
01:36:07 I was pro-Soviet.
01:36:09 I believed in a Soviet system.
01:36:13 And here I was working for the FBI,
01:36:16 the enemy of my country.
01:36:18 I just couldn't live with the idea
01:36:24 of betraying the Soviet Union.
01:36:26 - Are you still pro-Soviet?
01:36:28 - Oh, definitely not.
01:36:30 - So what changed you?
01:36:31 I don't understand how you've changed or why you've changed.
01:36:33 - That's a very long process,
01:36:37 something that doesn't happen overnight.
01:36:39 - This is the KGB blue book,
01:36:43 where Tuomi is listed under his Soviet name.
01:36:46 In it, he is named as an enemy of the fatherland.
01:36:49 But even a spy caught and turned
01:36:52 finds it difficult to be parted from his country.
01:36:55 - Because of the family.
01:36:58 - Your own family that you had over in the Soviet Union.
01:37:00 - Yes, I had a wife and I had three children.
01:37:03 Otherwise, coming back to the United States,
01:37:07 that's the greatest thing that ever happened to me.
01:37:10 - Have you ever heard from your former wife or your children?
01:37:15 - No, I haven't heard from them since 1963.
01:37:19 (dramatic music)
01:37:22 - On November 15th, 1979, Sir Anthony Blunt,
01:37:40 a distinguished British art historian
01:37:42 and the art advisor to the Queen,
01:37:44 was stripped of his knighthood.
01:37:45 - What happens now?
01:37:48 - A shocked House of Commons had been told
01:37:50 by the Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher,
01:37:52 that Blunt had been a Soviet agent.
01:37:54 While at Cambridge University in the '30s,
01:37:56 he acted as a talent spotter for the Soviets.
01:37:59 And later, while a member of British intelligence,
01:38:01 he continued to pass information to the Russians.
01:38:04 By remaining silent about his friends involved in spying,
01:38:07 he was directly responsible
01:38:09 for exposing British agents and operations.
01:38:12 - In the mid 1930s, it seemed to me
01:38:15 and to many of my contemporaries
01:38:17 that the Communist Party and Russia
01:38:19 constituted the only firm bulwark against fascism,
01:38:23 since the Western democracies were taking an uncertain
01:38:26 and compromising attitude towards Germany.
01:38:29 I was persuaded by Guy Burgess
01:38:32 that I could best serve the cause of anti-fascism
01:38:35 by joining him in his work for the Russians.
01:38:38 This was a case of political conscience
01:38:41 against loyalty to country.
01:38:44 I chose conscience.
01:38:47 When later I realized the true facts about Russia,
01:38:50 I was prevented from taking any action by personal loyalty.
01:38:54 I could not denounce my friends.
01:38:56 - Cambridge University in the 1930s,
01:39:01 where young men were recruited to rise up quietly
01:39:04 to the highest ranks of the British establishment
01:39:06 while secretly working for the Soviets.
01:39:09 These were the moles.
01:39:10 The most notorious was Kim Philby,
01:39:13 who rose to be a senior officer in MI6,
01:39:16 the British intelligence agency.
01:39:18 As liaison officer with the CIA,
01:39:20 Philby was well-placed to relay vital Western secrets
01:39:23 to the Soviets.
01:39:24 Since 1963, Philby has lived in Moscow
01:39:27 and is a colonel in the KGB.
01:39:29 His tip-offs were to cost many Western agents their lives.
01:39:33 Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess
01:39:36 were working for the Foreign Office
01:39:38 and both were friends of Philby.
01:39:40 They also worked for the Soviets
01:39:41 until they fled to Moscow in 1952.
01:39:46 As head of the American department,
01:39:48 Maclean had access to these top secret briefs
01:39:50 of President Truman's assurances
01:39:52 to then British Prime Minister Attlee
01:39:54 that American threats to use the atomic bomb
01:39:57 in the Korean War would never be carried out.
01:40:00 This valuable information went straight
01:40:02 to Maclean's Soviet handlers.
01:40:05 But there were many Americans also involved
01:40:07 in similar activities.
