The Genius Way Tottenham Came Back Against Man City
Tottenham scored a late equaliser to draw 3-3 with Manchester City recently with pundits still baffled by Ange Postecoglu's open attacking plan. But with Spurs being saved by a late refereeing howler, why do they seem incapable of taking their foot off the gas??
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00:00 Hello everybody, Adam Cleary from 442 here. Just don't worry about the suit, it's not
00:08 important, it's a whole other thing. What is important is Tottenham Hotspur against
00:11 Manchester City. And what the hell happened there? A lot of people are saying that Spurs
00:15 were lucky because City could have scored about 4 or 5 and a lot of people are saying
00:19 that Spurs were actually quite naive turning up and not adapting their style against those
00:23 opponents but I say, no, they absolutely deserve that point at a bare minimum and to call them
00:30 lucky or to say they need to adapt their style completely misses the point of what Ange Potokoglou
00:38 is doing here. Let's explore.
00:40 Okay so first things first, the elephant in the room, that was one of the weirdest and
00:47 wrongigest calls I have ever seen in a football game. Man City were clean through on goal,
00:52 Simon Hooper gives the advantage and then doesn't and fair play, you have never seen
00:57 a still image that better shows a man lining the inside of his own shorts as he realises
01:04 the impending consequences of his own actions. But as daft as this might sound, we will revisit
01:10 this exact moment in time at the end of the video to show you why this incredibly fortunate
01:15 thing that happened for Spurs does actually prove that it wasn't luck at all. Just trust
01:21 me. Alright so I'm not going to name any pundits here Gary Neville but the one thing that really
01:25 annoyed me about the coverage of this game was the implication that Spurs had just turned
01:29 up at the Etihad and not adapted their style at all. They didn't care about who they were
01:33 playing, they were just going to do Tottenham stuff. And that's just wrong because they
01:37 did make massive changes to the way they play to accommodate the fact it was Man City. Spurs
01:42 have been playing with a sort of double pivot 2-3-1 thing since Madison's injury but what
01:46 they really want to happen is for the other midfielder to be able to push up, Bissouma
01:50 comes into the middle then usually one of the full backs, possibly even both depending
01:55 on how they're feeling, they invert into the middle and they help with the build up there.
01:59 But we hardly saw any of that because Manchester City like to press you man for man. So if
02:04 Spurs had attempted to get this kind of shape going in their build up which they normally
02:08 like with the two full backs here and the sitting midfielder here, then both Foden and
02:11 Doku would have thought absolutely nothing about coming off the flanks to join them and
02:16 in that situation you end up with a 5 on 5 and Spurs will hold their hands up and say
02:21 man for man in that situation, City are much better so you want to avoid it happening.
02:26 The whole purpose of inverting the full backs is they're not really supposed to be in that
02:29 area so they tend not to get tracked in it by their markers. So one of them might be
02:34 free so it's easier to play through the middle of the pitch. But if you're playing Manchester
02:38 City who will not allow you that kind of numerical advantage, then you need to find other ways,
02:43 you need to adapt, that's literally what the word means, to come up with another idea.
02:48 And they did. So instead of inverting their full backs to get into those positions, they
02:52 just had Giovanni Lo Celso drop into these areas around Basuma to just relieve the pressure
02:58 when they were building out. And he did that magnificently by the way. Like this is his
03:01 pass map from the entire game and you will see he covers so much ground in Tottenham's
03:06 half of the pitch and that was because he saw it as his job with Basuma sort of staying
03:10 centrally to drop out to the flanks, to drop wide, to find wherever the space was being
03:15 created and either receive the ball or play a bounce pass or just help with the build-up.
03:19 He did not misplace one single pass in the entire 90 minutes even with Rodri up his arse.
03:27 And because of these changes they made, these adaptations if you will, City were forced
03:31 to make changes of their own and Tottenham got a bit of joy from the spaces that created.
03:36 So with Haaland, Alvarez, Silva, Foden and Doku all having a man each during Tottenham's
03:41 build-up, that meant that Rodri, who should have been sitting in this area keeping an
03:45 eye on Kulishevsky, was forced to follow Lo Celso all the way into this area. Which lo
03:50 and behold left absolutely loads of room for Kulishevsky to get on the ball if they could
03:55 beat Man City's press. City then tried to counteract that by having a Kanji step out
03:59 to keep an eye on him but whenever he did that, that left space for Son to either get
04:03 in behind or Bradley Johnson, who's currently on the right-hand side, to get in behind Guardiola.
