Pakistan remains trapped in grave existential incertitude with its economy tottering and polity being pulled apart by competing stakeholders. This is even as an investigative report by the Intercept website alleged that the Biden administration helped Pakistan secure a controversial new bailout from the IMF after Pakistan agreed to secretly sell $900 million arms to the United States for the war in Ukraine.
To understand Pakistan from the standpoint of its troubled history since its founding 76 years ago Mayank Chhaya Reports spoke to Prof Ayesha Jalal, eminent historian, author and the Mary Richardson professor of history at the Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
To understand Pakistan from the standpoint of its troubled history since its founding 76 years ago Mayank Chhaya Reports spoke to Prof Ayesha Jalal, eminent historian, author and the Mary Richardson professor of history at the Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
Category
🗞
NewsTranscript
00:00 [Music]
00:13 Pakistan remains trapped in grave existential incertitude,
00:18 with its economy tottering and its polity being pulled apart
00:22 by competing stakeholders such as the all-powerful military,
00:27 fractious political parties and an increasingly partisan judiciary.
00:32 This is even as an investigative report by the Intercept website said
00:37 the Biden administration helped Pakistan secure a controversial new bailout
00:42 from the International Monetary Fund or the IMF
00:46 after Islamabad agreed to secretly sell arms to the US for the war in Ukraine.
00:52 The deal allegedly allowed Pakistan to sell $900 million worth of munitions
00:58 to the US to be given to Ukraine.
01:00 It is those alleged earnings that convinced the IMF to offer a bailout.
01:05 Islamabad has completely rejected the report.
01:09 However, there are those within the country who believe it happened.
01:13 To understand Pakistan's current state of affairs from the standpoint of its troubled history,
01:19 since its founding 76 years ago, my entire report spoke to Professor Ayesha Jalal,
01:26 eminent historian, author and the Mary Richardson Professor of History
01:30 at the Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
01:35 Professor Ayesha Jalal.
01:37 Professor Jalal, it's a great pleasure to have you on. Welcome to my entire report.
01:42 Thank you. It's very good to see you after such a long time.
01:45 Likewise, I want to start with something very specific.
01:49 I'm sure you are aware of a rather damning report in a site called The Intercept.
01:55 Yes, I am.
01:57 About how the Biden administration has helped Pakistan secure an IMF bailout
02:04 in return for supplying munitions for the war in Ukraine.
02:08 Now that's a crazy arrangement and only the US would engage in something like that.
02:13 How do you see this deal? I mean, it's $900 million and it's once again dragging Pakistan back into so-called great game.
02:23 Yeah, but you know what I find very odd is that that's been the relationship between Pakistan and the United States for many, many decades.
02:30 And while we know it's changing now, I mean, first of all, I don't know the veracity of the report.
02:36 It's been firmly denied by the foreign office in Pakistan.
02:39 So I need I mean, I can't I can't say for sure that this has actually happened.
02:44 And in an age of fake news, anything's possible.
02:49 But I mean, you know, I mean, it doesn't surprise me. I mean, American pressure is not unusual.
02:55 I don't see why we have to moralize about it. That's the way things work behind the scenes.
03:00 I think that's what it is. It's not just Pakistan, but there are other countries on which the United States has put considerable pressure for this.
03:08 Unfortunately, very, very debilitating Ukraine war, which really should be brought to an end now.
03:15 And but it seems that continuing the war seems more important for certain elements.
03:20 And that's the heart is happening. That's obvious. I mean, so, as I said, I'm not privy to any information that confirms that Pakistan was under actually did provide what the intercept says to the Ukrainians.
03:36 So I think that's something that is probably it could be very much a concoction, given the fact that Iran can't found himself in Ukraine, I mean, rather in Moscow on the day.
03:46 So, you know, I mean, and, you know, the PTI media network, social media network is hyperactive, desperately trying to change narratives to suit their own purposes.
03:57 So I'm very skeptical. But I mean, that doesn't mean that I believe that America is not capable of that.
04:03 I have historical evidence for that. I just don't think Pakistan is that key at this stage in America's, you know, on America's radar for Pakistan to be sort of singled out to do something of the sort.
04:16 But nevertheless, I mean, you know, I'm not going to discount it since I don't know if it is indeed the case.
04:23 And I also heard from a couple of people in Islamabad about this who are rather credible when they make claims like that.