01:40:08 In the 1930s, Nathaniel Weil
01:40:11 was one of thousands of young Americans
01:40:13 who decided that the fascism of Hitler's Germany
01:40:16 was the true enemy and that communism was the answer.
01:40:19 He became a secret party member
01:40:21 who took his orders from the Soviets
01:40:23 while working for the US government.
01:40:25 - We were to rise into positions
01:40:28 of as much power as we could in the government
01:40:31 to influence the government
01:40:33 in a socialist or communist direction.
01:40:35 And so that in the event of our victory,
01:40:41 we would be trained men to take over
01:40:45 major governmental tasks.
01:40:48 - Seen here at a government conference in the '30s,
01:40:52 Nathaniel Weil was just one of many Americans
01:40:54 secretly working for the Soviets within the US government.
01:40:57 - We were to sever all connections
01:41:01 with known communists abruptly and instantly.
01:41:04 We were not to express left-wing views
01:41:08 under any circumstances.
01:41:11 And if we saw people who seemed to us likely recruits,
01:41:15 we would bring the name before the group
01:41:17 where this would be discussed.
01:41:19 But we would have no further contact with that person.
01:41:23 In other words, a decision would be made
01:41:26 and then some entirely different person
01:41:28 would make the approach,
01:41:31 thus preserving the clandestine nature of the film.
01:41:35 - Harry Dexter White,
01:41:37 Assistant Secretary of the US Treasury
01:41:39 during the war years,
01:41:41 was entrusted with the responsibility
01:41:43 for all treasury policy bearing on foreign relations.
01:41:46 He was also a Soviet mole.
01:41:49 In his sensitive position,
01:41:50 he was not only well-placed
01:41:52 to pass on intelligence material,
01:41:54 but to influence policy decisions as well.
01:41:57 Under Soviet instructions,
01:41:59 White drafted a plan
01:42:00 for Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau,
01:42:03 one of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's closest advisors,
01:42:07 which was presented to the allies
01:42:08 gathered at the Quebec Conference in September, 1944.
01:42:12 Dismissed as ill-conceived by Winston Churchill
01:42:17 and the chiefs of staff,
01:42:18 the Morgenthau plan called for the total de-industrialization
01:42:22 of Germany after the war
01:42:24 under the pretext of permanently disabling
01:42:27 German militarism.
01:42:28 It received wide publicity,
01:42:31 particularly in Germany,
01:42:32 where Adolf Hitler faced opposition
01:42:34 from his own officer corps
01:42:36 and had recently survived an unsuccessful bomb plot
01:42:40 on his life from amongst their numbers.
01:42:42 In the face of advancing Allied armies,
01:42:47 German propagandists called for determined opposition
01:42:51 as the only alternative to the grim future
01:42:53 offered by the Morgenthau plan.
01:42:56 Germany was to be shattered no matter what.
01:42:58 (bombs exploding)
01:43:02 (wind blowing)
01:43:05 An early end to the war
01:43:11 would have interfered with the Soviets' plans.
01:43:14 In late 1944, their forces were still far to the east.
01:43:19 But by May 1945, when Germany finally surrendered,
01:43:23 all of Eastern Europe, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
01:43:27 Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria,
01:43:29 East Germany, and Romania
01:43:31 were in their sphere of influence.
01:43:33 Harry Dexter White's influence on behalf of the Soviets
01:43:43 was not restricted to the European theater of battle.
01:43:46 In China, the Soviets were supporting Mao Tse-tung
01:43:49 in his battle against both the Japanese
01:43:51 and the nationalist Chinese forces of Chiang Kai-shek.
01:43:55 In 1943, President Roosevelt agreed
01:43:58 to lend Chiang's armies $500 million
01:44:01 for their fight against the Japanese
01:44:03 and agreed to immediately deliver $200 billion in gold.
01:44:08 But White's personal control
01:44:10 over the Chinese currency stabilization program
01:44:13 enabled him to ignore the declared policy
01:44:15 of Roosevelt and Congress and delay the gold shipments.
01:44:19 The Chinese economy continued to collapse,
01:44:22 paving the way for the eventual takeover by the communists.