04:07 Now is any of this some magic formula that saw them dominate the first half and get loads
04:11 of chances on goal? Absolutely not. But they did adapt to how Manchester City play and they
04:17 adapted in a really smart way. They even adapted really well when they didn't have the ball.
04:22 Like Manchester City, one of these teams that love to play that three box, three formation,
04:26 so they can get four players in this area to outnumber the opposition's three. That
04:30 should have left Tottenham with a bit of a problem but what did they do? When City got
04:34 four in the middle, Brian Gilles, Gilles, Gilles, never sure how you say that. When
04:38 City got four in the middle, rather than just being outnumbered, they would bring Brian
04:42 Gilles off the wing, he would leave Kyle Walker and they would match City up man for man in
04:46 the centre of the pitch. Son would then work tirelessly between the two remaining centre-backs
04:51 to close them down and force a pass. Brennan Johnson would sit on Guardiola so he wasn't
04:55 an option and they would leave Kyle Walker free. And why did you leave Kyle Walker free?
04:59 Because of all the options City have in this area, he's the least dangerous on the ball.
05:05 Yes, he can carry it forward but he lacks an incisive pass, he lacks a killer ball,
05:09 he doesn't really go round players when they're in traffic so they were quite happy for the
05:14 ball to go out to him. And when the ball finally did get out to Walker, then our man Brian
05:18 Gilles, Brian G, he would then press him but he would do so leaving the other player in
05:25 what's known as shadow cover. He would block off the pass by basically running in a nice
05:30 straight line, effectively meaning that wasn't an option, and isolating Kyle Walker. And
05:35 did that lead to Manchester City not getting a single chance in the first half, not being
05:38 able to get the ball up the pitch? No it didn't, they were still really, really good but this
05:43 is not how Tottenham normally press, they adapted to play man City. Now of course, this
05:49 is great but it didn't always work and City, you were right, should probably have been
05:54 out of sight at half time. Having Ben Davies and Emerson Royale at the back, as good as
05:59 they were, meant that this system had huge flaws in it. Emerson is not great at receiving
06:04 the ball under pressure and two or three times when City really pressed up on Tottenham,
06:08 his body shape was just all wrong and he gave it away, Haaland really should have scored
06:12 from that. And then for the Foden goal, Tottenham are holding one of their famous 'we do not
06:17 move high' lines. Ben Davies has really solid defensive fundamentals, he sees this run,
06:23 instinct tells him to go with him but that drags him out of position and plays everyone
06:26 else on side and it all falls apart and that's how they score. So positives, yes, but also
06:31 negatives. So they're doing alright but City are still tearing them to bits so at half
06:34 time, Ange Postakoglu makes another change. He adapts to how the game is going, he adapts
06:41 to Manchester City. So he takes off Brian, Gilles, halfpenny, who was getting sort of
06:45 physically bullied by Kyle Walker at this point and brings on Hoiberg, which for a man
06:49 who was unable to adapt or make defensive changes is a pretty big adaptable defensive
06:54 change. And what he wanted to do was pose Man City this question and that was, when
06:59 this is Lo Celso, Rodri is very happy to follow him into that space, okay? But what if A) it
07:05 wasn't Lo Celso and B) he wasn't following into that space, he was just sitting there
07:10 as a double pivot permanently. Are you happy to commit a sixth player this far up the pitch
07:17 when we are building out from the back? Do you really want to leave us 4v4 in your half
07:23 of the pitch? And the answer for the vast majority of that second half was, actually
07:28 no, that seems incredibly risky. So Rodri stopped tracking into that area, he sat on
07:34 the number 10 who was now Lo Celso and Tottenham could build out from the back much easier.
07:39 And did that make a difference? Well Tottenham had 36% possession in the first half, which
07:44 I'm sure you'll all agree, no judgement here, very normal amount of possession for a team
07:48 to have away at City. And in the second half, did that change? Yes, they had 57% possession.