04:30 So irrespective of the details of what the interceptor said, if there is indeed something behind the scenes going on, my broader question is, how long do you think Pakistan can sell its geostrategic value to prop up its economy?
04:46 I don't think it can. I think that's over. And I think the geostrategic.
04:50 I mean, Pakistan is now recalibrating its geostrategic position. It's now looking towards Russia and China.
04:56 China was always there, but much so now with Russia than with the United States.
05:01 It's always had close relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.
05:06 So I think there's a new kind of recalibration going on.
05:09 And so I think that I would I don't think that Pakistan is returning to a relationship of subordination and dictation, receiving dictation from the United States.
05:22 I mean, even if it is, I don't think the impact is anywhere close to what it used to be during the period of Zia and the immediate aftermath.
05:31 I think things have changed and the Pakistanis are aware of that.
05:34 In that context, how do you see the ouster of Imran Khan and what's happening to him?
05:41 This continuing incarceration or maybe 100 odd charges?
05:45 Well, I mean, he's incarcerated for a couple at the moment, but there are many more.
05:51 Well, I mean, I think this is not entirely for geostrategic reasons.
05:56 I mean, it's true that Imran's I mean, there was a perception in the military that under Imran relations with a variety of key allies suffered for a variety of reasons.
06:08 But that was not the only reason. I think there was there were the primary problem in terms of the army and Imran eventually was the province of Punjab,
06:20 which, as you know, is the heart of Pakistan. And the administration was really sort of brought down the level of administration in Punjab depreciated appreciably.
06:30 And there was corruption charges. And ultimately, you know, I mean, whatever Imran might say, this was an internal process.
06:38 I mean, I know confidence motion is not a conspiracy. It's actually part of the constitutional process.
06:46 And to say that America did it is, I think, playing into an old narrative for convenience sake, rather than actual evidence that America,
06:55 I mean, America can say, I mean, and just because an extraneous official expresses a dislike of Pakistan's policy doesn't mean it's American policy.
07:05 So I think there's I think there are huge assumptions here that it was American policy that brought down. I just don't buy it.
07:11 But on the other hand, the Americans have a long history of doing what they do.
07:17 And people easily believe what they were interested in Pakistan at that stage.
07:23 What is their interest in Pakistan today to say that Pakistan is still so important that of all the countries in the world,
07:30 it's Pakistan that has to provide arms to Ukraine. I think this is just sort of, you know, self.
07:36 I mean, you're just doing it on your own. I just don't think there's any evidence of it.
07:41 I think America's relationship with Pakistan has substantially changed. And I think people in the know in Pakistan are aware of that.
07:49 To expand the conversation in its 76th year. What foundational problems and weaknesses do you see in Pakistan that it has come to this?
07:59 I mean, they have been structural problems always, which I have written about at length, I think, in more recent years.
08:06 I mean, there was a shift for the first time in Pakistan's history in 2014.
08:12 The first sort of I mean, you know, Pakistan is only recently moved to 2013 to have the first elected one,
08:24 elected government transferring power to another elected government.
08:29 One of my contentions throughout in terms of studying Pakistan's history has been that what has really more of the democratic process and made things that much more difficult is constant intervention.
08:39 You cannot constantly intervene in the political process and then expect that when you restore it, things will be just fine.
08:46 It just doesn't happen. It's like turning a tap water off for six months.
08:50 And when you turn it on, you get a lot of dirty water for a while before things get to flow properly.
08:56 So I think this on off treatment of the political process is something that has been very damaging for Pakistan.
09:03 And I think that if you look at social indicators in 2017, even economic indicators, Pakistan was much better placed in 2017.
09:12 And then the precipitous fall on all fronts since 2017.
09:17 I think the whole Imran Khan project proved to be a fiasco for the army, at least what they were trying to achieve.
09:23 This was a longstanding project. They brought him in. I mean, the 2018 elections were fixed for Imran.
09:31 So it didn't work out. Why didn't it work out?
09:34 OK, I say because I mean, I knew it wouldn't, because that's the structural problem.
09:38 You can't have four centers of power and not expect trouble with the chief of army staff being the most important.
09:45 There's the president. There's the prime minister. Now there's the chief of chief of the chief justice as well.
09:51 That has complicated the picture in Pakistan. So I think that's basically what's going on.
09:56 I mean, Imran Khan eventually fell out with the military general who had made it possible for him to come in.
10:04 So I think that is I mean, you know, and I think that why is Imran Khan in is because the project failed and he was not entirely to blame himself.