01:44:27 (wind whistling)
01:44:30 There were others.
01:44:31 Lachlan Currie was President Roosevelt's personal emissary
01:44:35 to the nationalist Chinese,
01:44:37 yet he too was secretly working with the Soviets
01:44:41 to destabilize nationalist China.
01:44:44 But it was not until a few years later
01:44:46 that a shocked nation learned the extent
01:44:48 of Soviet penetration when Elizabeth Bentley,
01:44:51 a Soviet spy and courier,
01:44:53 testified before a US Senate committee.
01:44:57 - We were getting information from the Army,
01:45:00 particularly the Air Corps,
01:45:02 from the Treasury, from the State Department,
01:45:05 from the OSS, from the CIAA, the Rockefeller Committee,
01:45:10 from the OWI.
01:45:15 - Treasury?
01:45:18 - Oh, yeah, didn't I name the Treasury?
01:45:20 Yes.
01:45:21 - The War Production Board?
01:45:22 - Yes, from the War Production Board,
01:45:23 from the War Manpower Commission.
01:45:25 I think that about covers it, Senator.
01:45:29 - Now will you describe the kind of information
01:45:31 that you were getting out of these discussions?
01:45:35 - She revealed that she had passed to the Soviets
01:45:37 inside White House information
01:45:39 that Lachlan Currie had given to her.
01:45:41 - He did pass on the information
01:45:43 that the American government was just about
01:45:45 to break the Soviet code.
01:45:47 - And what happened then?
01:45:49 - I relayed that to the Russians.
01:45:50 They wanted to know which code,
01:45:52 which I couldn't obviously tell them.
01:45:54 - But Elizabeth Bentley named Harry Dexter White
01:45:57 as the man who did the most damage.
01:45:59 In his appearance before a US Congressional Committee,
01:46:02 he denied he had ever been a communist.
01:46:05 Two days later, he died of a heart attack.
01:46:07 - All these people were accused
01:46:12 by former Soviet spymasters
01:46:15 of being espionage agents of the Soviet government.
01:46:18 - As a man- - So we must assume
01:46:19 that today the situation is worse
01:46:21 since all of our security is broken down.
01:46:23 (dramatic music)
01:46:27 (explosion booms)
01:46:42 - The greatest act of Soviet espionage
01:46:44 was the operation to acquire the information
01:46:47 needed to build the atomic bomb.
01:46:50 In 1953, F.O. and Julius Rosenberg were executed
01:46:54 for relaying atomic information to the Soviets.
01:46:58 But by far the most important secrets were obtained
01:47:00 from highly placed agents working directly
01:47:03 on the top secret Manhattan Project.
01:47:06 British diplomat Donald MacLean
01:47:08 photographed classified documents
01:47:10 at atomic energy headquarters for the Russians.
01:47:13 Klaus Fuchs, a German scientist,
01:47:16 infiltrated the Manhattan Project
01:47:18 in Los Alamos, New Mexico.
01:47:20 These two were the key operatives
01:47:22 passing the latest developments to the Soviets.
01:47:25 Fuchs served less than 10 years in a British jail
01:47:29 and left for a hero's welcome
01:47:31 and a top scientific post in East Germany.
01:47:33 Scientific espionage is a critical area
01:47:38 of operations for the KGB.
01:47:40 Department T uses business fronts,
01:47:43 trade delegations, and exchange programs
01:47:46 as covers to acquire America's scientific
01:47:49 and industrial knowledge.
01:47:51 Many American campuses are host
01:47:54 to large numbers of Soviet scientists.
01:47:56 The universities are often the site
01:47:58 of secret scientific research
01:47:59 in areas of industrial and military significance.
01:48:03 For 10 years, Professor Robert Burns
01:48:05 of Indiana University ran the academic exchange program
01:48:09 between the Soviet Union and the United States.
01:48:12 - Well, for what purposes have Soviets been in this country?
01:48:14 Well, very clearly to get access
01:48:16 to American science and technology.
01:48:19 Very often to get access to particular fields
01:48:22 in which they are especially weak.