07:56 Do you know how many times City get out-balled at home? Virtually never. In fact, immediately
08:01 after making this change, it was like a 10 or 15 minute spell where Tottenham had 75%
08:08 of the ball. And because Rodri was now sitting in front of this back four extensively looking
08:12 for something to do, it meant that Man City's centre-backs could play a little bit wider,
08:16 which is fine, it makes you more expansive. But it also means that if Son can drop onto
08:20 Rodri and drag him out of position with a run, as he did for that equalising goal, it
08:26 leaves you number 10, in this case Lo Celso, a really good opportunity to get to the edge
08:31 of the box and get a shot away. So a really nicely worked equalising goal and a much improved,
08:36 dare I say it, almost controlling second half performance, all because Ange Postekoglu
08:42 adapted to what Manchester City were doing. That's great, right? Well, yes, but this
08:49 is not the point. As good as Tottenham were, Man City still had the chances to win this
08:54 game comfortably and that's why these accusations of naivety or just being too open or needing
09:00 to make even more adaptations have come in from pundits. But to say that Ange Postekoglu
09:06 should stop leaving Tottenham so open in these big games, or that the reason he does so is
09:11 because he's in some way naive and maybe just doesn't realise what's going to happen unless
09:16 you're a bit more defensive, just completely, completely misses the point of what he has
09:23 done with this football club. Like, people couldn't stop laughing at this still image
09:28 of them trying to defend on the halfway line with nine men against Chelsea, but that's
09:32 just, that's their philosophy. And yes, it got them smashed against Chelsea that time,
09:38 but you know what else it got them? Got them a late equaliser at the Etihad. Like, just
09:42 quick question here, right? What is, what actually is, Ange Ball? You? It's like this
09:50 4-3-3 where you've got...wrong, you. So it's when you invert your full back so that you've
09:56 got a numerical...wrong, you. Really wide attackers stretching the defence to create
10:01 room in the half space...wrong. It's none of those things. It's not a tactic, it's not
10:06 a system, it's not a formation, it's not a setup, it's not anything you can adjust with
10:09 a slider on Football Manager. It is purely a mindset that goes, whenever you receive
10:15 the ball, no matter who you are on the pitch or what your job is, think, how can I play
10:19 this forward? How can I make something happen here? It's what Brian Gilberto Silva was thinking
10:25 when he received the ball on the edge of his own box here, instead of just laying it back
10:29 to his team-mate here, as would be the simple pass, he weaves and he skins a Manchester
10:34 City player and from there, Tottenham are in for the first goal. It's what Oliver Skipp
10:38 was thinking here when instead of just playing this simple ball, he goes past his man instead,
10:43 he risks losing possession to give the ball to Son and from there, Tottenham get their
10:48 equaliser. But it is also what Bissouma was thinking here, when instead of retaining possession,
10:55 he tries to dribble through three Manchester City players in his own final third. Now,
11:00 common sense would tell you at that point, it is too old, you've played really well,
11:04 you've wrestled control back from your opponents. Just do the simple thing and try and see this
11:09 point now. But that's not what Tottenham are ever trying to do. If Bissouma had got through
11:15 that press, he would have taken three Manchester City players out of the equation and they
11:19 would have been in. And for all these first players, what is drilled into them by Posta
11:24 Koglu is, we may concede stupid goals like that every now and then, but if you can do
11:30 that, we will score so many more. And here it is, I told you we would return to this
11:35 moment in time, were it not for one of the most baffling refereeing whistles ever heard,
11:41 Tottenham would have been caught in the final seconds of the game, pushed entirely up to
11:46 the halfway line. And it isn't because they're naive, it is because this is how they choose
11:52 to play. They accept the risk of this happening if it means there might be a chance they can
11:58 win the game. And that is Ange Ball. Now, yes, of course, Man City should just take
12:03 their chances and we wouldn't even be having this conversation. But the fact is they didn't
12:08 and Tottenham turned up against the best team in the world. Let's not forget, with a game
12:12 plan and a system that meant that if City didn't get out of sight, they were always
12:16 going to have chances. How many teams do you see turn up against Manchester City and not
12:22 play the way they want to play to put everybody behind the ball and still just get humped
12:28 anyway? Like if you're playing Manchester City away from home, you're probably just
12:32 going to get beat anyway, so why not have a go? And likewise, if you are down to nine
12:37 men against Chelsea, you're probably going to get beat anyway, so why not have a go?
12:43 Like just bottom line here, I thought Tottenham played this absolutely perfectly. I thought
12:47 they got it spot on against City this weekend. And if you want to sit there and say, yeah,
12:51 but they had these enormous slices of luck with City's wasteful finishing and the referee
12:56 right at the end, then I agree. Those were so, so lucky. But if there's ever going to
13:02 be a mindset or a strategy in football that will just seem to create its own luck a little
13:09 bit more often than it should, it's this one. And I mean, also just scoring three goals
13:15 against Man City when you're missing your most creative player, you just deserve some
13:19 credit, don't you? Anyway, that's the video. If you enjoyed it, please do consider subscribing
13:23 to us here at 442 on YouTube. I'm not normally this well-dressed, but I do try to be this
13:27 insightful. Get me on Twitter, Instagram, everywhere else. Adam Gleary, CLERY, 442
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13:42 time, I think that's everything. Adam Gleary, 442. Please subscribe. I'll see you soon.