10:12 The generals involved are also to blame. But you know, there's a lot of attempt to suggest that they ought to be booked, but they won't be booked.
10:22 Only civilians get booked for these matters. So I think that's the problem.
10:27 But anecdotally, when I read the press, etc. in Pakistan, I get the sense that at least now there is a section of civil society that seriously believe that it's time for the military to step back from what it has been doing for all these decades.
10:43 Absolutely. I mean, I think this consensus is there. But I mean, I mean, no.
10:48 I mean, you know, when you have been involved so deeply, I mean, even if they are genuinely interested in getting out, which I'm not sure they are.
10:56 I mean, you know, the army has had all the power and no responsibility.
11:00 It's a very cushy number to have. Nobody would want to give that up when you have all the all the books and none of the responsibility when things are.
11:09 So I think that they would. I mean, they have been, I argue, have argued in my book, Democracy and Authoritarianism, that they did in the 90s choose in a highly polarized political system to play to step aside to play.
11:23 I mean, they are the ultimate arbiters. And so that will remain.
11:28 But what has been particularly damaging are I mean, 2017. I mean, you know, I mean, just revisit Nawaz Sharif's downfall.
11:37 Yes, I know there were Panama papers, but he wasn't actually booked for the Panama corruption. He was booked for something else.
11:43 I mean, he was disqualified for some idiotic reason, which was that he hadn't declared a 10,000 dinar salary that he was that he was allowed to take from his son's firm, of which he was on the board of directors.
12:01 And he forgot to report it to the election commission. And so he was disqualified for life.
12:06 Now, I mean, that's laughable. We're not stupid idiots in Pakistan. I mean, I think I think that's what the army needs to learn, that people are not stupid.
12:14 They see what is going on. So I think this so to disqualify that man and then Imran Khan has a ton of cases and he's still above board.
12:23 So I think people are irritated with all of this that's going on. I mean, I don't know.
12:28 Neither of them. I mean, I'm going to take any sides. I don't really care to take sides because there's no side worth taking.
12:35 But the problem has been structural. There have there has been an imbalance between civil and military relations.
12:42 But even within the civilian component, you have the judiciary that has become more and more assertive.
12:49 And that has gravely complicated matters and resulted in a decline in the quality of just about everything in Pakistan.
12:58 The military, I mean, the judiciary has been extremely partisan and problematic.
13:05 Why is it that civil society in Pakistan has not been able to, at the very least, dilute military primacy, if not seize altogether?
13:16 Because the political parties are all ready to do deals with the military.
13:20 They're much more. I mean, why did Imran Khan go and do a deal with the military?
13:23 I mean, why? Why did the PDM then decide to work with the establishment?
13:27 I mean, you have to come into power. You have to work with the establishment.
13:30 But you need to change that relationship with the establishment.
13:34 Decide, decide who comes in and how long they stay in. You need to govern.
13:38 You need to you need to create legitimacy for yourself by delivering.
13:42 And that process has become extremely difficult in a new liberal context where nothing really works.
13:50 And with the judiciary is becoming increasingly has become far too interfering.
13:56 And so bureaucrats, instead of doing their work now, are being dragged into courts.
14:01 So that is the problem. And when you can't govern, you cannot have legitimacy with the people.
14:06 And that gives the army the opportunity to manipulate from behind the scenes.
14:10 And that's what's going on. It's almost as if the judiciary is another political party in Pakistan.
14:18 I think you're very. They should declare it a judicial party of some sort.
14:24 I mean, the judiciary is divided like everything else in Pakistan.
14:28 And so, I mean, this recent change, I mean, the recent elevation of the new chief justice has brought high hopes
14:35 because Qazi Issa is known to be a man who works according to the Constitution.
14:40 I think that the previous judges have justices have really brought down the level of the judiciary by being so partisan, overtly partisan.
14:50 But I think that there is still hope that there will be a rule by according to the Constitution from now on.
14:57 And if there isn't, you're absolutely right that it is being perceived as a political party, which is very unfortunate.
15:04 But I would only sort of remind you that it is a political party that is divided.
15:09 Yeah. Now, if one were to separate political parties from civil society,
15:16 are there elements within ordinary civil society which are saying enough is enough?
15:22 We have been taken for a ride for such a long time. Everything needs to change.
15:27 I mean, the sad part, of course, that you have to realize is that the events of May 9th following Imran Khan's arrest have only not just intensified the authoritarianism of the state.