01:48:24 One of my colleagues in the '60s
01:48:26 made a study of Kosygin speech,
01:48:29 identifying their shortcomings,
01:48:31 and a list of Soviet scholars
01:48:33 who came to the United States in the next few years.
01:48:36 The list dovetailed perfectly.
01:48:38 This year, the Soviets tried to send 19 people
01:48:41 in very highly classified fields
01:48:44 in order to get around the restrictions
01:48:46 that we placed on exporting equipment
01:48:48 after the invasion of Afghanistan.
01:48:51 - An examination of the list of US scholars
01:48:55 in the Soviet Union is revealing.
01:48:57 It shows without exception that the topics studied
01:49:01 are all in the humanities,
01:49:03 history, literature, and the arts.
01:49:06 - The Soviets do not allow us to study the 20th century.
01:49:11 In all of the 20 years of the,
01:49:13 22 years of the exchange program,
01:49:15 we have not sent anyone to the Soviet Union
01:49:17 to study the things in which many Americans
01:49:19 are most interested.
01:49:20 - But the Soviets studying in the US
01:49:24 are enrolled in virtually every strategically important area
01:49:27 of research being carried out.
01:49:29 Lasers, microcircuitry, and ceramics,
01:49:33 all subjects that have applications to spacecraft,
01:49:35 missiles, and weapons aimed at the United States.
01:49:40 But while the Soviet scholars are welcomed
01:49:42 with academic courtesy in North America,
01:49:44 the same is not true of Western scholars
01:49:47 in the Soviet Union.
01:49:48 - I made a study of the exchanges from 1958 through 1975,
01:49:53 and something like 20% of the American participants
01:49:58 in the major program were affected by the KGB
01:50:01 in one way or another.
01:50:03 Obviously followed, in some cases harassed and intimidated,
01:50:07 in a few cases seduced and put under pressures
01:50:10 to provide information about fellow students
01:50:13 or about American embassy officials.
01:50:17 - One victim of the KGB's manipulation of exchange programs
01:50:21 was Canadian professor Johann Koenigstein,
01:50:24 targeted because of his expertise with laser technology.
01:50:28 Department T of the KGB often works closely
01:50:31 with the GRU, Soviet Military Intelligence,
01:50:34 whose objective is to acquire military technology.
01:50:38 While visiting the Soviet Union,
01:50:40 Professor Koenigstein was involved
01:50:42 with a female operative of the KGB, Galina Nusinova.
01:50:46 Returning to Ottawa, he met with Yuri Usaty of the GRU,
01:50:50 who convinced him to take a laser along on his next visit
01:50:54 without filing the proper export authorization forms.
01:50:58 - Because in my opinion, it was like taking a book with me
01:51:02 or something like that.
01:51:04 - Because if you took a--
01:51:05 - Well, it was-- - Why did you take it over?
01:51:07 - Well, to do these experiments they had to be doing.
01:51:10 I didn't want to do all that routine kind of research.
01:51:12 - Not all technology is gained by academic exchanges.
01:51:18 Many North American companies are approached
01:51:20 on a commercial basis by the KGB.
01:51:22 Heiko, a Vancouver firm, built the Pisces,
01:51:25 the most advanced deep sea submersible in the world.
01:51:28 As the Soviets lagged far behind the West
01:51:30 in deep sea technology,
01:51:32 they were anxious to obtain the submersible.
01:51:34 So Heiko was approached by a KGB agent named Sigalevich
01:51:38 working for Department T.
01:51:40 But Heiko was forbidden to export its product
01:51:42 to the Soviet Union
01:51:43 because the Pisces utilized secret welding techniques
01:51:46 used on US atomic submarines.
01:51:48 In order to avoid the export ban,
01:51:52 the submersible was sent part by part to Switzerland
01:51:55 where it was assembled and tested off the coast of Italy.
01:51:59 It was then sent to the Soviet Union,
01:52:01 giving them instant parity with the West.
01:52:04 Department T of the KGB often devises intricate schemes
01:52:08 using third party nationals to act as middlemen
01:52:12 to illegally avoid export bans placed on strategic technology.