15:38 It has also legitimized it. Because when you attack state institutions,
15:42 I mean, you know, no amount of democracy allows you to go and attack 200 military institutions.
15:49 So the point here is that unfortunately, you know, I mean, that has made life much more difficult.
15:56 So people are now on the back foot. They are. Some are protesting.
16:02 But unfortunately, the atmosphere has I mean, under I mean, even during Imran's period, it was much more authoritarian.
16:10 There was a crackdown on journalism. People were still disappearing for all the talk.
16:15 So nothing really changed. I mean, so to now say that the PDM is now I mean, the government that replaced Imran engaged in authority.
16:24 So did Imran. So, I mean, you know, they are Democrats so long as they're out of power.
16:29 The moment they get into power, they become authoritarians.
16:33 Don't you think civil society can argue legitimately that I'm saying in terms of the military,
16:40 that if you're going to behave like a political party, our response to you would be that of a political party.
16:48 But you have to understand that civil society is divided. I mean, one of the great impacts of neoliberalism,
16:54 and this is not restricted to South Asia, I mean, to Pakistan, but the whole of South Asia, is that, you know,
17:00 the intersectional nature of interests has been undermined.
17:05 And it has become that much more difficult for people to mobilize across interests.
17:11 People are mobilizing on small, narrow interests.
17:16 And that makes it easier for the state and interest groups to handle them and isolate them.
17:22 So they're in their silos. I think that is civil society.
17:26 And, you know, and if I may allow to say so, I mean, there's a chunk of civil society that was highly mobilized on social media for Imran.
17:35 But I do think that they have played a very, very negative role in creating an illusion of Imran Khan's power and popularity,
17:44 which is belied by the evidence on the ground. It's all a narrative.
17:48 We haven't proven it. How popular, if he is that popular, where are the people?
17:54 He's in jail for over a month now. Where are the people?
18:00 So I think that tells you volumes. I mean, it's all very well to tweet and FaceTime and do this and do that.
18:07 I mean, politics is, you know, I'm an old watcher of Pakistani politics.
18:12 They're played out on the ground, as you know.
18:19 Decentralization has been one of your many important themes that you've written about, not just in Pakistan, but beyond in South Asia.
18:28 During my visits to Pakistan in the 1990s, I came across quite a few people who argued one of the main reasons why Pakistan was where it was,
18:37 even then was the complete absence of land reform early on.
18:43 Within the decentralization debate, how do you see land reform as a problem?
18:49 Well, I mean, the point is that it's who's making the reforms, who's running the show.
18:54 I mean, if the landed elite have I mean, I have argued in my work that I'm in the 50s and 60s.
19:02 An arrangement was worked out where the landed or the dominant social classes became junior partners in the firm that was going to manage Pakistan.
19:11 I mean, they wouldn't I mean, they allied with the military to fend off maybe the Bengalis,
19:18 but they had never intended to become junior partners. But they did end up becoming junior partners.
19:24 And the price that the army paid for that was that they allowed them to retain their economic privileges so long as they didn't make a political demands.
19:36 So that has been one of the great problems. The land reforms really never were very effective.
19:43 I mean, Ayub's were completely a joke. Bhutto's were a little bit better and something that people have never forgotten.
19:51 I mean, the reason why Bhutto still has some sort of resonance amongst the people is his populism and the fact that he did give some land to the tiller.
20:02 So I mean, so the problem is that, you know, you know that this is not just a Pakistani problem.
20:07 This is a problem the world over that people who make the laws, I mean, they have a self-interest.
20:13 I mean, the legislation. I mean, they all I mean, they're landed backgrounds and they don't want agricultural income to be taxed.
20:21 So, I mean, I think this is a longstanding battle. But it is also a product of the arrangement that the army worked out.
20:29 The military powers worked out with these people to accept their secondary status so long as their economic privileges remained intact.
20:36 But that is no longer possible, as is the case, because what is Pakistan facing today is not just a perennial political instability,
20:44 but there is an economic crisis of unprecedented proportions.
20:49 So that will I mean, the army now is coming into agriculture. So that will lead to changes.
20:56 I mean, I mean, I think there is now much because of the IMF is much greater talk about Pakistan doesn't tax itself.
21:02 It faces a dual problem. And it's I mean, I mean, if I were to make me be concise in its economy, one relates to alarmingly falling productivity.
21:12 I mean, you need to be productive to trade, to keep your exports above your imports, which is not happening.