01:52:17 Peter Virag, a Montreal lawyer,
01:52:19 recently entered into an export deal
01:52:21 involving sophisticated computer equipment.
01:52:25 Aware the equipment would require special export licenses
01:52:28 if destined for other countries,
01:52:30 Virag arranged for the equipment to be sold
01:52:32 and Virag arranged for the equipment
01:52:34 to be initially exported to Canada.
01:52:37 He then illegally re-exported the computer equipment
01:52:40 to European centers
01:52:42 where his partner sent it on to final destinations
01:52:45 behind the Iron Curtain.
01:52:47 This man, Marc-Andre de Geiter,
01:52:51 is a Belgian with business ties in the Soviet Union.
01:52:54 Through bribery, he tried to obtain a computer source code
01:52:58 valuable to the Soviet military
01:53:01 that simplifies computer operations,
01:53:03 thus reducing the size of the computer required.
01:53:07 But the transfer of American technology to the Soviets
01:53:11 is not only accomplished by the subterfuges of the KGB.
01:53:15 Much of it is done openly,
01:53:17 for as Lenin had predicted,
01:53:19 when the time comes to hang the capitalists,
01:53:22 they will be eager to sell us the rope.
01:53:25 A Texas company has sold the Soviets
01:53:29 devices known as array processors,
01:53:32 which are now being used on Soviet killer submarines.
01:53:35 The array processors interpret underwater signals
01:53:38 and target the locations of other submarines.
01:53:41 In Corona, California,
01:53:47 the principals of Spar Optical Research, Incorporated
01:53:51 were convicted of exporting
01:53:52 copper water-cooled mirrors to Europe
01:53:55 for reshipment to the Soviet Union.
01:53:58 These mirrors are essential
01:53:59 to particle beam and laser research,
01:54:02 and the Soviet military is now closer
01:54:04 to achieving the ability to destroy
01:54:07 vital communication satellites.
01:54:09 A New England firm in 1972 sold the Soviets their product,
01:54:16 one of the most advanced ball bearing
01:54:18 manufacturing machines in the world.
01:54:20 The miniature ball bearings are essential
01:54:22 to the successful launch of multiple warheads
01:54:24 from a single missile.
01:54:26 Americans have also provided the Soviets
01:54:28 with the technology critical to the guidance systems
01:54:30 that greatly increased the accuracy of Soviet missiles.
01:54:33 Dr. Miles Kostik is a Washington-based defense analyst.
01:54:39 - The acquisition of American inertial guidance technology,
01:54:43 which consists of three different technologies,
01:54:46 has enabled Soviets to bridge a tremendous gap
01:54:51 in the circular error probable,
01:54:55 namely precision of on target delivery of their missiles.
01:55:00 When they started, they were about three miles
01:55:03 of the target, and this was not so long ago,
01:55:07 about eight years ago.
01:55:09 - But now the Soviet missiles are accurate
01:55:11 to within 600 feet of American missile silos.
01:55:16 In order to overcome this increased Soviet accuracy,
01:55:19 the MX missile system has been proposed.
01:55:23 It is the largest construction program
01:55:25 in the history of mankind,
01:55:27 with missiles on movable carriers.
01:55:29 - And that new missile, which is the MX missile system,
01:55:34 will cost us 60 to $100 billion,
01:55:37 strictly to offset the advantages which Soviet acquired
01:55:42 through their scientific and industrial espionage
01:55:44 in the United States.
01:55:45 (dramatic music)
01:55:51 (airplane engine roaring)
01:55:54 - Yuri Bisminov is a former KGB agent.
01:56:03 - Follows the statement of a very ancient
01:56:07 Chinese philosopher, Sun Tzu,
01:56:09 who was born 500 years BC, before Jesus Christ,
01:56:14 who said something to the effect
01:56:15 that fighting war on the battlefield
01:56:18 is the most stupid and primitive way of fighting a war.
01:56:22 The highest art of warfare is not to fight at all,
01:56:26 but to subvert anything of value in your enemy's country,
01:56:30 be it moral traditions, religion,
01:56:33 respect to your authority and leaders,
01:56:36 cultural traditions, anything.
01:56:39 Put white against black, old against young,
01:56:42 I don't know, wealth against poor, and so on.
01:56:47 Doesn't matter.
01:56:48 As long as it disturbs society,
01:56:50 as long as it cuts the moral fiber of a nation, it's good.
01:56:54 And then you just take this country,
01:56:56 when everything is subverted,
01:56:57 when the country is disoriented and confused,
01:57:00 when it is demoralized and then destabilized,
01:57:02 then the crisis will come.
01:57:05 - Within the KGB is a department that specializes
01:57:09 in planting false stories and forged documents
01:57:12 to distort others' perception of reality.
01:57:15 It is the department that deals in disinformation.
01:57:18 Department A of the KGB set up and controls
01:57:23 the disinformation department of Czech intelligence.
01:57:26 Ladislav Bittman was deputy director of that department
01:57:30 when he was with Czech intelligence.
01:57:32 - Disinformation can have a variety of forms.
01:57:38 Basically, an information deliberately misleading
01:57:44 that is leaked through a variety of channels
01:57:49 to the opponent to deceive him,
01:57:52 to deceive the decision makers in the United States
01:57:55 or Germany or Britain,
01:57:56 or it can be a disinformation to deceive
01:58:00 the public opinion around the world
01:58:02 or in a specific country.
01:58:04 - You got to be fairly good at this
01:58:08 when you were with Czech intelligence, didn't you?
01:58:11 - Unfortunately, I have to admit, yes.
01:58:13 - One of Bittman's audacious schemes
01:58:18 was to recover phony Nazi storage chests
01:58:21 from a Czechoslovakian lake.
01:58:23 The chests were filled with genuine Gestapo
01:58:25 and SS documents supplied by the KGB
01:58:29 and specifically chosen to rekindle animosity
01:58:32 towards the Germans decades after World War II.
01:58:35 - And I was a member of the diving team.
01:58:39 And when I talked with a few people
01:58:43 in the service about this,
01:58:44 we came to the conclusion that this is a very good opportunity
01:58:48 to play a dirty game against West Germany,
01:58:50 that we would actually put something
01:58:52 on the bottom of the lakes and make it a big discovery.
01:58:56 So we prepared several German chests.
01:59:01 Supposedly, they were thrown into the lakes
01:59:04 by Germans who were just fleeing Czechoslovak territory.
01:59:09 - The cases were brought from the bottom
01:59:11 in front of television cameras.
01:59:14 The documents were then displayed
01:59:16 in an elaborate press conference
01:59:18 aimed at weakening the solidarity of the NATO allies.
01:59:22 - It was quite successful in Italy, in France, in Austria.
01:59:27 The press of these countries published them
01:59:30 and basically the tone was anti-German.
01:59:33 Look what these German bastards did to us during the war
01:59:37 and there are so many who are still living in Germany.
01:59:40 - Who are the major targets of the disinformation campaign
01:59:45 that you were waging?
01:59:46 I understand there was two or three major targets.
01:59:49 - Yeah, well, the target number one
01:59:51 is of course the United States.
01:59:53 It is called the enemy number one, or the main enemy.
01:59:57 - It's always used in that way.
01:59:58 - That is the official term for the United States.
02:00:01 Then the second major target was the NATO alliance.
02:00:06 And the goal was, the objective was
02:00:08 to work toward the dissolution of NATO
02:00:12 with the hope that after some few years,
02:00:15 the tension within the organization
02:00:21 would reach such a stage, such a level
02:00:26 that NATO would stop existing.
02:00:29 - NATO was formed in post-war Europe
02:00:35 as a political and military alliance against the Soviets.
02:00:39 But its most effective opposition
02:00:40 now comes not from Soviet armies,
02:00:43 but from Soviet disinformation,
02:00:45 which continually attempts to turn
02:00:46 one NATO ally against another.
02:00:49 Each one of these papers appears
02:00:53 to be a leaked US government document,
02:00:55 but they're all forgeries designed
02:00:57 to sow dissension within NATO.
02:01:00 This document made damaging remarks,
02:01:03 supposedly from former president Carter
02:01:06 about both Greece and Turkey.