21:18 And the second is the refusal to tax the elements that need to be taxed.
21:23 I mean, you can't keep on taxing the middle class. The rich don't pay their taxes.
21:29 So, I mean, that is I mean, that is the most important issue at the moment.
21:35 Within that, where do you see the quality of education for young Pakistanis?
21:40 Absolutely, Mr. Shah. I mean, you know, the point is that this has been a longstanding issue, which is related to many other factors.
21:49 And then Imran's education policy, I mean, the so-called one single curriculum was trying to in the name of equity between two,
21:56 between the apartheid that exists between English and Urdu, was that since there was such an unevenness, you just lower the standards of everyone.
22:05 So the point is that this is not logical. I mean, Pakistanis need to be.
22:11 I mean, one of the things that happened is that the private educational systems that came up
22:18 in the 90s and afterwards, places like Lums where I've taught and many others.
22:22 I mean, you know, I'm not saying this is good enough, but they are producing people who are of high quality.
22:29 But this aim at creating a single curriculum was meant to bring it down.
22:35 And sadly, if I may also let you know, is that none of this probably has really begun to hurt.
22:42 But what has happened is that Quranic recitation has started.
22:46 And so even non-Muslims are having to go through this, which is really against the constitution.
22:52 You can't force them to be, you know, to hear the Quran every morning.
22:58 So, you know, it's just all symbolism. This is not I mean, you know, they're not really improving the educational system.
23:05 I mean, I mean, I struggle with Pakistanis who are educated in their system who try to come here.
23:11 They can't really express themselves.
23:15 Yeah, it gives me an interesting segue into Jinnah.
23:19 Do you believe that after seven and a half decades, Pakistan has developed a distinct identity that may have at least some of the features of what Jinnah envisioned?
23:30 Well, I mean, you're sorry, sorry to interrupt you.
23:34 You talked about Quranic citations that you mentioned.
23:39 I'm sure Jinnah perhaps wouldn't have been particularly happy about that.
23:44 But this is performative. This is not something I mean, I would have no objection if kids were being taught what the Quran, you know, actually has the content of it.
23:54 But this is wrote a recitation. This is not with explanation.
23:59 It's just it's just a performative act. And it's not something Mr. Jinnah would.
24:03 I mean, but I think more than just the Quranic aspect, I mean, look at the treatment of the minorities.
24:09 I mean, Hammadis are being subjected to attacks on a regular basis.
24:15 I mean, the Christians are also being affected. So, I mean, you know, there is this and I mean, it is not just and Muslims, too.
24:22 I mean, so it's, you know, this kind of ill, I mean, uncivil society that has been created for political purposes by interest groups that want to remain in power.
24:35 Because my contention is that if we did things right in Pakistan and in India, too, by the way, I mean, I do believe that we have much in common.
24:44 It would help more people. And if it helps, if something helps more people, the few who are making a bundle by doing things wrong would not make a profit.
24:54 So that is what we are facing. I mean, I'll give you the example of the dollar crisis in Pakistan.
24:59 Who's doing the I mean, this is set up. This is their betting.
25:05 Yes, Pakistanis who are betting. So when Imran says that the Americans did it, I mean, come on, you your own guys brought you down.
25:14 And his attitude was I'm not talking to anyone. They're all corrupt. And he's got I mean, so they have caught him in a corruption scandal.
25:24 So I mean, never a dull moment in Pakistan. I can just last couple of things.
25:29 How do you see the near total domination of Punjab over the ruling classes in Pakistan?
25:34 You know, there's a I mean, I think that that is true and seen from one perspective.
25:39 But at another perspective, you have to realize that the Punjabis are not a nest of singing birds.
25:44 They are divided, hugely divided. So so the real battle for Pakistan is the battle for Punjab.
25:53 That is a fact. And so the real heart of Pakistan is Lahore. Who has the Lahore is the real battle.
26:00 So this is about I mean, you know, this is going to be the key to the elections.
26:05 I mean, nobody I mean, I think even the establishment doesn't mind if the PPP persists in a you know, in sin.
26:13 Iran takes the I mean, I don't know whether he will, but if he takes the KP.
26:16 But Punjab is crucial. Who gets Punjab? I think it's going to be very fragmented because for the establishment,
26:23 the more fragmented the vote, the easier to manipulate. So I don't foresee any end to manipulation.