02:01:07 This is a phony intelligence report
02:01:11 on European left-wingers.
02:01:12 This is a forged NATO document
02:01:14 claiming to devise ways of getting support
02:01:17 for the neutron bomb.
02:01:18 A forged confidential State Department memo
02:01:22 advocating economic espionage by America on her own allies.
02:01:26 Many forgeries have been directed against Anwar Sadat,
02:01:33 a confidential US memo claiming his time is up.
02:01:36 Or false reports on former vice president Mondale's remarks
02:01:40 that neither Sadat nor Begin are viable leaders.
02:01:44 There have been forgeries released
02:01:46 to show American suppression of Islam,
02:01:48 the religion of its oil suppliers.
02:01:50 Yet perhaps the most successful Soviet disinformation attack
02:01:55 was on the KGB's main competition, the CIA.
02:01:59 It began with an agreement in the mid '60s
02:02:01 between the East German and Czech intelligence services.
02:02:04 - The two disinformation departments,
02:02:09 again under the supervision of the Soviets,
02:02:12 decided to start a long-term operation against the CIA,
02:02:16 making life as hard as possible for CIA.
02:02:21 That is to label many American diplomats, politicians,
02:02:30 cultural representatives abroad as CIA agents
02:02:33 and paralyze their positions.
02:02:37 Specifically in 1966, the first major operation
02:02:43 was to prepare a book which is called "Who's Who in CIA."
02:02:49 - The book "Who's Who in CIA" was the beginning
02:02:55 of the exposés that seriously undermined
02:02:58 American intelligence capabilities for almost a decade.
02:03:02 So powerful was the impact of this book
02:03:04 that its imitators, like Philip Agee's
02:03:06 covert action information bulletin,
02:03:08 frequently refer to it as source material,
02:03:11 as do other major news sources.
02:03:13 It was used as a source
02:03:17 in this ABC nightly news television broadcast
02:03:21 in November, 1980, claiming that the Reverend Jim Jones
02:03:25 had a secret CIA associate before the Guyana massacre.
02:03:29 - This man, Richard Dwyer, is the focal point
02:03:32 of many of the questions surrounding
02:03:34 the possible CIA involvement at Jonestown.
02:03:37 He's a career diplomat who served
02:03:39 in sensitive posts throughout the Mideast.
02:03:41 Two years ago, he was the deputy mission chief in Guyana.
02:03:44 He is listed as a CIA agent in a publication
02:03:47 that for years has specialized in such allegations.
02:03:50 The CIA denies the accusation.
02:03:53 But it was Ladislav Bittman who was one
02:03:55 of the real authors of "Who's Who in CIA."
02:03:59 And although it was not published under his name,
02:04:01 the book received exactly the attention he hoped it would.
02:04:05 - Shortly after coming to the United States,
02:04:07 I found this book in many bookstores.
02:04:09 I have it at home.
02:04:09 And for example, it was quoted
02:04:14 by the covert action bulletin.
02:04:18 - Is this Agee's group, the group?
02:04:21 - Yes, that's right.
02:04:22 - It's one of the major sources of information about CIA man.
02:04:27 Of course, that's ironic
02:04:29 because that is a communist disinformation.
02:04:32 - Konstantin Hanf is a New York-based journalist
02:04:36 for Polish language newspapers in North America.
02:04:39 When he decided to expose communist agents in the US,
02:04:42 the long reach of the KGB influenced his life.
02:04:45 - '76, we started a wave of exposure
02:04:48 of Soviet and Polish communist intelligence network,
02:04:53 especially here in New York.
02:04:56 We exposed agents mostly working around the United Nations.
02:05:01 - What agents were these?
02:05:04 Who were they working for?
02:05:05 - For the KGB.
02:05:06 A Polish communist intelligence service,
02:05:10 which is actually nothing but an arm of KGB too.
02:05:16 - Shortly after his exposés of the KGB in New York,
02:05:19 Hanf stories were published in a heavily ethnic area
02:05:22 in Winnipeg, several thousand miles to the west
02:05:25 by the weekly newspaper, Czas, the Polish Times.
02:05:28 In July, 1978, on a day the paper had not planned
02:05:32 to publish, a bizarre edition of the weekly
02:05:35 was put into circulation with articles
02:05:37 and semi-nude photos designed to offend
02:05:40 its conservative and older readership.
02:05:44 - It was done in a very clever way, you know,
02:05:47 because the look of it was exactly the same
02:05:51 as we would have printed, you know,
02:05:53 but some things struck us right away.
02:05:56 For example, right on the front pages
02:05:58 that beautifully breasted woman, you know,
02:06:01 which we would have never put into a paper
02:06:03 simply for the same, for different reasons, you know,
02:06:07 but our readers are mostly middle-aged people
02:06:10 who would never dream of doing kind of things like that.
02:06:13 Inside the paper, we have a picture
02:06:16 of one of our correspondents in the uniform
02:06:19 of a German Wehrmacht, you know,
02:06:21 and the letter supposedly written by a Jewish writer
02:06:26 referring to our journalist,
02:06:30 a contributor to the paper, Mr. Hanf,
02:06:32 as a war criminal, Nazi war criminal.
02:06:35 The funny part of it is that when the war ended,
02:06:38 he was about 18 years old, you know,
02:06:40 and yet they said that he was high-ranking officer,
02:06:43 you know, that he has killed so many Jews
02:06:45 and this and that, you know,
02:06:46 and there's another article portraying Mr. Hanf
02:06:51 as an agent of, you take it, KGB, CIA, FBI,
02:06:56 everything under the sun.
02:06:59 - It has become a classic case
02:07:01 of Soviet bloc disinformation on a very personal level.
02:07:05 The charges against Hanf were also made
02:07:07 in a letter supposedly written
02:07:09 by the Jewish Defense League of New York,
02:07:11 and the letter was sent out to advertisers
02:07:13 of the newspaper, informing them
02:07:15 that Choss was harboring a Nazi war criminal.
02:07:17 - I am Polish from my belief and from my birth
02:07:21 and from my persuasion, I would say,
02:07:26 but my father was a German,
02:07:28 so my engagement in the German Army
02:07:33 was not incidental, actually, because--
02:07:37 - How long were you in the German Army,
02:07:38 and just what did you do?
02:07:39 - I was a regular soldier.
02:07:43 I was drafted in March of '44.
02:07:48 - March, 1944?
02:07:49 - Yes, when I was 17 and a half age,
02:07:53 and in February of '45, I was captured by the Soviets.
02:07:58 - The accusing letter was revealed to be a forgery
02:08:04 when the real Jewish Defense League examined this
02:08:06 and declared it had not been written on their stationery
02:08:09 and also that they had never accused Mr. Hanf
02:08:12 of any war crimes.
02:08:14 - What effect would this have had on your readership?
02:08:19 What effect did this have on your advertisers?
02:08:21 I mean, what was--
02:08:23 - Obviously, I think the main aim was
02:08:26 to stop Choss being published
02:08:29 and have the same editorial policy
02:08:31 as it was since Mr. Mroczkowski took over,
02:08:34 and they wanted, I'm sure, to create panic
02:08:38 on the board of directors
02:08:39 so that you would fire him
02:08:41 and get some wooly-headed fellow,
02:08:44 which would be a little bit softer on communism.
02:08:46 - Yeah, there is a long-term plan and strategy
02:08:50 how to frighten prominent exiles who are politically active
02:08:55 or organizations that are very anti-Soviet
02:09:03 or anti-communist.
02:09:08 So, and I have to admit that this is
02:09:11 a relatively uneasy thing to do.
02:09:16 Why?
02:09:18 Because most exiles, most refugees or immigrants
02:09:23 have some kind of relations with the mother country,
02:09:28 with the people, with the relatives there,
02:09:32 and they can be even blackmailed
02:09:36 because imagine that you have a mother there
02:09:38 and somebody comes and says,
02:09:40 "So if you don't cooperate
02:09:42 or if you continue speaking against us,
02:09:46 your mother will have a very tough life, my dear friend."
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