26:30 But I do. I mean, to the to the essence of your question, I think the politicians have to finally realize that if they are going to make a change in Pakistan,
26:40 they need to talk to each other, come up with a new charter of democracy.
26:44 They don't have to love each other to work with each other. Right.
26:48 So I think that has been the great tragedy that while it's evident to us that the military lords it over,
26:54 has is embedded in the political economy. The politicians have allowed this to happen on account of their own divisions.
27:03 They prefer to look to the army for easy, easy ways into power, including Iran.
27:10 I mean, you know, what is Iran added? I mean, that is the sad part.
27:15 Right. How do you see the problem of a Baloch subnationalism? It's a serious problem.
27:22 It's very serious. And I think, again, the problem lies in the military taking control over Baloch policy.
27:30 I mean, it's a it's a political issue. And now what they've done, as you can see, I mean, to bring in a Baloch interim prime minister.
27:39 This is all all part of the army's efforts to sort of, you know, try to have somebody on their side.
27:45 But but, you know, this is ultimately a political issue. I mean, my contention has always been that the military,
27:52 not this, not this leadership, decades of leadership have treated Balochistan as a strategic asset and not as a political constituent of Pakistan.
28:01 So until they do that, things are not going to improve.
28:06 Do you see a scenario where the military really finally steps back from its stranglehold?
28:14 I do. I do. And I think that these are the questions that politicians will have to ask.
28:21 You know, I think a very good model for that is Indonesia.
28:26 I mean, you know, I mean, in one at one level, I'll say that the military would never step back.
28:30 But I think in terms of everyday running of affairs, you know,
28:33 I used to say in my frustrations that the military should set up a.
28:37 University to to to train its personnel to run this country, because, you know, if they're going to go, you know,
28:43 because of what I mean by structural contradiction is that they make it impossible to govern without their interference.
28:49 So they may as well run it. But if they're not going to do it, then then I think they do have to sort of step back and let the politicians.
28:59 I mean, first of all, I mean, these are simple things. I mean, finish that.
29:03 Let them finish that. Now, but what they did to him, Ron, you know, some people said, well, why didn't you let.
29:09 I think retrospectively, we would all have to concur that it was a huge error to throw him out because he was the most unpopular prime minister.
29:17 And then within, you know. And why did that happen?
29:20 It happened because the people of Pakistan are anti establishment.
29:24 They're anti establishment and they're anti America. So Imran went and got both narratives.
29:30 But that doesn't mean that tomorrow, if Imran by some miracle comes back, that he won't be unpopular.
29:37 So that is true. But there is serious belief that if the elections were to be held now.
29:45 He would come back. No, they are being held and he's not coming back.
29:50 He's been disqualified for the information. I'm saying his party.
29:54 Sorry, the PTI can come back. No, I mean, I don't think it will come back.
30:00 I think it will be a very tough ask. You know, Imran Khan was able to take a come in in 2018 because of a lot of assistance.
30:09 I mean, I think Pakistani politics are much more complicated than narratives.
30:13 Sure. I good looking national icons. Good looking national icons.
30:20 I think that is a much has much to do with Iran's popularity in Pakistan and beyond.
30:27 But he seemed to be a good looking honest. You know, he's not even that honest anymore.
30:31 I think from what the evidence is, he used to be good looking.
30:34 It's nice looking. So that I mean, that's what counts in Pakistan.
30:37 I think we're, you know, so people are not really deep and Imran himself, I think was quite content to just be PM.
30:45 He just doesn't know the complexity of how to govern the country.
30:49 That was the set because he's not really a politician. I mean, he was just a national icon.
30:56 Before I let you go. So who is the next good looking person that you can see on the horizon?
31:00 I'm good looking. It was not my comment. This is I understand. I'm being facetious.
31:07 Good looking. I think it's who's who's going to be acceptable to the establishment.
31:11 And at this stage, this talk about one or the other of the Sharifs.
31:16 So it's back to square one, right? That's what I'm trying to tell you. I mean, what has been achieved?
31:21 I mean, that's why I would really urge you to go and look at Pakistan's economic indicators in 2017.
31:27 I certainly would know. This has been wonderful. Professor Jalal, I'm so glad you found the time.
31:32 I hope it was worth your while and I would be happy to be in touch with you from time to time.
31:38 Wonderful to talk to you. All the best.
31:39 Thank you. All the best.
31:40 Thank you.
31:41 Thank you.
31:42 Thank you.
31:43 [BLANK_AUDIO]